LISA BLUEMEL v. CONDUENT STATE LOCAL SOLUTIONS INC (2026)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs Lisa Bluemel, Hudson Cockroft, Wes King, Kathy Stearns, and Jeffrey Klee bring this class action complaint against defendant Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that Conduent violated various California consumer protection laws while operating a website for the California Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”). Conduent now moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike certain portions of the complaint under Rule 12(f). For the following reasons, Conduent's motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

California's state parks span the rugged Lost Coast, groves of ancient redwoods and giant sequoias, ghost towns lingering in a state of arrested decay, and the meandering coastline of Lake Tahoe. California's legislature has determined that these landscapes “deserve to be preserved and managed for the benefit and inspiration of all state residents and visitors to the state parks.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5001. To achieve those ends, DPR was given control over the state park system, id., and ownership of all fees for the use of any state park, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5010.1 (a), (b).

This case involves claims about ReserveCalifornia.com, a booking interface used by DPR to manage state park resources. Defendant Conduent designed and operated the website for DPR from August 2017 until August 2024.¹ According to an exhibit attached to the complaint, Conduent agreed, among other responsibilities, to “develop, implement ․ operate, support, [and] maintain” a reservations sale service; to design the website; and to “provide the capability to accurately process sales transactions,” including those for camping, tours, programs, rentals, and merchandise.² Conduent also agreed to indemnify the State from any claims arising from Conduent's conduct. In exchange, Conduent was paid a fee for each booking completed through the website and a percentage of the revenue generated through certain field sales. Conduent invoiced DPR each month for the amount it was owed under that formula.

Users booking a campsite on ReserveCalifornia.com would search for a location, choose among listed campgrounds, and pick a campsite available on their preferred date. The price-per-night (such as “As little as $36”) was displayed for each campsite and continued to be displayed throughout the reservation process. It was only at the final check-out screen that a “reservation fee” of $7.99 was added to the underlying price-per-night. The plaintiffs, all citizens of California, used the website to reserve campsites in California's state park system. All but one of plaintiffs' reservations were made prior to July 1, 2024.

Plaintiffs allege that the last minute, mandatory reservation fees and the “bait and switch” advertising used to obscure them are illegal under California law. By omitting such “junk” fees (as the FTC characterizes certain fees added to listed prices) from the advertised price, Conduent allegedly induced consumers to pay a higher price than they otherwise would have. Plaintiffs seek relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and California's False Advertising Law (“FAL”).

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules require a complaint to include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If the complaint does not do so, the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is required if the plaintiff fails to allege facts allowing the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2009). While legal conclusions “can provide the [complaint's] framework,” the Court will not assume they are correct unless adequately “supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Materials attached to the complaint may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A [district] court may [ ] consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”). A court need not accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to and thus incorporated within the complaint. Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

A party may move to strike any “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” from a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are generally disfavored,” and should only be granted if the stricken matter could not possibly bear on the litigation. Gutzalenko v. City of Richmond, 723 F. Supp. 3d 748, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2024). Motions to strike should be viewed in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. If there is any doubt as to the relevancy of the material, then the court should deny the motion. Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims on two grounds: first, because plaintiffs are purportedly precluded from asserting claims under the UCL and FAL while simultaneously pursuing a CLRA claim that provides an adequate legal remedy; and second, because plaintiffs fail to allege that Conduent is responsible for any violation of their rights under the CLRA.

A. Plaintiffs' UCL and FCL Claims

A federal court cannot award equitable restitution under state law if an adequate legal remedy exists. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff therefore must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before seeking restitution under either the UCL or FAL. Id. at 844; see also Nacarino v. KSF Acquisition Corp., 642 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2022). Here, plaintiffs seek legal damages under the CLRA while also seeking equitable restitution and disgorgement of the reservation fees under the UCL and FAL for the same conduct.

While some courts allow for pleading in the alternative, other courts—including this one—require plaintiffs to plausibly allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law when asserting a UCL or FAL claim as an alternative to a separately pleaded legal claim providing a seemingly overlapping remedy. Weizman v. Talkspace, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 3d 984, 990 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2023); see also Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp.3d 869, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“I and many other district judges applying Sonner have understood it to require that a plaintiff must, at a minimum, plead that she lacks adequate remedies at law if she seeks equitable relief.”). Plaintiffs fail to make even the barest allegation of an inadequate legal remedy in their complaint. The Court therefore grants Conduent's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' UCL and FAL claims for failure to allege an inadequate remedy at law, while also granting plaintiffs leave to include such an allegation in an amended complaint should they be able to do so

B. Plaintiffs' CLRA Claim

The CLRA was enacted to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices. Cal. Civ. Code, § 1760; see Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67, 74 (Cal. 1999). The act lists certain deceptive practices, such as passing off another's services as one's own, making misrepresentations as to the character or condition of goods, advertising goods or services with the intent to not sell them as advertised, and advertising, displaying, or offering a price of a good or service that does not include all mandatory charges. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. All of these involve some underlying deceptive act by a business or an entity selling goods or services to others.

Plaintiffs bring claims under multiple provisions of section 1770(a). Plaintiffs' claims under subsections (a)(1)–(3) and (a)(14) are rooted in their contention that the website led “consumers to believe that the Junk Fees are being paid to [DPR], when in reality, the Junk Fees are kept by Conduent.” Plaintiffs also allege that “Conduent's standardized practice of advertising a price for a reservation when it cannot be made at that price,” violated subsections (a)(5), (a)(9), (a)(14), and (a)(20). Finally, they contend with respect to the single reservation that occurred after July 1, 2024, that Conduent violated (a)(29)(A)(i), the Honest Pricing Act (“HPA”), which prohibits “advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges.”³

Plaintiffs' claims under subsection (a)(1)–(3) and (a)(14) fail because the contract between Conduent and DPR contradicts plaintiffs' claim that Conduent retains the reservation fees. The terms of the contract make clear that Conduent is paid by DPR, not through retention of the fees. See Dkt. 1-1, 993 (“[U]pon receipt and approval of the invoices, the State agrees to compensate the Contractor for the eligible reservation-based transaction fees and a percentage of eligible recreation field sales revenue carried out through the Contractor's services.”). The display of DPR's logo throughout the booking process does not misrepresent the recipient of the junk fees but instead accurately indicates with whom the consumer is dealing.

Plaintiffs' HPA claim fails because that law expressly exempts government-imposed taxes and fees from its coverage. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29)(A)(i) (omitting “[t]axes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction” from CLRA protections). Under the contract between DPR and the defendant, DPR has exclusive control over setting and implementing reservation fees. See Dkt. 1-1, 27 (“[Conduent] shall be capable of charging transaction fees in addition to the base cost of any purchase through [the website]․ Such fees shall be set and implemented solely at the DPR['s] discretion.”). While plaintiffs cite to non-binding case law interpreting the HPA's exception narrowly and limiting it only to government-imposed taxes rather than fees, see Chowning v. Tyler Techs., Inc., No. 4:25-CV-04009-YGR, 2025 WL 3496690, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases), the language of the statute excepts “taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29)(A)(i) (emphasis added).⁴ Ignoring the use of the word “or” belies the disjunctive canon, Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447, 457 (2024) (“The word ‘or’ is almost always disjunctive and is generally used to indicate an alternative.”) (cleaned up), and the rule against surplusage, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (applying the rule to “avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant”). The HPA separately contemplates and excepts both taxes and fees so long as they are imposed by a government. The contract between Conduent and DPR makes clear that the reservation fees are imposed by DPR and thus fall within the HPA's exception.

Plaintiffs' remaining claim is that Conduent violated various CLRA subsections that purportedly prohibited drip pricing and junk fees even before the HPA's effective date. But Conduent likely is not an appropriate defendant as to those claims. The contract between DPR and Conduent suggests that plaintiffs never entered into any transaction with Conduent. Instead, each transaction was between that plaintiff and DPR: In exchange for making a payment (including a reservation fee) to DPR, plaintiffs received the right to use certain DPR property (within a DPR-owned campground) for a specified period of time. While the Conduent-operated website facilitated that transaction, DPR retained exclusive ownership and control over the services sold; the prices of said services, including any fees; the money paid to secure the services; and the advertising that would appear on the website. Plaintiffs have not cited any authority suggesting that the California Legislature intended to subject to CLRA liability every entity that provides the services (for example, payment processing, website design, customer management, and other forms of backend support) that underlie a particular transaction.

In any event, plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the pre-HPA CLRA's alleged prohibition of drip pricing and junk fees does not apply where a vendor lists a price that does not include applicable taxes and instead adds those taxes to the amount due at only some later point. As plaintiffs noted, that is because the vendor has no discretion with respect to those amounts and is instead simply complying with a government mandate. Under the terms of Conduent's contract with DPR, however, the reservation fees at issue here are no different: The presence and amount of any such fee is determined solely by DPR. As noted already, the Legislature expressly excluded such government-imposed fees from the Honest Pricing Act, and nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggests that, in doing so, the Legislature was narrowing the CLRA's scope. Cf. 2023 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 400 (S.B. 478) (noting that the HPA is reflective of existing law because it prohibits practices that were already “prohibited by existing statutes”). Instead, given both plaintiffs' concession regarding taxes and the HPA's government-imposed fee exemption, any CLRA prohibition on drip pricing or junk fees that existed before the HPA's enactment is better interpreted to exclude from its coverage the government-imposed fees at issue here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs fail to allege valid claims under the CLRA, the UCL, or the FAL. Accordingly, Conduent's motion to dismiss is granted. Dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within 35 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed, plaintiffs' CLRA claims with be dismissed with prejudice and plaintiffs' UCL and FAL claims will be dismissed without prejudice but without further leave to amend. Defendant's motion to strike is denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For the purposes of defendants' motion, the Court assumes the truth of the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint and the exhibits thereto.

2.   Plaintiffs attach a copy of the contract between Conduent and DPR to their complaint that includes a detailed scope of work, budget detail and payment provisions, and general terms and conditions. Dkt. 1-1.

3.   The HPA's effective date was July 1, 2024.

4.   Chowning involved almost identical claims against the entity that replaced Conduent as the designer and operator of Reserve California in 2024. Crucially, however, the plaintiffs in Chowning did not attach to their complaint a contract that directly contradicted the allegations therein. In the absence of that contract, the Chowning court concluded that the manner in which the reservation fees were set and distributed presented a factual issue requiring further development of the record.

P. Casey Pitts United States District Judge