MCENTEE v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION (2026)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 11

In this employment action, plaintiff Dianne McEntee alleges that defendant Santa Clara County Office of Education (SCCOE) terminated her in retaliation for McEntee's opposition to conduct by her supervisor that she believed violated federal or state law, union contracts, or California rules concerning public employees. McEntee asserts claims under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h), (j), and (k); and California Labor Code § 1102.5. Now before the Court is SCCOE's motion to dismiss McEntee's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, SCCOE's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

McEntee was formerly the Director of Human Resources Programs for SCCOE.¹ Beginning in May 2024, McEntee began reporting to Dr. Kushwinder Gill, SCCOE's newly hired Assistant Superintendent of Personnel Services. McEntee alleges that, over the next year, she observed or heard about Gill engaging in various acts that McEntee “reasonably believed ․ violated state or federal law or local rules” concerning employment discrimination, union contracts, and the rights of public employees. After McEntee repeatedly raised concerns about this conduct to Gill or higher-ups, Gill terminated McEntee in March 2025.

One of McEntee's alleged complaints to Gill is particularly relevant here. In January 2025, several employees “reported to McEntee that two supervisors who had been found to be racially discriminatory towards the employees were being returned to their unit.” McEntee, who “had been the investigator of the discrimination complaints,” had “earlier stated to Gill her concern about the racially discriminatory actions of the supervisors, the trauma to the affected employees, and that SCCOE could not have the supervisors return to the program.” So when McEntee received confirmation that “one of the discriminators had returned to the program,” she notified Gill, “stated her strong opposition to this continued discrimination against the employees[,] and insisted SCCOE take corrective action to remove the discriminator immediately.” Gill responded that she was already aware of the individual's return to the program and that it was “not her fault, out of her hands, ․ returning the discriminator was [another person's decision] ․ [and] the matter was over.” Id. When this incident was later raised to the personnel department, Gill first “blamed McEntee” and then “blamed another employee” before “withdr[awing] the accusation” when McEntee “suggested that they look at the emails to determine who was at fault.” Gill terminated McEntee within two months of this incident.

Following her termination, McEntee filed charges of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and the California Civil Rights Department. She received right-to-sue letters from both entities in June 2025. McEntee then commenced this action, alleging that SCCOE terminated her in retaliation for protected conduct in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); FEHA, Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h); and California Labor Code § 1102.5. Her complaint also asserts a derivative claim that SCCOE failed to prevent her unlawful termination by Gill in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k). SCCOE now moves to dismiss McEntee's complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” If the complaint fails to state a claim, the defendant may move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dismissal is required if the plaintiff fails to allege facts allowing the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2009). While legal conclusions “can provide the [complaint's] framework,” the Court will not assume they are correct unless adequately “supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).

ANALYSIS

McEntee asserts four claims against SCCOE under Title VII and various provisions of California's FEHA and Labor Code. But the same core allegation suffices to plead each of these claims: SCCOE retaliated against McEntee for opposing and reporting the return of a known discriminator to the same unit as his victims, which McEntee reasonably believed violated Title VII and FEHA. The Court explains the legal framework underlying McEntee's claims before turning to the sufficiency of her allegations.

McEntee asserts two claims for retaliation under Title VII and FEHA. Title VII's anti-retaliation provision prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by th[at]” statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). FEHA's analogous provision provides that “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice ․ for any employer ․ to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden” by FEHA. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h). The same framework applies to both claims. See Earl v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation” under either Title VII or FEHA, McEntee must allege “(1) a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 12 Cal. App. 5th 1168, 1193, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 42 (2017). For the third element, Title VII requires a showing of but-for causation, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013), while FEHA requires a plaintiff to show only that her protected conduct was a “substantial motivating factor” in the challenged employment action, Alamo v. Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp., 219 Cal. App. 4th 466, 469–70, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 (2013).

McEntee also asserts a claim under FEHA for failure to prevent Gill's retaliatory termination of McEntee. FEHA imposes liability on employers who “fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring,” including through unlawful retaliation. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k). A failure-to-prevent-retaliation claim under § 12940(k) is dependent on a claim for actual retaliation. See Martin v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State. Univ., 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 173, 315 Cal.Rptr.3d 117 (2023); Trujillo v. N. County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 289, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 596 (1998). Here, SCCOE argues that McEntee's § 12940(k) claim fails only because McEntee fails to state a claim for actual retaliation under § 12940(h). In other words, McEntee's claim for failure to prevent retaliation rises and falls with her direct retaliation claims.

Finally, McEntee asserts a claim for whistleblower retaliation under California Labor Code § 1102.5. “Section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities.” Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 12 Cal.5th 703, 709, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 572, 503 P.3d 659 (2022). “As relevant here, section 1102.5 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for sharing information the employee ‘has reasonable cause to believe ․ discloses a violation of state or federal statute’ or of ‘a local, state, or federal rule or regulation’ with a government agency, with a person with authority over the employee, or with another employee who has authority to investigate or correct the violation.” Id. (quoting Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b)). As with Title VII and FEHA, stating a claim for whistleblower retaliation under § 1102.5 requires a plaintiff to show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) her employer subjected her to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the two. See id. §§ 1102.5(b), 1102.6; Lawson, 12 Cal.5th at 718, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 572, 503 P.3d 659. But unlike Title VII and FEHA, § 1102.5(b) requires only that the protected activity be a “contributing factor” to the adverse employment action. See Lawson, 12 Cal.5th at 718, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 572, 503 P.3d 659.

In sum, McEntee can state each of her claims by alleging that she engaged in protected activity that caused an adverse employment action. SCCOE does not dispute that McEntee has plausibly alleged an adverse employment action (i.e., her termination). Nor does SCCOE dispute that McEntee has alleged a sufficient causal connection between her termination and the activity detailed in the complaint. The only question, then, is whether any of the activity McEntee alleges in the complaint is protected by Title VII, FEHA, and § 1102.5. The answer is yes.

“Protected activity” for purposes of Title VII and FEHA includes “activity intended to oppose an employer's discriminatory practices.” Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003). Critically, opposition to an employer's potentially discriminatory conduct is protected under Title VII even if the conduct is not prohibited by that statute—Title VII “protects an employee who opposes employer conduct in the mistaken but reasonable belief that the conduct is unlawful.” Maner v. Dignity Health, 9 F.4th 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2021). The same rule applies under FEHA. See Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 477, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 (1992). Section 1102.5 similarly protects “an employee [who] shar[es] information the employee ‘has reasonable cause to believe ․ discloses a violation of a state or federal statute ․ with a person with authority over the employee, or with another employee who has authority to investigate or correct the violation.” Lawson, 12 Cal.5th at 709, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 572, 503 P.3d 659 (quoting Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b)).

Here, McEntee alleges that she engaged in protected activity by opposing SCCOE's decision to allow a supervisor who had previously engaged in racial discrimination against other employees to return to the same unit as those employees. Upon learning of the supervisor's return, McEntee “reported [that fact] to Gill, who was responsible for such issues, ․ stated her strong opposition to this continued discrimination against the employees[,] and insisted SCCOE take corrective action to remove the discriminator immediately.” As the complaint explains, McEntee “reasonably believed” this and other conduct “violated state or federal law,” including “Title VII[ ] and [FEHA].” In other words, because McEntee believed that returning the supervisor to his unit constituted “continued discrimination” prohibited by Title VII and FEHA, she reported the supervisor's return to Gill in an effort to oppose and reverse the decision. That is precisely the sort of activity that Title VII, FEHA, and § 1102.5 protect.

SCCOE's counterarguments are unavailing.

First, SCCOE argues that the return of a supervisor who previously engaged in discrimination or harassment does not alone violate Title VII or FEHA. That is likely correct. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881–82 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Title VII does not require employers to fire all harassers.”). But it is not fatal to McEntee's claims. As explained above, McEntee need only allege that she reasonably believed that the reported conduct violated Title VII and FEHA, even if that belief was mistaken.

Second, SCCOE argues in its reply that McEntee simply “does not allege that she reasonably believed that returning the supervisor would violate Title VII or FEHA.” Yet in its second paragraph, the complaint states that McEntee “reasonably believed Gill violated state or federal law,” specifically including Title VII and FEHA. And the complaint notes that McEntee opposed the supervisor's return because it was “continued discrimination” against the employees in the supervisor's unit, further suggesting that McEntee believed returning the supervisor to violate Title VII and FEHA.

Third, SCCOE suggested at the hearing on its motion that McEntee's alleged belief that returning the supervisor would violate Title VII or FEHA was unreasonable in light of McEntee's role as a human-resources specialist. SCCOE contends that, even if an ordinary employee might believe the return of a known discriminator to the workplace to be unlawful, a specialist tasked with investigating discrimination would know better. But “[t]he reasonableness of [a plaintiff]'s belief that an unlawful employment practice occurred must be assessed according to an objective standard—one that makes due allowance, moreover, for the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their claims.” Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994). Common sense suggests that many ordinary employees would understand Title VII and FEHA to prohibit an employer from subjecting victims of past discrimination to the continued supervision of its perpetrator. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (explaining that courts may “draw on ․ common sense” in assessing the plausibility of an allegation). SCCOE has not argued otherwise. In any case, were the Court to assess the reasonableness of McEntee's alleged belief by reference to her unique job position, nothing in the complaint suggests that an ordinary human-resource professional would know the minutiae of antidiscrimination law.

Finally, SCCOE argues that McEntee's § 1102.5 claim fails because her complaint does not identify the specific statute that she believed had been violated. “Although there is some split of authority, the majority of courts require plaintiffs bringing section 1102.5(b) claims to allege the specific rule, regulation or statute they reasonably believed had been violated, and the factual basis for their reasonable belief.” La v. San Mateo County Transit Dist., No. 14-CV-01768, 2014 WL 4632224, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (collecting cases). That is because doing so may be necessary to “give the defendant fair notice” of the grounds for the plaintiff's claimed belief that reported conduct was unlawful. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). But here, McEntee's complaint does not “completely fail[ ] to connect the misconduct she allegedly disclosed to a specific ․ statute,” as would deprive SCCOE of notice of the nature of her claimed belief. Id. As already described, the complaint opens with an allegation that “McEntee reported Gill's attempt to violate or violation of ․ Title VII[ ] and [FEHA],” among other statutes that do not concern race discrimination. The complaint later recounts McEntee's alleged complaints about the return of the supervisor who had previously engaged in race discrimination. On the very next page, after describing McEntee's termination, the complaint asserts her Title VII claim on the sole ground that SCCOE “retaliated against [McEntee] because of her complaints about and opposition to race discrimination” prohibited by that statute. Taken together, these allegations give sufficient notice to SCCOE that McEntee believed the complained-of conduct violated Title VII, if not FEHA. And were the complaint unclear, McEntee “use[s] her opposition brief to clarify the specific statutes ․ that [she believed] were violated.” La, 2014 WL 4632224, at *6; see also Madrid v. Cnty. of Mono, No. 2:13-CV-01715, 2014 WL 2889910, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (suggesting that a plaintiff cured any failure to identify the specific statute he believed was violated by doing so in his opposition to a motion to dismiss).

The complaint plausibly alleges that McEntee believed the conduct she reported to Gill constituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII and FEHA, and that belief was plausibly reasonable. McEntee has therefore alleged that she engaged in protected activity for purposes of Title VII, FEHA, and California Labor Code § 1102.5(b). SCCOE does not dispute that McEntee has adequately pleaded the remaining elements of her retaliation claims under those statutes. And McEntee's derivative failure-to-prevent-retaliation claim under FEHA rises and falls with the other claims. As a result, each of McEntee's claims is viable based on her alleged reports of suspected race discrimination. The Court therefore need not address the sufficiency of the other legal theories and factual allegations underlying McEntee's § 1102.5 claim. See Est. of Verdugo v. City of El Centro, No. 20-CV-2458, 2022 WL 16577870, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2022) (“[A] cause of action should not be dismissed if it states a claim under any legal theory, even if there are other theories alleged.” (citing Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1985))); Surgical Instrument Serv. Co. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[On] a motion to dismiss[,] a court dismisses claims, not allegations”).²

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, SCCOE's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For the purpose of SCCOE's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in McEntee's complaint.

2.   For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this order suggests that the additional legal theories and factual allegations in the complaint are deficient. At the least, McEntee's allegations concerning her opposition to perceived violations of the union contract appear to provide an independent basis for relief under § 1102.5. McEntee may pursue all of the theories of retaliation articulated in her complaint going forward.

P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge