ILDIKO SZALAI v. JANAK RAJ CONSTRUCTION NEW YORK INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ildiko Szalai filed this diversity action against Defendants Janak Raj and J.K. Construction New York Inc. (“J.K. Construction”), alleging injuries sustained after a 2025 vehicle collision with Raj's work van during Raj's employment with J.K Construction. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)¹ Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to join Janos Balaz as a third-party defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), which Plaintiff opposes. (See ECF Nos. 23–26.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND 2

This action stems from a motor vehicle accident in a Home Depot parking lot in Glendale, New York, on March 13, 2025. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) At the time of the accident, J.K. Construction, a New York corporation, owned a van bearing New York license plate number 13264NB (“the Van”). (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 18–23.) Raj, a New York citizen, worked for J.K. Construction and used and operated the Van with his employer's consent. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10–17, 24–25.) Balaz, a citizen of New York, owned and operated a vehicle bearing New York license plate number LLV5670 (“the Car”) at the time of the accident. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Hungary, was a passenger in the Car. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 9.) According to Plaintiff, the Van driven by Raj collided with the Car driven by Balaz, causing Plaintiff “serious personal injuries” under New York law. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27–28.)

Plaintiff initiated this case on May 13, 2025, alleging a cause of action for negligence against J.K. Construction and Raj. (Id. ¶¶ 27–30.) At Plaintiff's request, after Defendants failed to appear or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the Clerk of Court entered default against them on June 25, 2025. (ECF Nos. 10–11.) On August 1, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to vacate default, with Plaintiff's consent. (ECF No. 13; Aug. 1, 2025 Order, ECF No. 14.) On August 4, 2025, Defendants filed their Answer. (ECF No. 16.) Following the initial case management conference, the Court issued a scheduling order designating January 2, 2026 as the deadline to amend pleadings and join new parties. (See Oct. 7, 2025 Min. Entry, ECF No. 20.)

Defendants timely filed the instant motion to implead Balaz on December 24, 2025, which Plaintiff opposed. (See generally Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23; Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 24.) On January 30, 2026, the Court heard oral argument on the motion, reserved decision, and requested supplemental briefs; the parties complied. (See Jan. 30, 2026 Min. Entry; Defs.’ Suppl., ECF No. 25; Pl.’s Suppl. Opp., ECF No. 26.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD 3

“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). The third-party plaintiff must “obtain the court's leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.” Id.

The “general purpose” of the rule enabling impleading a third party is “to avoid two actions which should be tried together to save the time and cost of a reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistent results from identical or similar evidence, and to do away with the serious handicap to a defendant of a time difference between a judgment against him and a judgment [in] his favor against the third-party defendant.”

Trisura Specialty Ins. Co. v. Robinson, No. 22-CV-3216 (KAM)(MMH), 2023 WL 4539843, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2023) (quoting Ouattara v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-CV-1753 (JLR), 2022 WL 17167983, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022), which in turn quotes Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 806–07 (2d Cir. 1959)). “The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against defendant by the original plaintiff.” Montague Williams Doe v. Aetna Ins. Co., No. 21-CV-4054 (MKB), 2026 WL 765109, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2026) (quoting 6 Kane & Erichson, Federal Practice & Procedure (Wright & Miller) § 1446 (3d ed. & Sep. 2025 update)).

“A third-party action, also known as an impleader action, must be dependent on, or derivative of, the main claim.” Sidik v. Royal Sovereign Int'l Inc., No. 17-CV-7020 (ADS)(ARL), 2019 WL 8275239, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019) (citing Bank of India v. Trendi Sportswear, Inc., 239 F.3d 428, 438 (2d Cir. 2000)). “A third-party claim is ‘dependent on’ another if there is a strong ‘causal link’ between the two, such that the outcome of the second is contingent on the first, but it must not be a ‘speculative, “but for” causal link’ or insufficiently direct.” Montague Williams Doe, 2026 WL 765109, at *8 (quoting Kenneth Leventhal & Co. v. Joyner Wholesale Co., 736 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984)). Additionally, “[a] claim is ‘derivative of’ another when a defendant alleges that another is secondarily liable to it as a contributor.” E.C. Contracting, Inc. v. D.F. Pray, Inc., No. 19-CV-6813 (FB)(VMS), 2021 WL 1152938, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (quoting Kenneth Leventhal, 736 F.2d at 31). “The traditional ‘derivative’ claims are indemnification, contribution and subrogation.” Id. at *2 (quoting Falcone v. MarineMax, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).

“[T]he decision whether to permit a defendant to implead a third-party defendant rests in the trial court's discretion.” ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Sprain Assocs., LLC, No. 20-CV-4296 (MKV), 2021 WL 1687277, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021) (quoting Kenneth Leventhal, 736 F.2d at 31). “Factors relevant to determining whether to grant leave to implead a third party include: (a) whether the moving party deliberately delayed or was derelict in filing the motion; (b) whether impleading would unduly delay or complicate the trial; (c) whether impleading would prejudice the plaintiff or the third-party defendant; and (d) whether the proposed third-party complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.” iBasis Glob., Inc. v. Diamond Phone Card, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted). “Timely motions for leave to implead non-parties should be freely granted to promote [judicial] efficiency.” Lightron Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 24-CV-8452 (JGK), 2025 WL 1616865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2025) (quoting Shafarman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to implead Balaz as the driver of the Car carrying Plaintiff at the time of the accident. (See generally Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23; Defs.’ Suppl., ECF No. 25.) Defendants argue that Balaz's negligence caused the accident and, as such, the proposed third-party complaint asserts claims against him for contribution and common law indemnification. (TPC, ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff argues in opposition that Defendants fail to state plausible claims for indemnification and contribution. (See generally Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 24; Pl.’s Suppl. Opp., ECF No. 26.)⁴

A. Delay, Trial, & Prejudice

The first three Rule 14 factors weigh in favor of impleading Balaz.

Defendants did not deliberately delay seeking to implead Balaz because they moved to file the third-party complaint on December 24, 2025, well before the January 2, 2026 deadline in the Court's Rule 16(b) Order. (See Oct. 7, 2025 Minute Entry & Order, ECF No. 20; Dec. 19, 2025 Order; see generally Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23.) Courts routinely permit impleader where the requesting party complies with Rule 16(b) scheduling orders to seek joinder. See, e.g., Trisura, 2023 WL 4539843, at *3 (“[Defendant] did not deliberately delay in seeking joinder because he moved to file a third-party complaint by the deadline in the Court's Rule [16(b)] Order.”); Compo v. River Real Est. Dev., LLC, No. 18-CV-614 (BKS)(DJS), 2019 WL 13299508, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2019) (permitting third-party action based on timely motion filed before scheduling order deadline); In re Mission Const. Litig., No. 10-CV-4262 (LTS)(HBP), 2013 WL 4710377, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013) (finding no deliberate delay because, inter alia, defendant requested leave to initiate impleader action by the deadline in the court's scheduling order.)

Impleading Balaz also would not unduly complicate trial because the proposed third-party claims arise out of the same occurrence that is the subject matter of Plaintiff's claim—i.e., the motor vehicle accident on March 13, 2025—and Defendants seek to pass on some or all of their liability to Balaz. As such, impleading Balaz will promote judicial economy by avoiding two trials and saving each party significant time and money on duplicative litigation. Cf. Lupia v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. 21-CV-11077 (LJL), 2022 WL 16549227, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2022) (denying impleader because additional parties and claims would require vacating a trial date and initiating extensive fact and expert discovery).

Finally, joining Balaz will not prejudice Plaintiff or Balaz. “Prejudice to plaintiff or third-party defendant considers the fairness of the proceeding and any disadvantages to the parties from allowing impleader.” Montague Williams Doe, 2026 WL 765109, at *16. Here, Balaz drove the Car in which Plaintiff was injured, and it was foreseeable that Defendants would seek to implead him to apportion liability. See Pilkington N. Am., Inc v. Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. Co. of Am., No. 18-CV-8152 (JFK), 2021 WL 4991422, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021) (“When considering the prospect of prejudice, courts in this Circuit focus on the extent to which the new claims arise from the existing ones and whether a party had prior notice of the new claim.”) (cleaned up). Moreover, the risk of disadvantage to Plaintiff or Balaz is minimal because “even absent a third-party complaint, [Balaz] will likely be involved in discovery in this matter” as a witness to the accident that allegedly caused Plaintiff's injuries. See iBasis Glob., Inc., 278 F.R.D. at 75 (finding that third-party defendants would not be prejudiced by allowing impleader because they would assert affirmative defenses).

Accordingly, “where, as here, ‘[t]he Court finds that the ․ motion was not the result of undue delay, will not complicate any future trial and will not cause prejudice to [Plaintiff and Balaz],’ ” the Court grants Defendants leave to file a third-party complaint against Balaz. Trisura, 2023 WL 4539843, at *4 (quoting Sidik, 2019 WL 8275239, at *2).

B. Plausibility

That said, “[i]n determining whether the third-party complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted in a Rule 14 impleader analysis, courts consider the plausibility of the claims alleged.” Montague Williams Doe, 2026 WL 765109, at *17. “This aspect of the Rule 14 inquiry closely tracks the analysis of whether dismissal is warranted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).” Red Rock Sourcing, LLC v. JGX, LLC, No. 21-CV-1054 (JPC), 2025 WL 524024, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (cleaned up). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Defendants’ proposed third-party complaint against Balaz states a plausible claim for contribution but not for common law indemnification.

1. Contribution

Under New York law, absent statutory exceptions, “two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the person from whom contribution is sought.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1401. “The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the injured party,” and “[t]he equitable shares shall be determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution.” Id. § 1402. Contribution thus serves as a remedy “ ‘to [a]ny tortfeasor who pays more than its fair share of a judgment—as apportioned by the factfinder in terms of relative culpability’ against other joint tortfeasors.” Amguard Ins. Co. v. Getty Realty Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540, 556 (1992), which in turn cites N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 1401–02). “To establish a right to contribution in New York between parties in privity, a third-party plaintiff must demonstrate that a third-party defendant owed it a duty of reasonable care independent of its contractual obligations, or that a duty was owed to the plaintiff as an injured party and that a breach of this duty contributed to the alleged injuries.” Trisura, 2023 WL 4539843, at *4 (quoting Rydstrom v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 16-CV-2833 (SJF)(SIL), 2019 WL 117600, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (cleaned up), R. & R. adopted by 2019 WL 438478 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2019)).

Here, Defendants’ third-party complaint plausibly alleges a claim for contribution against Balaz. Defendants allege that Balaz “was the operator” of the Car carrying Plaintiff at the time it “came into contact” with the Van owned by Defendants, and that “the collision between the two vehicles was caused in [ ] whole or in part by” Balaz's “negligence and failure to exercise due care ․ in the operation” of the Car. (TPC, ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 8–9, 11.) Defendants contend that Balaz “will be liable in whole or in part to [Defendants and Plaintiff] for any damages awarded to [ ] [P]laintiff under [the] doctrine[ ] of contribution ․ as a result of the failure of [Balaz] to have operated his vehicle prudently under the circumstances and in causing and/or contributing to the accident.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In other words, as the driver of the Car that caused Plaintiff injury, “[Balaz] violated a duty to Plaintiff, which caused or augmented the damages for which Defendants seek contribution.” See Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-3115 (DRH)(AKT), 2018 WL 11454818, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2018); see also In re Mission Const. Litig., 2013 WL 4710377, at *11 (finding contribution claim viable where third-party plaintiff alleged that “the negligence of these proposed third-party defendants contributed, in whole or in part, to the Accident”) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1401). Accordingly, Defendants may proceed on their third-party claim for contribution.

2. Indemnification

Unlike contribution, “[i]ndemnity ‘involves an attempt to shift the entire loss from one who is compelled to pay for a loss ․ to another person who should more properly bear responsibility for that loss because he was the actual wrongdoer.’ ” Olin Corp. v. Lamorak Ins. Co., 332 F. Supp. 3d 818, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Cnty. of Westchester v. Welton Becket Assocs., 478 N.Y.S.2d 305, 314–15 (2d Dep't 1984)). Under New York law, “[a cause of action for common law indemnification] can b[e] sustained only if: (1) the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant have breached a duty to the plaintiff, and (2) also if some duty to indemnify exists between them.” Trisura, 2023 WL 4539843, at *4 (emphasis added) (quoting Komatsu Equip. Co. v. Ravyn & Robyn Constr., LLC, No. 17-CV-2010 (SJF)(AYS), 2018 WL 5456671, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018) (cleaned up), R. & R. adopted by 2018 WL 4853052 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Indus. Water Sols., LLC v. Ravyn & Robyn Constr., LLC, 789 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2020)). Common law indemnification is “ ‘barred altogether where the party seeking indemnification was itself at fault, and both tortfeasors violated the same duty to the plaintiff.’ ” Amguard Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 3d at 220 (quoting Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P., 73 F.3d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1996)).

“The right to indemnification may be created by an express contract or implied by law.” Komatsu Equip. Co., 2018 WL 5456671, at *3. An implied right to indemnification may be found under two circumstances: (1) the special nature of a contractual relationship exists between the parties; or (2) “a tort-based right to indemnification may be found when there is a great disparity in the fault of two tortfeasors, and one of the tortfeasors has paid for a loss that was primarily the responsibility of the other.” Id. (cleaned up). In other words, “[t]o state a claim for implied indemnification, a party must allege a special relationship with the potential indemnitee that gives rise to an implied duty to indemnify.” Ainette v. Mkt. Basket Inc., No. 19-CV-4506 (DF), 2021 WL 1022590, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021) (citing Transmodal Corp. v. Pianin, No. 09-CV-10497 (DLC), 2010 WL 2629405, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010), which in turn cites Triguero v. Consol. Rail Corp., 932 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1991)).

Defendants’ common law indemnification claim cannot proceed because it could not survive a motion to dismiss. The proposed third-party complaint does not plausibly allege that Balaz owed Defendants any express or implied duty to indemnify them for damages that Plaintiff sustained during the accident on March 13, 2025. Put another way, Defendants fail to allege that Balaz had any independent obligation to pay them if Defendants were found liable for Plaintiff's damages, which is a necessary element for the proposed common law indemnification claim. See Highland Holdings & Zito I, L.P. v. Century/ML Cable Venture, No. 06-CV-181 (GBD), 2007 WL 2405689, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2007), aff'd sub nom. In re Century/ML Cable Venture, 311 F. App'x 455 (2d Cir. 2009). “Indeed, there are no allegations in the third-party complaint regarding the relationship between Defendants and [Balaz]. In the absence of an allegation of an express or implied duty between Defendants and [Balaz], the third-party complaint fails to state a claim of common law indemnification.” Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 11454818, at *5; see also Ainette, 2021 WL 1022590, at *10 (finding common law indemnification claim futile because third-party plaintiffs did not make “even the barest suggestion that they had any special relationship with” third-party defendants “that could have “give[n] rise to an implied duty to indemnify” or suggest that they had “any relationship at all” with them) (emphasis added); Perkins Eastman Architects, P.C. v. Thor Eng'rs, P.A., 769 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing common law indemnification claim because the third-party complaint did not allege the third-party defendant's breach of duty to plaintiff or the third-party defendant's duty to indemnify defendant).

Accordingly, Defendants fail to state a claim for common law indemnification.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Janos Balaz at ECF No. 23, as supplemented by ECF No. 25, is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants may proceed on the third-party contribution claim against Balaz but not the common law indemnification claim. By October 2, 2026, Defendants must file a proposed summons and the Third-Party Complaint consistent with this Memorandum and Order. By October 9, 2026, Defendants shall serve a copy of this Memorandum and Order, the Third-Party Complaint, and the approved summons on Balaz and file proof of service by the same date.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All citations to documents filed on ECF are to the ECF document number and pagination in the ECF header unless otherwise noted.

4.   Plaintiff also argues that a video of the collision demonstrates that “there is no factual or legal basis” to implead Balaz. (Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 24; Pl.’s Suppl. Opp., ECF No. 26 at 2.) The Court will not consider this video because, at this stage of the case, “it is inappropriate for the Court to choose between [Plaintiff's] and Defendants’ characterization of the factual record[.]” See Villafane ex rel. D.F. v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-1379 (EK)(SJB), 2021 WL 2450612, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2021) (declining to consider extrinsic evidence on motion to amend).

MARCIA M. HENRY United States Magistrate Judge