UGANDA KNAPPS v. GEO GROUP INC (2025)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Uganda Knapps, who is representing himself, sued his former employer, Defendant Geo Group, Inc., alleging religious and disability discrimination in violation of state and federal anti-discrimination law, and the U.S. Constitution. (Dkt. No. 19.) Geo Group moves to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 24.) For the reasons described below, Geo Group's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. This order assumes the reader is familiar with the facts of the case, the applicable legal standards, and the arguments made by the parties.

Factual Allegations. Knapps makes the following allegations, which are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. On February 13, 2023, Knapps accepted a position as a supervising case manager at Geo Group. (Dkt. No. 19 (“FAC”), at 1.) On March 8, 2023, Knapps's direct supervisor, William Gomez, informed him that he had seen an inmate pick up Knapps's Quran—which for religious reasons Knapps had placed on his desk along with a prayer rug—and stated that Knapps's Quran was “going to fall to the floor.” (Id. at 2, 5.) Gomez “suggested that [the Quran] be put away on a bookshelf out of plain [sight].” (Id. at 5.) Knapps alleges that another Muslim Geo Group employee was permitted to keep a prayer rug on his desk. (Id. at 5-6.) Knapps was not asked to put away his prayer rug. Knapps alleges that, pursuant to a Geo Group policy, Gomez should have filed an incident report related to the inmate's action, but that he failed to do so. (Id. at 3.)

In the wake of his conversation with Gomez, Knapps contacted and met with Facility Director Maria Richards and Gomez to “address[ ]” Knapps's “concerns.” (Id. at 47.) During the meeting, Richards advised Knapps that she was unsure what Geo Group's policy was regarding the placement of religious artifacts on desks, and said that she needed to inquire with corporate HR. (Id. at 17-18.) Knapps does not allege that he was required to remove his Quran from his desk, nor does he allege any other actions taken by Geo Group after the meeting. Because Knapps has dyslexia, he alleges that he recorded the meeting with Gomez and Richards as an ADA accommodation. (Id. at 4-5, 8.) However, Knapps does not allege that he informed Gomez and Richards that he needed an ADA accommodation at the meeting. The purported transcript from the meeting is incorporated in the complaint, and appears to show Knapps telling Gomez and Richards that he is not recording the meeting. (Id. at 14.)¹

Finally, in prior incidents that are not alleged to be related to the events involving Knapps's Quran, Gomez also allegedly (i) accused Knapps of being on drugs during his first week of work, (ii) once “banged on the table in an aggressive manner” while Knapps was working, and (iii) intentionally “physical[ly] bump[ed]” Knapps during a photo op. (Id. at 11, 13, 21.) Knapps resigned from his position at Geo Group on April 14, 2023, allegedly due to the persistent hostile work environment and retaliation. (Id. at 21.)

Legal Standard. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff's “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must ․ suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.’ ” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a complaint ․ may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

In deciding motions to dismiss, courts in the Ninth Circuit must liberally construe complaints by pro se plaintiffs. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that courts have an obligation, “where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt”) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).

Title VII & FEHA Religious Discrimination Claims. Title VII and the FEHA make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on their religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Cal. Gov. Code § 12940. Liberally construed, Knapps is pursuing a variety of theories of religious discrimination under Title VII and the FEHA, including (i) failure to accommodate, (ii) disparate treatment, (iii) retaliation, and (iv) harassment/hostile work environment. However, on the existing allegations Knapps has not plausibly pled a claim under any of these theories.

“To establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination under a failure-to-accommodate theory, an employee must show (1) he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected him to an adverse employment action because of his inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Keene v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023) (cleaned up). An adverse action is one that “materially affect(s) the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the [plaintiff's] employment.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1126 (Cal. 2005) (finding that under the FEHA, “the proper standard for defining an adverse employment action is the ‘materiality’ test, a standard that requires an employer's adverse action to materially affect the terms and conditions of employment”). At the motion to dismiss stage, the adverse employment action must be “plausibly link[ed]” to the discrimination. See Young v. Buttigieg, No. 19-cv-01411-JCS, 2021 WL 981305, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021).

Knapps's failure to accommodate claim has not been adequately pled because he has not identified a “practice that conflicted with an employment duty” or “an adverse employment action” plausibly linked to that practice. First, Knapps does not allege he was prohibited from keeping his Quran on his desk. At most, he alleges that Gomez “suggested” that it be placed on a bookshelf, and Richards stated her intent to inquire what Geo Group's relevant policy was and then follow up. These allegations are insufficient to establish a conflict between Knapps's practice and his duties. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 81 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Since no statutory conflict between [plaintiff's] religion and his work duties occurred, the duty to accommodate his religious practices never arose.”). Second, Knapps does not allege that he was subjected to “an adverse employment action” plausibly related to his practice of keeping his Quran on his desk. The conversation with Gomez, as alleged, simply involved a supervisor making a non-binding suggestion that Knapps apparently declined to follow without consequence. Knapps does not allege any formal prohibition, threat or other conduct by Gomez during the conversation that could plausibly be characterized as an adverse employment action.² See Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 646, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (agreeing that receipt of a “counseling memorandum” instructing plaintiff “not to pray” was plausibly alleged to be an implicit threat of adverse action). As for the subsequent meeting, it was Knapps who initiated contact with Richards to discuss the incident relating to Gomez, and the alleged purpose and result of the meeting was to allow Knapps to voice his concerns. Knapps does not plausibly allege any misconduct or adverse outcome from the meeting. Id. Under these circumstances, neither the conversation with Gomez nor the meeting is an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Wood v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, No. 13-cv-00063, 2014 WL 3721207, at *11 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2014) (“meeting [ ] called to resolve differences between plaintiff and [plaintiff's supervisor]” was not an adverse employment action), aff'd, 657 F. App'x 643 (9th Cir. 2016).

The other incidents relating to Gomez—the alleged drug use accusation, table banging, and the bump—are not alleged to be causally connected to the alleged religious discrimination. Therefore, without more information, even if those incidents amounted to material adverse employment actions, they would still be insufficient to plead a failure to accommodate discrimination claim. See Capristo v. Brennan, No. 15-cv-1071-EMC, 2015 WL 4396268, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (“Title VII does not protect against all workplace misconduct. Rather, it addresses only adverse employment actions taken by an employer because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).

Finally, to the extent Knapps is arguing that constructive discharge satisfies the third element of his prima facia claim, he fails to plausibly plead this theory. Constructive discharge can be alleged “in circumstances of discrimination so intolerable that a reasonable person would resign.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 560 (2016). As already discussed, at this point, Knapps has not plausibly alleged facts suggesting that the two interactions related to his Quran would have made a “reasonable person resign.” See Capristo, 2015 WL 4396268, at *4 (finding that a single incident of yelling did not create a hostile work environment). The other incidents involving Gomez are not alleged to be related Knapps's religion and therefore cannot form a basis for a constructive discharge claim either. Id. (finding that incidents unrelated to protected characteristic could not form the basis for a discrimination claim).

For the same reason, Knapps has not stated a claim for discrimination under Title VII or the FEHA on a disparate treatment or retaliation theory. An adverse employment action is a necessary element under both theories, and the adverse event must be because of plaintiff's belief or protected activity, respectively. See Berry, 447 F.3d at 656; Lelaind v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“A Title VII retaliation claim requires a showing that ‘a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,' meaning it might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”) (quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)). As discussed above, Knapps has not plausibly alleged an adverse employment action.

Finally, without more, Knapps does not plausibly allege discrimination under a harassment/hostile work environment theory. The hostile work environment theory requires allegations of repeated incidents that are “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive work environment.” Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Lelaind, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (“Title VII hostile work environment standards are equally applicable to FEHA.”). “[O]ccasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial harassment” is not enough to give rise to a hostile work environment claim. Foster v. ScentAir Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-05772-TEH, 2014 WL 2603995 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014). Knapps has not plausibly alleged that the two conversations were “severe and pervasive” discrimination. See Capristo, 2015 WL 4396268, at *4-5. As currently drafted, the complaint does not allege facts supporting an inference that the other incidents involving Gomez are related Knapps's religion or religious practice, so those incidents cannot form a basis for this claim either. Id.

Because it is possible that Knapps will be able to cure these deficiencies through amendment, and he has not received notice of these deficiencies prior to this ruling, dismissal of his Title VII and FEHA religious discrimination claims is with leave to amend.

ADA & FEHA Disability Claims. “For claims brought under the ADA, an aggrieved individual must first exhaust administrative remedies, which requires filing a charge with the EEOC detailing the facts underlying the alleged discrimination.” Tyson v. ACRT Servs. Inc., No. 23-cv-01889-HSG, 2024 WL 69073, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024) (citing Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002)). Claims under the FEHA are subject to a similar requirement. See Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001) (to bring a claim under FEHA, a plaintiff must first exhaust their administrative remedies by submitting a “written charge” to the relevant California agency). “Allegations of discrimination not included in the plaintiff's administrative charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” Hurst v. City of Los Angeles, 171 F. App'x 103, 104 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)); Rodriguez, 265 F.3d 896 (same under FEHA). “Subject matter jurisdiction extends over new claims only if the claims are: (1) ‘within the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation;’ or (2) within the scope of an EEOC investigation which could reasonably have been expected to grow from the discrimination alleged in the EEOC charge.” Hurst, 171 F. App'x at 104 (citing K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100). “Where a plaintiff alleges a distinct category of discrimination in his [ ] charge, a separate claim which was not raised during the administrative process must be dismissed.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Here, while it is undisputed that Knapps dual-filed a charge with the EEOC and the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”), that charge alleges only religious discrimination and does not allege any facts related to an ADA violation. (Dkt. No 24-4 at 3-4.)³ Furthermore, while the EEOC charge form provides the option of checking a box for a violation of the ADA, and that box was left unchecked by Knapps. (Id. at 4.) Because the factual allegations in the charge relate to Gomez's alleged religious discrimination, and do not mention or relate to Knapps's disability, the allegations regarding ADA accommodations could not “reasonably have been expected to grow from the discrimination alleged in the EEOC charge.” Therefore, the charge does not satisfy Knapps's administrative exhaustion requirement. See Tyson, 2024 WL 69073, at *4 (allegations in the complaint must be “consistent with the plaintiff's original theory” in the charge) (citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Knapps's disability-related claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust. Because Knapps, in opposition, does not argue that he can allege exhaustion of his disability-related claims via other documents or facts, it does not appear that Knapps can cure this deficiency through amendment. Therefore, dismissal is without leave to amend. See Starks v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 97-cv-4038-SI, 1998 WL 164934, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1998) (“[P]laintiff's federal employment discrimination claims are [dismissed] without leave to amend, for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.”); Tyson, 2024 WL 69073, at *4 (same).⁴

Constitutional Claims. “Individuals bringing actions against private parties for infringement of their constitutional rights, [ ] must show that the private parties' infringement somehow constitutes state action.” George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of religious discrimination claims for lack of state action). In George, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Section 1983 claims for violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments brought by an employee who was fired by a private operator of a state correctional facility. George, 91 F.3d at 1229. The court found no state action because the plaintiff had not alleged that (i) defendant's role as an employer was a state function; (ii) that there was joint participation by the state and defendant in employment decisions; (iii) that defendant's decision was the result of state coercion, or (iv) a close nexus between the state and the challenged action. Id.; see also Ledet v. Cal. Waste Sols., Inc., No. 12-cv-6255-JSC, 2013 WL 1120786, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (dismissing claims after applying the test described in George). Here, there are no allegations in the complaint that the challenged conduct amounts to state action. (See FAC at 8 (describing Geo Group as a “private employer”).) Therefore, Knapps constitutional claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

* * *

For the forgoing reasons, Geo Group's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. If Knapps believes he can cure the identified deficiencies, he may file an amended complaint that relates only to his religious discrimination and constitutional claims by July 28, 2025. Any amended complaint that Knapps files must be complete in itself, including all information about the surviving claim and parties, because it replaces the previously filed complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). The amended complaint should list each claim that Knapps intends to assert, and identify what facts support each claim.

Although Knapps is not represented by a lawyer, he is still required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules of this District. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 3-9(a). Failure to comply with these rules or any court order could result in dismissal of his complaint. Similarly, failure to timely file an amended complaint that cures the above-identified deficiencies could also lead to dismissal of the complaint without further notice.

As an unrepresented litigant, Knapps may seek free assistance from the Northern District's Legal Help Center; he can make a telephone appointment by calling (415) 782-8982 or emailing fedpro@sfbar.org. At the Legal Help Center, Knapps may speak with an attorney who may be able to provide free basic legal help but not representation. The District Court's website also has information about how to represent yourself and a link to the District Court's handbook on civil litigation for pro se litigants. See https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Though Geo Group objects to Knapps's use of the recording because it argues that the recording was unlawful, Geo Group has not moved to strike the recording or the related allegations. In any event, Knapps' allegations about the meeting are properly considered in assessing whether he stated a claim, regardless of whether he recorded it.Furthermore, the allegation that Knapps is a vexatious litigant was made for the first time in Geo Group's reply brief (Dkt. No. 40 at 6), and is therefore disregarded. See, e.g., George v. Sonoma Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 08-cv-02675-EDL, 2010 WL 4117381, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010) (arguments made for the first time on reply are “improper”).

2.   Gomez's failure to file an incident report is not plausibly alleged to be an adverse employment action either. (FAC at 3-4.) Knapps has not identified a specific Geo Group policy requiring Gomez to file a report if an inmate handled a personal item belonging to a Geo Group employee. Nor does Knapps allege that he requested an incident report be filed. Also, even if Gomez had such a duty, Knapps has not alleged that the failure to report caused a material adverse effect.

3.   Geo Group's request for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 24-3) is granted. “The Court may consider both the EEOC right to sue letter and the EEOC charge, either as referenced in the complaint or as public records subject to judicial notice.” Gallo v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 916 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 1995).

4.   Because dismissal is without leave to amend, the Court does not reach the argument of whether Knapps's disability-related claims are time-barred, or whether he adequately pled any disability-related claim.

RITA F. LIN United States District Judge