ELIE HERNANDEZ v. PACIFIC UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION INC (2025)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

This case arises from plaintiff Elie Hernandez's employment with Pacific Underground Construction, Inc. Hernandez filed this lawsuit against Pacific and his supervisor Chris Villa in California state court, asserting ten state-law causes of action. Pacific removed this case to federal court on the ground that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempts all of Hernandez's claims. Hernandez now moves to remand. For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that Section 301 does not preempt any of Hernandez's claims and that this Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Hernandez's complaint and accepted as true.

Hernandez began working for Pacific on May 1, 2019 as a non-exempt hourly employee. Villa was a director, officer, or managing agent of Pacific. In April 2024, Hernandez notified Pacific that he intended to take paternity leave pursuant to the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) in anticipation of the impending birth of his child. He planned to take leave from May 1, 2024 through June 24, 2024. Upon his return to work on June 24, 2024, Pacific told him not to come in because it did not have any work for him. Pacific never called Hernandez to return to work. When Hernandez inquired with Pacific a few weeks later, Pacific's employment department told him that Pacific had terminated his employment. Hernandez alleges that Pacific terminated him because he exercised his right to paternity leave under the CFRA. He raises two claims under the CFRA, one for retaliatory termination and one for interfering with CFRA rights.

In addition to his two CFRA claims, Hernandez asserts an additional two claims arising from his termination. First, he alleges that Pacific terminated him in retaliation for taking family and medical leave in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Second, he asserts that Pacific's termination of his employment violated public policy. Hernandez also asserts an additional six causes of action that arise from his employment with Pacific but are otherwise unrelated to his termination. These causes of action all arise under California wage-and-hour statutes and include claims for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest breaks, failure to issue accurate wage statements, failure to pay accurate wages upon termination, and failure to indemnify.

Hernandez exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the California Civil Rights department and subsequently receiving a “Right to Sue Notice.” He then filed this suit against Pacific and Villa on November 26, 2024. Pacific timely removed the case to federal court on January 14, 2025. Pacific's notice of removal contends that Hernandez was a member of the Laborers' International Union of North America and that the terms of his employment were covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).¹ Pacific argues that the CBA preempts many of Hernandez's claims and that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over those claims that are not preempted. Hernandez moved to remand on May 1, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal court if the federal court would have originally had subject matter jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction” and “reject[ ]” jurisdiction “if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

Federal courts may exercise subject matter jurisdiction if the complaint involves a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Such jurisdiction “exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Under this “well pleaded complaint” rule, a defense that implicates federal law is generally not sufficient to “inject[ ] a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim[.]” Id. at 399.

“Ordinarily federal pre-emption is raised as a defense” and does not itself create federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 392. The “complete pre-emption” doctrine, however, provides that “the pre-emptive force of [certain] statute[s] is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’ ” Id. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). Thus, any claim that arises from “an area of state law [that] has been completely pre-empted, ․ is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Id.

Section 301 of the LMRA is an example of a statute that completely preempts certain state-law claims that are intertwined with an employee's rights under a CBA. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The “preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). “Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). For example, states can create rights that are unwaivable by private contract, and if those rights can be enforced without reliance on a CBA, “it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under [ ] section [301] to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212. Mere “reliance on the CBA as an aspect of a defense is not enough to inject a federal question” into the case. Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted and cleaned up).

To determine whether Section 301 preempts a plaintiff's state law claim, the Ninth Circuit employs the two-part Burnside test. “First, a court must determine ‘whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA. If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059). Second, if the right is independent of the CBA, courts then ask whether that right “is nevertheless substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’ ” Id. at 1032 (quoting Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059). “Where there is such substantial dependence, the state law claim is preempted by § 301. If there is not, then the claim can proceed under state law.” Id. Because “[t]he burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” the party opposing remand bears the burden of demonstrating preemption. United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS

In addition to their claim preemption dispute, the parties each raise procedural arguments regarding removal and remand. Hernandez argues that Pacific's notice of removal was deficient and that Pacific has not met its evidentiary burden to establish federal jurisdiction. Pacific responds that Hernandez's arguments are untimely and therefore waived. As explained further below, neither argument is dispositive. Turning to the question of preemption, the Court concludes that the CBA does not provide a basis to preempt any of Hernandez's claims.

