STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. HURLEY (2025)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case presents the question whether an automobile liability insurer has a duty to defend a lawsuit arising from a gunshot injury allegedly caused by the insured's negligent operation of his automobile. Under South Carolina law, which controls, the answer is no. This order grants summary judgment for the insurer.

The plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company issued an automobile insurance policy to the defendant George Hurley and his wife. State Farm issued the policy through a South Carolina agent and delivered it to the Hurleys at their South Carolina residence. The insured vehicle was a Suzuki Samurai.

While Mr. Hurley was in Florida, he drove the Samurai in a manner that was unacceptable to a neighbor, David Andrew Ruttinger. Bryan Sieben was a passenger in the Samurai. Upon hearing a gunshot—as it turns out, Mr. Ruttinger's firing of a shotgun—Mr. Hurley stopped the car, and Mr. Sieben got out. Mr. Ruttinger fired again, this time hitting Mr. Sieben and injuring him. Mr. Sieben sued both Mr. Hurley, asserting he negligently caused the confrontation, including by driving recklessly, and Mr. Ruttinger, asserting he too was negligent.

Because the policy was issued through State Farm's South Carolina agent to South Carolina insureds, South Carolina law applies. See, e.g., Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1128–29 (Fla. 1988); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1059 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under South Carolina law, automobile policies do not cover claims arising from gunshot injuries. The controlling case is Progressive Direct Insurance Co. v. Groves, 438 S.C. 26, 882 S.E.2d 464 (S.C. 2022). There a driver was shot and killed by the driver of another car. The decedent and shooter were both in their cars at the time, stopped at a traffic light. The shooter was an uninsured motorist, so the decedent's personal representative asserted a claim under the applicable policies’ uninsured motorist provisions. Those provided coverage for damages “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of an uninsured motor vehicle.

The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized inconsistencies in its prior treatment of coverage disputes involving automobile policies and gunshots. But the court set out a clear rule going forward: no coverage. Id. at 465 (“We hold that gunshot injuries do not arise out of the use of an automobile.”). The court reached this result on two grounds, either of which it said would be sufficient standing alone. First, the court said gunshots are not “foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the automobile”—an essential element of coverage. Id. at 467; see also id. at 468 (“We agree with other courts that have held it is not reasonable to conclude that the parties to an insurance contract intended gunshot injuries to be covered by an automobile insurance policy.”). And second, the court said “the act of firing a weapon into another vehicle constitutes an act of independent significance,” breaking the chain of causation and thus again precluding coverage. Id. at 468.

To be sure, Groves involved uninsured-motorist coverage, while the case at bar involves liability coverage. But the critical policy language here, precisely as in Groves, is “the ownership, maintenance, or use” of the vehicle at issue. In the policy at issue here, that language is part of the definition of an insured; Mr. Hurley has liability coverage only for claims meeting that definition. The Groves analysis of that language is fully applicable here, just as it was there.

It is undisputed that a gunshot caused the only alleged injury to Mr. Sieben. The underlying second amended complaint makes this clear, and in any event, under South Carolina law, the duty to defend turns not only on facts alleged in the underlying complaint but also on undisputed facts like those set out earlier in this opinion. See USAA Prop. & Cas. Inc. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 661 S.E.2d 791, 798 (2008) (noting that the duty to defend is generally controlled by the allegations in the underlying complaint but that “the duty to defend may also be determined by facts outside of the complaint that are known by the insurer”).

The bottom line: under South Carolina law, which controls, State Farm has no duty to defend or indemnify Mr. Hurley on the claims asserted in Mr. Sieben's underlying lawsuit.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. State Farm's summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 39, is granted.

2. It is declared that the plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company has no duty to defend or indemnify George Hurley in the pending lawsuit brought against him by Bryan Sieben.

3. The clerk must enter judgment and close the file.

4. State Farm's motion, ECF No. 36, to strike Mr. Hurley's first affirmative defense is denied as moot.

5. State Farm's motion, ECF No. 47, to vacate the order to mediate is denied as moot.

SO ORDERED on February 24, 2025.

Robert L. Hinkle, United States District Judge