SAMITA BHANDARY v. JULIE EMEDE (2025)

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On July 11, 2025, self-represented Plaintiff Samita Bhandary filed this action and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 1 (the “Complaint”), No. 2 (the “IFP Application”). In the complaint, Plaintiff claims that she was labeled a “vexatious litigant” in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Plaintiff claims that her designation as a vexatious litigant violates her rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. She asserts one cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Judge Julie A. Emede of the Santa Clara County Superior Court.

Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 3 (the “Motion”). Plaintiff asks this Court for “a preliminary injunction staying or lifting the vexatious litigant restriction for such time as the Court deems just and necessary to allow urgent relief motions” in state court. Motion at 4. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests “a declaratory judgment that the enforcement of the vexatious designation is unconstitutional as applied.” Id.

Having considered Plaintiff's IFP Application, the Application is GRANTED. In this Order, the Court screens the complaint and finds that it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Because the complaint fails to state a claim, Plaintiff has not met the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the Court denies the motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. THE COMPLAINT IS DEFICIENT

Section 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Here, Plaintiff asserts one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff's sole cause of action against Defendant seeks injunctive relief. Compl. ¶ 6 (“Plaintiff seeks only prospective, injunctive relief.”). However, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege that her Section 1983 claim is based on a declaratory decree, nor does she allege that declaratory relief was unavailable. Miroyan v. Manley, No. 16-cv-00958-JCS (PR), 2016 WL 2606727, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2016) (dismissing Section 1983 claim because the complaint did not support an inference “that a declaratory decree was violated, or that declaratory relief was unavailable”). Because Defendant is immune from Plaintiff's injunctive relief claim, the complaint must be dismissed.¹

Additionally, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Plaintiff challenges her designation as a vexatious litigant on due process and equal protection grounds. But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that California's vexatious litigant statute does not deny due process nor equal protection. Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391 et seq.). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any non-conclusory facts to show that the vexatious litigant statute is unconstitutional as applied to her. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed on the additional ground that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an element of her Section 1983 claim.

II. THE COURT GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

Because this is the Court's first ruling on the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claim, and because Plaintiff is self-represented, the Court GRANTS leave to amend the complaint. However, Plaintiff is advised that the Court may dismiss the complaint without granting further leave to amend if Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a claim in her amended complaint.

The Court also advises Plaintiff that the District Court has a guide for pro se litigants called Representing Yourself in Federal Court: A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants (https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-handbook/), which provides instructions on how to proceed with a civil case. Plaintiff can access the guide, and additional resources for pro se litigants, on the Northern District Court's website (https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/).

III. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION IS DENIED

Plaintiff's Motion must be denied for three reasons.

First, the Court “may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). Plaintiff has not filed any proof that notice of the Motion was provided to Defendant. Thus, the Motion is improper.

Second, as discussed above, Section 1983 prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions against judicial officers, absent circumstances that are not present here. Therefore, the Court lacks the authority to issue Plaintiff's requested injunction. Plaintiff argues that the Court may enjoin Defendant's orders under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But, as discussed above, Plaintiff challenges conduct performed within Defendant's judicial capacity. Thus, Ex Parte Young does not allow this Court to issue an injunction. Munoz v. Super. Ct., 91 F.4th 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2024).

Third, Plaintiff has not satisfied the standard for obtaining the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Among other elements, Plaintiff must establish that she is likely to succeed on the merits. Id. at 20. Alternatively, Plaintiff must raise “serious questions going to the merits” of her claim and show that “the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the movant's] favor.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). To raise serious questions, the movant's claim must be more than just “plausible.” Where Do We Go Berkeley v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 32 F.4th 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim. Therefore, by definition, Plaintiff has not raised serious questions going to the merits of her claim, and she has not demonstrated a likelihood of success. Because this element is lacking, Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.

For these reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP Application.

2. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. Upon review of the complaint, the Court finds it does not state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint by August 18, 2025. If the amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies discussed in this Order, the Court may issue an order dismissing the complaint without leave to amend.

3. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff purports to bring this case against Defendant “in her official and individual capacities.” Compl. ¶ 6. But all of the allegations in the complaint relate to official judicial conduct. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges judicial orders denying Plaintiff's motions in state court. See id. ¶ 8. Therefore, the complaint does not allege any conduct that falls outside the scope of Section 1983's prohibition against claims for injunctive relief against a judicial officer.

Eumi K. Lee United States District Judge