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DB INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BRANCH), Plaintiff, v. JAMES KEENER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY
This is an insurance dispute. Before the Court is a motion to stay pending related cases in state court filed by Defendants James Keener and James Keener as Trustee for James H. Keener 401K Profit Sharing Plan (collectively, “Keener”). The matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing set for September 3, 2026, is VACATED. See Civil L.R. 7-6; Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments therein, as well as the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS Keener's motion to stay for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Keener owns a residential property in Napa, which contained a vineyard. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 8, 16; Dkt. No. 20 at 7 n.1.1 DB Insurance Company, Ltd. sold Keener an insurance policy for his property. Compl. ¶ 13. He responded to an underwriting question by declaring that no business operations were performed on his property. Id. ¶ 10.
Keener hired Defendant Ruben Rueda Marquez to maintain his property, including by pruning trees. Dkt. No. 20 at 8. In 2024, Rueda Marquez fell out of a tree and suffered serious injuries. Id.; Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. He therefore sought workers' compensation for those injuries. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.
In light of Rueda Marquez's injury, DB Insurance investigated and discovered the vineyard, which it alleges constituted a business operation. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. So DB Insurance filed this lawsuit in October 2025, seeking a declaration that it can rescind the policy due to Keener's allegedly material misrepresentation about business operations on the property. Id. ¶¶ 17-20. For similar reasons, DB Insurance has refused to indemnify Keener against the workers' compensation action, and initially refused to defend him in that action too. Dkt. No. 20 at 8.
Three months after DB Insurance filed this lawsuit, Keener sued DB Insurance and Rueda Marquez in the Superior Court of California, County of Napa. Id. at 10. In that case, Keener alleges that DB Insurance breached the policy and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to defend or indemnify him against Rueda Marquez's actions. Id. at 10, 12. Keener also seeks a declaration that DB Insurance owes him a duty to defend and indemnify. Id. at 10. Finally, he asserts claims of fraud and intentional misrepresentation against Rueda Marquez. Id.
Rueda Marquez also filed a lawsuit against Keener in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. Id. at 11. Rueda Marquez contends that Keener is uninsured, so under Cal. Lab. Code § 3706, workers' compensation exclusivity does not apply, and he is entitled to sue Keener in court. Id. DB Insurance has also refused to defend or indemnify Keener against that case. Id.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Standard
Several different doctrines allow for courts to stay cases. Three are relevant here. First, federal courts have discretion to hear declaratory judgment actions, so a stay is generally appropriate when there is concurrent state court litigation. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1942); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995). Federal courts also have inherent authority to manage their docket. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). Finally, in exceptional circumstances, federal courts can decline to adjudicate disputes when there is concurrent state court litigation. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976). Keener advocates for the more flexible Brillhart or Landis standards, while DB Insurance contends that the more stringent Colorado River standard applies. The Colorado River standard applies here.
First, the Brillhart standard is inapplicable if “the suit seeks more than merely declaratory relief.” Seneca Ins. Co., Inc. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 2017). To determine if that is the case, courts consider whether there are “claims that would continue to exist if the request for a declaration simply dropped from the case.” Id. (citation omitted). That analysis focuses on the substance of the claims rather than how they are styled. See id. at 840-41; First State Ins. Co. v. Callan Assocs., Inc., 113 F.3d 161, 163 (9th Cir. 1997). For instance, in a similar case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a plaintiff who sought “a declaration rescinding the policy of property insurance” was “in fact pursuing rescission of the contract based on [the defendant's] alleged misrepresentations—thereby altering the relationship of the parties—and not simply requesting that the court ‘announce[ ] the rights and obligations of the parties.’ ” Seneca, 862 F.3d at 840-41 (citation omitted). The same is true here: DB Insurance seeks a declaration that it is “entitled to rescind the Policy.” See Compl. at 4. True, that declaration is framed more declaratorily than the one in Seneca, since it would only expressly tell DB Insurance that it can rescind the policy. But DB Insurance alleges that it “seeks to rescind the Policy,” so an affirmative declaration would effectively cause rescission. See id. ¶ 18. Consequently, the declaration's framing is a distinction without a difference. Keener argues that Seneca involved both the declaration described above and a request for damages, but the Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests either requested remedy made Brillhart inapplicable. 862 F.3d at 841.
Where a party seeks a stay based on concurrent state court litigation and the Brillhart standard is inapplicable, the Landis standard is too. Ernest Bock, LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2023) (“ ‘[A] district court may, in its discretion, stay or dismiss a federal case in favor of related state proceedings’ in only two circumstances: ‘(1) when an action seeks only declaratory relief, or (2) when exceptional circumstances exist [under Colorado River].’ ” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court applies the Colorado River standard. See id.
B. Colorado River Factors
When evaluating whether a Colorado River stay is appropriate, courts consider eight factors: “(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court.” Seneca, 862 F.3d at 841-42 (citation omitted). The final factor, parallelism, is a “threshold requirement” for a Colorado River stay. Ernest Bock, 76 F.4th at 838. The balance of the eight factors is initially “heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction,” so a court's role is to “ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the ‘clearest of justifications,’ that ․ justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Seneca, 862 F.3d at 842 (citation omitted).
As a threshold matter, the federal and state court cases are sufficiently parallel to support a Colorado River stay as both the Napa and Alameda cases will necessarily require adjudicating DB Insurance's entitlement to recission. There need not be “exact parallelism” between the cases; it is enough if they are “substantially similar.” Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Even so, a stay is only appropriate if the state court will “necessarily resolve all issues between parties in the federal action.” Ernest Bock, 76 F.4th at 841 n.20. In the Napa case, Keener seeks a declaration that DB Insurance owes him a duty to defend and indemnify. The Napa court cannot declare that if DB Insurance is entitled to rescind the policy. See Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Sogomonian, 198 Cal. App. 3d 169, 182 (1988) (“[A] rescission effectively renders the policy totally unenforceable from the outset so that there was never any coverage and no benefits are payable.”). Similarly, the Alameda case is barred under workers' compensation exclusivity unless Keener is uninsured. The validity of Keener's insurance policy is therefore “a question going to the jurisdiction of the superior court to entertain the action.” See Coleman v. Silverberg Plumbing Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 74, 79 (1968). In sum, this case is “but a ‘spin-off’ of more comprehensive state litigation.” See Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1417 (citations omitted).
Two of the Colorado River factors support a stay. First, there is a risk of piecemeal litigation. The cases discussing this factor split into two lines. Some say this factor focuses on whether the dispute “evinces a special or important rationale or legislative preference for resolving these issues in a single proceeding.” Seneca, 862 F.3d at 843. Others back off from that language, noting that there is a concern of piecemeal litigation “when concurrent cases would resolve common questions that could result in ‘waste [of] judicial resources and cause confusion in the continuing disputes between the parties.’ ” Mendocino Ry. v. Ainsworth, 113 F.4th 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Here, adjudicating this case at the same time as the state court cases would risk inconsistent decisions about the validity of the insurance policy. The Alameda case can only proceed if Keener is uninsured, so inconsistent decisions would certainly cause confusion among the parties. See id. Moreover, if the Alameda court went forward with its case, and this Court eventually rescinded the policy, the parties would have wasted substantial judicial resources. See id. Thus, the risk of piecemeal litigation weighs in favor of a stay.
A stay would also discourage forum shopping. Keener contends that DB Insurance filed suit in federal court to preempt the filing of his non-removable state court suit. A party is generally entitled to “act[ ] within [its] rights in filing a suit in the forum of [its] choice.” See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990). Yet the Ninth Circuit has found forum shopping when “the insurer may anticipate that its insured intends to file a non-removable state court action, and rush to file a federal action before the insured does so.” Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds. Though Cont'l Cas. Co. arose under Brillhart, the forum-shopping analysis is seemingly the same across both standards. Cf. Seneca, 862 F.3d at 846 (considering similar argument but finding that any suit filed by the defendant would have been removeable). Keener's Napa case is not removeable because opposing parties (Keener and Rueda Marquez) are both citizens of California. See Compl. ¶¶ 3-5. When considering that the parties were already contesting DB Insurance's obligations before this case was filed, there is reason to believe this case was reactive, and letting it go forward would encourage forum shopping. See Cont'l Cas. Co., 947 F.2d at 1372-73. DB Insurance contends that Keener also engaged in forum shopping by filing suit in state court after this case was already filed, but at worst, because Keener's case could not have been brought in federal court, that demonstrates an “opportunistic” litigation strategy that does not constitute forum shopping. See R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 981 (9th Cir. 2011).
The remaining factors are neutral. First, there is no real property at stake. See Mendocino Ry., 113 F.4th at 1188. Second, the Napa County Superior Court and Alameda County Superior Court are both within this judicial district. See id. Fourth, while the Napa and Alameda cases were filed after this one, no substantial progress has been made in any of the three cases. See Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1370; Dkt. No. 20 at 9-12; Dkt. No. 27 at 8. Fifth, because this is a “straightforward insurance dispute” under California law, it does not raise “complex and difficult issues better resolved by a state court.” See Seneca, 862 F.3d at 844. Sixth, the Napa court can adjudicate DB Insurance's entitlement to recission, though “an adequate state forum ‘never compel[s] abstention.’ ” See Mendocino Ry., 113 F.4th at 1190 (quoting Seneca, 862 F.3d at 845); Cal. Civ. Code § 1692 (“[A]ny party to the contract may seek relief based upon such rescission by ․ asserting such rescission by way of defense or cross-complaint.”).
To summarize, the threshold parallelism requirement is met, two additional factors weigh in favor of a stay, and the remainder are neutral. That is sufficient to support a stay. See, e.g., R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 983 (affirming Colorado River dismissal where piecemeal litigation and order of jurisdiction factors weighed against jurisdiction, and the remainder were neutral); Mendocino Ry., 113 F.4th at 1193 (same, with the forum-shopping factor also weighing against jurisdiction).
III. CONCLUSION
Keener's motion to stay is GRANTED. The Court ORDERS that the instant case is CLOSED for statistical purposes only. Nothing contained in this Order shall be construed as a dismissal or disposition of the action, and should further proceedings become necessary herein, any party may initiate them in the same manner as if the case had not been closed. The parties SHALL FILE a joint status report on December 1, 2026, and every 90 days thereafter, to inform the Court of the status of the state court cases. Additionally, within 30 days of the resolution of either of the state court cases, the parties SHALL FILE a joint status report and advise whether the case should be terminated and/or other actions which should be taken.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
FOOTNOTES
1. All citations to page numbers in filings on the docket refer to ECF pagination.
ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN United States District Judge
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Docket No: Case No. 25-cv-09343-AMO
Decided: September 01, 2026
Court: United States District Court, N.D. California.
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