I. Hernandez's motion was timely, and Pacific's notice of removal was sufficient.

Hernandez argues that Pacific's notice of removal was deficient because it provided no evidence that he was a member of the Laborer's International Union of North America. Pacific responds that this argument is untimely and therefore waved.

Hernandez's argument is timely, at least in part. Pacific is correct that a “motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after” the case has been removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Hernandez filed his motion nearly three and a half months after Pacific removed this case to Federal Court, so to the extent that Hernandez's motion seeks remand for any technical or procedural reason other than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that argument has been waived. Id. But the statutory time limit, by its plain terms, does not apply to motions to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such motions “can never be forfeited or waived” because federal courts have an “independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Here, although Hernandez attacks the sufficiency of Pacific's notice of removal and evidence in support of thereof, the core of his argument is that the Court cannot exert federal question jurisdiction. His motion is therefore not subject to the 30-day statutory time limit.

To the extent Hernandez challenges the sufficiency of Pacific's notice of removal as a purely procedural matter, his argument is not only waived but also without merit. A notice of removal need only provide a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Pacific satisfied this requirement by stating that Hernandez is a member of a union whose employment was governed by a CBA, the terms of which purportedly preempt his state law claims. Although Hernandez attacks the evidentiary support for the removal notice, “[a] statement ‘short and plain’ need not contain evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84 (2014). Hernandez's challenge to the factual basis for Pacific's removal imposed a new burden on Pacific to “support [its] jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof,’ ” which Pacific did by providing a copy of the applicable CBA with its opposition to his motion to remand. Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). Pacific's submission satisfies its burden to show competent proof in support its jurisdictional allegations.

II. The CBA does not preempt any of Hernandez's claims.

Hernandez moves to remand on the ground that Pacific has not met its burden to establish that his state law claims are preempted by the CBA. In Hernandez's view, his claims arise entirely from state law. Pacific argues first argues that Hernandez's meal and rest break, minimum wage, and expense reimbursement claims are all preempted by the CBA. Pacific further contends that the waiting time penalty claims are derivative of other claims preempted by the CBA and thus are likewise preempted. Pacific finally argues that the wrongful termination claims are subject to the CBA's grievance procedures and therefore preempted.

As noted above, the Ninth Circuit's two-prong Burnside test must be used in determining whether Hernandez's meal and rest break, minimum wage, and expense reimbursement claims are preempted by the CBA.

A. Step 1: Hernandez's rights exist independently from the CBA.

On its face, Hernandez's complaint does not invoke any rights he might have under the CBA. Instead, he asserts rights solely under state law. Pacific nonetheless argues that Hernandez's meal and rest break claims exist solely under the CBA because two California Labor Code sections—226.7 and 512(a)—and the applicable IWC Wage Order provide that where a CBA provides an employee with rights or benefits equivalent to their state law analog, the state law does not apply.² In Pacific's view, because the CBA provides for meal and rest breaks, the exemptions from the asserted state employment laws apply to Hernandez's claims, and those claims therefore arise solely from the CBA.

As Pacific notes, courts have at times adopted this approach when considering with the LMRA preempts state law wage-and-hour claims. See, e.g., Coria v. Recology, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that where an exemption to the Labor Code applies to a plaintiff's claims, those claims “cannot be said to be based on a state law right” and therefore exist solely under the CBA); see also Sarfraz-Sattar v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., No. 24-cv-00639-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 449276, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2025) (collecting cases and discussing different approaches to preemption taken in various decisions). The problem with this approach is that requires an evaluation of the merits of the plaintiff's claims under state law: If the exemption applies, he has no rights under the asserted state laws, but if it does not, he may proceed in pursuing those claims. Undertaking such a merits evaluation is inconsistent with the argument that the claims themselves are preempted, because preempted claims are “displace[d] entirely” by federal law. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23. The very purpose of federal preemption is to make federal law applicable whether or not the state law claims otherwise have merit.

Rather than providing a basis for complete preemption, a defendant's invocation of a Labor Code exemption involves an affirmative defense to the merits of the state law claims at issue. See Rapheal v. Tesoro Refining & Mktg. Co., LLC, No. 15-cv-02862-ODW, 2015 WL 3970293, *5 (C.D. Cal. 2015). As noted already, such an affirmative defense cannot serve as the basis for removal, particularly where, as here, the plaintiff has “specifically and repeatedly plead[ed] violations of state law, not a violation of the CBAs or right[s] they provide.” Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 65 F. Supp. 3d 932, 954 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014). Hernandez asserts all of his claims under the Labor Code, not Pacific's CBA. In fact, he does not even agree that the CBA covered his employment. Contrary to those cases finding that the Labor Code exemptions provide a basis for preemption, Hernandez has not “concede[d] that those pre-conditions [for exemption] have been met[.]” Coria, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1097; see Atuatasi v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 2018 WL 2748259, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (concluding that the Labor Code exemptions provide an affirmative defense where the “Plaintiff has made no such concession” to the exemptions' applicability). Pacific may ultimately win on the merits of its argument that Hernandez has no rights under the statutes he invokes because he falls within the exception for CBA-covered employees. But that simply means that Hernandez's claims fail, not that his rights are derived from the CBA.

Nor does Curtis v. Irwin Industries, Inc. compel a finding that Hernandez's claims are completely preempted by the LMRA in a manner that would support this Court's exercise of federal question jurisdiction over his complaint. 913 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019). First and foremost, Curtis was not a jurisdictional case. It instead considered the merits of the plaintiff's claims on appeal from a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The parties in Curtis never disputed that federal jurisdiction existed, perhaps because the court undoubtedly had jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which extends federal law to the Outer Continental Shelf (the region in which Curtis worked) as “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction[.]” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)(A).

Nor did Curtis actually consider claims like Hernandez's that arise directly under state law. Under the OCSLA, state laws that are “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law are “federalized” and “declare[d] to be the law of the United States[.]” Id. § 1333(a)(2)(A). So even though Curtis's claims were premised on California's minimum wage and overtime statutes, see Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1150–51, the claims were in truth federal claims that merely incorporated the substantive standards of California law. See id. at 1156 (noting that under then-binding Ninth Circuit precedent, “claims brought pursuant to California's minimum wage and overtime laws ․ appl[y] on the Outer Continental Shelf”) (citing Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 881 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2018)).

In considering whether Curtis's state-derived federal law claims presented a claim for relief, the Ninth Circuit first considered the merits of the state-derived claims and held that the Labor Code's exemption applied. See id. at 1155. Crucially, Curtis conceded that the relevant CBA applied to his claims and argued only that differences between the minimum wage and overtime requirements of state law and those in the applicable CBA rendered the exemption inapplicable. See id. at 1154. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that such a construction of the exemption would defeat its purpose and that the California courts had rejected this interpretation of California law. Id. at 1154–55. After holding that Curtis's claims fell within the Labor Code exemption and failed as a matter of state law, the Court reasoned that his overtime claim was “controlled by his CBAs” because it could not otherwise exist. Id.³

Curtis was in essence a decision about the merits of Curtis's claims, rather than a decision about the court's ability to exercise jurisdiction on an LMRA “complete preemption” theory. Unlike Curtis, Hernandez does not concede that the CBA applies to his claims, and he does not concede that the CBA satisfies the Labor Code exemptions' requirements. Whether Pacific's CBA falls within a Labor Code exemption presents an affirmative defense, rather than a jurisdictional issue. Even assuming Pacific is correct about the exemptions' applicability, “the presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398.

Curtis's analysis is of limited value for a separate reason. The claims in that case were all premised on the Ninth Circuit's prior holding in Newton that California's minimum wage and overtime laws apply on the Outer Continental Shelf. See 881 F.3d at 1084. But soon after the panel issued its decision in Curtis, the Supreme Court reversed Newton. See Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs. v. Newton, 587 U.S. 601, 604 (2019). Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's standard for determining what state laws apply on the outer continental shelf, the Supreme Court concluded “that where federal law addresses the relevant issue, state law is not adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS.” Id. Applying that standard, the Court held that because the FLSA includes provisions addressing the minimum wage, California's minimum wage law was inapplicable on the OCS. Id. at 616–17.

Because the FLSA addresses overtime pay as well as minimum wages, Curtis in truth had no state-derived overtime claims arising from his work on the Outer Continental. His claims ultimately lacked merit not simply because they were preempted, but more fundamentally because Curtis had no basis for invoking state law. See Curtis v. Irwin Indus. Inc., No. 15-cv-02480-ODW, 2020 WL 636049, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2020) (concluding on remand that “Parker Drilling expressly held that the FLSA addresses overtime and minimum wages and leaves no gap for California law, thereby barring Plaintiffs' California overtime and minimum wage claims as a matter of law”).⁴

Here, Hernandez's claims arise solely under state law. His minimum wage and expense reimbursement claims are pleaded under California state law and do not reference the CBA in any way. Under the first prong of the Burnside test, all of Hernandez's asserted rights are “conferred upon [him] by virtue of state law,” 491 F.3d at 1059–60, and Curtis does not compel a contrary conclusion.⁵

B. Step 2: Hernandez's rights do not depend on interpreting the CBA.

Pacific next argues that Hernandez's minimum wage claim and expense reimbursement claims are substantially dependent on the terms of the CBA.⁶

Under the second prong of Burnside, the Court considers whether “a state law right is ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA ․ [by] decid[ing] whether the claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” Id. at 1060 (citations omitted). If the Court must interpret the CBA to adjudicate a claim, the claim is preempted. Id. Although the “ ‘look to’/'interpret' distinction” is not always so clear cut, simply “alleging a hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim.” Id. (quoting Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). Similarly, “when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a [CBA] will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994). Consulting a CBA to determine “bargained-for wage rates” or to consider whether the plaintiff's union “bargained away the state law right at issue” generally does not preempt a plaintiff's claim. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060 (citations omitted).

Hernandez's minimum wage claim alleges that he regularly performed “off the clock” work for which Pacific never paid him. In Pacific's view, determining whether Hernandez is entitled to pay for those hours will require the Court to interpret whether that alleged work constituted hours worked under the terms of the CBA.

This argument fails for two reasons.

First, as previously noted, Hernandez's claims depend on the allegation that Pacific violated Section 1194 of the labor code by not paying him for the hours he worked. That claim for relief is premised solely on state law, not Pacific's CBA. Thus, “resolution of [his] state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” Silva v. Medic Ambulance Serv., Inc., 846 Fed. Appx. 592, 593 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Dent v. Nat'l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018)).

Second, to the extent the CBA is relevant to this analysis, neither party has raised a clear dispute as to the meaning of any term under the CBA. Although Pacific cites generally to provisions of the CBA that might be relevant to Hernandez's claim, it has not shown that the Court will need to go any further than consulting the CBA. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 (“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a [CBA] will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.”). Thus, resolution of Hernandez's minimum wage claim does not depend on the CBA.

Pacific next argues that Hernandez's expense reimbursement will depend on interpretation of the CBA. This argument similarly fails. Like Hernandez's other claims, his reimbursement claim is a creature of state law. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2802. In fact, by its very terms, that state law is not waivable by contract. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2804 (“Any contract or agreement ․ made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article ․ is null and void[.]”). Although Pacific points to language in that CBA that is supposedly relevant to Hernandez's claim, a quick comparison of that language to Hernandez's complaint undermines Pacific's argument. The CBA provides that Pacific will furnish its employees with “goggles, hard hats or other protective clothing.” Hernandez seeks reimbursement for the use of his personal cell phone for work purposes. Pacific's cited portion of the CBA plainly does not apply to that claim. Even assuming arguendo that a different section of the CBA is relevant to Hernandez's expenditure claim, Pacific concedes that the CBA “provides great detail on the type of expenditures that it covers on behalf of employees.” Such precise detail should render “looking to” the CBA a relatively straightforward task. The expense reimbursement claim therefore does not provide a basis for reimbursement.

Finally, Pacific argues that the CBA's grievance procedures offer an independent basis for preemption. Although grievance procedures may allow for “a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of facts’ [as a right existing under state law to] be pursued,” such procedures are not themselves a source of “rights under the collective-bargaining agreement.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060 (citation omitted). So the CBA's grievance procedures cannot be the sole basis for preemption.

Pacific cites Hollinquest v. St. Frances Med. Ctr. in support of its argument that the grievance procedures provide a basis for preemption. 872 F. Supp. 723 (C.D. Cal. 1994). In that case, the court held that the plaintiff's “first cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy [was] merely a claim for wrongful termination” and thus preempted by the CBA's grievance procedures. Id. at 726. But that plaintiff asserted a termination in violation of public policy under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2700, which the court noted “does not contain any public policy whatsoever, but rather contains information regarding the ․ requirements for a person to practice as a nurse in this state.” Id. Because the plaintiff identified no applicable public policy, the only manner in which the plaintiff's termination could have been deemed “wrongful” was if it violated the protections against termination provided by the CBA, including its grievance procedure.

By contrast, Hernandez's wrongful termination claims squarely implicate California public policy. He invokes both the CFRA and FEHA, which provide that it is unlawful for employers to “discharge ․ any individual because ․ of [that] individual's exercise of the right to family care and medical leave[.]” Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(k)(1). Hernandez's wrongful termination claim thus derives from the public policy stated in this (and similar) state statutes, rather than any just cause or grievance provisions of the CBA. Although the CBA's grievance procedures may have provided him with an avenue to vindicate those rights, they do not supply the right in the first instance. The CBA's grievance procedures are therefore not a source of preemption.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, none of Hernandez's claims are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. Given the Court's lack of original jurisdiction over any of these claims, it cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. The Court remands this action to the Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pacific attached a copy of the CBA to its brief opposing Hernandez's motion to remand.

2.   For example, Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a) requires employers to provide their employees with meal and periods, but § 512(e) states that subsection (a) does not apply to construction workers “covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement” where such agreement “expressly provides for [among other things,] meal periods for those [covered] employees[.]”

3.   The Curtis panel did not explain its reasons for considering Curtis's overtime claim notwithstanding its lack of merit under California law, but the court appears to have concluded that Curtis would wish to continue pursuing that claim even if it were governed by something other than state law. In this case, Hernandez has made it clear that he does not wish to pursue claims under anything other than the Labor Code and wage order provisions cited in his complaint.

4.   Of course, applying that rule would not have changed the result of Curtis's appeal, which affirmed the dismissal of his state-derived claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

5.   Because Hernandez's waiting time claims are derivative of his other claims, they also derive from state law. And because the CBA's grievance provisions are not an inherent source of rights (as explained further below), they also do not provide a basis for finding preemption under the first prong of Burnside.

6.   Pacific does not argue that Hernandez's meal and rest break claims depend on interpretation of the CBA, instead arguing only that they are preempted under Burnside's first prong.

P. Casey Pitts United States District Judge