LU v. MIDPEN HOUSING CORPORATION (2026)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 17

Pro se plaintiff Kai Lu brings this action against MidPen Housing Corporation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for housing discrimination. This Court previously found that it lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Lu's initial complaint. Ms. Lu subsequently filed an amended complaint that cured those deficiencies. MidPen now moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule12(b)(6). Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, MidPen's motion is granted.¹

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules require a complaint to include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If the complaint does not do so, the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is required if the plaintiff fails to allege facts allowing the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2009). While legal conclusions “can provide the [complaint's] framework,” the Court will not assume they are correct unless adequately “supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Materials outside the complaint can be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if they are incorporated by reference therein or otherwise judicially noticeable. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A [district] court may [ ] consider certain materials— documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”). The Court may consider documents which are “not physically attached to the complaint” “if the [ ] ‘authenticity ․ is not contested’ and ‘the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies’ on them.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705–06 (9th Cir. 1998)).

ANALYSIS

Ms. Lu alleges two causes of action under the Fair Housing Act and a cause of action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The laws have statutes of limitations of two and three years, respectively. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A); see Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the limitations period applicable to Cal. Gov. Code Section 11135 to similar claims). The allegations in Ms. Lu's complaint involve conduct that occurred between March 2022 and July 2022.² Ms. Lu filed the instant action on January 28, 2026. Therefore, unless Ms. Lu's allegations demonstrate that a possible exception could apply, all three of her causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations.

Ms. Lu first argues that the discrimination continued through August 2023, when she was subjected to a lockout of her apartment by a sheriff. But the sheriff lockout was the result of a legally valid judgment barring Ms. Lu from possession of her apartment, not an act of discrimination.³ While eviction may constitute an adverse action under the FHA, see Patton v. Hanassab, No. 14CV1489 AJB, 2016 WL 4507022, at *6 S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016, when that eviction is the result of a state court unlawful detainer proceeding, the Court may not review the propriety of those proceedings, see Tucker v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, No. 2:13-CV-01874 JAM-AC, 2013 WL 5159730, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013) (declining to review a writ of possession issued by a state court and citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). Even if the Court could review the judgment, Ms. Lu fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that the unlawful detainer proceedings and resulting judgment were discriminatory or retaliatory acts. Although she alleges that MidPen urged the property owner to file the unlawful detainer proceeding, MidPen was not a party to those proceedings, and Ms. Lu does not allege that the property owner acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory purpose. Therefore, the statute of limitations on all of her claims began to run in July 2022.

Ms. Lu also argues that she is entitled to equitable tolling on her FHA claims. But her complaint fails to allege facts that would allow the Court to make such a finding. Ms. Lu alleges that she submitted a housing discrimination complaint “to the appropriate governmental fair-housing enforcement agency in or about 2022 or 2023.” She alleges that the administrative matter “remained pending for a period of time after submission,” but she does not state when the matter was resolved. Without more information, the Court cannot determine whether the claim expired before the instant action was filed. And her filing of a prior federal lawsuit based on substantially similar claims does not provide a basis for equitable tolling, as she voluntarily dismissed the case. Holt v. Cnty. of Orange, 91 F.4th 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[V]oluntary dismissal generally does not toll the statute of limitations for the dismissed claims for the period during which those claims were pending.”).⁴

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Lu fails to allege valid claims under the FHA or the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, MidPen's motion to dismiss is granted. Dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within 35 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed, Ms. Lu's claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   MidPen requests that the Court strike Ms. Lu's opposition for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3(a). The Court exercises its discretion to resolve MidPen's motion on the merits.

2.   For the purposes of defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint.

3.   The Court may take judicial notice of documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

4.   The Court may take judicial notice of filings in other court proceedings. United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).

P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge