ROBERT CEASAR 388150 v. LOUISIANA DEPT OF CORRECTIONS ET AL (2019)

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (“Motion”).¹ For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion ² will be denied.

Pro se Plaintiff Robert Ceasar (“Plaintiff”), an inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), Angola, Louisiana, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Louisiana Department of Corrections, James LeBlanc, the Louisiana State Prison's Chaplains Department, Robert Rowe, Jeremy McKey, Gabriel Hebert,³ Rickey Sharkey, Paul Smith, and Willie Rosso (“Defendants”) alleging that his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection have been infringed upon by Defendants' failure to update the prison grooming policy in light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections.⁴ Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants have been dismissed, except those against Gabriel Hebert and Robert Rowe.⁵

The Court has the authority to “request” an attorney to represent a plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and the extra-statutory authority to order an attorney to do so in rare circumstances.⁶ A civil rights complainant has no right to the automatic appointment of counsel.⁷ A district court may appoint counsel “if doing so would advance the proper administration of justice,”⁸ but appointment of counsel is not required “unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.”⁹ In determining whether exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel, a district court should consider (1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) the indigent's ability to adequately present the case; (3) the indigent's ability to investigate the case adequately; and (4) the existence of contradictory evidence and the necessity for skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross-examination.¹⁰

In the instant case, “exceptional circumstances” requiring the appointment of counsel are not apparent at this time. Plaintiff's Complaint is neither factually nor legally complex, and no other factors in Ulmer are found to require the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff has set out the factual basis for his claim in his Complaint and numerous amendments,¹¹ and these voluminous pleadings reflect that Plaintiff understands the proceedings and can address the issues presented. Plaintiff has been provided with the benefit of Court-ordered discovery ¹² and can use these materials to cross-examine the defendants and prepare for trial. Additionally, while it does not appear that any great skill will be needed to cross-examine the witnesses in connection with the issues in this case, pro se plaintiffs are given great flexibility in the examination of witnesses. Further, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that his imprisonment will limit his ability to litigate because he has limited access to the law library and limited knowledge of the law,¹³ this is true of nearly every prisoner who prosecutes a pro se lawsuit. Further, the substantial number of pleadings and motions filed by Plaintiff demonstrate that he is sufficiently capable to pursue this action, despite being housed in extended lockdown.¹⁴ Because pro se plaintiffs often have more limited abilities than trained attorneys and a limited knowledge of the law, pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys.¹⁵ This Court is liberal in reviewing the pleadings and motions filed by pro se inmates pursuant to § 1983, giving inmates ample opportunity to amend and granting extensions of time to comply with Court orders, if appropriate.

While appointment of counsel might be beneficial to Plaintiff (as it would to nearly every pro se plaintiff), in light of the Court's liberal construction of pleadings filed by pro se litigants, coupled with the lack of complexity of the legal issues in this case and Plaintiff's ability to adequately litigate this action pro se, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not warranted in this case at this time. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel ¹⁶ is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 10, 2019.

FOOTNOTES

1.   R. Doc. 89.

2.   R. Doc. 89.

3.   Gabriel Hebert was originally named as Unknown Hebert. Defendant's name was subsequently corrected. (See R. Doc. 74).

4.   806 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff also alleged claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, but these claims have been dismissed. (See R. Doc. 83).

5.   R. Doc. 83.

6.   Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 804 (5th Cir. 2015). For ease of reference, the Court will refer to a request for attorney representation as “appointment of counsel.”

7.   Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).

8.   Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989).

9.   Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 212.

10.   Id. at 213.

11.   R. Docs. 1, 4, 6, 7, 18, & 51.

12.   R. Doc. 24.

13.   R. Doc. 89, p. 1.

14.   Plaintiff has filed many motions with this Court and has successfully, in part, defeated a Motion to Dismiss. (See R. Doc. 83).

15.   Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

16.   R. Doc. 89.

ERIN WILDER-DOOMES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE