VIRAL DRM LLC v. DOMINGUEZ (2026)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE

Re: Dkt. No. 27

In this copyright-infringement action, plaintiffs Viral DRM LLC, Michael Brandon Clement, Jonathan Petramala, and Reed Timmer allege that defendants Daniel Salvador Aguila Dominguez and El Universal, Compania Periodistica Nacional, S.A. de C.V. unlawfully distributed plaintiffs' copyrighted video content on YouTube. Defendants reside in Mexico, and plaintiffs have apparently been unable to serve them through Mexico's central authority as required under the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents. Now before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for alternative service. For the reasons below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs commenced this action in September 2024 and filed their operative amended complaint in March 2025. They assert that since that time they “have diligently been trying to serve Defendants, who reside in Mexico.” As plaintiffs' motion recounts:

On March 25, 2025, Plaintiffs sent the Amended Complaint and associated documents to a translator to translate the documents in accordance with the Hague Convention. On April 16, 2025, Plaintiffs received the translated documents from the translator. On April 24, 2025, Plaintiffs' Hague Convention Service Documents were received by FedEx and sent to Customs in Mexico. On May 23, 2025, after nearly a month delay, the package was released from Customs and it was delivered to Mexico's Central Authority/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On July 29, 2025, Plaintiffs' [counsel] received a letter from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ․ Among other things, the letter claims deficiencies in Plaintiffs' translations of the documents and the number of copies provided to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Immediately after receiving this letter, [they] began working to correct the deficiencies.

On August 19, 2025, Plaintiffs' [counsel] shipped the documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ․ On February 11, 2026, Plaintiffs' [counsel] received a letter from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated January 9, 2026. The letter states service was not completed because Plaintiffs failed to “submit the model form with the original signature of that office.”

Plaintiffs insist that the Mexican government's letter “is factually inaccurate” and that they “fully complied with th[e] requirement” to submit a model form with an original signature. They therefore assert that the Mexican authorities have impermissibly refused to serve defendants, leaving plaintiffs “without any recourse absent an order for alternative service from the Court.” Plaintiffs ask the Court to authorize service upon defendants by email and by publication of the complaint and related filings on a designated website.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs move for alternative service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), under which the Court may authorize service on “an individual ․ not within any judicial district of the United States” using “means not prohibited by international agreement[.]” The Court denies the motion for two reasons: The Hague Convention prohibits plaintiffs' requested modes of alternative service, and plaintiffs have not sufficiently established a need for alternative service.

I. The Hague Convention, and thus Rule 4(f)(3), bars plaintiffs' requested modes of service upon defendants residing in Mexico.

Both Mexico and the United States are parties to the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention “provides for three principal forms of service: (a) through the receiving country's central authority, Arts. 2–7; (2) through various alternative methods like consular channels, service on judicial officers, or service through ‘postal channels,’ so long as the receiving country has not objected to such methods, Arts. 8–10; and (3) through methods to which the receiving country has affirmatively agreed or authorized, Arts. 11, 19.” Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Fenda USA Inc., 734 F. Supp. 3d 960, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2024). Email and website publication, the two forms of alternative service plaintiffs ask this Court to authorize, are not listed as alternative methods.

As plaintiffs acknowledge, Mexico has neither affirmatively agreed to allowing service by email or website publication nor specifically objected thereto. Plaintiffs argue that absent a specific objection from the Mexican government, the Hague Convention does not prohibit such forms of service. District courts in this circuit are split on the issue of whether defendants may be served in a foreign country that is a signatory to the Hague Convention using alternative service methods that are not mentioned in the convention and which the foreign country has not affirmatively agreed to allow. See id. at 963; Facebook, Inc. v. 9 Xiu Network (Shenzhen) Technology Co., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 3d 977, 984 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (collecting cases).

This Court agrees with those that have concluded that the Hague Convention does not permit alternative service in these circumstances. See, e.g., Cadence Design, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 963–65; Xiu Network, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 980–87. First, the text of the Hague Convention does not contemplate service by email or website publication. As noted above, these methods of service are not among the enumerated methods for which the Convention expressly provides. “It is difficult to understand why the Hague Service Convention would specifically enumerate the authorized methods of service, and the situations in which alternate service could be permitted, if the signatory countries were free to simply authorize additional alternate methods under their local laws at will.” Id. at 964. Further, the Convention states that it “shall apply in all cases ․ where there is occasion to transmit a judicial ․ document for service abroad.” Art. I (emphasis added). “Using a method of service that is not enumerated in the Convention would be tantamount to not ‘apply[ing]’ the Convention, which is expressly prohibited.” Xiu Network, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 983; see also Anova Applied Elecs., Inc. v. Hong King Grp., Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 465, 472 (D. Mass. 2020) (“To permit service by e-mail would bypass the means of service set forth in the Convention.”).

The Supreme Court has twice suggested as much. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the Court authorized alternative service upon a defendant's domestic subsidiary, concluding that this form of service did not need to comply with the Hague Convention because it did not involve sending documents abroad. But the Court noted that “[i]f service of process in this case f[ell] within Article 1 of the Convention, the trial court should have granted [the defendant]'s motion to quash,” indicating that the Convention would not permit the use of any unenumerated alternative. 486 U.S. 694, 699, 707, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988). And in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, the Court considered “whether the Convention prohibit[s] service by mail.” 581 U.S. 271, 273, 137 S.Ct. 1504, 197 L.Ed.2d 826 (2017). The Court explained that “the Hague Service Convention specifies certain approved methods of service and ‘pre-empts inconsistent methods of service’ wherever it applies.” Id. (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698, 108 S.Ct. 2104). Because the Convention expressly authorizes service “by postal channels” unless a country affirmatively objects to that method, the Court concluded that mail-service was not prohibited. Id. at 280–81, 137 S.Ct. 1504. But the Court's reasoning suggested that unenumerated methods like email service are prohibited.

Second, reading the Hague Convention to prohibit unenumerated methods of service to which a signatory country has not affirmatively consented “is also consistent with its purpose.” Cadence Design, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 964. As another court in this district has explained:

The preamble to the Convention states that its purpose is to “create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time” and “to improve the organisation of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure.” As such, the Convention requires service through a “central authority” to ensure that service occurs “in the manner prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698, 108 S.Ct. 2104. If each signatory country could authorize alternate methods of service that were unfamiliar to foreign defendants and had not been agreed upon by their receiving countries, the core purpose of the treaty would be undermined. China, for example, could authorize methods of serving American defendants that would be unfamiliar in this country and would be unlikely to give American defendants notice of the claims against them. Indeed, before the Convention, “certain civil-law countries authorized methods of service that failed to give notice to the American defendant, thereby creating the risk that an American defendant would suffer a default judgment in that country without having had an opportunity to defend the claim.” DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981). The Convention sought to mitigate against that danger by requiring service abroad in a manner compliant with local law. Id. Allowing each signatory to authorize new and unfamiliar methods of service not agreed upon in the Convention and not compliant with local law would defeat that purpose.

Id. at 964–65.

Plaintiffs do not meaningfully engage with these textual or purposive arguments. Instead, they rely principally on Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). There, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court was within its discretion to authorize alternate service by email on a defendant in Costa Rica under Rule 4(f)(3). But Costa Rica is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, so Rio does not address whether email service is “prohibited by” the convention so as to preclude such service under Rule 4(f)(3). See Cadence Design, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 965.

Because the Hague Convention is best read to prohibit alternate methods of service that are not specifically enumerated in the convention, the convention prohibits serving defendants by email or website publication unless an exception applies. The convention provides for exceptions in cases of urgency, where a receiving country refuses to complete service for impermissible reasons, or if the receiving central authority does not return the required certificate showing it has completed service for more than six months. See id.; see also Arts. 13, 15.

Plaintiffs argue that the exception for impermissible refusals to serve applies here. But they have not provided evidence showing as much. As detailed above, the Mexican authority sent plaintiffs a letter stating that plaintiffs failed to “submit the model form with the original signature of that office,” as is required for the Mexican authority to complete service. Plaintiffs argue that this was an “impermissible” refusal to serve because, as their counsel attested, “[p]laintiffs fully complied with this requirement and all other requirements for service of process via the Hague [Convention].” But this conclusory statement by plaintiffs' counsel, without more, is not sufficient to discredit the Mexican government's statement that plaintiffs failed to submit the required model form with the correct signature. Perhaps if plaintiffs had attached a copy of the form they submitted, it would be possible to assess whether the Mexican central authority's letter were accurate, but plaintiffs did not do so. And if it is in fact true that plaintiffs mistakenly failed to submit the required documents, Mexico's refusal to serve defendants is hardly for an “impermissible reason.” (Indeed, if the letter is accurate, the Mexican authority has not “refused” to serve defendants at all—it has simply instructed that plaintiffs must first satisfy the requirements to effect service.)

In sum, the Hague Convention does not permit service by email or website publication in Mexico unless an exception applies, and plaintiffs have not established that the exception for “impermissible” refusals applies. As a result, service by email or website publication is “prohibited by international agreement” for purposes of Rule 4(f)(3), and the Court lacks discretion to authorize service by those methods on defendants.

II. Even if the Court had discretion, plaintiffs have not shown that alternative service is warranted.

That the Hague Convention prohibits service upon defendants by email and publication is reason enough to deny plaintiffs' motion. But even if plaintiffs' requested modes of service were permissible under the Hague Convention, the Court would deny the motion because plaintiffs have not established that alternative service by any method is warranted. Plaintiffs argue that alternative service is needed only because the Mexican central authority refused to serve defendants despite plaintiffs' satisfaction of all the Hague Convention requirements. But as already discussed plaintiffs have not conclusively shown that they met those requirements. Based on the available record, it appears as likely that plaintiffs inadvertently failed to submit the correct model form with the required signature, and that the Mexican government would serve defendants upon receipt of the correct documents.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for alternative service is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge