BROWN v. YOUNG (2025)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

This Court has considered, without hearing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, ECF No. 29, and Plaintiff's response in opposition, ECF No. 31. For the reasons set out below, the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

Defendants first assert Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendant Young should be dismissed because (1) sovereign immunity bars all forms of monetary relief against him, (2) Plaintiff alleges no ongoing violation of federal law that would support prospective relief under Ex parte Young, and (3) Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief.

As to Defendants’ sovereign immunity argument, Plaintiff agrees that her complaint seeks nominal damages and pre- and post-judgment interest against Defendant Young even though the Eleventh Amendment bars these specific forms of relief against him in his official capacity. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for such monetary relief are DISMISSED as barred by sovereign immunity.

As to Defendants’ Ex parte Young and Article III standing concerns, Plaintiff has the better of the argument. In addition to seeking some forms of monetary relief against Defendant Young, Plaintiff also seeks reinstatement, a form of prospective relief that does not run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. Lane v. Cen. Ala. Comty. Coll., 772 F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that equitable relief in the form of reinstatement “is not the ‘functional equivalent’ of a form of relief otherwise barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’ ”). To support this request for relief, Plaintiff includes detailed factual allegations giving rise to a plausible claim that she was terminated in violation of her First Amendment rights. Such wrongful termination “is a continuing violation ․ despite relating to a past violation.” Johnson v. Madden, Case No.: 3:22cv17910-MCR/HTC, 2023 WL 4060180, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 19, 2023) (citing State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Josephson v. Ganzel, 115 F.4th 771, 782 (6th Cir. 2024) (noting that complaint alleged an ongoing violation of federal law seeking prospective relief where former public medical school professor sued for First Amendment retaliation after his contract was not renewed following public comments he made at a Heritage Foundation event concerning the treatment of gender dysphoria in children). Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she is suffering an ongoing violation based on Defendant Young's wrongful termination of her employment because of her protected speech. Consistent with Ex parte Young, she seeks equitable, prospective relief in the form of reinstatement. To the extent Defendant Young seeks dismissal based on these grounds, the motion is due to be denied.

Next, Defendants assert Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Tucker must be dismissed because it is barred by qualified immunity. Again, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has the better of the argument.

An official asserting qualified immunity must first prove that he or she was acting within the scope of his or her “discretionary authority at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.” Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.15 (11th Cir. 2014). If so, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff to establish (1) a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and (2) that the right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citations omitted). Here, although Plaintiff quibbles with whether Defendant Tucker has demonstrated that she was acting within her discretionary authority when she signed and delivered Plaintiff's termination letter, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendant Tucker “is the ultimate supervisor of Plaintiff's division and the official who executed the decision to terminate Plaintiff.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 107. Assuming arguendo that this allegation suffices to demonstrate that Defendant Tucker was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when she purportedly violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights, this Court turns to whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established when the violation occurred.

Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, as this Court must at the pleading stage, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of her First Amendment right, as a public employee, to be free from wrongful termination based solely on her protected speech. Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Plaintiff was terminated because she made a social media post ¹ on her personal Instagram account that her employer deemed to be a “hateful sentiment” with which Defendants have a “zero-tolerance policy.” See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 38, 46. Plaintiff includes detailed factual allegations setting out the timeline from the moment she spoke to the moment her employer publicly posted about its disagreement with her speech and announced her termination, specifically citing Plaintiff's speech as the reason for her termination. See id. She alleges that Defendant Tucker had actual knowledge that Plaintiff's termination was “solely because of objections to the content [and viewpoint] of her political post,” and that Defendant Tucker “shared Young's objections to the content of Plaintiff's speech and the viewpoint expressed in Plaintiff's post.” Id. ¶¶ 108–10. Defendant Tucker's suggestion that the Pickering balance tilts in her favor because FWC's employer interests in avoiding potential disruption and reputational harm outweigh Plaintiff's free speech rights, and thus, no First Amendment violation has occurred, is a conclusion this Court cannot make at the pleading stage. Indeed, Plaintiff's factual allegations, taken as true for purposes of ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, assert that the decision to terminate her employment was due only to Defendants’ disagreement with the message of her private speech and not based on any good faith belief that her speech would disrupt FWC's ability to effectively and efficiently fulfill its duties to the public. See id. ¶¶ 50–53. Defendants’ public-employer interests may well outweigh Plaintiff's interest in speaking, but that is a determination best left for summary judgment.

Plaintiff has also demonstrated that her free speech right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. Defendants’ suggestion that Plaintiff must identify binding caselaw that is factually identical to Plaintiff's complaint to satisfy this requirement misapprehends the law. “[A] judicial precedent with identical facts is not essential for the law to be clearly established.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Rather, “[a]uthoritative judicial decisions may ‘establish broad principles of law’ that are clearly applicable to the conduct at issue.” Id. (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007)). And here, as Plaintiff points out, it is clearly established that the State cannot fire an employee—even an at-will employee—solely in retaliation for the employee's speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383–84 (1987) (“Even though McPherson was merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression.”). Thus, construing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff has demonstrated, at the pleading stage, that her right not to be terminated simply for exercising her right to post a statement about Charlie Kirk's death on her personal Instagram account was clearly established when Defendants allegedly terminated her solely in response to her speech. Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude, at this juncture, that Defendant Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity.

Finally, both Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants again contend that Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that the Pickering balance tilts in their favor, as opposed to Plaintiff's, and that the complaint does not plausibly allege causation. Defendants are mistaken as to both arguments.

First, Defendants suggest this Court should draw inferences in their favor, not Plaintiff's, and conclude that Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that Defendants were well within their right to fire Plaintiff before any workplace disruption actually occurred. But this turns the standard for motions to dismiss on its head. Moreover, Defendants’ argument ignores several allegations that give rise to a reasonable inference that Plaintiff's termination was not based on any actual or reasonably foreseeable disruption in the workplace, but instead, was solely in retaliation for her protected speech. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 37–40, 46–49, 51–55.

As to causation, Plaintiff's complaint plausibly alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for her protected speech—indeed, Plaintiff specifically cites the timing and content of her employer's public statements describing the reasons for terminating Plaintiff. See id. ¶ 55 (“There is a direct causal connection between Plaintiff's political speech and Defendants’ decision to terminate her employment; the timing and substance of the FWC press statements leave no doubt.”); see also id. ¶¶ 38–44, 46–48. Defendants’ contention that she has not plausibly alleged that Defendants would not have terminated her absent her speech again relies upon a misapprehension of the law. “Mt. Healthy causation,” as Defendants describe it, places the burden on Defendants to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have reached the same decision to terminate Plaintiff even in the absence of her speech. See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977)). Defendants cite no authority for their contention that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for failing to preemptively rebut Defendants’ rationale for terminating her in the absence of her speech.

In short, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part as to Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief against Defendant Young in his official capacity. However, the balance of Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. Taking Plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, this Court cannot say, at this juncture, that Defendant Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity. Instead, Plaintiff's detailed factual allegations plausibly allege that she has suffered and continues to suffer an injury in fact based on her allegedly wrongful termination in retaliation for protected speech, which is traceable to Defendants Young and Tucker, and redressable by prospective relief in the form of reinstatement against Defendant Young and damages against Defendant Tucker in her individual capacity.

SO ORDERED on December 16, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff characterizes her post as a “political message” expressing the views that nature is indifferent to human affairs and that Charlie Kirk's ideology allegedly included supporting gun rights even at the expense of innocents, such as children in their classrooms. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that her post “does not condone Mr. Kirk's killing; nor does it call for further violence.” Id. ¶ 28. Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff's speech had any connection at all to her job duties for the FWC. Based on Plaintiff's allegations and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, she has plausibly alleged that she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern when she made the post on her personal Instagram account.

Mark E. Walker, United States District Judge