WILLIS II v. ZACHARY (2025)

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Casey Lester's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. 25) and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Dkt. 26). The Court, having reviewed the relevant filings and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes that the motion should be granted because Plaintiff's claims are insufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Plaintiff pleads no facts, other than legal conclusions, that Defendants’ actions were official government actions. Also, Plaintiff has adequate remedies under Florida law.

BACKGROUND

This is an alleged Bivens action arising out of Plaintiff's employment as a correctional officer with the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked, pepper sprayed, and handcuffed by fellow BOP officers and lieutenants, including Officer Casey Lester, the moving Defendant.¹ The Amended Complaint includes three counts against each respective officer and lieutenant, styled “Excessive Force in Violation of the Eighth Amendment” (Counts I–V), “Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Violation of the Fourth Amendment” (Counts VI–X), and “Deprivation of Due Process in Violation of the Fifth Amendment” (Counts XI–XV). Defendant Lester moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice, arguing that none of the claims implicate federal law.

According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's coworkers handcuffed him, punched him, placed him in a holding cell, put him in a head lock, and pepper sprayed him in the face and eyes. While Plaintiff also alleges that these coworkers were acting under color of law, there are no facts to support that conclusion. Rather, the Amended Complaint describes five separate incidents where his coworkers did horrific things to Plaintiff. The prison “purported to conduct an investigation,” but “took no actions against the [Defendants] and told Plaintiff to return to work.” In fear of further attacks and retaliation, Plaintiff did not return to work following the investigation.

Lester's motion argues that the allegations do not support a legitimate Bivens action. Lester also contends that the allegations do not plausibly describe government activity; rather, they conjure coworkers harassing one another well outside the legitimate scope of any job functions. The Court agrees with Lester.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must limit their consideration to the well-pleaded allegations, documents central to or referred to in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed. See La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). Courts must accept all factual allegations as true and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007).

Legal conclusions, however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In fact, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must instead contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This plausibility standard is met when the plaintiff pleads enough factual content to allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A claim under Bivens allows a plaintiff whose federal constitutional rights have been violated by federal officers, acting under color of federal law, to bring a claim for damages against that officer. Unlike Section 1983, which is a congressionally authorized remedy for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, the authority to recognize an action under Bivens against federal actors is anchored in the inherent power of federal courts to decide all cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–67, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). As a result, Bivens is far more limited in scope than Section 1983, authorizing recovery in only certain types of cases. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017).

The Supreme Court has inferred a private cause of action against federal officers under Bivens in three contexts. First, in Bivens itself the Supreme Court recognized an implied private action for damages against federal officers who violated a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when acting in their official capacities. Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 818 F.3d 1194, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999). Second, in Davis v. Passman, the Supreme Court recognized a Fifth Amendment implied damages remedy for a congressional staffer who was dismissed on the basis of sex. Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741, 206 L.Ed.2d 29 (2020) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979)). And third, in Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court recognized a damages remedy for a federal prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 741 (citing Carlson, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980)).

Recognizing a new cause of action under Bivens is “a disfavored judicial activity.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 213 L.Ed.2d 54 (2022). The Supreme Court has, therefore, refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category for more than thirty years. See Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135, 137 S.Ct. 1843. As recent Supreme Court jurisprudence instructs, courts should be reluctant to extend Bivens because the power to create causes of action is “a legislative endeavor,” and courts are ill-equipped to weigh the range of policy considerations that a legislature might rely on to create a new cause of action. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491, 142 S.Ct. 1793.

Accordingly, expansion of Bivens requires that (1) the plaintiff has no alternative means of obtaining redress and (2) “no special factors counseling hesitation are present.” Hardison v. Cohen, 375 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).

Here, the Court agrees with Lester that Plaintiff's Bivens claims fail for numerous reasons, but perhaps the simplest reason is the availability of redress under state law. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 125, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012) (“Pollard cannot assert a Bivens claim ․ primarily because Pollard's Eighth Amendment claim focuses upon a kind of conduct that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law.”). Plaintiff alleges he was handcuffed, punched, made fun of, placed in a holding cell, “headlocked,” and pepper sprayed by coworkers. These allegations may support tort claims against Defendants. So, the inquiry could end there.

Notably, Plaintiff's alleged Bivens claims do not fit the three categories recognized: (1) an unconstitutional, warrantless home search and arrest without probable cause by federal law enforcement agents acting in their official capacities under the Fourth Amendment, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90, 91 S.Ct. 1999; (2) the termination of a congressional administrative assistant because the Congressman wrote that “although [the plaintiff] was ‘able, energetic and a very hard worker,’ he had concluded ‘that it was essential that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man,’ ” under the Fifth Amendment, see Davis, 442 U.S. at 230, 99 S.Ct. 2264; or (3) prison staff that were deliberately indifferent to a chronic asthmatic inmate's condition under the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1, 100 S.Ct. 1468. Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are without merit.

With respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, allegedly suffering punches, pepper spraying, and “headlocking” at the hands of coworkers does not plausibly establish cruel or unusual punishment. Plaintiff fares no better with his Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims because none of the allegations describe law enforcement or official federal action. Again, while the Court sympathizes with the horrible treatment Plaintiff experienced, Plaintiff appears to manufacture federal claims that are simply not on point. Whether the incidents might be construed as hazing, horseplay, or something more sinister, no plausible reading of the factual allegations indicates enforcement of the law.

In sum, the Court agrees with the motion to dismiss to the extent that this appears to be a tort case. Assuming the truth of the allegations, which the Court must do at this stage, it is not plausible to infer that the purposeless pepper spraying, handcuffing, and other described batteries were undertaken as official government action. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint. While the Court believes any further amendment is futile, the Court will permit Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend his complaint if he can allege his claims in good faith keeping in mind the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendant Casey Lester's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. 25) is granted to the extent that the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint only if he can do so in good faith. The Second Amended Complaint shall be filed within fourteen (14) days of this Order.

3. If Plaintiff does not timely file a Second Amended Complaint, this action will be closed without further notice.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this June 5, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The other Defendants have not appeared in the action to date.

JAMES S. MOODY, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE