SHANNON IRELAND GORDY v. TILE INC (2025)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO STAY

Defendants Tile, Inc. and Life360 Inc. (together “Tile”) move to stay the entire action pending the outcome of their interlocutory appeal of the Court's December 19, 2024 Order denying in part Tile's motion to compel arbitration as to certain claims brought by Plaintiffs Melissa Broad and Jane Doe. (Dkt. No. 75.) Defendant Amazon.com, Inc., joins in the motion to stay. (Dkt. No. 76.) The parties agree that Tile has an automatic right to a stay pending appeal as to the claims brought against it by Broad and Doe. See Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 738 (2023). Therefore, Tile's motion to stay is GRANTED IN PART as to Broad and Doe's claims brought against Tile. Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree as to whether a discretionary stay of (i) Broad and Doe's claims against Amazon, and (ii) Plaintiffs Shannon Ireland-Gordy and Stephanie Ireland Gordy's claims against all Defendants, is proper. As discussed below, Defendants' motion to stay is DENIED as to the remainder of the action.

The Court has already denied Defendants' prior request to stay the action pending arbitration of certain claims. (Dkt. No. 65). As noted in the prior ruling, a stay was not warranted because non-arbitrable claims predominated and, “regardless of the outcome of the arbitration,” the non-arbitrable claims “will need to be litigated in this court.” (See id at 22 (citing Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 226 F. Supp. 3d 983, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2016).) Therefore, “proceeding with this lawsuit would not waste judicial resources,” and “staying the non-arbitrable claims,” including those against the non-arbitrating parties, “would only serve to needlessly delay their resolution.” (Id. at 23 (citing Cal. Crane Sch., Inc. v. Google LLC, 621 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 2022).) Little has changed since the December 19 Order, as the majority of Plaintiffs' claims are still not subject to arbitration or appeal.

On the renewed motion, the parties disagree as to whether the Nken standard or Landis standard should be applied to Defendants' request. (See Dkt. No. 75 at 5; Dkt. No. 79 at 5). But the Court need not reach that issue, because a discretionary stay is not appropriate under either standard for essentially the same reason: there is no “clear case of hardship or inequity” or “irreparable harm” to proceeding with the case when the non-arbitrable claims predominate and will need to be litigated regardless.¹ The only prospective injury Defendants identify is a “significant risk of sequential litigations” if a stay is not granted. (Dkt. No. 75 at 6.) They argue that, should Tile lose its appeal, Doe and Broad may:

• “[A]ssert a right to reopen depositions, seek additional and different written and document discovery [or] relitigate decided discovery disputes;”

• “[R]elitigate the merits of the case at the motion to dismiss stage or other later, even more substantive inflexion points.”

(Id.) These cited risks are speculative, and Defendants have not adequately explained how “sequential litigation” would give rise to a cognizable hardship or irreparable injury.

Significantly, there are non-arbitrable, un-appealed claims that implicate each Plaintiff and each Defendant. This case is unlike Pandolfi v. Aviagames, Inc., No. 23-cv-05971-EMC, 2024 WL 4951258 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2024), where all claims against one set of defendants were on appeal, and the court found a risk to those defendants' ability to be “heard in a timely fashion” as to issues in which they had an important interest and were being litigated in a non-binding fashion as to other co-defendants, if a stay was denied. Id. at *6. Here, by contrast, Tile and Amazon will both continue to litigate claims if the case proceeds. Furthermore, the Court notes that all four named Plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel, and, therefore, the parties can coordinate to minimize the risk of unnecessary “sequential” discovery or motions practice. Finally, assuming Defendants lose their appeal, and further assuming that discovery disputes arise that the parties are unable to resolve, the parties may seek relief from the Court at that time regarding any duplicative discovery that poses an undue burden.

For the forgoing reasons, Tile's motion for a stay is GRANTED IN PART as to Broad and Doe's claims brought against Tile. Defendants' motion to stay is DENIED as to the remainder of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (explaining that “irreparable injury” is a necessary requirement for establishing a need for a stay); Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (A party seeking a stay “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.”) (quoting Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936)).

RITA F. LIN United States District Judge