STELLANTIS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC v. WINDING (2025)

ORDER CONCERNING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 19

Plaintiff Stellantis Financial Services, Inc. filed this action against defendant Michael Winding to recover amounts owed to Stellantis by third party WindingMakia Automotive Group II, LLC and guaranteed by Winding. Winding has failed to respond to any of Stellantis's allegations, and Stellantis now moves for default judgment. For the following reasons, the Court orders Stellantis to supplement the record to demonstrate proper service of process upon Winding and a clear basis for this Court's jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of default judgment, the factual allegations in a complaint are accepted as true except for those related to damages. See Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff Stellantis is a Texas corporation. Defendant Winding is, according to the complaint, a resident of California. In September 2023, Stellantis and WindingMakia executed a Master Loan and Security Agreement, under which Stellantis agreed to provide WindingMakia with a floorplan loan to allow WindingMakia to purchase inventory for display and sale on its automotive lot in Pennsylvania. In the event that WindingMakia defaulted, the agreement authorized Stellantis to pursue remedies including repossession of its collateral for sale.

Soon after Stellantis and WindingMakia executed the agreement, Winding executed a continuing guaranty in which he agreed to guarantee the prompt and punctual payment of all of WindingMakia's obligations to Stellantis when they became due. Winding agreed that he would have primary liability under the guaranty and would be jointly and severally liable with WindingMakia for its obligations to Stellantis.

In the summer of 2024, WindingMakia failed to make required payments to Stellantis. Stellantis alleges that this constituted a default under the agreement. Stellantis consequently repossessed and sold WindingMakia's collateral to cover the deficiency. The proceeds of the sale did not, however, completely cover WindingMakia's obligations to Stellantis.

Stellantis notified Winding of WindingMakia's default under the agreement and demanded that he pay for the remaining amounts due to Stellantis after sale of the collateral. When Winding did not, Stellantis filed this suit against him, seeking to recover the remaining amounts owed by WindingMakia and guaranteed by Winding, as well as Stellantis's costs of collection and pre- and post-judgment interest. Though the complaint alleges that Winding resides and could be served in California, Stellantis served a person named “Michael Winding” in Texas. The certificate of service provides no information to identify “Michael Winding” apart from his name and the residential address in Texas at which he was served.

Winding has not appeared in this action. On July 14, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered default against Winding. Stellantis now moves for default judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

After entry of default, a party is generally entitled to apply to the Court for default judgment when a party has failed to plead or defend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Where a plaintiff seeks default against a non-appearing defendant, a court must first examine whether it has jurisdiction to enter judgment and whether service of process was proper. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999); Innovative Sports Management, Inc. v. Nunez, No. 22-cv-07136-JSC, 2023 WL 4551069, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2023).

DISCUSSION

Because Stellantis has not yet demonstrated that it properly served Winding and that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over its claims, the Court is unable to enter default judgment at this time.

First, Stellantis has not established that it properly served defendant Winding. See S.E.C. v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that plaintiff generally bears the burden of demonstrating proper service). As noted above, Stellantis did not serve Winding at the California address listed on the summons. Instead, Stellantis served a person named “Michael Winding” at a residential address in Texas. Neither the certificate of service nor Stellantis's motion for default judgment offer any information or evidence showing that the “Michael Winding” served in Texas is the same “Michael Winding” named as a defendant in this action. Without more, the Court cannot conclude that defendant Winding has been served. See Innovative Sports Mgmt., Inc. v. Ruiz, No. 24-CV-07241-PCP, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 2838815, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (denying motion for default judgment where plaintiff served a person with defendant's name at an address not listed on the summons and could not demonstrate a connection between the individual served and the named defendant).

Second, if Stellantis properly served defendant Winding at a residential address in Texas rather than California, that fact could suggest that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Stellantis asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction to resolve its state-law contract claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For the Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, there must be complete diversity between the parties—i.e., no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant. Demarest v. HSBC Bank USA, 920 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, Stellantis is a citizen of Texas. See Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a corporation is “a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). If Winding is a citizen of California, complete diversity exists. But if Winding “resides with the intention to remain” in Texas, as his service at a residential address in that state might suggest, he is a citizen of Texas. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). In that case, the parties would not be diverse, and the Court would lack jurisdiction to resolve Stellantis's claims.

Because the Court cannot determine from the current record whether defendant Winding has been properly served and whether the Court may properly exercise diversity jurisdiction, the Court must defer resolution of Stellantis's motion for default judgment until Stellantis supplements the record.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders Stellantis to file, by no later than December 12, 2025, a supplementary brief and evidence demonstrating that it properly served defendant Winding and that the parties are completely diverse. The Court also continues the hearing on Stellantis's motion for default judgment to January 8, 2025 and vacates the November 6, 2025 case management conference. Stellantis's motions to appear remotely at the hearing and conference, Dkt. No. 18 and 19, are denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge