PRECIOSO v. NATIONAL HEALTH CORP (2025)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is “Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum of Law For Reassignment of Related Case Under Administrative Order 176” (Doc. No. 87, “Motion”). Via the Motion, Plaintiffs “move the Court for reassignment of this matter to Chief Judge Campbell as the judge presiding over the first-filed related action, National Health Corporation v. Marie Jodel Halasan Montalvo, M.D. Tenn. Case No. 1:23-cv-00074, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 176 of this District (“A.O. 176”).” (Id. at 1).

Also pending before the Court (meaning the undersigned and Chief Judge Campbell, respectively) is the motion (Doc. No. 82) of Defendants National Healthcare Corporation (“NHC”), Jeffrey R. Smith, and Maria Wong, to consolidate the instant case (Case No. 3:24-cv-00561, “Precioso”) with the case pending before Chief Judge Campbell (Case No. 1:23-cv-00074, “Montalvo”), as well as a corresponding motion (Montalvo, Doc. No. 32)¹ by NHC in Montalvo to consolidate Montalvo with Precioso.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DEFERRED in part.

BACKGROUND AND STANDARD

Before addressing the Motion, the Court discusses the history of the Montalvo and Precioso cases as needed.

In Montalvo, NHC filed suit against a former employee, Marie Montalvo, in Tennessee state court on October 3, 2023. (Montalvo, Doc. No. 1-1). In Montalvo, NHC asserts claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Ms. Montalvo, arising out of her “Nursing Employment Agreement.” (Montalvo, Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-3). The action was removed to this Court on October 27, 2023, (Montalvo, Doc. No. 1), and assigned to Chief Judge Campbell. NHC filed a motion to remand (Montalvo, Doc. No. 8), and Ms. Montalvo filed a motion to dismiss (Montalvo, Doc. No. 10). After denying these motions, (Montalvo, Docs. No. 17, 18), Chief Judge Campbell ordered the parties to mediation and administratively closed Montalvo (Montalvo, Doc. No. 19). On June 25, 2024, Chief Judge Campbell stayed all deadlines in Montalvo (Montalvo, Doc. No 28). On September 15, 2025, NHC filed a motion to consolidate Montalvo with Precioso (Montalvo, Doc. No. 32). Montalvo remains administratively closed and all deadlines remain stayed. (Montalvo, Doc. No. 30).

Precioso was initiated on May 6, 2024, when seven plaintiffs, including Ms. Montalvo, filed a complaint in this Court (Doc. No. 1) against NHC, Jeffrey R. Smith, Maria Wong, Infinity Care Partners, LLC (“ICP”), and John Does 1-10. As alleged in Precioso’s now-operative complaint—the second amended complaint (Doc. No. 75, “SAC”)—“NHC, ICP, and their agents operated a comprehensive labor trafficking scheme designed to secure the forced labor of Ms. Montalvo, the other Plaintiffs, and a nationwide putative class of at least 200 other nurses through threats of harm to their physical safety and immigration status, abuse of legal process, and financial harm ․. One of the actions on which the Precioso Plaintiffs base their claims is NHC's abuse of legal process in filing the Montalvo matter.” (Doc. No. 87 at 2) (citing Doc. No. 75 at ¶¶ 1, 86, 87(a)-(b), 95, 96, 102, 103, 166, 182). On September 8, 2025, NHC, Jeffrey R. Smith and Maria Wong filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 79) the SAC. On September 10, 2025—five days before filing a similar motion in Montalvo, as noted above—NHC, Jeffrey R. Smith and Maria Wong filed their motion to consolidate Precioso with Montalvo (Doc. No. 82).

Via the instant Motion, Plaintiffs specifically request that the Court: “1. Find that Precioso and Montalvo are “related” within the meaning of A.O. 176; 2. Reassign Precioso (Case No. 3:24-cv-00561) to Chief Judge Campbell as the presiding judge in the first-filed Montalvo action (Case No. 1:23-cv-00074); and 3. Deny NHC's [m]otion to [c]onsolidate (Doc. No. 82).” (Doc. No. 87 at 6).

In the Motion, Plaintiffs in pertinent part describe the two motions to consolidate filed by NHC respectively in Montalvo and Precioso:

In these [m]otions to [c]onsolidate, NHC expressly argues that “the outcome of either case is largely determinative of the claims and defenses at issue in the other” and that both actions present “common questions of law and fact stemming directly from the same Employment Agreement.” (Montalvo at Doc. No. 32, p. 5; Precioso at Doc. No. 82, p. 5.) In making this argument, NHC has now effectively conceded that the two cases are “related” under A.O. 176. It has also clearly signaled that it intends (though it has not expressly asked) for Montalvo [which currently was and is administratively closed] to be reopened.

(Doc. No. 87 at 4).

A.O. 176 provides in relevant part:

b. Reassignment of Related Cases. A civil case assigned to a District Judge may be reassigned to another District Judge as a Related Case as set forth herein when such reassignment is in the interest of justice. Nothing herein shall create a right of reassignment of Related Cases. The reassignment of cases is discretionary and is within the exclusive province of the Court.

c. Definition of Related Cases. Cases may be considered “Related Cases” based on the following non-exclusive factors:

1. The cases arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences (see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 20);

2. The cases involve common questions of law or fact (see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a));

3. The cases involve one or more of the same parties or the same property;

4. The relief sought in the cases could result in a party being subject to conflicting orders or judgments;

5. Substantial duplication of effort and expense by the Court and the parties could occur if different District Judges presided over the cases;

6. Substantial savings of judicial time and resources could result if the cases were handled by the same District Judge; or

7. It is in the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances, for the same District Judge to preside over each of the cases.

A.O 176 §§ I(b); I(c).

A.O. 176 § II(a) also provides that “[a]ny request for reassignment of a new case as a Related Case shall be made promptly by filing a Motion supported by a Memorandum in accordance with LR 7.01.”

Between them, Defendants have filed two responses in opposition to the Motion. (Doc. Nos. 91, 92). One set of Defendants (ICP, Andrew Huckabay, and Rachel Kamau, collectively “ICP Defendants”) argues that the Motion should be denied because (according to these Defendants): (1) “Plaintiffs’ Motion is untimely” because by “waiting seventeen months” after filing the instant case to file their Motion, “Plaintiffs failed to affirmatively request reassignment within the time required by” A.O. 176 § II(a); (2) “Plaintiffs fail to analyze or even mention any of the ․ substantive questions that the Court must consider when deciding whether to reassign a case”; and (3) “the administrative closure and prolonged inactivity of the Montalvo case weighs against reassignment” because, with Precioso and Montalvo in “substantially different procedural postures with differing parties and myriad allegations,” reassignment “is likely to result in the same duplication of effort and inefficient use of judicial time and resources that [A.O. 176] seeks to remedy.” (Doc. No. 91 at 3-5).

Another set of Defendants (NHC, Jeffrey. R. Smith, and Maria Wong, collectively “NHC Defendants”) argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied because (1) “Plaintiffs have failed to promptly seek reassignment, as required by A.O. 176”; and (2) “Reassignment of the Precioso [c]ase to Chief Judge Campbell is [i]nconsistent with the [r]equirements of A.O. 176.” (Doc. No. 92 at 3-7).²

In effect, the arguments for denial of the Motion raised by the IPC Defendants and the NHC Defendants boil down to two arguments: (1) the Motion is untimely; and (2) Plaintiffs have not satisfied the substantive requirements of A.O. 176 and therefore the Court should not find Precioso and Montalvo are Related Cases, and should not reassign Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell. The Court will address each of these arguments, as well as Plaintiffs’ assertions as relevant to these arguments, in turn.³

DISCUSSION

1. The Motion's Timeliness

The IPC Defendants and the NHC Defendants argue, respectively, that the Motion is untimely because Plaintiffs waited “seventeen months” from the filing of the instant case to file the Motion (Doc. No. 91 at 3) and because “[t]he administrative closure of the Montalvo case in February 2024, or the stay in June 2024 did not prevent Plaintiffs from moving for reassignment (as they have done now), and any purported disagreement about relatedness underscores that the issue should have been presented to the Court promptly, not after substantial proceedings had already taken place.” (Doc. No. 92 at 5).

These arguments are unavailing. It is true that A.O. 176 provides that “[a]ny request for reassignment of a new case as a Related Case shall be made promptly by filing a Motion supported by a Memorandum in accordance with LR 7.01.” A.O. 176 § II(a) (emphasis added). However, it is not clear that the Motion was not made promptly. As Plaintiffs argue, “NHC's [m]otions to [c]onsolidate [(Doc. No. 82, Montalvo, Doc. No. 32)] evidence why A.O. 176 applies,” (Doc. No. 87 at 5), and Plaintiffs in fact filed their Motion just 16 days after NHC conceded in its motions to consolidate that “ ‘the outcome of’ ” Montalvo or Precioso “ ‘is largely determinative of the claims and defenses at issue in the other.’ ” (Doc. No. 87 at 4) (quoting Doc. No. 82 at 5, Montalvo, Doc. No. 32 at 5). It is debatable whether Plaintiffs should have filed their Motion prior to NHC's concession in its motions to consolidate, and if not, then the Motion is easily viewed as filed “promptly.” So the Court declines to find that Plaintiffs did not make their request for reassignment “promptly.”

Even assuming arguendo that the Motion is untimely, A.O. 176 does not contemplate anywhere that a failure to make a motion for reassignment “promptly” waives the ability to seek reassignment later. (Doc. No. 96 at 5). Indeed, for the Court to read such a waiver into A.O. 176 would undercut the purpose of A.O. 176 in permitting reassignment to assist in the “savings of judicial time and resources” and in preventing the “duplication of effort and expense by the Court and the parties.” A.O. 176 §§ I(c)(5), I(c)(6). True, A.O. 176 does require “prompt[ ]” filing, and it behooves a party that seeks reassignment to be able to explain why its request was made “promptly,” and failure to do so could undercut its argument that reassignment truly is warranted. But that is not to say that one consequence of flunking that requirement is that reassignment automatically cannot be requested later. Such a consequence would prevent the Court from being alerted to potential warranted reassignments that, even if requested belatedly, would help the Court to save “judicial time” and prevent the “duplication of effort and expense by the Court and the parties.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the IPC Defendants’ and NHC Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied as untimely.

2. Whether the Motion Comports with A.O. 176's Substantive Requirements

The IPC Defendants and NHC Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the substantive requirements of A.O. 176 and that therefore the Court should not find Precioso and Montalvo are Related Cases and thus not reassign Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell. As explained below, the Court rejects this argument and finds that Precioso and Montalvo are Related Cases within the meaning of A.O. 176 and will grant Plaintiffs’ request to reassign Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell.

As an initial matter, and as Plaintiffs note, the NHC Defendants concede that factors one through five as provided in A.O. 176 support reassignment of Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell as a Related Case of Montalvo. (Doc. No. 92 at 5-6). Thus, the NHC Defendants apparently argue only that Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied because “Plaintiffs’ [sic] offer no logical explanation” for (1) “how reassignment at this juncture would conserve judicial resources (as opposed to requiring duplication of efforts by Chief Judge Campbell relative to the work done by Judge Richardson)”; or (2) “how the reassignment of the Precioso [c]ase and continued stay of the Montalvo case promotes avoidance of duplication of discovery and potential for inconsistent outcomes.”⁴ (Id. at 7). These arguments are unavailing.

First, the NHC Defendants in their motions to consolidate have already conceded that “the outcome of either [Precioso or Montalvo] is largely determinative of the claims and defenses at issue in the other” and that both actions present “common questions of law and fact stemming directly from the same Employment Agreement.” (Doc. No. 82 at 5, Montalvo, Doc. No. 32 at 5). Thus, having Precioso and Montalvo before the same judge would necessarily help to conserve judicial resources (by eliminating the need for two judges to learn a similar set of facts) and prevent duplicative discovery (by eliminating the need for the parties to produce the same documents in two cases before two different judges). Second, to the extent that the NHC Defendants point this Court to their motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 79) filed on September 8, 2025 as evidence that transferring Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell would result in no “[s]ubstantial saving of judicial time and resources,” (Doc. No. 92 at 6), the Court rejects this argument. First, NHC's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 79) was filed on September 8, 2025, a mere month and a half prior to the Court's decision on the instant Motion; the Court has not yet invested resources in resolving that motion, because NHC's motion to dismiss joined a very busy docket with over 400 pending motions, many of which are older than NHC's motion to dismiss. Second, reassigning Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell, such that Chief Judge Campbell would be able to address NHC's motion to dismiss, would in fact save judicial time and resources, because Chief Judge Campbell has already ruled on a motion to dismiss in Montalvo (Montalvo, Doc. Nos. 10, 18) that involved some of the same parties and events in Precioso.

Additionally, the IPC Defendants argue briefly that reassignment of Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell would in fact “result in the same duplication of effort and inefficient use of judicial time and resources that [A.O. 176] seeks to remedy” because Montalvo and Precioso are in “substantially different procedural postures with differing parties.” (Doc. No. 91 at 4-5) The Court rejects this argument for two reasons. First, the procedural postures of the two cases are not as different as the IPC Defendants argue. It is true that Montalvo remains stayed for now and that the parties in Montalvo have already engaged in dispositive motion practice (Montalvo, Doc. Nos. 10, No. 18). However, the dispositive motion practice in Montalvo will actually assist Chief Judge Campbell in resolving the dispositive motion practice (Doc. No. 79) in which the parties in Precioso are currently engaged because, as discussed above, the motion practice in Montalvo involved some of the same factual background and parties (NHC and Ms. Montalvo) as does the motion practice in Precioso. Second, the argument that reassignment should be denied because the two cases have “differing parties” is unavailing based on the plain text of A.O. 176 § I(c)(3) which provides that reassignment may be considered if the “cases involve one or more of the same parties.” (emphasis added). Here, though Montalvo and Precioso do not have identical slates of parties, the cases share two parties—NHC and Ms. Montalvo—such that this factor actually weighs in favor of reassignment.⁵

Accordingly, because the NHC Defendants already have conceded that factors one through five favor reassignment of Precioso to Chief Judge Campbell (Doc. No. 92 at 5-6), that “the outcome of either [Precioso or Montalvo] is largely determinative of the claims and defenses at issue in the other” and that both actions present “common questions of law and fact stemming directly from the same Employment Agreement,” (Doc. No. 82 at 5, Montalvo, Doc. No. 32 at 5), and because the IPC Defendants’ arguments are unavailing, the Court finds that Precioso and Montalvo are Related Cases within the meaning of A.O. 176.

Thus, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ requests that the Court “1. Find that Precioso and Montalvo are ‘related’ within the meaning of A.O. 176;” and “2. Reassign Precioso (Case No. 3:24-cv-00561) to Chief Judge Campbell as the presiding judge in the first-filed Montalvo action (Case No. 1:23-cv-00074).” (Doc. No. 87 at 6). However, the Court defers Plaintiffs’ request that the Court “Deny NHC's [m]otion to [c]onsolidate (Doc. No. 82).” (Id. at 6). NHC's motion to consolidate (Doc. No. 82), is now fully briefed, and the Court defers decision on that motion to Chief Judge Campbell as the (transferee) judge who will now preside over this matter.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DEFERRED in part, and the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to reassign the above captioned matter (Case No. 3:24-cv-00561) to Chief Judge Campbell.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Herein, when the Court cites docket entries in Precioso, it cites them as “(Doc. No. _).” When the Court cites docket entries in Montalvo, it will cite to them as “(Montalvo, Doc. No. _).”

2.   The NHC Defendants also correctly note that “Administrative Order No. 176 [d]oes [n]ot [r]equire [r]eassignment.” (Doc. No. 92 at 2). The Court does not disagree with this assertion because as noted above, “[t]he reassignment of cases is discretionary and is within the exclusive province of the Court,” A.O. 176 § I(b). Thus, the Court will exercise its discretion in ruling on the Motion.

3.   Plaintiffs also filed a reply (Doc. No. 94) and then an amended reply (Doc. No. 96, “Amended Reply”) in further support of their Motion. Where applicable, the Court cites to the Amended Reply at Docket No. 96.

4.   The Court notes that the NHC Defendants are seemingly in conflict with themselves on this point because they concede that factor five in A.O. 176, concerning whether without reassignment there would be “[s]ubstantial duplication of effort and expense by the Court and the parties,” A.O. 176 § I(c)(5), favors reassignment, while at the same time asserting that Plaintiffs fail to show how reassignment “promotes avoidance of duplication of discovery and potential for inconsistent outcomes.” (Doc. No. 92 at 7).

5.   To the extent that the NHC Defendants argue that “[a] stay of the Montalvo Case would prejudice NHC by prohibiting it from litigating its claims in the Montalvo Case,” (Doc. No. 92 at 7), the Court cannot deduce how any prejudice would result to NHC from the stay in Montalvo. But in the event that NHC perceives itself to be harmed by the continued stay in Montalvo, NHC may, of course, move to lift the stay.

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE