KLING v. HEBERT (2020)

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery (R. Doc. 33) (“Motion to Stay”), filed by Defendant Troy Hebert (“Hebert”), requesting a temporary stay of discovery until the Court rules on Hebert's pending Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32). Plaintiff Randall Kling filed a Memorandum in Opposition (R. Doc. 37) to Hebert's Motion to Stay. No reply has been filed.

For the reasons set forth below, Hebert's Motion to Stay (R. Doc. 33) is granted. Any discovery as to Hebert is stayed pending resolution of Hebert's Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32). If Hebert's Motion to Dismiss does not resolve all of Plaintiff's claims against him, full discovery as to Hebert may commence upon resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this suit against Defendants on October 3, 2019, alleging retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.¹ Plaintiff, a former employee of the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control (“ATC”), filed a series of complaints against Hebert, Commissioner of the ATC at the time.² Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff's employment at ATC was terminated by Hebert, allegedly in retaliation for his complaints against Hebert.³

On December 6, 2019, in response to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant Juana Marine-Lombard (“Marine-Lombard”) filed a Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery (R. Doc. 13) in light of her pending Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 12), filed the same day. This Court granted in part Marine-Lombard's Motion to Stay (R. Doc. 13), thereby staying any discovery as to Marine-Lombard pending resolution of her Motion to Dismiss. (R. Doc. 31). The order also allowed only written discovery to proceed as to the other parties, with the caveat that if Marine-Lombard's Motion to Dismiss “does not resolve all Plaintiff's claims as to her, full discovery may commence as to all parties upon resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.”⁴

Following this ruling, on February 19, 2020, Hebert filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims against him. At the same time, he filed a Motion to Stay (R. Doc. 33), now before the Court. In his Motion to Stay, Hebert notes that this Court has granted a similar motion filed by his co-defendant.⁵ He also argues, in his accompanying memorandum in support, that “good cause” to issue the stay exists because he has asserted a defense of qualified immunity, which may be dispositive of Plaintiff's claims against him.⁶

Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition (R. Doc. 37) to Hebert's Motion to Stay, arguing that the immunity asserted by Hebert is different from that asserted by Marine-Lombard, so that this Court's prior grant of Marine-Lombard's motion to stay is not determinative of Hebert's Motion to Stay.⁷ Plaintiff further argues that Hebert cannot show that his Motion to Dismiss will be successful on the merits and, as such, his Motion to Stay should be denied.⁸

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to issue a protective order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)'s “good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S. v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978)).

“Trial courts possess broad discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial court has broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may dispose of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

“The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just immunity from liability, but immunity from suit.” Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Qualified immunity shields government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Discovery on the issue of qualified immunity “must not proceed until the district court first finds that the plaintiff's pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Wicks v. Miss. State Emp't Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (“Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.”). This heightened pleading standard requires the plaintiff “to allege the particular facts forming the basis of his claim, including those preventing [the individual defendant] from successfully maintaining a qualified immunity defense.” Wicks, 41 F.3d at 994-95. “To overcome the immunity defense, the complaint must allege facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that [the individual defendant] violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Id. at 995.

The Court has considered the position of each party and the prior orders of this Court and finds that Hebert is entitled to the relief requested. Hebert's pending Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 33) raises varying issues including the sufficiency of the pleadings to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. This motion could be dispositive of the claims against him. In addition, with respect to a defense of qualified immunity, a stay of discovery is likely required until the court finds that the plaintiff's pleadings are sufficient to overcome such a defense. Accordingly, the Court finds that discovery as to Hebert be stayed until Hebert's pending Motion to Dismiss is resolved.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that a temporary stay of discovery in this action is warranted in light of Defendant Hebert's asserted qualified immunity defense.

IT IS ORDERED that Hebert's Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery (R. Doc. 33) is GRANTED. Discovery as to Hebert in this proceeding is hereby stayed pending a Ruling by the assigned District Judge on Hebert's pending Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon a Ruling by the assigned District Judge on Hebert's pending Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32), the parties are authorized to re-commence discovery without any further Order from the Court, if any claims against Hebert remain.

FOOTNOTES

1.   R. Doc. 1, p. 1.

2.   R. Doc. 1, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 8-9.

3.   R. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 10.

4.   R. Doc. 31, p. 4.

5.   R. Doc. 33, p. 1.

6.   R. Doc. 33-1, p. 3.

7.   R. Doc. 37, pp. 2-3.

8.   R. Doc. 37, pp. 1-2.

SCOTT D. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE