SHIKEB SADDOZAI v. OAK SMITH (2024)

ORDER DENYING RHINES STAY, DENYING MOTION TO DIMISS, AND GRANTING DUKE STAY

Petitioner Shikeb Saddozai is a state prisoner confined in Salinas Valley State Prison, where Respondent Oak Smith is the Acting Warden. Saddozai seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1 (Petition). Smith moves to dismiss the Petition due to ongoing state court proceedings. Dkt. No. 22. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Smith's motion and issues a stay pursuant to Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088 (9th Cir. 2023).

BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2018, Saddozai was sentenced to 21 years to life for attempted murder, an additional five years for a prior strike offense in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 667(a), and a consecutive 12-year term for burglary. Dkt. No. 1, at 4. Saddozai's conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal for the First District in March 2021, but the state appellate court remanded the case for resentencing so the trial court could reconsider the prior serious felony enhancement under Section 667(a). Saddozai's petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court in June 2021, and he filed this Petition on September 12, 2022. Id.

On October 13, 2022, the state trial court declined to strike the prior serious felony enhancement, and in December 2022 Saddozai appealed that decision to the California Court of Appeal for the First District pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 1172.6. That appeal is still pending.

In his Petition, Saddozai asserts six claims: (1) denial of his constitutional right to due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments due to insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions; (2) denial of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments because his trial court counsel (a) failed to object to the admission of out-of-court statements and (b) displayed open disdain for him in front of jurors; (3) denial of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because his appellate counsel failed to argue that the trial court denied him a fair trial by failing to remove his trial counsel; (4) denial of his constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the trial court did not permit trial counsel to withdraw; (5) denial of his constitutional confrontation rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the trial court admitted purportedly testimonial statements in the form of an audiotape without giving him the opportunity to confront a witness; and (6) denial of his constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the trial court admitted out-of-court statements about a prior conviction. See Dkt. No. 18 (detailing Saddozai's claims and finding them to be cognizable).

Saddozai acknowledges that only some of his claims have been fully exhausted in state court, as they must be before they can be heard in this federal habeas proceeding. See Dkt. No. 3, at 3 (admitting that claims 2(b), 3, and 4 have not been exhausted); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–16 (1982). In January 2023, Saddozai filed a habeas petition including these unexhausted claims in San Mateo County Superior Court, which denied his petition in March 2023. In July 2023, Saddozai appealed that decision to the California Court of Appeal for the First District, which denied his habeas petition in May 2024. To the Court's best knowledge, the California Supreme Court has not yet ruled on Saddozai's claims, so claims 2(b), 3, and 4 remain unexhausted.¹ See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Roman v. Estelle, 917 F.2d 1505, 1506 (9th Cir. 1990).

Because his petition includes unexhausted claims, Saddozai previously moved this Court for an order permitting him to (1) sever the unexhausted claims from his Petition; (2) stay litigation of the exhausted claims while he exhausts the other claims; and (3) amend the Petition to add the unexhausted claims back into the Petition after exhaustion is complete. Dkt. No. 3, at 3–5. On December 1, 2022, this Court denied the requested relief—known as a Kelly stay after Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003)—on the ground that the unexhausted claims (which primarily involve ineffective assistance of counsel) are based on facts different from those that form the basis for his exhausted claims (which primarily involve due process and confrontation clause issues), and thus would not relate back to the exhausted claims after exhaustion. See Dkt. No. 7, at 5–6. Saddozai moved for reconsideration of the Court's denial of a Kelly stay, Dkt. No. 8, which this Court denied, Dkt. No. 18.

In the alternative, Saddozai moved for a stay pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), and the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing on whether the requirements for a Rhines stay are met.

Respondent Smith contends that a Rhines stay should not be granted because the state appellate court has not yet issued a final judgment on Saddozai's prior felony enhancement. Smith separately moves to dismiss the Petition, arguing that this ongoing state court proceeding requires the Court to dismiss the Petition under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Dkt. No. 22.

LEGAL STANDARDS

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), there is a one-year statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition, which begins to run only on “the date on which the [state court] judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

ANALYSIS

I. The Court Denies Saddozai's Request for a Rhines Stay.

A Rhines stay allows a petitioner to stay a mixed habeas petition (i.e., a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) in federal court as the petitioner finishes exhausting the unexhausted claims in state court. A petitioner moving for a Rhines stay must meet three requirements: (1) the petitioner has “good cause” for his failure to exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; and (3) the petitioner has not engaged in “intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005). To demonstrate good cause, a petitioner must “set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence” to justify the failure to exhaust. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). A “bald assertion cannot amount to a showing of good cause,” id., nor can allegations that are “insufficiently detailed.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d at 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009).

Saddozai argues that he has good cause for his failure to exhaust claims 2(b), 3, and 4 because he was confused about the various statutes of limitations for his claims and therefore hoped to preserve the timeliness of his claims by filing them all in a single federal habeas petition. Dkt. No. 20, at 3. He further argues that the unexhausted claims here involve ineffective assistance of counsel and an attorney cannot raise claims about their own ineffectiveness, contributing to the delay. Id. at 4. Saddozai also contends that there is no evidence showing that his claims are plainly meritless or that he engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.

