INGRAM v. SANTA ROSA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD (2024)

ORDER

Plaintiff Marjorie Ingram filed this action against her former employer, the Santa Rosa County School Board (“SRCSB”), claiming that SRCSB violated (i) the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) by terminating her based on her long COVID with Centralized Sensitization Syndrome and by failing to accommodate her medical condition; and (ii) the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) by interfering with her statutory rights and by retaliating against her for exercising them. SRCSB moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because Ingram failed to plausibly allege that she is a “qualified individual” under the FCRA or an “eligible employee” under the FMLA, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Background

There have been over 100 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the United States since the virus was first reported in February 2020.¹ The majority of people infected with COVID-19 experience only mild or moderate symptoms, and while most also feel better within a few weeks, some people experience post-infection symptoms known as “long COVID.”² According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, long COVID can cause, among other things, “brain fog,” headaches, debilitating fatigue, heart palpitations, shortness of breath, sleep problems, diarrhea, depression, chest pain, and joint and muscle pain.³

Marjorie Ingram alleges that she contracted COVID-19 twice during her employment as an art teacher at Central School in Milton, Florida, first in December 2020 and again in August 2021.⁴ Unfortunately, Ingram says that her COVID-19 infections resulted in severe and debilitating symptoms.

In March 2021, after her first bout of COVID-19, Ingram was diagnosed with long COVID with Centralized Sensitization Syndrome. Ingram says her condition is characterized by catastrophic chronic migraines, which are exacerbated by exposure to ultraviolet light and the blue light emitted by digital devices. Ingram wears prescription ultraviolet light glasses and a hat to combat the harmful light rays. In the beginning, despite the severity of her condition, Ingram states that she only missed an estimated 15 days of work between August 2021 and August 2022 due to her migraines.⁵

But a new school year brought new challenges. On or around August 5, 2022, during the pre-planning week for the 2022–23 academic year, Ingram says that she met with Central School's new principal, Klinton Lay, to discuss her medical condition. Ingram alleges that Principal Lay originally questioned the legitimacy of her condition and denied her request to wear a hat while teaching indoors because of the school's dress code. For four days, Ingram claims that she was forced work in an environment with overhead lighting that triggered her migraines and otherwise worsened her long COVID symptoms. On August 9, 2022, the fourth day following her accommodation request, Ingram says that Principal Lay finally agreed to permit her to wear a hat on school grounds, but only after she submitted a physician note documenting her condition.⁶

Ingram's health further deteriorated shortly thereafter. By October 2022, Ingram's migraines were “debilitating” and “affected and limited [her] ability to stand, walk, work, think, care for herself, read, and concentrate.” See ECF No. 9 at ¶ 28. One of her treating physicians concluded that Ingram needed continuous time off to undertake neurostimulation therapy. Ingram began taking sick leave on November 8, 2022 with an expectation of returning on February 16, 2023.⁷ Ingram's neurologist described her condition as “catastrophic.” Id. at ¶ 38.

As her February 16, 2023 return date inched closer, Ingram became increasingly sure that she would not be fit to resume teaching. On February 3, 2023, approximately two weeks before Ingram was set to return, Ingram sought short-term disability benefits from SRCSB's health insurance provider for an additional three months of leave through May 2023.⁸

On the morning of February 15, 2023—the day before she was set to resume teaching and also the day she had exhausted her 100 days of authorized sick leave—Ingram attempted to call Principal Lay to notify him that her medical condition had not improved enough to return to work. The two did not connect, Principal Lay never returned Ingram's call, and Ingram did not resume teaching on February 16, 2023 as planned.⁹

On February 17, 2023, one of Ingram's treating physicians provided her with additional corroborating medical documentation of her long COVID symptoms and accompanying restrictions on her ability to teach and communicate with students and parents. That physician recommended that Ingram should not return to teaching until at least March 23, 2023. Ingram mailed a copy of her physician's recommendation to SRCSB and attempted to phone SRCSB to request additional sick leave. Ingram was not able to reach anyone and, once again, left a voicemail instead.¹⁰

One week later, on February 24, 2023, Ingram received two letters by certified mail stating that Principal Lay had recommended her termination to SRCSB, effective March 9, 2023. Principal Lay claimed that Ingram had abandoned her teaching position when she did not resume teaching on February 16, 2023.

SRCSB considered Principal Lay's recommendation during a March 9, 2023 board meeting. Ingram was given the opportunity to address SRCSB at the meeting and oppose Principal Lay's recommendation. In her remarks, Ingram claimed that she was discriminated against based on her long COVID diagnosis and asserted that “she [was] trying to get better but just needed a little more time.” Id. at ¶ 50.¹¹ SRCSB terminated Ingram nonetheless. Ingram does not allege that she appealed this decision.

About a year later, on March 7, 2024, Ingram filed the present action in Florida state court. See ECF No. 1-1. SRCSB removed the case to this Court on July 22, 2024, see ECF No. 1, and moved to dismiss the original complaint on September 23, 2024. See ECF No. 8. Because Ingram then amended her complaint on October 7, 2024, see ECF No. 9, this Court denied SRCSB's original motion to dismiss as moot. See ECF No. 10.

The Amended Complaint contains four counts. Counts I and II are brought under the FCRA, Fla. Stat § 760.01, et seq., while Counts III and IV arise under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. Count I asserts that SRCSB discriminated against Ingram by failing to provide her with accommodations she needed while teaching and by declining to grant her an additional leave of absence due to her long COVID with Centralized Sensitization Syndrome. See ECF No. 9 at ¶¶ 56–63. Count II contends that SRCSB discriminated against Ingram by terminating her based on her medical condition in violation of the FCRA. Id. at ¶¶ 64–71. Count III alleges that SRCSB interfered with Ingram's statutory rights by failing to advise her of the leave available under the FMLA, id. at ¶¶ 72–77, and Count IV claims that SRCSB retaliated against Ingram by firing her for taking allegedly protected FMLA leave after she was unable to return to teaching in February 2023. Id. at ¶¶ 78–82. On October 28, 2024, SRCSB renewed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See ECF No. 12.

II. Discussion

A complaint that fails to state a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal pleading rules require only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not detailed allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements,” conclusory statements, labels or mere legal conclusions will not suffice. Id.; see also Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true and construes all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012); Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010).

A. The Florida Civil Rights Act

The FCRA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee “because of such individual's ․ handicap.” See Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). Disability discrimination claims brought under Florida law are analyzed under the same framework as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See D'Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1021 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, Ingram must demonstrate that (i) she has a disability; (ii) she was a “qualified individual” at the relevant time; and (iii) she was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability. See Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93 F.4th 1181, 1191 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023)).

Here, the second factor is determinative. To be considered a “qualified individual,” Ingram must plausibly allege that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held that regular, consistent attendance and classroom presence are essential functions of teaching. See McCutchen v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 22889471, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 11967874 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 13, 2023); Mills v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 2005 WL 8158200, at *5 (N.D. Ala. July 27, 2005) (“Regular attendance and punctuality are essential functions of the job of a teacher ․ The work of a teacher cannot merely be done after hours, or off site. Much of the work requires face to face interaction with, and regular supervision of, children.”). This makes good sense, because “unlike other jobs that can be performed without regard to a specific schedule, the tasks of [a teacher] by their very nature must be performed daily at a specific time.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279 (11th Cir. 1994) (regular and predictable attendance is an essential function of many jobs).¹²

Ingram falls well short of plausibly alleging that she could have reliably taught her art classes had SRCSB offered her reasonable accommodations. See Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (even a “relative[ly] infrequen[t]” inability to perform a job's essential functions is enough to render a plaintiff not a “qualified individual” under the ADA).¹³ In fact, the Amended Complaint paints the opposite picture. Ingram's neurologist described her long COVID with Centralized Sensitization Syndrome as “catastrophic.” See ECF No. 9 at ¶ 38. Her migraines were so debilitating and uncontrollable that, after taking three consecutive months off to try and improve her condition through neurostimulation therapy, Ingram was still not well enough to return to work. Id. at ¶ 27. She then sought between one and three months of additional leave, see id. at ¶¶ 39, 43, and at her termination hearing stated, “that she [was] trying to get better but just needed a little more time.” Id. at ¶ 50.

Unfortunately for Ingram, the FCRA only “covers people who can perform the essential functions of their jobs presently or in the immediate future,” and nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests that she could do so at the time she was fired (or in the months that followed). See Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (holding that plaintiff suffering from cluster migraines was not a qualified individual under the ADA because by requesting “another ․ leave of absence” he “was not requesting an accommodation that allowed him to continue work in the present, but rather, in the future—at some indefinite time.”).¹⁴ To put a finer point on it, Ingram has not plausibly alleged that SRCSB could have provided her any accommodation—whether it be more time off, wearing a hat indoors (which SRCSB allowed her to do), or dimmer lighting in her classroom—that would have allowed her to return to teaching with a medical condition her neurologist determined was “catastrophic.” See ECF No. 9 at ¶ 38. Indeed, nowhere in the Amended Complaint does Ingram allege that her “catastrophic” medical condition improved, to the point where she could have returned to work, over the weeks she requested (but did not receive) additional leave for in late-spring 2023. See Santandreu v. Miami Dade Cnty., 513 F. App'x 902, 906 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff was not a qualified individual “[b]ecause [he] was unable to show that he would be able to perform the essential functions of the job anytime in the reasonably immediate future”) (per curium). Nor does the Amended Complaint allege that Ingram's long COVID symptoms and chronic migraines subsided enough for her to return to teaching during the following academic year—or even today.

Absent factual allegations indicating that Ingram could have performed the essential functions of her job with an accommodation in March 2023 (or shortly thereafter), the Court cannot find that Ingram plausibly stated a disability discrimination claim under the FCRA.¹⁵ Ingram's FCRA claims therefore must be dismissed.¹⁶

B. The Family and Medical Leave Act

The FMLA guarantees eligible employees the right to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave because of, among other things, serious medical conditions that leave employees unable to do their job. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612. In addition to granting workers important rights, the FMLA also precludes employers from interfering with, or retaliating against, employees exercising those rights. Id. § 2615. Congress meant business. It authorized aggrieved employees to sue employers that run afoul of the FMLA. Id. § 2617(a). But in order to do so, Congress required that employees be “eligible.” Id.; see also Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 927 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ligible-employee status under the FMLA is a threshold jurisdictional question that also appears to be a prima facie element for recovery in a civil action.”) (citations omitted). An “eligible employee” under the FMLA is an individual who has been employed at least a year by the employer and worked at least 1,250 hours during the prior 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611; see Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[t]o recover on either an interference or a retaliation claim under the FMLA,” an employee must meet the FMLA's eligibility requirements).

SRCSB argues that the Amended Complaint fails to establish that Ingram was an “eligible employee” under the FMLA in February 2023, after Ingram exhausted her authorized sick leave and requested additional time off. SRCSB claims that Ingram's representation that she worked “for more than 1,250 hours in the school year immediately preceding her need for [FMLA] leave,” see ECF No. 9 at ¶¶ 74, 80 (emphasis added), is insufficient to establish that Ingram worked the required hours “during the previous 12-month period,” to be eligible under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611.¹⁷ The Court agrees. As any student that yearns for summer break can attest, a “school year” is very different than a calendar year, fiscal year, or any other type of year. A school year is typically nine months and, in northern Florida, usually runs from August to May.¹⁸ Ingram's allegation that she worked more than 1,250 hours between approximately August 2021 and May 2022 therefore says little to nothing about whether she worked the requisite 1,250 hours between February 2022 and February 2023 to be FMLA-eligible. Because Ingram fails to plausibly allege that she worked the hours required to be an eligible employee, her FMLA claims must also be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendant SRCSB's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED without prejudice and with leave to amend. Any amendment is due within fourteen days of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of December 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As of March 10, 2023, the last day that Johns Hopkins University updated its COVID-19 data, more than 103.8 million Americans had been infected with COVID-19. See COVID-19 Dashboard, The Johns Hopkins Univ., https://perma.cc/J7XS-FYHT.

2.   Tragically, for other Americans, the virus caused severe medical problems. As of December 2024, over 1.2 million Americans have died after contracting COVID-19. See COVID Data Tracker, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#maps_deaths-total (last accessed December 3, 2024).

3.   Long COVID or Post-COVID Conditions, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://perma.cc/AMM9-UDKQ.

4.   Central School is within the Santa Rosa County School District. See generally Our Schools, Santa Rosa Cnty. Dist. Schs., https://www.santarosaschools.org/en (last accessed December 3, 2024).

5.   Ingram acknowledges that she missed “four to five weeks” of work following her gallbladder surgery in late-2021, which was needed due to “digestion issues” caused by her COVID-19 infections. See ECF No. 9 at ¶ 12.

6.   Ingram alleges that she also discussed the possibility of replacing the lights in her classroom with “soft lighting” during the August 5, 2022 meeting, but that SRCSB took no steps in furtherance of that discussion.

7.   Although Ingram did not plan to resume teaching until February 16, 2023, she returned to Central School's campus on January 12, 2023 to teach when the long-term substitute art teacher had a scheduling conflict. That day, Ingram learned that Principal Lay had cancelled a class field trip she had planned for March 2023, and the two got into a heated argument. Ingram claims that field trips planned by Central School teachers without serious medical conditions or disabilities were not cancelled. Ingram alleges that Principal Lay shouted at her, forced her to pack up her personal effects, and escorted her off campus—claiming that she was “not well.” See ECF No. 9 at ¶ 31. Principal Lay's conduct, according to Ingram, worsened her long COVID symptoms. One day later, on January 13, 2023, Ingram's neurologist faxed medical documents to SRCSB's human resources department that further corroborated the “catastrophic” nature of her medical condition. Id. at ¶ 38.

8.   Ingram was notified that her request for short-term disability benefits was denied on April 14, 2023.

9.   Ingram alleges that she subsequently tried to contact Principal Lay directly, and through intermediaries, on February 16, 17, 21, and 22—but only ever reached his voicemail. She alleges that she informed other Central School employees that she needed additional leave due to her debilitating and persistent long COVID symptoms and treatment side effects, which included “dizziness, nausea, and vomiting.” See ECF No. 9 at ¶¶ 45–46.

10.   On February 21, 2023, Ingram alleges that she was finally able to notify SRCSB's administrative office that she could not yet return to teaching.

11.   Ingram also alleges that she was later scolded by SRCSB employees for her comments at the March 9, 2023 meeting.

12.   Other courts have likewise concluded that teachers who are unable, or are unwilling to, show up for work cannot perform the essential functions of their job. See Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiff's “twenty-three absences prevented him from performing the essential functions of his teaching position,” and as a result, “he is not a qualified individual”); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Centers, Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's “frequent absences rendered her unable to function effectively as a teacher” where she missed “almost forty days of work during a seven-month period”); see also Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing with approval Tyndall’s discussion of job presence as an essential function under the ADA).

13.   Although SRCSB moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on this basis, see ECF No. 12 at 15, Ingram inexplicably failed to address or oppose this argument. This alone is grounds to grant the motion. See Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., 564 F. App'x 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] party's failure to respond to any portion or claim in a motion indicates such portion, claim or defense is unopposed.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(H).

14.   Whether Ingram could be considered a “qualified individual” before she was fired is irrelevant. The question is whether Ingram was “qualified” at the time of the alleged adverse employment action. See Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that an employee was not a qualified individual because she could not work her full-time job at the time of her termination); see also Geter v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 2023 WL 7321610, at *13 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (citing Browning favorably for this proposition); Kocsis v. Multi–Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that to prove disability discrimination a plaintiff “must first establish as part of her prima facie case that she was a ‘qualified individual with disability’ at the time of the discriminatory act”) (emphasis in original).

15.   Because the Court concludes that Ingram failed to plausibly allege that she is a “qualified individual,” under the FCRA, it need not decide today whether Ingram's long COVID diagnosis qualifies as a disability under the FCRA or whether she was discriminated against on that basis.

16.   Even assuming that a hostile-work-environment claim is actionable under the ADA, see Gilliard v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 500 F. App'x 860, 868–69 (11th Cir. 2012) (“We have not addressed the availability of a claim for a hostile work environment under ․ the ADA”), the Court dismisses this putative claim as well because it runs afoul of the Eleventh Circuit's prohibition on shotgun pleadings. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015). Neither of Ingram's FCRA counts purport to bring a hostile-work-environment claim, and Ingram appears to invoke this legal theory for the first time in opposition to SRCSB's motion. See ECF No. 14 at 8–9. To the extent Ingram wishes to bring such a claim, she must plead it in a separate count that includes sufficient factual allegations to support this putative theory of relief. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23 (explaining that a type of “shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief,” which waste resources, broaden discovery, ravage dockets, and do not give the defendants fair notice of the claims against them).

17.   Ingram curiously failed to respond to or oppose this argument as well, and the Court, in the alternative, could grant Defendant's motion by default on this basis too. See Jones, 564 F. App'x at 434; see also N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(E)

18.   For example, the current Santa Rosa County School District school year is set to run from August 12, 2024 until May 29, 2025. See Santa Rosa County School Board 2024–25 Calendar, Santa Rosa Cnty. Dist. Schs., https://santarosaschools.org/en-US/24-25-district-calendar-b1333c63 (last accessed December 3, 2024). Teachers may have additional responsibilities, such as participating in pre-planning and post-planning weeks, that extend beyond the students’ school year—but, in Santa Rosa County, those responsibilities only result in seven to ten additional days of work. Id.

M. CASEY RODGERS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE