JANE DOE v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2025)

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

The City and County of San Francisco (CCSF), Officers Erickson and Mondragon, and Sergeant Polovina move to dismiss Jane Doe's complaint. In the alternative, they seek a more definite statement. Doe's complaint includes an array of claims, all arising from the officers' decision to place her in a psychiatric unit for 72 hours against her will. Some of the claims are based on the theory that the officers lacked probable cause to detain Doe. The complaint plausibly alleges this theory. Other claims have elements that Doe hasn't pleaded adequately. Yet even for those claims, an order directing Doe to provide a more definite statement isn't warranted. The Court will grant in part the motion to dismiss, with leave to amend, and deny the motion for a more definite statement.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2024, a college instructor called CCSF to report that a student, Jane Doe, had indicated that she might harm herself. In response to the call, Officers Brandon Erickson and Andres Mondragon visited Doe's home in San Francisco. Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 22–23, 65.

Doe lived with her partner, who answered the door. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. Doe approached the door, too. Smiling, she said, “Hi, I'm [Jane]. I'm okay.” Id. ¶ 25 (alteration in original). Officer Erickson asked Doe if she felt like hurting herself. She replied, “Not right now.” Id. ¶ 30. “I'm doing ․ okay right now.” Id. ¶ 29. He also asked her when she had last thought of hurting herself. “A couple days ago,” she replied, “[b]ut I'm okay.” Id. ¶ 31. “I've been talking to Kaiser” about medication. Id. ¶ 32. She explained that she had spoken with her doctor the day before and expected the doctor to contact her again later that day. See id.

While Officer Erickson met with Doe, Officer Mondragon spoke with Doe's partner. Her partner explained that Doe had “a long history of suicidal ideation from the time she was a child, that [her behavior] was not out of the norm, that she was taking her medication, that she may feel a little more stress, but that she ha[d] never acted on any such ideation.” Id. ¶ 50. Officer Mondragon shared this assessment with Officer Erickson. Id.

During the officers' visit, SFFD personnel arrived. Their notes indicate that Doe was oriented and didn't show signs of agitation, combativeness, or confusion. Id. ¶ 42. Her level of distress was mild, her acuity was “lower,” and she had “superficial scratches” on her wrist that were “scabbed over.” Id.

After speaking with Doe and her partner, Officers Erickson and Mondragon deliberated over whether to issue an involuntary mental-health hold. In California, when an officer has probable cause to believe that a person is a danger to herself because of a mental illness, the officer may place the person in custody for up to 72 hours for assessment and treatment. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150(a). This practice is referred to as a “5150 hold” or a “72-hour hold.” Siskiyou Hosp., Inc. v. County of Siskiyou, 109 Cal. App. 5th 14, 23 (2025).

Officer Erickson told Officer Mondragon that the 5150 decision was a close call and remarked that if they didn't detain Doe and she later hurt herself, there “could be a problem for” the officers. Compl. ¶ 52. Officer Mondragon agreed and said they needed to “CYA,” meaning “cover your ass.” Id. Officer Erickson ordered the hold. CCSF transported Doe to a psychiatric unit, where she was involuntarily held for three days. Id. ¶¶ 55, 57.

Sergeant Theodore Polovina approved the 5150 hold based on Officer Erickson's police report. Id. ¶ 68. Officer Erickson had reported that “upon arrival” at Doe's home, Doe “was crying” and appeared uneasy. Id. ¶ 27. Officer Erickson also explained that:

Based on [Doe] telling me she hurt herself two days ago, she told [her college instructor] that she hurt herself two days ago, she showed me self-inflicted wounds on her left wrist that were a couple days old and she told [her instructor] that she had suicidal thoughts on a daily basis; I determined that [Doe] was a danger to herself and I placed her on a 72 hour Mental Health Detention Hold.

Id. ¶ 65 (second and third alterations in original).

Doe alleges that Officer Erickson made multiple inaccurate statements in his report. She wasn't crying when he arrived; she began to cry only after he placed her on a 5150 hold. Id. ¶ 27. She didn't tell him she had hurt herself; she said that two days ago, she “thought of hurting herself.” Id. ¶ 31. She didn't show him her wrist wounds until she was in the ambulance, so contrary to what Officer Erickson reported, he didn't rely on the wounds in deciding on the hold. Id. ¶ 66. And Doe's wounds were “superficial scratches” that had “scabbed over,” facts Officer Erickson omitted from his report. Id. ¶ 42.

Officer Erickson also didn't address factors that would have weighed against a 5150 hold, contrary to CCSF training. These mitigating factors included Doe's “repeated comments that she was ‘okay,’ ” id. ¶ 59; her “plan[ ] to speak with her [doctor] that day,” id. ¶ 60; her “long history of suicidal thoughts,” coupled with her track record of “never act[ing] on those thoughts,” id. ¶ 61; and her living situation: she “lived with her partner,” who “was present to monitor and support her,” id. ¶ 63. Also contrary to CCSF training, Officers Erickson and Mondragon didn't consider alternatives to a 5150 hold, such as “voluntary treatment,” id. ¶ 35, or enlisting “mobile civilian response teams,” id. ¶ 40.

After her involuntary commitment, Doe filed this civil action against CCSF, Officers Erickson and Mondragon, and Sergeant Polovina. Her complaint includes 14 claims:

(1) Fourth Amendment violation (Officers Erickson and Mondragon);

(2) Due Process Clause violation (Officers Erickson and Mondragon);

(3) Equal Protection Clause violation (Officers Erickson and Mondragon);

(4) Conspiracy to violate constitutional rights (Officers Erickson and Mondragon);

(5) Supervisory liability (Sergeant Polovina);

(6) Monell liability (CCSF);

(7) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violation (CCSF);

(8) Rehabilitation Act violation (CCSF);

(9) Unruh Civil Rights Act violation (CCSF);

(10) Negligence (Officers Erickson and Mondragon, CCSF);

(11) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (Officers Erickson and Mondragon, CCSF);

(12) Negligent supervision and training (Sergeant Polovina and CCSF);

(13) False arrest and imprisonment (Officers Erickson and Mondragon, CCSF); and

(14) Bane Act violation (Officers Erickson and Mondragon, CCSF).1

Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), and, in the alternative, for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Dkt. 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

On a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the complaint's allegations, construes them in plaintiff's favor, and evaluates whether they state a plausible claim. Fort v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court doesn't credit “conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), or “legal conclusion[s] couched as ․ factual allegation[s],” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting another source).

The burden of persuasion is on the defendant. See Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2015) (“All federal courts are in agreement that the burden is on the moving party to prove that no legally cognizable claim for relief exists.”)). Defendants “must present arguments demonstrating that dismissal is appropriate.” Starks v. County of Los Angeles, 2022 WL 4131699, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2022).

Under Rule 12(e), a defendant may seek a more definite statement if the complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that the [defendant] cannot reasonably prepare a response.”

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

If a police officer detains a person under section 5150 but lacks probable cause to do so, the officer violates the detained person's Fourth Amendment rights. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2007). Probable cause exists “if facts are known to the officer ‘that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that the person detained is mentally disordered and is a danger to himself or herself.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d 283, 288 (1983)).

Based on Doe's account, Officer Erickson plausibly detained her without probable cause to believe she was a danger to herself. Doe had considered harming herself two days before the officers' visit, but she said the thought had passed. She was calm, medicated, and her behavior wasn't “out of the norm.” Compl. ¶ 50. Her partner said she had “a long history of suicidal ideation” but “never acted on any such ideation.” Id. She had depression and suicidal ideation but wasn't in imminent danger of self-harm.

In his police report, Officer Erickson described a more alarming situation. Doe was crying when he arrived, id. ¶ 27; she had “self-inflicted wounds on her left wrist,” id. ¶ 65; she said she had hurt herself two days before; and she told her college instructor that she had daily suicidal thoughts, id. Officer Erickson's account suggested that Doe was on the verge of suicide. But critically, Doe says that Officer Erickson's report was inaccurate. She wasn't crying when he arrived; she didn't admit to hurting herself; and she didn't show him her wounds, which were “superficial scratches” that had “scabbed over,” id. ¶ 42, until after he had placed her on a 5150 hold, id. ¶¶ 27, 31, 66.

On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept Doe's version of events. Fort, 41 F.4th at 1144. Plausibly, based on her account, “a person of ordinary care and prudence” wouldn't have “entertain[ed] a strong suspicion” that she was a danger to herself. Bias, 508 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 288). Officer Erickson, then, plausibly lacked probable cause to detain Doe and violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

Doe claims that Officer Mondragon also violated her Fourth Amendment rights. He “understood that [Officer] Erickson lacked probable cause,” and he had “a realistic opportunity” to intervene to prevent the 5150 hold, but failed to do so. Compl. ¶¶ 82–84. “[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate [a person's] constitutional rights,” but only when they have a “realistic opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation modified). Taking Doe's allegations as true, Officer Mondragon did have a realistic opportunity to intercede. He was on the scene, had access to the same information as Officer Erickson, and deliberated with Officer Erickson. He could have opposed the hold but agreed to it instead.

Doe has stated Fourth Amendment claims against Officers Erickson and Mondragon. The Court denies the motion to dismiss these claims.

B. Due Process and Equal Protection Clause Claims

Doe next alleges that Officer Erickson “deprived [her] of liberty without due process” by detaining her “without properly considering the relevant factors,” Compl. ¶ 73; that Officer Erickson denied her equal protection by discriminating against her “because of her mental health disability,” id. ¶ 80; and that Officer Mondragon failed to intervene to prevent Officer Erickson's actions despite having “a realistic opportunity” to do so, id. ¶ 83.

Defendants have moved to dismiss “the entire” complaint, dkt. 18 at 6, but they never mention the due process and equal protection claims in their motion or reply. Because they offer no analysis, they haven't carried their burden of persuasion. Cohen, 819 F.3d at 481; Starks, 2022 WL 4131699, at *4; see also United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (“In our adversarial system we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”) (citation modified). Their motion to dismiss these claims is denied.

C. Conspiracy Claim

Doe asserts that Officers Erickson and Mondragon conspired to violate her constitutional rights. “Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort [T]here must always be an underlying constitutional violation.” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, there was a plausible constitutional violation, at a minimum under the Fourth Amendment. The Court thus considers whether defendants conspired to commit that violation. Based on what Doe alleges, they plausibly did. Officers Erickson and Mondragon “reached a unity of purpose in an unlawful arrangement.” Id. (quoting another source). They deliberated and decided to detain Doe under 5150, Compl. ¶¶ 52, 56, even though they lacked probable cause to do so under Doe's version of events.

In moving to dismiss the conspiracy claim, defendants offer no case citations or analysis of conspiracy law. See Dkt. 18 at 10; Dkt. 23 at 3. They haven't established that dismissal is warranted. The Court denies their motion to dismiss the conspiracy claim.

D. Supervisory Liability Claim

Doe brings a supervisory liability claim against Sergeant Polovina. She asserts that he is partially to blame for her detention because he approved the 5150 hold based on Officer Erickson's police report. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 98–102.

To establish a constitutional claim against a supervisor, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the supervisor “participated in or directed the [constitutional] violations, or knew of the violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent them.” Puente v. City of Phoenix, 123 F.4th 1035, 1064 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting another source). Doe hasn't satisfied this standard. Sergeant Polovina approved the hold based on Officer Erickson's report, a report that supported a “strong suspicion” that Doe was “a danger to ․ herself.” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 288). Allegedly, the report was inaccurate, Compl. ¶¶ 27, 66, but Doe doesn't assert that Sergeant Polovina knew about the inaccuracies. He approved the hold based only on what Officer Erickson told him.

Doe contends that Sergeant Polovina should have known that Officer Erickson's report was deficient because it was based on “meager information,” id.¶ 68, and didn't address mitigating factors, id. ¶¶ 58–64. It's unclear, however, how Sergeant Polovina was supposed to know that Officer Erickson had withheld certain information. And although Doe alleges that CCSF trained its officers to consider mitigating factors, id., she doesn't allege that CCSF required Polovina to review for mitigating factors before approving a 5150 hold.

Doe hasn't plausibly alleged that Sergeant Polovina did anything wrong. He relied on Officer Erickson's report, which strongly suggested that Doe was a danger to herself. If Officer Erickson misrepresented the facts on the ground, Sergeant Polovina cannot be faulted for relying on those facts in approving the 5150 hold.

The Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss the supervisory liability claim.

E. Monell Claim

Doe next asserts that Officers Erickson and Mondragon's unconstitutional acts were pursuant to CCSF policies and practices, and were the result of a failure to train. Compl. ¶¶ 103–06. If true, CCSF could be liable for its officers' unconstitutional acts under Monell. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073–77 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing requirements to establish liability under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). But the Court cannot accept Doe's Monell allegations because they are supported only by “conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

For example, Doe alleges that a CCSF policy authorized officers “to place an individual on an involuntary mental health hold without probable cause that the individual pose[d] a risk of harm to herself.” Compl. ¶ 104(a). This allegation parrots the Fourth Amendment and 5150 legal standards. See Bias, 508 F.3d at 1220. It is “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting another source). Doe's other Monell allegations are similarly devoid of factual substance. See Compl. ¶ 104.

In opposition, Doe focuses on her failure-to-train theory. See Dkt. 22 at 16 (“The encounter at issue ․ demonstrat[ed] a widespread lack of training or guidance.”). That theory has an additional shortcoming. Doe repeatedly alleges that Officer Erickson acted contrary to his training. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 35 (“Defendant Erickson did not inquire with [Doe] about the possibility of voluntary treatment or voluntary commitment, despite, upon information and belief, receiving training that discusses such tactics and considerations ․”); id. ¶ 55 (“Defendant Erickson's training taught [that] ․ strong protective factors and modifiable risk factors ․ would not qualify [Doe] for a 5150 mental health hold.”); id. ¶ 60 (“Defendant Erickson did not include in his report the fact that [Doe] planned to speak with her clinician that day, despite the fact that, ․ as part of his training, he was taught to assess whether the individual [was] ․ actively engaged in treatment.”). Doe's allegations suggest that Officer Erickson didn't follow his training, not that CCSF failed to train him.

Doe hasn't stated a Monell claim. The motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

F. Disability Discrimination Claims

Doe alleges that she has a disability, severe depression, and that CCSF discriminated against her based on her disability in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51. Compl. ¶¶ 107–130. CCSF allegedly discriminated against her by “making unwarranted assumptions about the heightened risk posed by individuals with mental health disabilities, and denying her community-based interventions, supports, services, and accommodations.” Id. ¶ 119; accord id. ¶ 126.

The complaint doesn't support Doe's discrimination theory. The officers detained her because they believed she would hurt herself. They reached that conclusion based on her behavior and statements she made to them and her college instructor. Compl. ¶ 65. Her diagnosis of depression wasn't the reason for the hold. See Mayfield v. City of Mesa, 131 F.4th 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, discrimination must be “by reason of [a] disability”) (citation modified).

Also, while Doe asserts that the officers denied her “community-based interventions” and “accommodations,” Compl. ¶ 199, she doesn't allege that she ever requested such interventions or accommodations. In opposition, she says she “explicitly communicated to [Officer] Erickson that she was seeking community-based treatment.” Dkt. 22 at 20. She doesn't cite any such allegation in her complaint, nor did the Court find one.

Doe relies on Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), in arguing that CCSF needed to provide her with community-based services. The Olmstead plaintiffs were voluntarily admitted to psychiatric units, and after their conditions stabilized, State doctors determined that “community-based treatment ․ [was] appropriate,” id. at 607. In that context, the Court held that, “under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities [if] ․ the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated.” Id. Doe, in contrast, was admitted to a psychiatric unit involuntarily, and State doctors hadn't said she should receive community-based treatment. She hasn't established that Olmstead applies, or otherwise plausibly alleged disability discrimination.

The Court grants the motion to dismiss Doe's disability discrimination claims.

G. Negligence and IIED Claims

Doe says Officer Erickson negligently detained her, Officer Mondragon negligently failed to intervene, both officers acted in reckless disregard for her rights and caused her to suffer severe emotional distress, and CCSF can be held vicariously liable for the officers' negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Compl. ¶¶ 150–63.

Defendants argue that the officers are immune from liability for negligence and IIED under California Government Code section 820.2. Not so. Section 820.2 grants immunity to public employees only for “policy decisions,” not for “operational decisions by the police purporting to apply the law.” Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 920 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). “As a matter of law, section 820.2 discretionary immunity does not apply to an officer's decision to detain or arrest a suspect.” Id. (citation modified).

Defendants argue that CCSF is also immune from liability for negligence and IIED. Also not so. “California ․ has rejected the Monell rule and imposes liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees ․” Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2).

Defendants offer no other arguments for dismissal of the negligence and IIED claims. They haven't carried their burden of persuasion. Cohen, 819 F.3d at 481; Starks, 2022 WL 4131699, at *4. The Court denies their motion to dismiss these claims.

H. Negligent Supervision and Training Claim

Doe contends that Sergeant Polovina and CCSF “had a duty to properly train and supervise [Officers] Erickson and Mondragon” and breached that duty through deficient policies, training, and supervision. Compl. ¶ 147. For the same reasons that Doe hasn't stated plausible supervisory liability and Monell claims, she hasn't stated a plausible negligent supervision and training claim. The Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss this claim.

I. False Arrest and Imprisonment Claim

Doe claims that Officers Erickson and Mondragon committed the tort of false arrest and imprisonment by intentionally depriving her of “freedom of movement” when they detained her for “a 5150 hold without probable cause.” Id. ¶ 132. She also alleges that CCSF is vicariously liable for the officers' acts. Id. ¶ 135.

Defendants, in moving to dismiss, note that there was no arrest—but that fact isn't dispositive. The relevant inquiry is whether there was a “nonconsensual, intentional confinement” for “an appreciable period of time.” Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000)). Plausibly, there was. Against Doe's will, the officers took her to a psychiatric unit, where she was held for three days. Compl. ¶ 57.

Defendants' only other argument against the false arrest and imprisonment claim is that Officers Erickson and Mondragon “had probable cause to detain [Doe].” Dkt. 18 at 12. The Court already rejected that argument. See Part III.A, supra. Doe's allegations plausibly support the conclusion that the officers lacked probable cause to detain her.

The Court denies the motion to dismiss Doe's false arrest and imprisonment claim.

J. Bane Act Claim

Doe contends that Officer Erickson, Officer Mondragon, and CCSF violated the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. An officer violates the Bane Act if he intentionally or recklessly violates a person's constitutional rights. See Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2018). Doe has satisfied this standard at the pleading stage.

From Officer Erickson's inaccurate statements, Compl. ¶¶ 27, 62, 66, one can infer that he either knew a 5150 hold wasn't warranted but intended to mislead his supervisor, or that he acted in reckless disregard of Doe's rights by carelessly preparing his report. Officer Mondragon should have known that Officer Erickson's report was inaccurate. He deliberated with Officer Erickson and agreed to the hold. Id. ¶¶ 52, 56. Both officers, then, plausibly violated Doe's rights with intent or reckless disregard. And CCSF can be held vicariously liable for their actions. Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2013).

The motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim is denied.

K. Punitive Damages Prayer

Defendants lastly move to dismiss Doe's prayer for punitive damages against CCSF. They argue that CCSF cannot be held liable for punitive damages under California Government Code section 818. Doe, in opposition, doesn't respond. She has thus waived her prayer for punitive damages against CCSF. See Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“A district court may find a cause of action waived where a plaintiff fails to defend the cause of action in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).

The Court grants the motion to dismiss Doe's prayer for punitive damages against CCSF. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a motion to dismiss, not a motion to strike, is the proper mechanism for challenging the legal sufficiency of a prayer for damages).

L. Motion for a More Definite Statement

In addition to moving to dismiss all claims, defendants, in the alternative, move for a more definite statement. Dkt. 18 at 7. A court order directing the plaintiff to provide a more definite statement is warranted if the complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that the [defendant] cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Here, this standard isn't satisfied. Some of Doe's claims need more factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, but Doe's complaint isn't so vague or ambiguous that defendants cannot reasonably prepare a response. The Court denies defendants' motion for a more definite statement.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court grants in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The motion is granted on the supervisory liability and negligent supervision and training claims; on the claims under Monell, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Unruh Act; and on the punitive damages prayer against CCSF. The motion is denied on the constitutional claims, the conspiracy claim, the negligence and IIED claims, the false arrest and imprisonment claim, and the Bane Act claim. An amendment may not be futile, so the Court grants Doe leave to amend her complaint. She may file an amended complaint by August 29, 2025.

The Court denies defendants' motion for a more definite statement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Doe included her first three claims under one heading in her complaint, alleging a violation of the “Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. ¶¶ 68–69. She similarly included her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under a single heading. Id. ¶¶ 106–07. As a result, the claims are numbered differently here than in the complaint. If Doe amends her complaint, she should separate these claims, giving each claim its own heading.

Alex G. Tse United States Magistrate Judge