Smith responds that Saddozai has not provided sufficient evidence of “good cause” to excuse his failure to exhaust besides mere confusion about the statutes of limitations. Moreover, Smith notes that Saddozai's appeal of the state trial court's October 2022 resentencing decision (where the court declined to strike his prior felony enhancement) is still pending. Accordingly, Smith argues, Saddozai's resentencing has not yet been finalized and the AEDPA statute of limitations has not even begun to run. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

The Court agrees. Because the state appellate court has yet to rule on Saddozai's appeal concerning the trial court's decision to uphold his prior felony enhancement, his resentencing has not yet been finalized, and a Rhines stay is unnecessary. See Smith v. Williams, 871 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that a resentencing amounts to a “new judgment, starting a new one-year statute of limitations” under AEDPA). The Court therefore denies the motion for a Rhines stay.

II. The Court Denies Smith's Motion To Dismiss and Grants a Duke Stay.

Smith separately moves to dismiss Saddozai's petition under the Younger abstention doctrine due to Saddozai's pending state court appeal concerning his prior felony enhancement. Younger abstention is required if: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional challenge in state court; and (4) the requested relief [in federal court] enjoins or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state proceeding. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). Abstention under Younger is “an extraordinary and narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018).

Smith argues that Saddozai has a pending state appeal as to the same conviction underlying the federal habeas petition, and that state criminal proceedings inherently implicate important state interests. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Smith also contends that Saddozai can raise his constitutional challenges in state court. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Finally, Smith argues that the relief sought here (release from custody) would effectively enjoin the state resentencing proceedings.

Saddozai counters that Younger is inapplicable because the felony enhancement comprises only a small portion of Saddozai's underlying sentence and a successful outcome for him in state appellate court would not render any of the constitutional issues in his federal habeas petition moot. Dkt. No. 27, at 3. Notably, a guilty conviction has already been reached in the state court proceedings and that issue is no longer being appealed. The remaining proceedings only involve questions related to the felony enhancement on his sentence. See Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding in a case where the state proceedings challenged pretrial detention conditions that “Younger abstention is not appropriate ․ because the issues raised in the bail appeal are distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and would not interfere with it.”).

As discussed above, the Court finds that the state court proceedings are not yet final because the resentencing appeal is still ongoing. See Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In the context of finality, we treat the judgment of conviction as one unit, rather than separately considering the judgment's components, i.e., treating the conviction and sentence for each count separately.”). But this alone does not warrant abstention under Younger, which separately requires that the ongoing proceedings provide the petitioner with an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional questions presented in the federal habeas petition.

Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088 (9th Cir. 2023), is instructive. In Duke, the petitioner similarly initiated resentencing proceedings in state court under Cal. Pen. Code § 1172.6 after filing a habeas petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court held that the federal habeas petition should be dismissed under Younger given the pending state court resentencing proceedings, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “the animating rationale of Younger is not implicated” by “a federal habeas petitioner's ongoing § 1172.6 proceeding.” Duke, 64 F.4th at 1094. In particular, the Duke Court found that “Younger did not mandate dismissal of Duke's federal habeas petition because the third part of the test for Younger abstention is not met [as] the § 1172.6 resentencing proceeding will not address Duke's constitutional challenges.” Id. In addition to finding that the district court's dismissal of the case under Younger was an abuse of discretion, the Court concluded that the district court erred in denying a stay because this “unnecessarily created a significant risk that Duke would lose his one chance for federal review of his constitutional claims.” Id. at 1099.

The same logic applies here. Because Saddozai is specifically challenging the application of a prior felony enhancement to his sentence in state court, the state court proceeding “affords no opportunity for [Saddozai] to raise federal constitutional claims” and “Younger's comity concerns do not come into play.” Id. at 1095. Saddozai's habeas petition asserting constitutional violations therefore will not significantly interfere with the state court proceedings involving his sentencing. Id. at 1098 (“The federal petition seeks a retrial and the chance to be acquitted of all charges; the state proceeding seeks a reduced offense and resentencing.”). The Court therefore denies Smith's motion to dismiss.

Instead, as in Duke, the Court will grant a stay of these proceedings pending the conclusion of Saddozai's state court resentencing proceedings. See id. at 1099 (“The federal constitution guarantees Duke one shot at federal review of the state courts' resolution of his federal claims, and that right may be forever lost if Duke's petition is dismissed rather than stayed.”); see also Guerrero v. People of California, 2023 WL 7003264, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2023) (finding that “a stay is appropriate under Duke rather than outright dismissal because not all the Younger elements are present”).²

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Saddozai's request for a Rhines stay and denies Smith's motion to dismiss the case under Younger, but grants a stay under Duke until the conclusion of Saddozai's state court resentencing proceedings. The Court orders the parties to inform the Court once the resentencing proceedings and any related appeals have concluded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the California Court of Appeal for the First District denied Saddozai's habeas petition on May 6, 2024, it is not clear whether Saddozai has filed a petition with the California Supreme Court. Regardless, the Court assumes that the California Supreme Court has not ruled on any such appeal because Saddozai has not provided the Court with any update in that regard.

2.   Although Saddozai may still have not exhausted claims 2(b), 3, and 4 in his state habeas proceedings, because the Court stays the case under Duke it need not address that issue at this time.

P. Casey Pitts United States District Judge