TIMOTHY BROWN v. BIO LAB INC (2026)

ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on Defendant Bio-Lab Inc.’s (“Bio-Lab”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16)¹ , Plaintiff Timothy Brown's Response in Opposition (Dkt. 26), and Bio-Lab's Reply Brief in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 31).

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. 23) is also before this Court. After Bio-Lab filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint, but Bio-Lab responded in opposition (Dkt. 24). With this Court's permission, Plaintiff replied to Bio-Lab's opposition (Dkt. 29).

This Court now considers both pending motions.

I. Background

On August 4, 2023, Plaintiff was injured while working at Bio-Lab's Palm Coast facility when his hand became caught in a machine known as a “palletizer.” Although the parties dispute whether Plaintiff was adequately trained to operate the palletizer and whether appropriate safety precautions were in place, this Court does not reach those issues because it must first address the threshold question of whether Bio-Lab is immune from suit under Florida's workers’ compensation scheme.

At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was employed by a third-party staffing company, Labor Finders. Labor Finders had an agreement with Bio-Lab (the “Agreement”)² under which Labor Finders supplied temporary employees to supplement Bio-Lab's workforce (Dkt. 16-1, Ex. 1; Dkt. 26-1). Labor Finders provided Plaintiff to Bio-Lab as a temporary employee, and he worked at Bio-Lab's Palm Coast facility from approximately May 8, 2023 through August 14, 2023 (Dkt. 16-1, Ex. 3; Dkt. 16-2, Ex. 1).

Labor Finders was not responsible for training temporary employees regarding their job duties at the Bio-Lab facility (Dkt. 26-2 at 37:21-38:8). Mike Carey, Bio-Lab's Plant Manager, testified that Plaintiff received training from Bio-Lab's maintenance personnel and supervisors (Dkt. 26-3 at 38:24-39:7) and further testified that Bio-Lab would “never put anybody on a machine, piece of machinery, that hasn't been trained” (Id. at 45:19-25). On his first day at the facility, Plaintiff signed acknowledgments reflecting his job description as a “Machine Operator/Stacker,” his participation in a plant orientation, and his receipt of various safety policies (Dkt. 31-4, Ex. 1).

Labor Finders did not maintain any on-site supervisors at Bio-Lab's facility, and Labor Finders representatives visited the plant only once or twice each year (Dkt. 26-3 at 51:1-4, 52:11-17). The Agreement provides that Bio-Lab, as the customer, was responsible for supervising its Labor Finders personnel. While Plaintiff was working at the facility, using Bio-Lab's equipment, and assisting with Bio-Lab's operations, he was subject to Bio-Lab's supervision (Dkt. 16-1 ¶ 11; Dkt. 26-2 at 41:25-42:9). Bob Franks, Bio-Lab's Production Manager, monitored Plaintiff's work and directed his assigned tasks (Dkt. 26-2 at 58:17-24).

Plaintiff was injured “while trying to repair a malfunctioning piece of machinery” at the Bio-Lab plant (Dkt. 26). Following the incident, Plaintiff pursued workers’ compensation benefits through Labor Finders. On October 25, 2023, the Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order reflecting that Labor Finders settled Plaintiff's workers’ compensation claims for $125,000.00 (Dkt. 31-1).

After resolving his workers’ compensation claim, Plaintiff initiated this action in Flagler County, Florida, initially asserting negligence claims against the two entities he alleged controlled the premises on which he was injured. Approximately six months later, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in state court, adding Bio-Lab as a defendant without altering the underlying factual allegations (Id. at Dkt. 9). Shortly after amending the complaint, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the other two defendants, leaving Bio-Lab as the sole remaining defendant (Id. at Dkts. 15, 16). Bio-Lab timely removed this action to this Court (Dkt. 1), and this Court denied Plaintiff's motion to remand.

Bio-Lab then moved for summary judgment (Dkt. 16), arguing that Plaintiff's claims are barred by workers’ compensation immunity. Following the Preliminary Pretrial Conference held on May 14, 2025, this Court entered an Order permitting discovery limited to the issue of workers’ compensation immunity (Dkt. 21). Bio-Lab's Motion for Summary Judgment is now fully briefed.

Before responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff requested leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to assert a strict liability claim based on Bio-Lab's alleged ownership and operation of an ultrahazardous and unreasonably dangerous machine (Dkt. 23). Plaintiff's Motion is fully briefed, as well.

II. Standard

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party claiming relief may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.” Summary judgment is proper if after discovery, the materials in the record (the pleadings, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations, stipulations, admissions, and answers to interrogatories on file) show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The movant bears the responsibility for informing the court of the basis of the movant's motion and identifying those portions of material that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

In making this determination, a court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Hinson v. Clinch Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 826-27 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). But the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Rather, its responses ․ must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). Nor do conclusory allegations or speculation create a genuine issue of material fact. Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 2015).

III. Analysis

A. Bio-Lab's Motion for Summary Judgment

According to Florida's workers’ compensation laws, an employer shall pay an employee workers’ compensation benefits “if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” Fla. Stat. § 440.09.³ This workers’ compensation liability is “exclusive and in place of all other liability,” absent certain exceptions, Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1). In other words, an employer is typically immune from suit.

The workers’ compensation statute contemplates situations like the one at hand, where a help supply services company employs a person but temporarily loans that person to a business to supplement its workforce, and the employee is injured while working for the borrowing business. The relevant statute reads:

The immunity from liability described in subsection (1) shall extend to an employer and to each employee of the employer which uses the services of the employees of a help supply services company, as set forth in North American Industrial Classification System [“NAICS”] Codes 561320 and 561330, when such employees, whether management or staff, are acting in furtherance of the employer's business. An employee so engaged by the employer shall be considered a borrowed employee of the employer and, for the purposes of this section, shall be treated as any other employee of the employer. The employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of compensation to all such borrowed employees as required in s. 440.10, except when such payment has been secured by the help supply services company.

Fla. Stat. § 440.11(2). Therefore, to be immune from suit under this statutory provision, Bio-Lab must demonstrate that: 1) Labor Finders was a help supply services company and Bio-Lab used its services with regard to Plaintiff; 2) Plaintiff was acting in furtherance of Bio-Lab's business when he was injured; and 3) either Bio-Lab or Labor Finders compensated Plaintiff in accordance with § 440.10.

Labor Finders was clearly a help supply services company. NAICS Code 561320 describes “Temporary Help Services” as:

[An] industry comprise[d] [of] establishments primarily engaged in supplying workers to clients’ businesses for limited periods of time to supplement the working force of the client. The individuals provided are employees of the temporary help services establishment. However, these establishments do not provide direct supervision of their employees at the clients’ work sites.

NAICS, United States, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 488 (2022). As reflected in the Policy, Labor Finders’ NAICS Code is 561320. Additionally, the Agreement between Bio-Lab and Labor Finders explains that Labor Finders “hires its own employees and assigns them to clients to support or supplement the clients’ work force.” Accordingly, Labor Finders is a help supply services company as contemplated by § 440.11.

Labor Finders provided Plaintiff to Bio-Lab as a candidate for a temporary position, and Bio-Lab selected Plaintiff under the Agreement. This Court finds that Bio-Lab used Labor Finders’ services to lease Plaintiff.

Next, this Court finds that Plaintiff was acting in furtherance of Bio-Lab's business at the time he was injured. When a plaintiff is assigned to work for a defendant employer pursuant to a staffing contract with a help supply services company, courts routinely find the plaintiff was acting in furtherance of the defendant employer's business when the plaintiff was injured at work. E.g. Fossett v. Se. Toyota Distribs., LLC, 60 So. 3d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (injured from being run over by a car while working at defendant's car wash); Am. Eng'g & Dev. Corp. v. Sanchez, 932 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2006) (fatal injury from a machine while working at defendant's construction site); Caramico v. Artcraft Indus., 727 So. 2d 348, 348-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (slip and fall while working on defendant's premises); Toucet v. Future Foam Carpet Cushion Co., Case No: 6:11-cv-617, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107336, *2, 9 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 31, 2012) (injured by a machine while working at defendant's factory plant); Young v. Cargill Juice N. Am., Inc., Case No. 8:06-cv-1350, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100902, *2, 13 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2008) (injured by an ammonia leak while working at defendant's processing plant). It is undisputed that Plaintiff was injured while trying to repair a malfunctioning piece of machinery at Bio-Lab's Palm Coast facility. Plaintiff presents this Court only with a conclusory assertion that there is a question of fact as to whether he was acting in furtherance of Bio-Lab's business when he was injured, instead focusing his arguments on the “control” requirement of the common law borrowed servant doctrine—which is not at issue here. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff was acting in furtherance of Bio-Lab's business at the time he was injured.

Finally, it is undisputed that Labor Finders compensated Plaintiff in accordance with § 440.10. The Order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (Dkt. 31-1) reflects that Plaintiff accepted $125,000.00 from Labor Finders. Because Bio-Lab ensured Plaintiff had workers’ compensation coverage through Labor Finders and because Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries, “the purpose of the worker's compensation law was served in accordance with statutory requirements, and [Plaintiff] is not entitled to a second bite at the apple by suing [Bio-Lab] in tort.” Maxson Constr. Co. v. Welch, 720 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998).

Bio-Lab has demonstrated the necessary elements to be immune from suit: Labor Finders was a help supply services company; Bio-Lab used Labor Finders’ services with regard to Plaintiff; Plaintiff was acting in furtherance of Bio-Lab's business when he was injured; and Labor Finders provided workers’ compensation benefits to Plaintiff. Because Bio-Lab is immune from suit, it is entitled to summary judgment.

B. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint

In his proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add a claim of strict liability against Bio-Lab for its ownership and maintenance of “an inherently dangerous and ultra-hazardous piece of machinery called a palletizer” (Dkt. 23-1 ¶ 7).

Rule 15(a) grants a district court “extensive discretion to decide whether to grant leave to amend after the time for amendment as a matter of course has passed.” Hargett v. Valley Fed. Say. Bank, 60 F.3d 754, 761 (11th Cir. 1995). Although leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” a district court “should consider whether there has been undue delay in filing, bad faith or dilatory motives, prejudice to the opposing parties, and the futility of the amendment.” United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices etc. v. Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend “when the amendment would prejudice the defendant, follows undue delays, or is futile.” Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999).

Though futility and prejudice are the most important components to this Court's assessment of the situation before it, this Court first addresses Plaintiff's lack of diligence. Plaintiff filed this action in June of 2024. Approximately six months later, he amended his complaint. Despite filing this action over a year before his present motion and despite having previously amended his complaint, Plaintiff now asks this Court for leave to amend his complaint for a second time. As justification for his delay, Plaintiff asserts that his proposed amendments “are based on information and evidence discovered after the filing of the original Complaint through Plaintiff's continuing investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident” (Dkt. 23 ¶ 8). Although this Court does not hold Plaintiff to the “good cause” showing required by Rule 16(b) because this Court did not enter a scheduling order, it seems to this Court that any information or evidence leading to Plaintiff's conclusion that the palletizer—which amputated Plaintiff's hand—was “inherently dangerous” would have been known to Plaintiff at the inception of this litigation.

Regardless, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is due to be denied because it is futile. “Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be ․ immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). As discussed above, Bio-Lab is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim because it is statutorily immune from suit. Therefore, the question is whether a strict liability claim would fall outside the immunity granted by § 440.11.

It would not. Section 440.11(b) carves out an exception for intentional torts, but strict liability is not an intentional tort. See Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 880 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2018) (characterizing negligence and strict liability as “non-intentional” torts). “The workers’ compensation exclusivity provision contains no exception for causes of action based on strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. Neither does case law provide such an exception.” Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Because a claim of strict liability against Bio-Lab would not fall under any exception to § 440.11, Bio-Lab would be statutorily immune from a strict liability claim.

In addition to the futility of the amendment, allowing Plaintiff to amend his Complaint after Bio-Lab filed a dispositive motion and without sufficient justification for the delay in seeking amendment would be unduly prejudicial to Bio-Lab.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendant Bio-Lab, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16) is GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiff Timothy Brown's Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. 23) is DENIED; and

3. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Defendant Bio-Lab, Inc., terminate all pending motions, and close this file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of February, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant's motion is captioned as a motion for summary judgment and as a motion to stay discovery. This Court previously issued an Order (Dkt. 21) dispensing with Defendant's request to stay discovery.

2.   It is undisputed that Sunbelt Pool Products, LLC, an entity that also sometimes did business as “KIK,” merged into Bio-Lab on January 3, 2023 (Dkts. 31-2; 31-3 16-1 ¶ 9). Certain documents in the record, including the Agreement, identify “Sunbelt” or “KIK Consumer Products-Sunbelt Pool Products” rather than “Bio-Lab” because Sunbelt was Bio-Lab's predecessor entity. As a result of the merger, however, Sunbelt ceased to exist as a separate legal entity and all its contractual relationships and obligations were assumed by Bio-Lab (Dkts. 26-3 at 15:7-9). See also Corp. Express Office Prods., Inc. v. Phillips, 847 So. 2d 406, 414 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that, absent contrary agreement, preexisting contracts continue after a merger). Accordingly, the Court treats the Agreement as a contract between Labor Finders and Bio-Lab. For the same reason, the Court treats references to “Sunbelt” or “KIK Consumer Products–Sunbelt Pool Products” in the record as references to Bio-Lab.

3.   Florida's statutory provisions governing workers’ compensation liability are distinct from the common law “borrowed servant” doctrine. St. Lucie Falls Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Morelli, 956 So. 2d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Although some of Plaintiff's arguments rely on the borrowed servant doctrine, Bio-Lab relies only upon the statutory provisions (Dkt. 31). As such, this Court does not address arguments regarding the borrowed servant doctrine.

HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE