CHIMA v. PERKINS LMFT (2025)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE

Pro se plaintiff Chikodi Chima brings suit against 88 defendants—including his former spouse, her counsel, individuals who submitted statements in support of his former spouse, judges of the San Francisco Superior Court, social workers, police, financial and insurance companies, the State Bar of California, the Medical Board of California, the San Francisco Unified School District, the City and County of San Francisco, and others—in connection with custody litigation in state court. See FAC (dkt. 12). Judge Thomas S. Hixson screened the First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See R&R (dkt. 17). Judge Hixson therefore recommended that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id. at 1. Mr. Chima filed a timely objection to the R&R. See Obj. (dkt. 20).

The Court has carefully reviewed the relevant materials and finds the R&R to be thorough, correct, and well-reasoned. The R&R concluded that the complaint should “be dismissed because it is at its core a domestic relations dispute subject to abstention.” R&R at 3. The domestic relations exception applies to cases that “while raising constitutional issues, [are at their] core [ ] child custody dispute[s].” R&R at 3–4 (quoting Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1987)). Even where a complaint brings section 1983 and section 1985 claims, and even where it alleges “a massive conspiracy by judges, legislators, attorneys, and a court psychologist,” if it is essentially about a custody dispute, it is subject to the domestic relations exception. See R&R at 4–5 (quoting Caetano v. Santa Clara County, No. C-02-1191 PJH, 2002 WL 1677723, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2002)).

Mr. Chima asserts that Judge Hixson has misconstrued the complaint because it “does not seek modification of a custody or support decree,” “includes torts and coordinated fraudulent acts actionable between any private parties,” and names defendants who “were never parties to the underlying family-law proceeding.” Obj. at 1–2, 5. But Mr. Chima concedes that the claims arise from an “underlying family-law proceeding,” as well as the administration of “Title IV-D child-support obligations.” Id. at 3, 5. It is also not accurate that Mr. Chima does not seek modification of a custody or support decree. See FAC at 49 (seeking injunctive relief “enjoining further retaliation, obstruction, or interference with Plaintiff's parental rights and access to the courts” and equitable relief “including restoration of parental decision-making authority wrongfully revoked.”); see also id. ¶ 135 (alleging that judicial misconduct “deprived” Plaintiff “of legal custody and decision-making authority over his minor child”), id. ¶ 137 (“Defendants deprived Plaintiff of parental rights”), id. ¶ 139 (“Plaintiff was further deprived of legal custody and decision-making rights over his minor child through reliance on fraudulent affidavits, perjured testimony, and judicial misconduct.”). Nor does the inclusion of claims that could be actionable between any private parties take the complaint outside of the domestic relations exception. See Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding even where the complaint included a tort claim for wrongful interference with inheritance that “the primary issue is still the marital status” and that if a party could escape the domestic relations exception “by pleading an independent tort,” then “a clever pleader” could bring “child and spousal support matters ․ into federal court.”). Nor does the inclusion of additional individuals mean that the case is not at its core about the child custody dispute. See, e.g., Soto v. Child Protective Services, No. 21-cv-04570-EMC (JSC), 2021 WL 3610324, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2021) (holding—where plaintiff alleged “that she was denied access to the court proceedings wherein her parental rights were terminated, that evidence in those proceedings was falsified, and that she was ‘cut off’ from the process,” and that she was “mistreated and abused by the entire legal system,” and sued Child Protective Services, the Sonoma County Superior Court, and four individuals—that the domestic relations exception applied).

Because the R&R correctly concluded that the complaint's allegations of “racketeering activities, including the submission of false affidavits and perjured testimony, insurance obstruction, money laundering, judicial interference, child kidnapping, failing to investigate misconduct, fabricating authority, and obstructing ․ parental rights,” were all in the context of “the underlying custody litigation,” see R&R at 5, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in all respects. The case is DISMISSED without leave to amend but also without prejudice to Mr. Chima bringing suit in an appropriate forum.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 1, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff Chikodi Chima's application to proceed in forma pauperis and screened his complaint, finding it deficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). ECF No. 9. Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 12. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds the amended complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. As not all parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Court requests this case be reassigned to a district judge and RECOMMENDS the complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

II. BACKGROUND

In its original screening order, the Court found Plaintiff's complaint did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiff listed John David Perkins as the sole defendant in the caption and “Parties” section of his complaint, but in paragraph 13 he named nine other individuals by name, also referring to them as “DOE Defendants.” Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also appeared to bring allegations against these individuals throughout his complaint. As such, the Court directed him to amend the complaint to properly name all defendants and allege: (1) the specific laws or rights he thinks the defendant(s) violated; (2) for each law or right, state the specific factual allegations that connect each defendant with the alleged wrongdoing, including the dates, the names of people involved, and what those people did; (3) how he was harmed; and (4) what relief he seeks. ECF No. 9.

Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on September 2, 2025. ECF No. 12. He now names at least 88 defendants, including judges of the San Francisco Superior Court, attorneys, social workers, police, financial companies, insurance companies, the Judicial Council of California and its employees, State Bar of California and its employees, Board of Registered Nursing and its employees, Medical Board of California and its employees, City and County of San Francisco and its employees, and the San Francisco Unified School District and its employees. He alleges these defendants engaged in a conspiracy related to marital and child custody proceedings in state court. Plaintiff seeks “damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d), arising from a coordinated enterprise of private and state actors that deprived him of constitutional rights, parental rights, and property interests through a pattern of fraud, obstruction, and retaliation.” Id. at 1.

III. SUA SPONTE SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Legal Standard

A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(i)-(iii). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). As such, the complaint must allege facts that plausibly establish each defendant's liability. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In making this determination, the Court must “take as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted). The Court must also “construe a pro se plaintiff's pleadings liberally and afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). However, the Court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

A complaint must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The failure to comply with Rule 8 is a basis for dismissal that is not dependent on whether the complaint is without merit. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, even claims which are not on their face subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may still be dismissed for violating Rule 8(a). Id.

B. Application

The undersigned finds Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because it is at its core a domestic relations dispute subject to abstention. As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that district courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter jurisdiction”). The domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (explaining domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction). Even where parties “do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody,” federal courts may still abstain in cases “involving elements of the domestic relationship.” Id. at 705 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)). Thus, abstention is appropriate where “domestic relations problems are involved tangentially to other issues determinative of the case.” Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) (Federal courts must follow the “abstention doctrine under which federal courts traditionally decline to exercise jurisdiction in domestic relations cases when the core issue involves the status of parent and child or husband and wife.”). Abstention is specifically appropriate in a case which, “while raising constitutional issues, is at its core a child custody dispute.” Coats, 819 F.2d at 237; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (“Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.”).

In Coats, the plaintiff alleged her ex-husband and others involved in state court proceedings had wrongfully deprived her of custody of her children. Coats, 819 F.3 at 236. Defendants included the former husband and his current wife, their attorney, the court-appointed attorney for the children, a court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners, two superior court judges, the county, the police department, and an organization called United Fathers. Id. In depriving her of child custody, the plaintiff alleged defendants deprived her of a liberty interest in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3). Id. Because the action implicated domestic relations issues, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 237.

Similarly, in Caetano v. Santa Clara County, 2002 WL 1677723 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2002),¹ the court dismissed with prejudice claims brought by a pro se plaintiff alleging violations of his civil and constitutional rights in connection with court proceedings involving child custody and visitation, and also asserting numerous state law claims, including civil conspiracy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, “frustration of visitation and custody,” and “induced systematic parental alienation.” Id. at *1. The plaintiff named as defendants his ex-wife and her current husband, the County of Santa Clara, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors and five individual supervisors, five judges or commissioners of the California Superior Court, the District Attorney of Santa Clara County and two deputy District Attorneys, the Sheriff of Santa Clara County; three attorneys involved in the child custody and visitation proceedings, a psychologist employed by the Santa Clara County Department of Social Services, and two other individuals. Id. He alleged the defendants “conspired to, among other things, sever the relationship between plaintiff and his children by denying him custody and visitation rights.” Id. The court found that “[s]tripped of its excess verbiage, the complaint essentially alleges that the Superior Court of the State of California deprived plaintiff of the custody of his children by awarding custody to his ex-wife, the mother of those children,” and [t]he remainder of the complaint is replete with vague and conclusory allegations of a massive conspiracy by judges, legislators, attorneys, and a court psychologist to place plaintiff's children in proximity to a ‘sexual predator’ (rather than in plaintiff's custody) and to cover up that conspiracy.” Id. at *5. The court held these claims were “nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions ․ and lie outside this court's subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291–92 (9th Cir. 1995). Although the plaintiff brought claims under §§ 1983 and 1985, the court found “[i]t is irrelevant whether federal constitutional issues are at stake.” Id. (citing Branson, 62 F.3d at 292). Since Caetano, other courts in this District have dismissed such claims on similar grounds. See Soto v. Child Protective Servs., 2021 WL 3610324, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3610323 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2021) (dismissing claims under domestic relations exception where plaintiff alleged violation of her constitutional rights and a conspiracy by Child Protective Services, the Sonoma County Superior Court, and various individuals with respect to her access to the courts and child custody/parental termination proceedings); Safapou v. Marin Cnty. of California, 2018 WL 4381552, at *3, 5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4378745 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Safapou v. Marin Cnty., California, 787 F. App'x 976 (9th Cir. 2019) (dismissing conspiracy claims because “Plaintiff's claims amount to a de facto challenge to her divorce and child custody proceedings.”).

Like these cases, Plaintiff's case is at its core a domestic relations dispute. He alleges racketeering activities, including the submission of false affidavits and perjured testimony, insurance obstruction, money laundering, judicial interference, child kidnapping, failing to investigate misconduct, fabricating authority, and obstructing his parental rights, all tied to the underlying custody litigation. See generally First Am. Compl. “In California, parents in child custody or dependency proceedings can appeal or otherwise challenge the legality of the proceeding itself.” Caetano, 2002 WL 1677723, at *6 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 238, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 395, 800). Thus, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff seeks to bring federal claims — if he “is dissatisfied with the outcome of the custody proceedings involving his children, his remedy, if any, lies in state court.” Id.; Coats, 819 F.2d at 237 (“If the constitutional claims in [a child custody case] have independent merit, the state courts are competent to hear them.”). As such, the undersigned finds the Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and “repleading will not cure the deficiencies in the complaint. When it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies in a complaint cannot be overcome by amendment, the court need not provide an opportunity to amend.” Caetano, 2002 WL 1677723, at *6 (citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims without leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, any party may serve and file objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.

The Court reminds Plaintiff that he may wish to seek assistance from the Legal Help Center, a free service offered by the Bar Association of San Francisco where he can speak with an attorney who may be able to provide basic legal help but not representation. He may request an appointment by emailing fedpro@sfbar.org or calling 415-782-8982. At the Legal Help Center, you. More information is available at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/. Plaintiff may also wish to obtain a copy of this District's Handbook for Litigants Without a Lawyer, which provides instructions on how to proceed at every stage of a case. The handbook is available in person at the Clerk's Office and online at: https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Dated: October 17, 2025

FOOTNOTES

1.   On Westlaw, the case is called Cartano v. Santa Clara County, but the order itself refers to the plaintiff as “Caetano,” as does the PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) website. The undersigned thus refers to the case as “Caetano” in this report and recommendation.

CHARLES R. BREYER, United States District Judge