RUSSELL v. MERCEDES BENZ INTERNATIONAL INC (2026)

ORDER

This case is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Opposed Motion for Conditional Certification and to Facilitate Notice (Doc. 90). Plaintiffs Ronald Russell and Timothy Smith filed a collective action complaint against Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. (MBUSI), asserting a claim under § 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid overtime. See Doc. 64. The FLSA authorizes employees to bring an action on behalf of “themselves and other employees similarly situated” “to recover the liability prescribed in” § 207. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Courts have the discretionary power under § 216(b) to certify a class and send potential class members notice about a pending action. But first, plaintiffs must “mak[e] substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendants' affidavits to the contrary.” Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952 (11th Cir. 2007). Without that showing, “it is doubtful that § 216(b) would further the interests of judicial economy, and it would undoubtedly present a ready opportunity for abuse.” Id. at 953.

Plaintiffs have not carried their burden. MBUSI operates a plant in Vance, Alabama, that employs thousands of workers across its body shop, paint shop, and two assembly shops. Plaintiffs allege that these workers are owed additional overtime based on (1) time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE); (2) work done during off-the-clock meal breaks; (3) MBUSI's failure to properly account for bonuses when calculating their overtime pay; and (4) time spent walking from the parking lot, through security, to their worksite, and back. But the seven employee declarations submitted by Plaintiffs, if anything, undercut the notion that thousands of MBUSI workers performing different jobs in different shops are similarly situated. On PPE, some must wear steel-toed boots while others wear specialized suits for painting vehicles. On meal breaks, nearly half of the seven declarants fail to allege that they have worked through a meal. On the bonus issue, none state that their bonuses have been miscalculated. And on the walking-to-the-worksite theory, no one alleges any “liability prescribed in” § 207 because the FLSA expressly precludes any such liability. Plus, MBUSI's evidence, much of which Plaintiffs have not “successfully engage[d],” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 952., further shows that Plaintiffs have not met their burden. Thus, as explained further below, Plaintiffs' motion (Doc. 90) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. Collective-Action Complaint

Plaintiffs Ronald Russell and Timothy Smith filed a collective action complaint against Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. (MBUSI), under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).¹

Russell and Smith both work at MBUSI's plant in Vance, Alabama. See Doc. 91-1 at ¶4; Doc. 91-2 at 2; Doc. 64 at ¶14. The Vance plant houses MBUSI's body shop, paint shop, and two assembly shops—Assembly 1 and Assembly 2. Doc. 94 at 9-10; Doc. 64 at ¶16. Russell and Smith bring the action on behalf of “current and former non-exempt employees” against MBUSI. Doc. 64 at ¶12. Their complaints break down into three categories.

First, Plaintiffs allege that MBUSI failed to pay for “off-the-clock” work and “maintained a policy and practice whereby hourly employees are encouraged and/or required to work off-the-clock” in violation of the FLSA. Doc. 64 at ¶¶18, 28. MBUSI allegedly required employees to perform uncompensated preliminary and postliminary work activities, including donning and doffing personal protective equipment. Id. at ¶¶32, 41.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that due to MBUSI's automatic 30-minute meal deduction, they frequently performed uncompensated work during mealtimes. Id. at ¶¶29-31.

Third, Plaintiffs allege MBUSI violated the FLSA by failing to properly account for non-discretionary bonuses they received when calculating the hourly rate upon which their overtime rates would be based. Id. at ¶¶53-60.

Fourth, embedded alongside Plaintiffs' PPE allegations, Plaintiffs allege they perform “compensable,” but uncompensated, work by “walking to Defendant's time clock;” “walking to Defendant's locker room/changing area;” and “walking to the work deck to report to their scheduled shifts.” Id. at ¶41. In their motion and declarations, Plaintiffs also assert that they “must pass through security screening.” Doc. 90 at 12.

Pursuant to § 216(b), Plaintiffs ask the Court to conditionally certify and send notice to the following collective:

All current and former non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked in production positions in Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.'s body shops, paint shop, or assembly shops and who worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek in Alabama between [undecided date] and the present.

Id. at 9. Plaintiffs allege that they, along with the proposed collective, performed uncompensated work and were not paid a proper overtime fee.

II. Plaintiffs' Evidence in Support of Certification

In support of their request for conditional certification, Plaintiffs submit declarations of seven employees, copies of four MBUSI webpages, a copy of a MBUSI job posting, and copies of two MBUSI manuals. See generally Doc. 91.

Plaintiff Ronald Russell worked as a team member in Assembly 2. See Doc. 94 at 35. When he arrived at the plant, he passed through a metal detector and turnstile then walked to the locker room and donned the required PPE for assembly, which included steel-toed boots, safety badges, gloves, goggles, and occasionally other items. Doc. 91-1 at ¶¶4, 6-8. After his shift, he clocked out, returned to the locker room to doff his PPE, and then went through security to exit the building. Id. at ¶12. Russell testified that he worked through meal breaks approximately two times per month; and, other times, his meal break was cut short when the team was behind on production. Id. at ¶13. Russell does not assert that he is required to leave his PPE on site; presumably, he can, for example, wear his boots to work and back home.

Plaintiff Timothy Smith and Declarant Lasonja Jackson work in Paint and testify that upon arrival to MBUSI, they pass through a metal detector and turnstile and then walk to the locker room to don the required Paint PPE. Paint employees are required to wear steel-toed boots, a safety badge and belt, gloves, goggles, chemical protective clothing, and specialized headgear. Doc. 91-2 at ¶¶1-8; Doc. 91-6 at ¶¶1-8. Both testified that the chemical protective clothing is required to be kept on campus, thereby requiring Smith and Jackson to spend time at MBUSI before and after work, donning and doffing the chemical protective clothing. Smith and Jackson are “not able to leave the plant” during the meal break because “[t]here is not sufficient time to doff and re-don [ ] PPE, pass through security to leave and reenter the site, and then return and report back to [the] workstation in time.” Doc. 91-2 at ¶12; Doc. 91-6 at ¶13. Unlike Russell, however, neither Smith nor Jackson assert that they have had to perform unpaid work during their meal breaks.

James Click, Sammie Ellis, and Craig Ferguson work in Assembly 2. Doc. 91-3 at ¶4; Doc. 91-4 at ¶4; Doc. 91-5 at ¶4. Click, Ellis, and Ferguson each testify that upon arrival, they pass through a metal detector and turnstile, then walk to the locker room to don Assembly's required PPE, which includes steel toed-boots, safety badges, goggles, gloves, and sometimes a bump camp or hearing protection; and, at the end of the day, they return to the locker room to doff the PPE. Doc. 91-3 at ¶¶7-8, 12; Doc. 91-4 at ¶¶7-8, 12; Doc. 91-5 at ¶¶7-8, 12. Ellis and Ferguson—but not Click—testify that occasionally, when production line is running behind, their meal break is cut short, yet a 30-minute break is still deducted from their paychecks. Doc. 91-4 at ¶13; Doc. 91-5 at ¶13. None assert that they are required to keep their PPE on site or are not allowed to don or doff it at home.

Willis Wilson also works in Assembly 2. Doc. 91-7 at ¶5. When he arrives, he goes through the metal detector and turnstile, then goes to the locker room to retrieve his bump cap and gloves. Id. at ¶¶8-9. Willis is “not able to leave the job site during [his] meal period because there is insufficient time to doff and don [ ] PPE, pass through security when exiting and re-entering the facility, and return to [his] workstation in time.” Id. at ¶15. He also testifies that he sometimes performs unpaid work during his meal break. Id. at ¶14.

ANALYSIS

I. Statutory Background

A. Liability under the FLSA

Congress enacted the FLSA to address certain “labor conditions” it found to be “detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). One provision of the FLSA relevant here is § 207, which requires overtime pay for many workers by generally prohibiting employers from employing anyone “for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” Id. § 207(a)(1).

The FLSA, however, “did not define ‘work’ or ‘workweek,’ ” and in two decisions shortly after the law was enacted, the Supreme Court “interpreted those terms broadly.” Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 31 (2014). The Court “defined ‘work’ as ‘physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.’ ” Id. (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Loc. No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944)). And the Court “defined ‘the statutory workweek’ to ‘includ[e] all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1946)). In doing so, the Court “found compensable the time spent traveling between mine portals and underground work areas, and the time spent walking from timeclocks to work benches.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Those decisions “provoked a flood of litigation” that Congress declared an “emergency” it met “with the Portal-to-Portal Act.” Id. at 31-32. The Act now generally exempts employers from any liability under the FLSA for failure “to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation” for the following activities:

(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and

(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities,

which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.

29 U.S.C. § 254(a).

The Supreme “Court has consistently interpreted the term ‘principal activity or activities’ to embrace all activities which are an ‘integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.’ ” Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 33 (citation modified). An activity is “integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform if it is an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.” Id. In Integrity Staffing, the Supreme Court held that “warehouse workers who retrieved inventory and packaged it for shipment” who were required “to undergo an antitheft security screening before leaving the warehouse each day” were not entitled to be compensated under the FLSA for “time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing those security screenings.” Id. at 29.

B. Collective actions to recover the liability prescribed by the FLSA

Section 216(b) gives teeth to § 207 (and other provisions) of the FLSA by providing employees a private right of action: “Any employer who violates ․ section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of ․ their unpaid overtime compensation, ․ and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “An action to recover the liability prescribed in the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” Id. But unlike in an opt-out class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” Id.

The Supreme Court has held that “district courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ․ by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989). But “courts, as well as practicing attorneys, have a responsibility to avoid the ‘stirring up’ of litigation through unwarranted solicitation.” Brooks v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 561, 567 (N.D. Ala. 1995), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Severtson v. Phillips Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264, 266 (D. Minn. 1991)).

The “key” to starting a § 216(b) collective action “is a showing that there is a similarly situated group of employees.” Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008). Upon that showing, a court can authorize notice to give employees a chance to opt in to the suit. See Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (express opt-in provision requires employees to give consent in writing).

The term “similarly situated” has not been precisely defined by the Eleventh Circuit. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259. But it requires, at minimum, that plaintiffs show that their positions are similar to the proposed class with respect to job requirements and pay provisions, and plaintiffs bear the burden of “demonstrating a reasonable basis for crediting the assertion that aggrieved individuals exist in the class they propose.” Marsh v. Butler Cnty. Sch. Sys., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Ala. 2003). “[T]he similarities necessary to maintain a collective action under § 216(b) must extend beyond the mere facts of job duties and pay provisions.” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To manage FLSA collective actions, the Eleventh Circuit “suggest[s]” that district courts use a two-tiered approach to certification because it may be an “effective tool,” but the decision to create an opt-in class “remains soundly within the discretion of the district court.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2001). The first stage requires the court to determine whether notice should be given to potential opt-in plaintiffs and whether the case should conditionally proceed as a collective action. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259. Then, after discovery, the defendant may move for decertification of the collective. Id.

At this initial notice stage, the standard for determining similarity is “not particularly stringent, fairly lenient, flexible, not heavy, and less stringent than for joinder under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials under 42(b).” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1260-61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But this lenient standard still requires evidence, not mere allegations, from plaintiffs. They must “mak[e] substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendants' affidavits to the contrary.” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219.

* * *

Defendants urge the Court to forgo this suggested two-step approach and follow the Fifth Circuit's framework from Swales v. KLLM Transport Services, L.L.C., which requires district courts to “rigorously scrutinize the realm of ‘similarly situated’ workers ․ from the outset of the case, not after a lenient, step-one ‘conditional certification.’ ” 985 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs respond that the Court cannot apply this standard for various reasons, including because no discovery has taken place. See Doc. 99 at 18-19. But Plaintiffs did not want the chance to develop a robust record prior to certification, and in fact, strongly opposed any discovery prior to a ruling on their conditional certification motion, which makes their arguments ring hollow. See Docs. 79, 84, 89.

Regardless, even under their preferred two-step approach, Plaintiffs fail to meet the lenient standard for conditional certification and notice, and the Court will not certify the proposed collective. Plaintiffs' request fails for two reasons. For three of their theories of § 207 liability—PPE, unpaid mealtime, and bonus miscalculations—Plaintiffs have not shown that their declarants are even similarly situated to each other, much less thousands of other MBUSI employees across four different production shops. And for Plaintiffs' fourth theory of liability—walking through security and to and from their worksites—Plaintiffs have not stated a theory of liability at all. Section 216(b) allows employees to bring only “[a]n action to recover the liability prescribed in” the FLSA, and the FLSA makes plain that “no employer shall be subject to any liability” for failing to pay employees for “walking ․ to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). Thus, the Court would likely abuse its discretion by notifying thousands of employees about this non-claim, and the Court certainly has discretion to refrain from doing so.

II. Plaintiffs Fail to Show Similarity as to Personal Protective Equipment.

Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that MBUSI “required that Plaintiffs and Collective Members arrive to their work shifts sufficiently early to don required PPE,” and that MBUSI “did not allow Plaintiffs and Collective Members to take PPE out of the building,” but “required the PPE to be stored on Defendant's premises.” Doc. 64 at ¶¶38, 43. But at the conditional certification stage, “there must be more than only counsel's unsupported assertions that FLSA violations [are] widespread and that additional plaintiffs” exist. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs were required to provide evidence to substantiate these claims, but their evidence undercuts them.

Plaintiffs present declarations from employees from only two of the four shops they seek to draw into their collective action—Assembly 2 and Paint. Of those declarants, only the two paint employees testify that they are required to leave PPE on site and are thus required to arrive early to don the required PPE and stay late to doff it. Docs. 91-2; 91-6. None of the other declarants provide evidence that they are required to, for example, don and doff boots or gloves on site rather than at home.² Indeed, Willis testified that he retrieves just his bump cap and gloves on site, which suggests that he wears his other required PPE to and from campus. Doc. 91-7 at ¶9. If Willis, one out of the five assembly shop team members before the Court, wears most of his PPE to and from campus and does not attest he is required to spend uncompensated work time donning and doffing, it follows that all Assembly workers are not similarly situated.

Only two of the employees before the Court provide evidence that they are required to don and doff PPE at MBUSI, and the rest of the employees, while required to wear certain PPE, provide no evidence that they must don or doff at work as pre- and post-shift activities. Even without evidence from the Body shop, evidence from workers in the Paint and Assembly shops demonstrates a lack of similarity that defeats conditional certification. Paint shop employees are the only ones required to don and doff certain protective gear on site, and, accordingly, they are given an extra twelve minutes of paid work time each day to accomplish those tasks. Doc. 95-5 at ¶19.

Plaintiffs argue that this consideration “goes to a merits issue, which ․ is not part of the conditional certification.” Doc. 100 at 9. Plaintiffs are correct to an extent. The submitted evidence tends to show that most or all of the PPE claims are meritless because “[d]onning and doffing ․ protective gear at home has never been considered work time.” Llorca v. Sheriff, Collier Cnty., Fla., 893 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018). But “the Court is not making a merits determination” because it is not adjudicating whether Russell and Smith are entitled to additional overtime pay due to required PPE. See Roberts v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., No. 8:23-cv-2447, 2024 WL 4753703, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2024). Rather, the Court is considering the different PPE requirements because it shows how different even the two named Plaintiffs' claims are. The difference in PPE requirements, the Paint shop's allocated 12 minutes of donning-and-doffing pay, and the lack of a requirement for Assembly (and presumably Body) workers to don and doff any PPE on campus leads the Court to conclude that the proposed collective is not similarly situated. See id.

Plaintiffs' allegation in the complaint that MBUSI “did not allow Plaintiffs and Collective Members to take PPE out of the building,” Doc. 64 at ¶43, is not supported by Plaintiffs' evidence and is controverted by the Defendants. The only employees who aver that they are not allowed to take PPE off site are the Paint employees, which are only a fraction of the thousands of production workers that Plaintiffs seek to certify. Plaintiffs submit MBUSI's handbook, which does show that all employees are required to wear some type of PPE. See Doc. 91-12. But their evidence also shows that the types of PPE vary and that there is no overarching requirement that PPE be donned and doffed on campus. See Docs. 91-1, 91-2, 91-3, 91-4, 91-5, 91-6, 91-7.

All this underscores the problem with certifying a broad class based on PPE donning and doffing. Failing to pay “employees for the time spent donning and doffing protective equipment ․ is not an FLSA violation in itself.” Duncan-Watts v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1437, 2020 WL 589041, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2020). Indeed, the time spent donning and doffing clothing and equipment is only compensable and, therefore, can only trigger FLSA overtime violations, if such donning and doffing is “integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform.” Id. (quoting Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 37). Even so, Plaintiffs seek to certify a class that spans four different MBUSI shops, different job duties, and different PPE requirements based on declarations from employees of only two shops. That “broad class would involve multiple different theories of FLSA overtime violations.” Id. at *4. For example, whether donning and doffing the Paint shop's “chemical protective clothing,” Doc. 91-6 at ¶8, is integral and indispensable to applying paint “would not necessarily be relevant to employees” whose required PPE consists of boots and gloves, Duncan-Watts, 2020 WL 589041, at *4. Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown similarity between their claims and those of their proposed class. Beecher v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2012).

III. Plaintiffs Fail to Show Similarity as to Automatic Mealtime Deductions.

Plaintiffs allege that MBUSI's mealtime policy—an automatic deduction of thirty minutes for meal periods—violates the FLSA. Doc. 90 at 13.

Plaintiffs fail to show a similarly situated group of employees because they present only “unsupported and generalized allegations.” Beecher, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. In the complaint and motion for certification, Plaintiffs state that employees are “frequently required to work through meal breaks” without compensation, Doc. 90 at 13; Doc. 64 at ¶29, but these allegations are unsupported by Plaintiffs' evidence. Russell “worked through [his] meal breaks approximately two (2) times per month,” and other times, his “break was cut short of the allotted thirty minutes because the team was behind on production.” Doc. 91-1 at ¶13. Ellis, Wilson, and Ferguson testify that sometimes the production line is running behind and they are not allotted a full 30-minute lunch break. Doc. 91-4 at ¶13; Doc. 91-5 at ¶13; Doc. 91-7 at ¶14. But Smith, Jackson, and Click do not testify they were required to work through a meal break. Doc. 91-2 at ¶12; Doc. 91-3; Doc. 91-6 at ¶13.³ When asked how these three declarations could support certification of a mealtime claim, Plaintiffs responded: “We didn't say that they're not working.” Doc. 100 at 21. In other words, Plaintiffs offer only “counsel's unsupported assertions,” when “there must be more.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261.

The Court cannot find similarity among a proposed class of thousands of employees when three of Plaintiffs' seven declarants cannot confirm they have ever worked through a lunch break. See Docs. 91-2, 91-3, 91-6. The Court “cannot envision a more pertinent disparate factual setting, for purposes of the similarly situated inquiry, among a group of Plaintiffs than the fact that some members of the group do not actually have a viable claim in the action at issue.” Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Servs., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1303–04 (N.D. Ga. 2014). The Court cannot conclude that thousands of employees are similarly situated when almost half of the employees Plaintiffs bring before the Court are not similarly situated. No evidence suggests that all production workers are similarly affected by MBUSI's mealtime policies.

The similarity showing fails on Plaintiffs' evidence alone, but consideration of Defendant's evidence further shows that an FLSA claim would require a highly individualized inquiry. First, MBUSI presented evidence that the meal breaks are structured differently among Assembly, Body, and Paint. Doc. 95-5 at ¶39. Second, MBUSI explained that if a team member (TM) works through a lunch break, the group leader for that team has the “authority and capability to designate the lunch break as ‘No Meal’ in the timekeeping system so the TM is paid for the full lunch break.” Id. Therefore, any unpaid lunch break would first be reported to a group leader. Plaintiffs do not “successfully engage defendants' affidavits” on this point, Anderson, 488 F.3d at 952, which suggests that the failure of a few employees to get credit for time worked during their meal breaks was likely the product of more individualized considerations, not widespread FLSA violations, see Hilley v. Tacala, L.L.C., No. 2:12-cv-2691, 2014 WL 1246364, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2014) (company-wide collective action not supported by evidence showing that “[t]he decisional sources for the alleged practices appear to be one or more store managers”). “[T]he mere fact that violations occurred cannot be enough to establish similarity.” Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.

Further, the structure of reporting and approving work during meal breaks creates highly individualized inquiries unsuited for a collective action. To prove an overtime claim, a plaintiff will have to show specific meals through which he worked, that he reported those meals to his group leader, and that a particular group leader failed to mark them. The evidence suggests that MBUSI's automatic deduction policy “impacted employees in different ways depending on ․ whether they asked for corrections to be made,” and “material facts will vary among Plaintiffs as to the significant question of liability—whether due to automatically deducted breaks a Plaintiff ever worked in excess of 40 hours per week without appropriate compensation.” Willoughby v. Youth Villages, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2015).

Plaintiffs contend that the mere “existence of the common auto-deduction policy” is enough to show similarity, Doc. 99 at 33, but clear variations in the declarants' testimony, including three Plaintiff declarants who did not (and presumably could not) swear that they worked through a meal break, show that the automatic meal deduction policy impacts employees in different ways—and that this claim is thus not suitable for certification, see Green v. Atlas Senior Living, LLC, No. 421-cv-237, 2022 WL 2007398, at *5-7 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 2022) (discussing meal-time violations and finding that based on certain distinctions, it would “be impossible for Plaintiffs to establish liability on a class-wide basis, which is a requirement to maintain, and in this case institute, a collective action”).

IV. Plaintiffs Fail to Show Similarity as to Bonus Gross-up.

In the complaint, Plaintiffs assert that MBUSI failed to pay employees the appropriate overtime rate of compensation by failing to account for certain non-discretionary bonuses when calculating employees' hourly pay rate. Doc. 64 at ¶53. Plaintiff Smith specifically alleges that his non-discretionary bonus was not included in the calculation of his overtime pay. Id. at ¶57. But the declarations submitted by Smith and others fail to substantiate the allegations in the complaint, and the Court will not conditionally certify a class on conclusory unsupported allegations alone. See Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs may meet the burden for conditional certification by making “detailed allegations supported by affidavits”).

The affidavits provide no support for the allegations. The only detailed allegation in the complaint is related to Smith, who claimed his 2025 bonus and gross-up pay were not properly calculated. Doc. 64 at ¶57. When it was time to offer proof, he testified only that he is “eligible to receive various non-discretionary bonuses.” Doc. 91-2 at ¶14. Likewise, the six other employees testified only that they are “eligible” or “entitled” to receive various bonuses. Doc. 91-1 at ¶16; Doc. 91-2 at ¶14; Doc. 91-3 at ¶14; Doc. 91-4 at ¶15; Doc. 91-5 at ¶15; Doc. 91-6 at ¶15. Critically, not one employee testified that MBUSI improperly calculated their overtime rates of compensation. Based on that absence of evidence, the Court will not conditionally certify a collective. There can be no “evidence of a pattern of FLSA violations” sufficient to meet the “similarly situated” standard when there is no evidence of any FLSA violation at all. See Marsh, 242 F. Supp. at 1094.

V. The Court Will Not Certify an FLSA Collective Action Based on Conduct That the FLSA Declares is Not Compensable.

Plaintiffs' final theory of FLSA liability involves walking to and from their work sites and passing through security. Specifically, they allege that “Plaintiffs and Collective Members” walk to their time clocks, walk to locker rooms or changing areas, and “walk[ ] to the work deck to report to their scheduled shifts.” Doc. 64 at ¶41. And in their motion and declarations, they add that they must pass through security screenings when arriving at work. See, e.g., Doc. 91-6 at ¶7. Unlike for the other theories of FLSA liability, all seven of Plaintiffs' declarants can attest that they have to go through security and have to walk to their worksites, which provides more support for the proposition that they are similarly situated to other MBUSI employees in these respects.

But § 216(b) authorizes collective actions only “to recover the liability prescribed in the preceding sentences” of that provision, including against an “employer who violates the provisions of ․ section 207.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). And MBUSI plainly faces no liability under § 207 for failing to pay employees for “security screening ․ and traversal of distances.” Doc. 99 at 26. Rather, as discussed above, the Portal-to-Portal Act was enacted decades ago precisely so “no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the [FLSA]” for failing to compensate employees for “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities,” or “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). Principal activities are those that are “integral and indispensable,” which include only an activity “if it is an intrinsic element” of the employee's principal activities “and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.” Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 33. If a preliminary or postliminary activity is not both integral and indispensable, the employee's time is not compensable under the FLSA. Id.

In Integrity Staffing, the Supreme Court found that the time spent waiting to enter a security screening and then undergoing the screening was a noncompensable postliminary activity. Id. at 35. These actions were not the principal activity because the employees were not employed “to undergo security screenings, but to retrieve products from warehouse shelves and package those products for shipment to Amazon customers.” Id. “The integral and indispensable test is tied to the productive work that the employee is employed to perform,” and the fact that an employee is required to perform preliminary or postliminary activities does not transform those activities into a compensable principal activity. Id. at 36. The security screenings in Integrity Staffing were required, but their absence would not “impair[ ] the employees' ability to complete their work,” and the screenings were therefore not an intrinsic element of employees' jobs. Id. at 35.

Plaintiffs' claims based on time spent passing through security screenings, walking to and from time clocks, and walking to and from workstations are expressly foreclosed by the Portal-to-Portal Act. Indeed, it is concerning that an officer of the court would even allege that activities like “walking to the work deck to report to their scheduled shifts” are “activities that constituted compensable work” under the FLSA, Doc. 64 at ¶41 (emphasis added), when the FLSA lists under “Activities not compensable” “walking ․ to ․ the actual place of performance of the principal activity ․ which such employee is employed to perform,” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs' response is that these are “merits-based question[s]” that must wait for “the second stage” in the certification two-step. Doc. 100 at 25. And to be sure, as Plaintiffs note, see Doc. 99 at 22, some district courts have stated that, “[a]t this procedural stage, ․ a court should not weigh the merits of the underlying claims in determining whether potential opt-in plaintiffs may be similarly situated,” Abrams v. Mansari LLC, No. 8:24-cv-949, 2024 WL 5220891, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 26, 2024).

But even “[d]rawing all inferences in favor of [Plaintiffs] at this preliminary certification stage,” id., Plaintiffs are not trying “to recover the liability prescribed” in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), when their claim is premised on actions for which the FLSA plainly imposes no liability. Certifying a class and sending notice to thousands of employees because they all “similarly” lack a colorable FLSA claim cannot be squared with the statute, caselaw, or commonsense.

First, the statute. As noted, § 216(b) authorizes collective actions only to “recover the liability” prescribed in that subsection. When Plaintiffs cannot begin to explain how MBUSI would be liable for not compensating them for conduct the FLSA has declared to be not compensable, the Court likely has no authority to issue notices, must less an obligation to do so.

Second, the caselaw. There is no way that sending out notices for claims foreclosed by the Portal-to-Portal Act “would further the interests of judicial economy,” but doing so “would undoubtedly present a ready opportunity for abuse.” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953. Sending “notice to employees who are not potential plaintiffs ․ risks crossing the line from using notice as a case-management tool to using notice as a claims-solicitation tool.” Swales, 985 F.3d at 442. And “courts, as well as practicing attorneys, have a responsibility to avoid the ‘stirring up’ of litigation through unwarranted solicitation.” Brooks, 164 F.R.D. at 567.

Finally, common sense. “[I]t makes little sense to certify a collective action based on manifestly deficient pleadings.” Boutros v. JTC Painting & Decorating Corp., No. 12-cv-7576, 2013 WL 3110943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2013). Yet under Plaintiffs' view, a plaintiff alleging that he was entitled to overtime for working only 30 hours per week could demand certification and notice to his fellow employees. After all, those other employees would be “similarly situated” in that they too did not get overtime pay to which they were not entitled under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (requiring overtime pay only for time worked after 40 hours have been worked in a workweek). When the Court asked at the hearing if it would have to certify that hypothetical class, counsel for Plaintiffs could not say “one way or another.” Doc. 100 at 25. The Court is convinced that the answer is no. While “district courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to ․ facilitate[e] notice to potential plaintiffs,” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 169, neither the Court's 30-hour-workweek hypothetical nor Plaintiffs' walking-to-the-worksite case can be reasonably deemed “appropriate cases” for certification and notice.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs do not meet their burden to show that there are other employees of MBUSI who desire to “opt-in” to their action to recover the liability prescribed by § 207 of the FLSA and who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiffs. See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259. Plaintiffs Russell and Smith may continue to pursue their claims, and nothing prohibits them from later attempting to certify a class. But based on the current pleadings and evidence, the Court exercises its discretion and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification and to Facilitate Notice (Doc. 90).

DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of August, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiffs Smith, Russell, and Ford originally filed this action in the Northern District of Georgia against multiple Mercedes-Benz entities. See Doc. 1. Upon request from the parties, that court severed those claims into two separate actions and transferred Russell and Smith's claims to this Court. See Doc. 61.

2.   See Doc. 100 at 9 (Court: “[I]it doesn't seem like there's anything prohibiting him from wearing the gloves and the goggles home or driving to work in the gloves and the goggles.” [Plaintiffs' Counsel]: “Correct, Your Honor.”).

3.   Smith and Jackson merely state they are unable to leave the plant for lunch because there is no time to don and re-doff their PPE. Doc. 91-2 at ¶12; Doc. 91-6 at ¶13.

EDMUND G. LACOUR JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE