KELVIN WELLS v. SID GAUTREAUX (2025)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 7, 2025.

Before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment (R. Doc. 10) filed by pro se Plaintiff Kelvin Wells on June 12, 2024. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Sid Gautreaux, the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Department, Cpl. Dejuan Fleming, and Darion ¹ Garrett on November 2, 2023, alleging, inter alia, discrimination and due process violations.² Plaintiff amended his Complaint on November 30, 2023.³ On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking entry of default against all Defendants for their failure to timely file an answer or other responsive pleading in this matter.⁴ The Court, finding that “[s]ervice having been executed on Defendants, Sid Gautreaux, East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Department, Dejuan Fleming, and Darion Garrett, on April 9, 2024, and no answer, claim or other responsive pleadings having been filed,” granted Plaintiff's Motion on June 6, 2024.⁵ Shortly thereafter, on June 12, 2024, Defendants East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Sid. J. Gautreaux, Cpl. Dejuan Fleming, and the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office (collectively, the “Sheriff Defendants”) filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default.⁶ The Court subsequently granted the Sheriff Defendants' Motion and set aside the Clerk's entry of default against those Defendants.⁷

On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment, to which no Party has filed a response. Shortly thereafter, on July 3, 2024, the Sheriff Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which remains pending before the Court.⁸

II. APPLICABLE LAW

“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once default has been entered, the court may enter a default judgment against the defaulting defendant upon motion by the plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). “In considering a motion for default judgment, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations of facts in the complaint (except regarding damages) but must determine whether those facts state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” BSG Clearing Sols. N. Am., LLC v. V&T Commc'ns, LLC, No. 17-1093, 2018 WL 4677906, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2018). Thus, for a plaintiff to obtain a default judgment, “[t]here must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A] party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in default.”) (quoting Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996)). A defaulting party is deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. Matter of Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992).

Once a clerk has entered default against a defendant, and a plaintiff seeks a default judgment against that defendant, a court employs a two-part analysis to determine whether a default judgment should be entered against a defendant. J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. KCK Holdings, LLC, No. 14-269, 2015 WL 4656714, at *3 (M.D. La. Aug. 5, 2015) (citing Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F.Supp.3d 807, 813 (M.D. La. 2014); U.S. v. Chauncey, No. 14-32, 2015 WL 403130, at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 28, 2015)). “First, the court must consider whether the entry of default judgment is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998)). “The factors relevant to this inquiry include: (1) whether material issues of fact are at issue; (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether the grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether the default was caused by good faith mistake or excusable neglect; (5) the harshness of a default judgment; and (6) whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant's motion.” Id. (citing Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893). “Second, the court must assess the merits of the plaintiff's claims and find sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that, in his Motion, Plaintiff seeks a default judgment against all Defendants. However, the Court previously set aside the Clerk's entry of default against the Sheriff Defendants, meaning Darion Garrett is the only Defendant against whom a Clerk's entry of default remains and, therefore, the only Defendant against whom Plaintiff potentially could obtain a default judgment.

A. Whether Default Judgment is Appropriate

The Court must first apply the Lindsey factors and determine whether entry of a default judgment against Garrett is appropriate. First, Garrett has failed to file an Answer, a motion pursuant to Rule 12, or a response to the instant Motion. As such, no material facts pertaining to him are in dispute. Second, it is undisputed that Garrett has not responded to Plaintiff's Complaint or otherwise made an appearance of any kind in this litigation. Third, the grounds for granting a default judgment against Garrett are clearly established, supported by the procedural history of this case with regard to Garrett and the Clerk's entry of default against him. Fourth, the Court has no basis to find that Garrett's failure to respond was the result of a good faith mistake or excusable neglect. Fifth, Garrett's failure to file any responsive pleading or motion mitigates the harshness of default judgment. Finally, the Court is not aware of any facts that would lead it to set aside the default judgment if challenged by Garrett. The Court, therefore, finds that all six Lindsey factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment against Garrett.

B. Whether Plaintiff's Pleadings Establish a Sufficient Basis for Default Judgment

Next, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff's pleadings provide a sufficient basis for a default judgment against Garrett. In making such a determination, the Court may consider only well-pleaded facts; conclusions of law are not presumed to be true. Buerger v. Clifton, No. 18-78, 2021 WL 748106, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2021) (citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206). “In determining whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for judgment, a court should ‘draw meaning from the case law on Rule 8.’ ” Id. (quoting Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015)). As such, factual allegations need only “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (quoting Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498). “The pleading must present ‘more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,’ but ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required.” Id. (quoting Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498). “This low threshold is less rigorous than that under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. (citing Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498 n.3).

Here, Plaintiff lists the following as the bases for his claims against Defendants: “18 USC § 1962 ․ Intentional Discrimination, 1964 Civil Rights Act, Equal Protection, Due Process.”⁹ In his pleading, as best the Court can tell, Plaintiff's allegations with regard to Garrett are that after reporting “a loose pitbull,” Garrett verbally attacked Plaintiff at his home and threatened to kill him while “trespassing.”¹⁰ 18 U.S.C. § 1962 is a criminal statute that lists the activities prohibited by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statutes. Plaintiff cannot bring criminal charges against Garrett. See Edwards v. Louisiana, No. 22-2171, 2023 WL 1170309, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2023) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”). In addition, as there is not an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Garrett, or any similar type of relationship between them, and Garrett appears to be a private citizen and not a state or government official, the Court cannot surmise from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint the factual basis for a claim against Garrett for discrimination, equal protection, or due process based on Plaintiff's allegations that Garrett trespassed on Plaintiff's property, threatened him, and yelled a racial epithet, even presuming the truth of these allegations.¹¹ As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff's purported facts fail to state a claim against Garrett upon which relief may be granted. For this reason, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment against Garrett should be denied. See Ross v. Miss Lou Mobile Home Movers, LLC, No. 17-46, 2019 WL 6108710, at *4 (S.D. Miss. May 20, 2019) (“Because the complaint does not allege any plausible claims against the defendant, the Court lacks a ‘sufficient basis’ to enter a default judgment against [the defendant].”); U.S. v. Kees, No. 16-1180, 2018 WL 4473895, at *3-4 (W.D. La. Aug. 30, 2018) (recommending denial of a motion for default judgment for, among other reasons, failing to find a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (R. Doc. 10) be DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 7, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court notes that while “Darion” Garrett is listed as a Defendant in this case, some of the attachments to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint indicate that the individual's name actually is Davion Garrett. See, e.g., R. Doc. 2 at 17. While the Court finds that both names refer to the same individual, it will use “Darion” herein, as it is the name in the caption of this proceeding.

2.   R. Doc. 1.

3.   R. Doc. 2.

4.   R. Doc. 4. The Court notes that the Motion sought entry of default against all Defendants, including Darion Garrett.

5.   R. Doc. 5.

6.   R. Doc. 8.

7.   R. Docs. 16, 18.

8.   R. Doc. 13.

9.   R. Doc. 2 at 3.

10.   Id. at 13, 15, 24.

11.   The Court notes that Plaintiff has attached to his Amended Complaint multiple copies of an Incident Report from the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office against Garrett, charging Garrett with simple assault. However, the report states that an Animal Control Officer needed assistance, continuing: “Upon my arrival, I met with my complainant/Animal Control Officer, who stated that an [sic] Hispanic male approached her angry about her being on his property. AC Officer stated that the subject had a weapon on him but never pointed at her or threatened her. Contact was never made with the male subject.” R. Doc. 2 at 17. This report, however, makes no mention of Plaintiff, and in no way indicates Plaintiff was present or otherwise involved in the altercation.

SCOTT D. JOHNSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE