KILKENNY v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC (2025)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 8

Plaintiff Pierce Edward Kilkenny filed this lemon-law case in Santa Clara County Superior Court, alleging that defendant General Motors, LLC breached certain express and implied warranties concerning a 2020 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 purchased by Kilkenny. General Motors removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Kilkenny now moves to remand, arguing that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction because General Motors has not established that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). In recent months, plaintiff's counsel has filed dozens of similar motions to remand in other cases against General Motors, the vast majority of which have been denied. See, e.g., Murphy v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-08202, 2025 WL 3268814, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025); Alkalla v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07795, 2025 WL 3240801, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025); Griffin v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 25-CV-8160, 2025 WL 3187563, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); Abayneh v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07582, 2025 WL 3240799, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025); Leal v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-08545, 2025 WL 3124332, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); Soto v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-02531, 2025 WL 3101973, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025); Gomez Venegas v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-8445, 2025 WL 3084047, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Golik v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-06921, 2025 WL 3090758, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Brindas-Puga v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 25-CV-08425, 2025 WL 3072628, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); Tate v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07663, 2025 WL 3072627, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); Revollar v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-7904, 2025 WL 3034059, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); Borrayo v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-02384, 2025 WL 3034062, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); Roubos v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-7631, 2025 WL 3033983, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); Andrade v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07000, 2025 WL 3022669, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2025); Gutierrez v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-08237, 2025 WL 3012277, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); Cesena v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07225, 2025 WL 3002616, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025); Perez v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-7116, 2025 WL 2985229, at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025); Thibodeaux v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07105, 2025 WL 2970561, at *3–5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025); Leon v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-7298, 2025 WL 2971079, at *2–4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2025); Watanabe v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07006, 2025 WL 2848993, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025); Stewart v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-07153, 2025 WL 2848991, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025); Jackson v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 25-CV-7021, 2025 WL 2835457, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2025). It should come as no surprise, then, that Kilkenny's motion in this case is also denied.

BACKGROUND

According to Kilkenny's complaint, he purchased a 2020 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 on May 6, 2022. Kilkenny alleges that he received various warranties from General Motors in connection with his taking possession of the vehicle and that the vehicle later manifested defects covered by the express warranties during the warranty period. Kilkenny further alleges that although he delivered the vehicle to General Motors or its authorized service-and-repair facilities for diagnosis and repair of the defects, they failed to service or repair the vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities to do so. General Motors has, according to Kilkenny, neither promptly replaced the vehicle nor paid Kilkenny restitution for the alleged warranty breaches.

Based on these allegations, Kilkenny filed this action in Santa Clara County Superior Court, alleging that General Motors violated California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq.; the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.; and various provisions of the California Commercial Code. Kilkenny's complaint sought “actual damages in an amount according to proof,” restitution, a civil penalty under the Song-Beverly Act “in the amount of two times [his] actual damages,” “any consequential and incidental damages,” additional remedies authorized by California Commercial Code §§ 2711–13, “costs and expenses of the suit” including “reasonable attorneys’ fees,” and “prejudgment interest at the legal rate.” After filing an answer to Kilkenny's complaint, General Motors removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Now before the Court is Kilkenny's motion to remand.

LEGAL STANDARD

In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). As relevant here, federal courts have original jurisdiction where each plaintiff's citizenship is diverse from each defendant's citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, excluding interest and costs. Id. § 1332(a).

Because “[t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper,” Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009), courts usually must resolve “any doubt” about the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of remanding an action. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has made clear, however, that courts must not permit a plaintiff “to prevent or delay removal by failing to reveal information showing removability” in the complaint. Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). So where a plaintiff's complaint “does not enumerate the [plaintiff]’s claimed damages ․, a removing defendant need only allege in its notice of removal that the amount in controversy requirement is met.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2020). “Thereafter, the plaintiff can contest the amount in controversy by making either a ‘facial’ or ‘factual’ attack on the defendant's jurisdictional allegations.” Id. “A ‘facial’ attack accepts the truth of the defendant's allegations but asserts that they are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. (citation modified). “For a facial attack, the court, accepting the allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the defendant's favor, determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction.” Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). By contrast, “a factual attack contests the truth of the allegations themselves.” Harris, 980 F.3d at 699 (citation modified). “When a plaintiff mounts a factual attack, the burden is on the defendant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the ․ jurisdictional threshold.” Id.

ANALYSIS

General Motors has carried its burden of establishing that removal was proper based on diversity jurisdiction.

First, General Motors has demonstrated complete diversity. Kilkenny's complaint states that he “is ․ a resident of Santa Cruz, California,” and Kilkenny has not represented that he has any intent to leave the state, so he is a citizen of California. See Kanter v. Warner–Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). General Motors's notice of removal asserts that it is a “limited liability company” incorporated in Delaware and “with its principal place of business in Michigan.” Kilkenny's complaint also states that General Motors “is ․ a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware.” General Motors is therefore a citizen of Michigan and Delaware. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010). As a result, the parties are completely diverse. Kilkenny does not argue otherwise.

Second, General Motors has established that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Because Kilkenny's complaint does not enumerate his damages, General Motors's notice of removal needed only to plausibly allege that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. See Harris, 980 F.3d at 699. It did so. As another court in the Central District of California explained with respect to a nearly identical notice of removal (NOR) filed by General Motors (GM):

To determine the amount in controversy, GM summed its estimate of [Kilkenny]’s actual damages, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees. With respect to actual damages, GM alleges it estimated the purchase price of the subject vehicle underlying [Kilkenny]’s complaint to be [$66,876.27], from which it subtracted [$4,524.05] “in total deductions including estimates of statutorily required deductions for mileage offset, third-party service contracts, manufacturer's rebate, and negative equity.” This yielded an estimate of actual damages of [$62,352.22]. In its opposition, GM further refined its calculations, determining the estimated mileage offset to be [$10,128.77] and other offsets for optional third-party contracts [and unpaid financing] to be [$24,488.50], which yielded an actual damages estimate of [$32,259.00].

With respect to civil penalties, GM indicated that the complaint “seeks civil penalties in the amount of two times Plaintiff's actual damages.” Multiplying the actual damages estimate of [$32,259.00] by two yields [$64,518.00].

Tate, 2025 WL 3072627, at *4 (internal citations omitted and dollar estimates replaced with those used by General Motors in removing this case). Accordingly, “[t]he Court finds that [General Motors] plausibly alleges that the estimated actual damages and civil penalties alone are [$96,777.00], exceeding the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.” Id.

Kilkenny faults General Motors for failing to offer evidence to support its allegations concerning the amount in controversy. “But a notice of removal ‘need not contain evidentiary submissions.’ ” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84, 135 S.Ct. 547, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014)). “Only upon a factual attack does [the defendant] have an affirmative obligation to support jurisdictional allegations with proof.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Here, Kilkenny contests the sufficiency of General Motors's jurisdictional allegations, not their truth. That is, he launches only a facial attack. See Harris, 980 F.3d at 699. He contends, for example, that General Motors's allegations concerning “the amount of potential civil penalties” are “speculatory and conclusory,” that its “estimation of [Kilkenny's] actual damages is fatally speculative,” and that its “calculation of a mileage offset” improperly relies on “assumption.” See Tate, 2025 WL 3072627, at *3 (finding substantially similar challenges to constitute a facial attack). The Court therefore must “accept[ ] the allegations as true and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in [General Motors]’s favor.” Salter, 974 F.3d at 964. Viewed in that light, the allegations are clearly plausible.

In any case, even if Kilkenny's challenge were factual, General Motors has provided evidence to supports it allegations. For example, it produced a copy of the sale agreement for the vehicle to prove its allegation of the purchase price. To support its calculation of the mileage offset, General Motors also provided documentation of the odometer reading for the vehicle at the time of Kilkenny's last visit to a dealership for repair of the claimed defects. And it estimated the unpaid financing offsets based on the loan terms in the sale agreement. “Because [General Motors]’s estimates of the purchase price and offsets are based in actual data about [Kilkenny]’s vehicle, it appears to the Court that [General Motors]’s ‘reasoning and underlying assumptions are reasonable.’ ” Murphy, 2025 WL 3268814, at *4 (quoting Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022)). Kilkenny fails to offer even a shred of contrary evidence. So even under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to factual challenges, General Motors has carried its burden of establishing an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, Kilkenny's motion to remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge