VALTRUS INNOVATIONS LTD v. GOOGLE LLC (2026)

ORDER DENYING RELIEF UNDER RULES 59(E) AND 60(B)

Re: Dkt. No. 385

This action involves two consolidated cases originally filed in the Northern District of Texas. In the first case (“Valtrus I”), plaintiff Valtrus Innovations, Ltd. asserted claims against defendant Google LLC for alleged infringement of six patents. But while that case was pending, Valtrus realized that its failure to join its parent company Key Patent Innovations Ltd.—which held all exclusionary rights to the asserted patents—might doom its claims to dismissal for lack of standing. So even though Valtrus I had yet to be dismissed, Valtrus filed a new case (“Valtrus II”) asserting identical patent-infringement claims against Google but adding Key Patent as a co-plaintiff. The cases were consolidated by the Texas court and subsequently transferred to this district. On motions by Google, this Court dismissed Valtrus I for lack of Article III standing and dismissed Valtrus II based on claim splitting.

Plaintiffs now move for relief from the Court's order dismissing Valtrus II and the resulting judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). They argue that where, as here, a first-filed action is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, no later-filed action can ever constitute claim splitting. Plaintiffs therefore ask the Court to reverse its dismissal of Valtrus II based on claim splitting. The Court denies the motion for two reasons.

First, plaintiffs could have but did not meaningfully raise this argument prior to the entry of judgment. Rule 59(e) does not permit a party to “raise arguments ․ for the first time when the party could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Nor does Rule 60(b) require a district court to consider “new arguments raised after final judgment which could have been raised earlier.” Schanen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 762 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir.), reaff'd as modified by, 798 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1985); see also San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (explaining that neither Rule 60(b)(1) nor (b)(6) is a proper vehicle to raise arguments that were available before the entry of judgment), aff'd sub nom. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. United States, 672 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2012). Yet until plaintiffs' latest motion, none of their briefing in this action ever asserted that the dismissal of Valtrus I would obviate the claim-splitting concerns posed by Valtrus II. The only prior reference to this argument came at the hearing on Google's motions to dismiss, at which plaintiffs' counsel stated that if the Court did not “ha[ve] Article III jurisdiction from the outset of Valtrus I, ․ there's no claim splitting with Valtrus II because there are no claims that the Court can deal with in Valtrus I.” An argument raised only at a hearing, and even then in a cursory fashion without any citation to supporting authority, is waived. See Mobley v. Workday, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 3d 796, 811 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (citing Booth v. United States, 914 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2019)); see also United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Arguments made in passing and not supported by citations to the record or to case authority are generally deemed waived.”)

Plaintiffs' arguments that their new argument could not reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation are unavailing. As the Court explained in its prior order, “[t]he record is clear that Valtrus and Key Patent feared that Valtrus I would be dismissed for lack of standing and, rather than waiting to refile after such dismissal, they filed Valtrus II to preserve a longer damages period.” Dkt. No. 380 at 14. Plaintiffs thus knew (or at least suspected) that Valtrus I might be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds from the outset of Valtrus II, well before Google moved to dismiss Valtrus II based on claim splitting. And Google first asserted that Valtrus lacked standing to pursue Valtrus I in January 2025, see Dkt. No. 228 at 12–15, one month before plaintiffs filed their opposition to Google's motion to dismiss Valtrus II on claim-splitting grounds, see Dkt. No. 65, Valtrus Innovations Ltd. v. Google LLC, No. 24-CV-1795 (N.D. Tex.). So by the time plaintiffs filed that opposition, they were well aware of the circumstances relevant to their argument that the dismissal of Valtrus I for lack of standing would preclude Google's claim-splitting defense in Valtrus II. And most of the authority on which plaintiffs now rely was available well before the December 2025 hearing on Google's motions to dismiss—certainly early enough for plaintiffs to file a notice of supplementary authority. See, e.g., Sound Around, Inc. v. O'Donnell, No. 23-12479, 2025 WL 2887175, at *8 (11th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (updated October 2024). In sum, nothing prevented plaintiffs from raising their new argument in the briefing submitted to the Texas court or to this Court prior to the entry of final judgment in Valtrus II. It is far too late for them to do so now.

Second, even if plaintiffs' new argument were properly before the Court, it would fail. The Court stands by the reasoning in its prior order, and at least two courts of appeal have affirmed dismissals based on claim splitting where, as here, a plaintiff filed a second action before the dismissal of a first-filed action for lack of standing. See Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1236 (11th Cir. 2021); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiffs' purportedly contrary authorities do not alter the Court's conclusion. Plaintiffs point to the recent decision in Medtronic Ireland Mfg. Unlimited Co. v. Recor Med., Inc., No. 25-cv-05881 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026), Dkt. No. 76. But that case held only that no claim splitting occurred where a plaintiff filed a second action after the entry of a final judgment in the first action but while the first action was being appealed. See id. at 6–9. Nothing in Recor suggests that the circumstances here—a second case filed while the first action was still pending in the district court—do not amount to claim splitting.

Nor does § 26(1)(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which instructs that the general rule against claim splitting does not apply where “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts.” As the relevant comment makes clear, this exception concerns “formal barriers” that categorically prevent a court from assessing claims of a particular type or awarding relief of a particular form. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 cmt. c. For example, a plaintiff's filing of a first action “in a state court under a state antitrust law” would not prevent the “commence[ment] [of] an action in a federal court upon the same facts, charging violations of federal antitrust laws, of which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.” Id.; see also United States v. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 55 F.2d 753, 782 (9th Cir. 1932) (holding that the “rule as to splitting causes” did not apply where a “congressional mandate limited the first action” to claims challenging “specified” leases such that the plaintiff could not “include the instant leases in the first suit”). No such formal barriers existed in Valtrus I, as this Court generally has jurisdiction to entertain the patent-infringement claims plaintiffs assert and to award the relief they seek. The only barrier to plaintiffs' pursuit of their claims in Valtrus I was their own decision not to include Key Patent as a plaintiff. The rule against claim splitting offers no exception for such strategic blunders.

Finally, plaintiffs cite the Eleventh Circuit's unpublished decision in Sound Around, which held that “the rule against claim splitting could not have barred” a second-filed action where the first-filed action was later dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 2025 WL 2887175, at *8. That decision does not bind district courts in the Eleventh Circuit, let alone this Court. And it appears to conflict with the Eleventh Circuit's published opinion in Kennedy, which affirmed the dismissal on claim-splitting grounds of a second action filed during the pendency of a first action that was later dismissed for lack of standing. See 998 F.3d at 1226, 1236.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for relief under Rule 59(e) and 60(b) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge