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DEFALCO CONSTRUCTION INC., Plaintiff, v. ACRISURE, LLC d/b/a/ Traza Insurance Agency, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff Defalco Construction Inc. alleges insurance broker Defendant Acrisure LLC misled Plaintiff when Defendant procured for Plaintiff's subcontractor an insurance policy that did not provide coverage to Plaintiff, despite confirming the contrary. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b).1 Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend the operative complaint should its allegations be found insufficient, and Defendant moves to strike from the operative complaint Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court also denies Plaintiff leave to amend and denies Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a corporation organized in New York with a principal place of business in Jamaica, Queens that specializes in concrete foundations and superstructures. (See Amended Complaint (“Amend. Compl.”), Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 43–44.) Defendant is a limited liability company insurance broker organized in Michigan with headquarters in Lansing, Michigan and an office in North New Hyde Park, New York. (See id. ¶ 45.) Defendant's parent and sole member, Acrisure Intermediate, Inc., is a privately held Delaware corporation that maintains its principal place of business in Michigan. (See Corporate Disclosure Statement by Acrisure, LLC, Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 6.)
The parties’ business relationship originated sometime in 2015, when Defendant began serving as Plaintiff's insurance broker. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 50–51.) Years later in 2023, Plaintiff entered multiple construction contracts in which another construction company, A2Z Construction Services Inc. (“A2Z”), served as Plaintiff's subcontractor on certain projects, including two construction projects at 103 Grand Street and 32-350 Kent Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. (See id. ¶¶ 2, 53.) The construction agreement between Plaintiff and A2Z for these projects allegedly required A2Z to procure insurance naming Plaintiff as an additional insured. (See id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was aware that A2Z would serve as a subcontractor to Plaintiff on those projects and that, pursuant to industry standards, the resulting construction contracts would require A2Z to purchase insurance naming Plaintiff as an additional insured. (See id. ¶ 54.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff says Defendant procured a policy for A2Z that did not cover Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that, on at least two occasions, Defendant manufactured and sent to Plaintiff certificates of insurance falsely certifying that Plaintiff held additional insured status under the policy between A2Z and Defendant, falsely assuring Plaintiff that it was covered under the policy. (See id. ¶¶ 3–8.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant's actions were part of a sophisticated scheme operated between July 2022 and 2025 to generate brokerage commissions on policies that did not satisfy client requirements, concealing those failures through fraudulent documentation to evade liability. (See id. ¶¶ 20–22, 29.) Plaintiff alleges that this scheme, which encompassed acts of wire fraud directed at Plaintiff and other participants in the construction industry, was perpetrated by a group of seven entities and individuals including (i) Defendant Acrisure—which operates across multiple states under various assumed names, including Traza Insurance Agency in New York and Falcon Insurance Agency in Washington; (ii) Amalfi Coast Insurance Services, Inc., a broker Defendant Acrisure acquired in 2019; and individuals (iii) Gaetano Causi, who is alleged to have altered the “N” under “Additional Insured” on the certificates of insurance to a “Y” then and transmitted those certificates of insurance to Plaintiff; (iv) Joseph Caramante; (v) Frank Weber; (vi) Sergio Nunez; and (vii) Orlando Frasca. (See id. ¶¶ 20, 27.)
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant's actions it “was blindsided by its lack of coverage[,]” on the relevant construction projects. (See id. ¶ 73.) Among other things, Plaintiff claims that its reliance on Defendant's representations exposed Plaintiff to “potentially catastrophic liability[,]” forced Plaintiff to “completely restructure its entire business operations[,]” disqualified Plaintiff from jobs it was previously qualified for, and damaged Plaintiff's reputation in the construction industry. (See id. ¶¶ 36–40, 73–95).
Plaintiff filed a complaint in Queens County Supreme Court on February 9, 2026 alleging eight federal, and state law causes of action: (i) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act of 1970; (ii) negligence; (iii) fraud; (iv) negligent misrepresentation; (v) tortious interference with a prospective business relationships; (vi) breach of fiduciary duty; (vii) violation of New York General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349; and (viii) RICO conspiracy. (See Complaint, Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 82–204.) Defendant removed those claims to this Court on March 4, 2026, asserting the Court had federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal RICO claims; supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims; and diversity jurisdiction over the entire action. (See Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 8–19.)
Defendant moved on April 1, 2026 for a pre-motion conference in anticipation of its motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). (See Letter Motion, Dkt. No. 17.) The Court held a pre-motion conference on April 20, 2026, where it granted Defendant leave to file its motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. Order dated Apr. 6, 2026; Minute Entry dated Apr. 21, 2026.) The Court also offered Plaintiff the opportunity to amend its complaint—though Plaintiff seemed inclined to persist in its allegations as then pleaded. (See Transcript of April 20, 2026 Pre-Motion Conference, Dkt. No. 19 at 27:5–28:22.)
Two weeks after the conference, and after Defendant filed its motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting the same eight causes of action in the original state court complaint. (See Letter, Dkt. No. 21; Amend. Compl.) Defendant was permitted to file a revised motion to dismiss specifically addressing the Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. Order dated May 11, 2026.) That motion was fully briefed on June 30, 2026.2
LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Sherman v. Abengoa, S.A., 156 F.4th 152, 162 (2d Cir. 2025); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996). “Consideration is limited to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991); see also, Clark v. Hanley, 89 F.4th 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2023) (citing Goel v. Bunge, Ltd. 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Under this pleading standard, “ ‘labels and conclusions,’ ” or “ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Sherman, 156 F.4th at 162. Instead, a plaintiff must provide enough factual support that, if true, would “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses Plaintiff's federal RICO claims and then addresses Plaintiff's state law claims.
I. Federal RICO Claims
Plaintiff's first claim alleges Defendant engaged in conduct which violated the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C § 1962(c), and Plaintiff's eighth claim alleges Defendant is liable under § 1962(d) because it conspired with others to commit conduct that violated the statute. (See Amend. Compl. ¶ 131.) The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Section 1962(c) RICO Violation
To establish a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) a substantive RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, (2) injury to the plaintiff's business or property, and (3) that such injury was by reason of the substantive RICO violation.” Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2015). To establish a substantive § 1962(c) RICO violation, the complaint “must allege the existence of seven constituent elements: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an interest in, or participates in (6) an enterprise (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Edmondson v. Raniere, 751 F. Supp. 3d 136, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (citation modified). A plaintiff must establish each element as to each individual defendant; otherwise the claim fails against each defendant. See, e.g., DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 306 (2d Cir. 2001). And when, as here, one of the alleged acts underlying the RICO claim is wire fraud, a plaintiff must comply with Rule 9(b)’s requirement to plead with particularity. See, e.g., Condos Bros. Constr. Corp. v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 280 F. Supp. 3d 349, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). “Allegations of predicate mail and wire fraud acts should state the contents of the communications, who was involved, where and when they took place, and explain why they were fraudulent.” Id. (citation modified).
1. The Distinctness Requirement to Establish an Enterprise
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff's allegations establish an enterprise. A RICO enterprise can be “any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Plaintiffs allege that the enterprise here is an association-in-fact within the meaning of § 1961(4), as opposed to a union or formal group. (See Amend. Compl. ¶ 20.) An association-in-fact enterprise “is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 945, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009) (citation modified) This type of enterprise “must have at least three structural features: [1] a purpose, [2] relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and [3] longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose.” Id. at 946, 129 S.Ct. 2237.
In addition to the above, when asserting violations of § 1962(c) by an association-in-fact enterprise, as Plaintiff does here, a plaintiff must satisfy a “distinctness requirement”—i.e., they “must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161–62, 121 S.Ct. 2087, 150 L.Ed.2d 198 (2001) (citation modified). In other words, “a corporate entity can be sued as a RICO person or named as a RICO enterprise, but the same entity cannot be both the RICO person and the enterprise.” U1it4less, Inc. v. Fedex Corp., 871 F.3d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation modified).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Acrisure is the RICO person, and the RICO enterprise is made up of Defendant Acrisure, Amalfi Coast Insurance Services, and Gaetano Causi, Joseph Caramante, Frank Weber, Sergio Nunez, and Orlando Frasca. (See Amend. Compl. ¶ 20.) Defendant argues, in turn, that these seven members of the alleged enterprise cannot be an association-in-fact enterprise because they are not distinct from Defendant Acrisure itself; Amalfi Coast Insurance Services is Defendant Acrisure's affiliate, and the five remaining named individuals are Defendant Acrisure's employees. (See Defendant Acrisure, LLC's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mem.”), Dkt. No. 24-1 p. 8.)
Plaintiff counters that “Acrisure's national acquisition strategy incorporates licensed and separately branded brokerage operations into a common ownership framework while preserving district trade names, licensing identities, client books, and personnel.” (See Pl.’s Opp. p. 7; see also Amend. Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff says each corporate entity “operate[s] under its own brand and licensure framework” and “maintains its own producer roster, its own client relationships, and its own document-issuance practices.” (Pl.’s Opp. pp. 7–8; see also Amend. Compl. ¶ 25 (“The Fraudulent Documentation Enterprise has members, structure, and operational scope that exceed Acrisure's corporate identity, including the separately branded acquired entities, the crossjurisdictional producer network, and the individual associates whose fraudulent acts are not within the scope of their Acrisure employment.”).)
The Court finds that all individual entities that Plaintiff alleges as part of the association-in-fact enterprise are, instead, part of the same entity. Plaintiff's allegations establish that Gaetano Causi, Joseph Caramante, Frank Weber, Sergio Nunez, and Orland Frasca are all employed by Defendant or an entity operating within the larger Acrisure organization. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 67, 109, 110, 115, 120.) They are not separate from Defendant Acrisure for purposes of RICO's distinctiveness requirement. See, e.g., Premium Merch. Funding 26, LLC v. Sonata Constr. LLC , 25-CV-1086, 2026 WL 867165, at *12 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026) (“enterprise” could not be established where allegation was defendant “was in an enterprise consisting only of itself or its own employees”). Thus, Plaintiff's RICO claim can only survive if the final member of the alleged enterprise, Amalfi Coast Insurance Services, is distinct from Defendant.3
Additionally, Plaintiff itself explains that Amalfi Coast Insurance Services was acquired by Defendant Acrisure in 2019 and acknowledges that any affiliate entity members of Acrisure's corporate structure are under a “common ownership framework.” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 21.) Such allegations contradict any allegation of distinctness. See, e.g., U1it4less, 871 F.3d at 206–09 (stating enterprise is not distinct when alleged members “operate within a unified corporate structure” and are “guided by a single corporate consciousness”); Palatkevich v. Choupak, 12-CV-1681, 2014 WL 1509236, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2014) (dismissing civil RICO claim because six corporate defendants were not distinct from alleged association-in-fact enterprise when complaint alleged they “had common ownership and officers and that they failed to respect corporate formalities among themselves”); Gordon v. Kaleida Health, 847 F. Supp. 2d 479, 492 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing civil RICO claim because healthcare consortium did not associate with others to form enterprise sufficiently distinct from itself when members were “alleged to have common ownership and common management”); DeSilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 497, 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing civil RICO claim because alleged enterprise consisting of named defendants and affiliates was not sufficiently distinct when plaintiffs’ allegations acknowledged defendants “shared a common ownership and that one defendant was responsible for operations through various health care centers and affiliates”). Beyond noting that Amalfi Coast Insurance Services has preserved its separate license and branding, Plaintiff does put forth any showing as to how Amalfi Coast Insurance Services operates independently from Defendant Acrisure. See Fossil Grp., Inc. v. Angel Seller LLC, 627 F. Supp. 3d 180, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (pleading insufficiently established distinctness when plaintiff argued two companies were separate legal entities without explaining the operation and management of the alleged enterprise). For these reasons, the Court finds all members of the alleged association-in-fact enterprise are indistinct and, thus, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the enterprise element required state a § 1962(c) RICO violation. Because of that failure, Plaintiff's RICO claim cannot survive Defendant's motion to dismiss. Thus, the Court declines to address the other requisite elements of a RICO claim.
B. Section 1962(d) RICO Conspiracy
Because Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish a substantive violation of § 1962(c), Plaintiff's claim that Defendant engaged in a RICO conspiracy in violation § 1962(d) must also be dismissed. See, e.g., Citadel Mgmt., Inc. v. Telesis Tr., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 133, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[A] RICO conspiracy claim cannot stand where, as here, the elements of the substantive RICO provisions are not met.” (citing Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1064 (2d Cir. 1996) vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 128, 119, 119 S.Ct. 493, 142 L.Ed.2d 510 (1998))).
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Remaining State Common Law Claims
Outside of the RICO claims, all remaining claims in this action arise under state common law. Before addressing these state common law claims, the Court must fulfill its “independent obligation to ensure subject-matter jurisdiction exists” in the absence of federal claims. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006).
The operative complaint invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction because the remaining claims “are so related to the federal racketeering claims that they form part of the same case or controversy and derive from a common nucleus of operative facts.” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 48.) Absent the federal claims, an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state common law claims is tenuous. “Supplemental jurisdiction is not mandatory, and courts should, under certain circumstances, ‘decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim.’ ” UBS Sec. LLC v. Dondero, 705 F. Supp. 3d 156, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Those circumstances include when the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has federal question jurisdiction, and when there is no alternative basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See, e.g., Zohar CDO 2003-1, Ltd. v. Patriarch Partners, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 634, 651–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over eleven remaining common law claims after dismissing RICO claim). If this were the only basis for jurisdiction, the Court would decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state common law claims.
However, the record establishes an alternative basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant invoked diversity jurisdiction when it removed to this Court Plaintiff's original complaint and same eight claims presently at issue. (See Notice of Removal ¶ 12.) Diversity jurisdiction exists when there is complete diversity between the parties—i.e., when all plaintiffs are citizens of different states from all defendants, and when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 US.C. § 1332(a).
The Court finds these requirements are met here. The amount in controversy at the time of removal was greater than $75,000. (See Dkt. No. 1-2 § 204 (asserting, inter alia, over $15 million in compensatory damages)); see also Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570–71, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 158 L.Ed.2d 866 (2004) (existence of diversity jurisdiction determined at time of removal). Plaintiff is citizen of New York, the state where it is incorporated and maintains its principal place of business. See supra pp. –––– – ––––; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). As a limited liability company, Defendant's citizenship is determined by the citizenship of its members. See, e.g., Platinum-Montaur Life Scis., LLC v. Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., 943 F.3d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 2019). Defendant's parent and sole member, Acrisure Intermediate, Inc., is a privately held Delaware corporation that maintains its principal place of business in Michigan. (See Corporate Disclosure Statement by Acrisure, LLC, Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 6.) Because the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000, and because Plaintiff and Defendant do not share citizenship, diversity jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff's state law claims.
III. Choice of State Common Law
The Court next considers which law to apply to Plaintiff's state common law claims. Because the Court exercises diversity jurisdiction over these claims, it must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits—in this case, New York. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012). The remaining claims all sound in tort.4 See supra p. ––––. New York courts apply the interest analysis to determine what law applies to tort claims. See, e.g., GlobalNet Fin.Com., Inc. v. Frank Crystal & Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2006). Under that analysis, courts look to the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in regulating the tortious conduct at issue. See, e.g., Prime Mover Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Elixir Gaming Techs., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 651, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In cases like this one involving insurance, “New York courts look to the location of the insured risk; the insured's principal place of business; where the policy was issued and delivered; the location of the broker or agent placing the policy; where the premiums were paid; and the insurer's place of business.” Homestead Vill. Assoc., L.P. v. Diamond State Ins., 818 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation modified). “Of these factors, the location of the insured risk is given the greatest weight.” Id. at 646. Even in circumstances in which a choice of law determination cannot be made with any certainty, a district court may still apply the law of the forum state. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Advanced Chimney, Inc., 13-CV-4608, 2014 WL 4438899, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4439102 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2014) (collecting cases).
Here, New York likely has the greatest interest in regulating the tortious conduct at issue, and the factors relevant to cases involving insurance also weigh in favor of applying New York law to Plaintiff's claims. Defendant maintains an office in New York, and Plaintiff, the party claiming it should have had insurance coverage, is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York. See supra pp. –––– – ––––. Both construction projects for which insurance was sought are also located in New York. See supra p. ––––. Accordingly, the Court applies New York law to Plaintiff's state common law tort claims.
IV. Sufficiency of State Common Law Claims
The Court next evaluates whether Plaintiff's allegations sufficiently establish its state common law tort claims. These claims are: (i) negligent misrepresentation (count 3); (ii) fraud (count 4); (iii) breach of fiduciary duty (count 6); (iv) negligence (count 2); and (v) violation of GBL § 349 (count 7). (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 167–233.) As detailed below, all but Plaintiff's claim for fraud must be dismissed.
A. Fraud
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action asserts Defendant committed common law fraud by deliberately falsifying and providing certificates of insurance that misrepresented Plaintiff as an additional insured. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 195–212.) To state a claim for fraud under New York common law, a plaintiff must show (1) misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the falsity of that misrepresentation; (3) intent to defraud; (4) reasonable reliance on that representation; and (5) damage caused by such reliance. See, e.g., Hesse v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d 453, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). “[A] plaintiff alleging common law fraud must satisfy both the facial plausibility standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).” Cohen v. Nutricost, 747 F. Supp. 3d 467, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). As with RICO, Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff claiming common law fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” including an explanation of why the statements were fraudulent. Equinox Gallery Ltd. v. Dorfman, 306 F. Supp. 3d 560, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The parties here only dispute whether Plaintiff satisfies the reliance element.
1. Reasonable Reliance
“In assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff's alleged reliance,” courts “consider the entire context of the transaction, including factors such as its complexity and magnitude, the sophistication of the parties, and the content of any agreements between them.” Emergent Cap. Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Where “matters are held to be peculiarly within defendant's knowledge, it is said that plaintiff may rely [on his representations] without prosecuting an investigation, as he had no independent means of ascertaining the truth.” Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation modified). By contrast, “[a] plaintiff cannot close his eyes to an obvious fraud, and cannot demonstrate reasonable reliance without making inquiry and investigation if he has the ability, through ordinary intelligence, to ferret out the reliability or truth” of a defendant's statements. Id.
The parties agree that, because the certificates of insurance contain standard disclosures and disclaimers, Plaintiff could not reasonably rely solely on the certificates to conclude it was an additional insured. (See Def.’s Mem. pp. 24–25; Pl.’s Opp. pp. 16–17.) But Plaintiff says its allegations regarding “[t]he parties’ course of conduct, tripartite relationship between Defalco, A2Z, and Acrisure, and Acrisure's affirmative statements confirming that coverage existed—combined with the forged [certificates of insurance]—made Defalco's reliance on Acrisure's verbal and written statements reasonable.” (See Pl.’s Opp. p. 17). Defendant counters that Plaintiff's “head-in-the-sand response” was unreasonable when Plaintiff could have easily discovered whether it was an additional insured through “exercise of ordinary intelligence” by asking A2Z for a copy of the policy. (Defendant Acrisure, LLC's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 26 p. 18; see also Def.’s Mem. p. 26 (quoting Stuart Silver Assocs., Inc. v. Baco Dev. Corp., 245 A.D.2d 96 , 665 N.Y.S.2d 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).))
Taking all Plaintiff's allegations into account and drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff as it must at this stage, the Court finds these allegations sufficient to allege reasonable reliance for the purpose of a common law fraud claim. Further, Plaintiff's allegations about the broader context of the transaction—including that Defendant facilitated and had been involved with Plaintiff and A2Z's business relationship; had a copy of the construction agreement between Plaintiff and A2Z; and was aware that the resulting construction contracts would require A2Z to purchase insurance naming Plaintiff as an additional insured—raise an inference that Plaintiff's reliance on the certificates’ certification of coverage could have been reasonable under the circumstances. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 50–62, 71–95.) Plaintiff's allegations that “Defalco specifically requested that Acrisure procure a policy that named it an additional insured[,]” and “Defendant repeatedly confirmed to Defalco that the A2Z Policy properly named Defalco as an additional insured” establish, at least at the pleading stage, it took more than a “head-in-the-sand” approach. Considering the Second Circuit's observation that “ ‘[t]he question of what constitutes reasonable reliance is always nettlesome because it is so fact-intensive[,]’ ” Plaintiff's allegations plausibly allege reliance and, thus, “[t]he issue of Plaintiff's reasonable reliance cannot be resolved as a matter of law at this stage of the proceedings.” Martin Hilti Fam. Tr. v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 137 F. Supp. 3d 430, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation modified).
2. Remaining Elements of Fraud
It appears undisputed, and the Court finds, that Plaintiff alleges with sufficient particularity the remaining elements of fraud. Plaintiff clears the low hurdles of the first, second, and fifth elements. See supra p. ––––. The allegations contained in the Amended Complaint establish Plaintiff's status as an additional insured was a material fact, the alleged misrepresentation that Plaintiff was an additional insured was false, and Plaintiff suffered economic harm. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 197, 203–10.)
With regard to the intent element, Rule 9(b) requires a complaint to plead facts that “give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.” United States v. Strock, 982 F.3d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 2020). Facts giving rise to a strong inference of intent “may be established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” Id. “An inference is strong if it is cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2015.) “In determining whether this strength-of-inference requirement is met, a court considers the complaint in its entirety and takes into account plausible opposing inferences.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Gaetano Causi deliberately changed the “N” under “Additional Insured” to a “Y,” and that he did so to make Plaintiff believe it held additional insured status under the policy when it did not. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 206–07.) And, as Causi's employer, Defendant may be vicariously liable for that conduct. See, e.g., Stapon v. Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., 19-CV-4708, 2025 WL 2938604, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2025). Plaintiff's allegations regarding Defendant's history of forging documents and providing clients with false insurance documentation also serve as circumstantial evidence of misbehavior. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 96–124.) Discovery will test the veracity of those allegations, but they are enough to survive dismissal at this stage.
B. Remaining State Common Law Tort Claims
All of Plaintiff's remaining state common law tort claims—negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence—require the same inquiry into whether Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff. See Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. Co. of Am., 420 F. Supp. 3d 123, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Thus, the Court proceeds by making this inquiry for all three claims together.
1. Special Relationship Sufficient to Establish a Duty
Insurance brokers generally have no more than a common law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients. See, e.g., Pilkington, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 136. That common law duty “runs from a broker to the broker's customer or client; it does not extend to strangers to the broker-client relationship, or even to additional insureds.” Servicemaster Restoration by Marano Servs, LLC v. A-Cap. Brokerage Inc., 728411/2021, 2023 WL 4305337, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 3, 2023). Nevertheless, “particularized situations may arise in which insurance agents, through their conduct or by express or implied contract with customers and clients, may assume or acquire duties in addition to those fixed at common law.” Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 660 N.Y.S.2d 371, 682 N.E.2d 972, 975 (1997). The question of whether such additional responsibilities should be “given legal effect is governed by the particular relationship between the parties and is best determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. Existence of such a relationship between an insurance broker and customer is the “exception” to the general rule. Holborn Corp. v. Sawgrass Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 392, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.3d 728, 985 N.Y.S.2d 448, 8 N.E.3d 823, 829 (2014)).
“[C]ase law presents varied interpretations as to what constitutes a special relationship to support a negligent misrepresentation claim.” Alley Sports Bar, LLC v. SimplexGrinnell, LP, 58 F. Supp. 3d. 280, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases and finding it “difficult to reconcile this competing case law”). Some courts have required a fiduciary relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[U]nder New York law, a plaintiff may recover for negligent misrepresentation only where the defendant owes her a fiduciary duty.”). Others have required a “special or privity-like” relationship, which is less rigorous than that of a fiduciary duty. Musalli Factory For Gold & Jewellry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 261 F.R.D. 13, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd F. App'x 107 (2d Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, such “a special relationship will also support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because “[t]he ‘duty’ element of [negligence and fiduciary duty] causes of action requires the same inquiry.” ’’ Muller–Paisner v. TIAA, 289 F. App'x. 461, 465 (2d Cir. 2008).
In determining whether a special relationship exists for purposes of establishing a negligent misrepresentation claim, courts consider three factors: “[1] whether the person making the representation held or appeared to hold unique or special expertise; [2] whether a special relationship of trust or confidence existed between the parties; and [3] whether the speaker was aware of the use to which the information would be put and supplied it for that purpose.” Suez Equity Invs., L.P. v. Toronto–Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 103 (2d Cir. 2001). The first factor is the most important. See LBBW Luxemburg S.A. v. Wells Fargo Sec. LLC, 10 F. Supp. 3d 504, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A plaintiff can make an appropriate showing under the first factor by “emphatically alleg[ing]” that the defendant held a unique or special expertise, and that the defendant provided information knowing how that information would be used by the plaintiff.” Bhagat v. Shah, 24-CV-1424, 2025 WL 1918014, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2396668 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025). Although determining whether a special or privity-like relationship exists is “intertwined with issues of justifiable reliance[,]” the two inquiries are distinct because “[f]or purposes of the justifiable reliance analysis, it is irrelevant whether a particular fact was within one defendant's peculiar knowledge[.]” LBBW Luxemburg, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege as a matter of law that Defendant had specialized knowledge, the first element of a special relationship. The parties sharply disagree on whether a special relationship exists between them. Plaintiff's only allegations with regard to this element are that Defendant, “engaged in the business of insurance brokering, possese[d] unique or special insurance experience”; that, as an insurance broker, Defendant possessed superior knowledge regarding the amount of insurance coverage required; and that additional insureds generally rely on certificates of insurance to determine coverage status. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 183, 184, 227.)
These allegations are insufficient. Any allegations of Defendant's special knowledge about the business of insurance brokering fail, as a party's “superior knowledge of the particulars of its own business practices is insufficient to sustain the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.” 360 N. Rodeo Drive, LP v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Assoc., 22-CV-0767, 2024 WL 4039643, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2024). Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant had specialized knowledge of the amount of coverage required are also contradicted by Plaintiff's allegations that it knew from the beginning the level of insurance coverage required—i.e., that the policy with A2Z needed to name Plaintiff as an additional insured. Cf. Bhagat, 2025 WL 1918014, at *12 (dismissing plaintiff former employee's negligent misrepresentation claim when plaintiff was an employee at the time of the incident underlying the complaint, and plaintiff failed to allege why or how defendant, another former employee, had special knowledge that was unavailable to plaintiff), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2396668 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025); Dall. Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 789 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding a party cannot establish a special relationship based on expertise where that party has the same expertise).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations, even construed in its favor, do not demonstrate a special relationship as required to adequately state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. For the same reasons, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty under the more rigorous standard associated with those torts.5 See supra pp. –––– – –––– . Therefore, these claims must all be dismissed.6
V. GBL Section 349
Plaintiff's seventh cause of action arises under New York statutory rather than common law. It alleges Defendant violated GBL § 349 by disseminating fraudulent certificates of insurance. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 191–99.) Section 349 of the GBL provides a cause of action for any person injured by “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a), (h) (McKinney 2026). To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result. See, e.g., MacNaughton v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC, 67 F.4th 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2023). Claims under GBL § 349 need not meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). See, e.g., Duran v. Henkel of Am., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
For the purposes of GBL § 349, consumer-oriented conduct is broadly construed as an activity that causes any “consumer injury or harm to the public interest.” Anderson v. Unilever United States, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 3d 441, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citation modified). Nevertheless, the statute “does not grant a private remedy for every improper or illegal business practice, but only for conduct that tends to deceive consumers” and has “ramifications for the public at large.” Baldeo v. Airbnb, Inc., 20-CV-7771, 2023 WL 7689652, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1367189 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2024), aff'd, 24-1238-CV, 2025 WL 3152716 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2025). As such, “business-to-business transactions” generally do not give rise to a GBL § 349 claim unless the business bringing the action is harmed by conduct also directed at consumers. Exxonmobil Inter-Am., Inc. v. Advanced Info. Eng'g Servs., Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of GBL § 349 because Defendant is a commercial entity, not a consumer, and because Plaintiff's allegations center on what is essentially a private dispute. (See Def.’s Mem. pp. 38–39; Def.’s Reply p. 20.) Plaintiff counters that Defendant can still be liable because the alleged falsification of insurance documents “impact[s] the consuming public and marketplace at large” by “creat[ing] a systematic falsified-certificate practice that affects the reliability of insurance verification across an industry with public-safety dimensions.” (Pl.’s Opp. p. 27.)
The Court finds GBL § 349 does not apply to Plaintiff's allegations. The dispute here is between two sophisticated businesses, not consumers in the general public. Courts in this Circuit considering the scope of GBL § 349 have “almost uniformly ․ held that such disputes are nothing more than private ․ disputes that lack the consumer impact necessary to state a claim[.]” Fishberg v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 20-CV-6664, 2021 WL 3077478, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2021); see also, e.g., Northway Med. Ctr. Condo v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 20-CV-9864, 2022 WL 94884, at **2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022) (dismissing GBL § 349 claim brought by policyholder against insurer in part because generalized allegations that offending practice affected other insureds could be made in any insurance dispute); Mohawk Gaming Enters., LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 3d 216, 224 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (dismissing GBL § 349 claim based on “a private insurance contract between two sophisticated parties” despite the insured's “series of conclusory allegations about [its insurer]’s broader approach to coverage decisions vis-a-vis the COVID-19 pandemic”); Kramer v. Lockwood Pension Servs., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 354, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding dispute regarding insurance benefits not consumer-oriented when “parties include[d] sophisticated insurance brokers and not ordinary consumers to whom the statute is directed”). Even though Plaintiff's allegations also name five other parties affected by Defendant's conduct, all are still corporate entities, not the general public. (See Amend. Compl. ¶ 42.) Accordingly, Plaintiff does not establish that Defendant's conduct was consumer oriented within the meaning of GBL § 349. Therefore, this claim is dismissed.
VI. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff requests the opportunity to amend its complaint if the Court finds any claims insufficient. (See Pl.’s Opp. p. 30.) Defendant opposes. (See Def.’s Reply p. 20 n.10.) While leave to amend should generally be “freely given when justice so requires,” the circumstances here do not warrant amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Indeed, after declining the Court's invitation to amend the complaint in the interest of efficiency prior to any motion practice, Plaintiff then did so after Defendant's original motion to dismiss had already been filed. See supra p. ––––. As a result, when it filed the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was fully aware of Defendant's arguments about the sufficiency of its allegations. Even then, Plaintiff persisted in the same eight causes of action, only adding six pages to bolster the facts to support its RICO allegations. (See Redlined Complaint, Dkt. No. 22-6.) Parties are only entitled to so many proverbial bites at the apple, and, under these circumstances, Plaintiff is not entitled to another. See, e.g., In re Eaton Vance Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd sub nom., Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In light of the plaintiffs’ failure to cure the defects after being provided notice, this is not a case where leave to amend should be given because ‘justice so requires.’ ”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).
VII. Punitive Damages
Defendant asks the Court to strike Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages because Plaintiff fails to state any tort claims nor any facts establishing broad public harm. (See Def.’s Mem. p. 40; Def.’s Reply p. 20.) Punitive damages are available under New York common law if the plaintiff can show “willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a conscious disregard of the rights of others, or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard.” Gomez v. PetPivot, Inc., 25-CV-5622, 2026 WL 507708, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026) (citation modified). Having found Plaintiff's fraud claim should proceed to discovery, it would be premature to decide this question as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss. See id. (acknowledging the determination whether to award punitive damages is a fact-intensive inquiry inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss). As such, Defendant's motion to strike the demand for punitive damages is denied.
CONCLUSION
While Plaintiff's allegations do establish a plausible claim of fraud regarding Defendant's conduct in procurement of an insurance policy and issuance of a certificate of insurance, they do not constitute a civil RICO conspiracy, nor do they establish a basis for Plaintiff's remaining state common law claims. As such, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion to dismiss. Count four, Plaintiff's common law fraud claim, shall proceed to discovery. The remaining seven counts in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's request for leave to amend is denied, and Defendant's request to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is denied without prejudice to renew at an appropriate stage of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
FOOTNOTES
1. The parties consented to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction to decide dispositive motions and enter final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Notice of Option to Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 16.)
2. In its opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff withdrew its fifth cause of action for tortious interference with prospective business relationships. (See Plaintiff Defalco's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Acrisure's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s Opp.”), Dkt. No. 25 p. 26.)
3. Plaintiff suggests that separateness of Defendant's two other affiliates, Falcon Insurance Agency and Traza Insurance Agency, should be considered in evaluating the distinctness requirement. (See Pl.’s Opp pp. 7–8.) Whether or not those entities are in fact separate, Plaintiff's argument fails because neither entity is listed as a member of the enterprise as alleged in the operative complaint. (See Amend. Compl. ¶ 130.)
4. The underlying insurance documents provided by the parties do not include a choice of law provision that might assist the Court in determining what law to apply to Plaintiff's claims—though any provision likely would not be dispositive because Plaintiff's common law claims are not contractual in nature. Cf. Winter-Wolff Int'l, Inc. v. Alcan Packaging Food & Tobacco Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (tort claims not covered by contract's choice of law provision).
5. Although Defendant does not affirmatively raise the argument, and so the Court does not conclusively decide the issue, the economic loss doctrine likely would not bar any of Plaintiff's common law tort claims. New York's economic loss rule holds that “if the parties have a remedy in contract, they may not also bring claims sounding in tort that claim only economic damages independent of physical injury or damage to property.” Holborn Corp. v. Sawgrass Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 392, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).Here, Plaintiff's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims would not be barred because New York's interpretation of the doctrine does not preclude intentional torts. See, e.g., Chung v. Igloo Products Corp., 20-CV-4926, 2022 WL 2657350, at *14 n. 9 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022). And Plaintiff's other two common law tort claims—breach of fiduciary duty and negligence—would likely survive because there was no contract between the parties, and Plaintiff alleges duties of loyalty and care independent of any contract. See, e.g., Ambac Assurance Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 328 F. Supp. 3d 141, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims pursuant to economic loss rule when allegations established breach of extra-contractual duty).To be sure, “the [economic loss] doctrine may apply even when there is no contract at all between the parties.” King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 288, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev'd in part on other grounds, 09-CV-8387, 2012 WL 11896326 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2012). But, because these arguments were not raised as reasons for dismissal, the Court need not discuss them further.
6. As these claims are all dismissed, the Court does not address the parties’ contentions regarding the remaining elements of each claim.
SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ, United States Magistrate Judge
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Docket No: 26-CV-1251 (SDE)
Decided: October 23, 2026
Court: United States District Court, E.D. New York.
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