OLIVE GROUP FZ LLC v. AFGHANISTAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Non-parties Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Lufthansa Cargo Aktiengesellschaft, Lufthansa Group Business Services GMBH LLC, and Lufthansa Technik Aktiengesellschaft (together, “Lufthansa”) move for a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to prevent Petitioner Olive Group FZ-LLC (“Olive Group”) from subpoenaing information about Lufthansa's operations related to defendant and judgment-debtors Afghan Civil Aviation Authority (“ACAA”) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Because this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Lufthansa, its motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Olive Group is a Dubai-based security contractor that provided security services to the ACAA at four airports in Afghanistan. Mem. in Support, ECF No. 5 at 1. In 2021, Olive Group commenced arbitration proceedings in Dubai against the ACAA for breach of contract and was awarded $15,286,002.30, plus interest. Id. Olive Group petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to recognize and enforce the arbitration award pursuant to the New York Convention. Id. In July 2025, the D.C. court entered judgment in favor of Olive Group, which subsequently registered the judgment in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963.

In October 2025, Olive Group served an information subpoena on non-party Lufthansa seeking post-judgment discovery. Mem. in Opp., ECF No. 8 at 4. Olive Group seeks information from Lufthansa about potential debt obligations it may owe to the ACAA, through overflight fees or other debts, to assist collecting on its judgment. ECF No. 5 at 6. The subpoena commended responses to four interrogatories, asking:

(1) Whether Lufthansa was or had been indebted to ACAA or the Afghan government, and in what amount;

(2) Whether Lufthansa holds any goods, chattel, or credits of ACAA;

(3) Identification of any accounts payable owed to ACAA; and

(4) Identification of any other debts Lufthansa owed to ACAA or related Afghan entities, including the amounts of such debts.

ECF No. 8 at 4. Lufthansa served limited responses to Olive Group's requests, but did not provide the substantive information that Olive Group is seeking. Id.

Now, Lufthansa seeks a protective order from this Court to prevent Olive Group from compelling it to provide the requested information. Lufthansa raises two principal arguments why the Court should grant its motion: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Lufthansa; and (2) attachment of overflight fees to collect a judgment is prohibited by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, leaving the subpoena with no legitimate purpose. ECF No. 5 at 2.

II. Legal Standards

Courts must have personal jurisdiction over a non-party to compel it to comply with a subpoena. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 141 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Gucci I”). Personal jurisdiction takes two forms: it may be general or specific. See id. at 134 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014)). “General, all-purpose jurisdiction permits a court to hear any and all claims against an entity․ Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, permits adjudicatory authority only over issues that arise out of or relate to the entity's contacts with the forum.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Olive Group asserts only specific jurisdiction over Lufthansa, pursuant to New York's long-arm statute, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ECF No. 8 at 12.

Three requirements must be met for the Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction: (1) service must be procedurally proper; (2) there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Licci II”). As the parties do not contest that service was proper, the Court must determine only whether there is a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over Lufthansa and, if so, whether exercising jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process. See H.B. by Barakati v. China S. Airlines Co. Ltd., No. 20-CV-9106, 2021 WL 2581151, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2021) (“Only if personal jurisdiction is proper under the state's long-arm statute does the Court need to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).

III. Analysis

A. The Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Lufthansa.

To establish personal jurisdiction over Lufthansa, a nondomiciliary, the requirements of New York's long arm statute must be satisfied. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125, 134 S.Ct. 746 (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). Under New York's long-arm statute, courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary “who in person or through an agent ․ transacts any business within the state,” so long as the plaintiff's “cause of action aris[es] from” that transaction. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a). Therefore, courts must determine “(1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such a business transaction.” Licci II, 673 F.3d at 60 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In cases where a party is seeking to compel a response to a subpoena, the relevant nexus is “the connection between the nonparty's contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue” rather than the connection between the cause of action and the party's business transactions. Gucci I, 768 F.3d at 141–42; Nike, Inc. v. Wu, 349 F. Supp. 3d 310, 323 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 349 F. Supp. 3d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

1. Lufthansa transacts business in New York.

First, to determine whether Lufthansa “transacts business” in New York, the Court considers whether it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Spetner v. Palestine Inv. Bank, 70 F.4th 632, 639 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2007)); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (2012) (“Licci III”). Olive Group alleges that Lufthansa transacts business in New York by (1) maintaining offices in New York, (2) having a designated service agent, and (3) operating flights arriving to and departing from New York airports. ECF No. 8 at 7–8. Lufthansa does not dispute these contacts. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lufthansa's physical presence and commercial activity is sufficient to show that it “transacts business” in New York. See, e.g., H.B. by Barakati, 2021 WL 2581151, at *4 (operating daily flights from New York airports and maintaining a physical office in New York was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the § 302(a)(1) injury).

2. The subpoena does not arise from Lufthansa's business transactions in New York.

Next, the Court must determine whether Olive Group's discovery requests “arise from” Lufthansa's business operations in New York. In determining whether there is an “articulable nexus or substantial relationship” between “the nonparty's contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue,” courts look to whether the party's transaction or business in the forum is sufficiently related to the discovery sought. Gucci I, 768 F.3d at 141–42. Although this is a relatively permissive standard, it is not without substance. See Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893. The discovery sought may not be “completely unmoored” from the New York conduct. Id.; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Gucci II”). If the relationship between the discovery sought and the New York conduct is too attenuated or merely coincidental, jurisdiction under New York's long arm statute is not justified. Licci II, 673 F.3d at 66; See Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 340, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893.

Olive Group alleges that Lufthansa's contacts arise from its business operations in two ways. First, Olive Group argues that there is an articulable nexus between its discovery requests and Lufthansa's New York business activity because its requests relate to “the same integrated commercial enterprise and accounting systems through which Lufthansa operates its New York routes and generates revenue from those routes.” ECF No. 8 at 9. Second, Plaintiff argues that its requests “arise[s] from” Lufthansa's use of the “international banking system” that “runs through New York correspondent banks and clearinghouses.” Id.

To support its arguments, Olive Group relies heavily on Licci III and Gucci II, cases in which courts exercised long-arm jurisdiction over foreign banks that executed impugned transactions through correspondent accounts in New York. Plaintiff argues that, as in these cases, the information it seeks through the subpoena is not “completely unmoored” from Lufthansa's New York business activity. ECF No. 8 at 9. But Olive Group's attempt to liken this case to Licci III and Gucci II is unpersuasive.

In Licci III, survivors and family members of Israeli residents who had been injured or killed in terrorist attacks sued a Lebanese bank that allegedly used a New York correspondent account to effectuate wire transfers on behalf of a terrorist organization. 20 N.Y.3d at 330–31, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893. Although the bank contested personal jurisdiction, in answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals found that the deliberate, repeated use of the bank's correspondent account to transfer funds to the terrorist group created an articulable nexus between the bank's New York conduct and the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 340–41, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893. While holding that New York's long-arm statute “does not require a causal link between the defendant's New York business activity and a plaintiff's injury,” the Court of Appeals made clear that there still must be some relationship between the entity's conduct and the claim. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Licci IV”); Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 339–40, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893.

In Gucci II, Judge Sullivan, then of the Southern District of New York, analyzed the articulable nexus standard in the context of a subpoena issued to a nonparty bank. 135 F. Supp. 3d 87. In that case, the plaintiff, a luxury goods distributor, sued a Chinese website for trademark infringement based on the website's sale of counterfeit products. Id. at 90–91. As part of the lawsuit, the plaintiff sought to compel a non-party Chinese bank to comply with a subpoena because the defendants used the bank to effectuate wire transfers of their sale proceeds. Id. at 91. The court rejected the bank's argument that the court lacked specific jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena under New York's long-arm statute. Id. at 93–96. In relevant part, the court concluded that there was an articulable nexus between the bank's New York business transactions and the subpoena requests because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant used the bank's New York correspondent account to make transfers between the United States and China as part of their counterfeiting operation and the subpoena requested information related to those transfers. Id. at 93–95.

In each of these cases, the party's New York contacts in some way related back to the discovery sought or to an element of the party's claims. In Gucci II, the nonparty bank's wire transfers represented a “crucial component[ ] of [Defendants’] counterfeiting operation.” Gucci II, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 94. And in Licci III, the defendant's New York correspondent was used to make several transfers on behalf of a terrorist organization—a central element to the plaintiff's claims. Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 340–41, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893.

Here, by contrast, Lufthansa's flight operations in New York have no connection to the payment of overflight fees in Afghanistan. Although Olive Group claims that the overflight fees are part of Lufthansa's global operations, this alleged connection is far too attenuated to satisfy the articulable nexus standard. First, Lufthansa does not operate any flights from the United States that pass through Afghanistan's airspace; all itineraries are routed through Lufthansa's European hubs. See ECF 5 at 6–7. Second, the mere operation of flights to and from New York alone cannot sustain specific jurisdiction where the entirety of the conduct at issue took place elsewhere. Indeed, courts routinely dismiss tort claims against airlines for lack of personal jurisdiction when a passenger is injured on a foreign leg of an itinerary that originated in New York. See, e.g., Cordice v. LIAT Airlines, No. 14-CV-2924, 2015 WL 5579868, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015) (“The mere purchase of a ticket in New York is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction based upon an injury that occurred elsewhere while travelling on that ticket.”); H.B. by Barakati, 2021 WL 2581151, at *5–6 (finding no substantial connection between the defendant's sale of round-trip airline from New York to China via India, and the plaintiff's injury during a connection from India to China where “the entirety of Defendant's alleged conduct that is relevant to Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred thousands of miles from New York.”); Zito v. United Airlines, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d 377, 385–87 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (plaintiff's claim did not “arise from” the defendant-airline's business activity where, despite purchasing round-trip plane tickets in New York, the subject accident occurred during a leg of plaintiff's return trip that did not begin or end in New York); Mali v. Brit. Airways, No. 17-CV-685, 2018 WL 3329858, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2018) (no specific jurisdiction over plaintiff's tort claims where plaintiff purchased plane tickets connecting through New York but all events relating to plaintiff's claim occurred in Mumbai).

Olive Group's second alleged nexus fares no better. Olive Group argues that, as an international company, Lufthansa's financial transactions must inevitably flow through New York. This contention is speculative and is, in any event, too attenuated to create an articulable nexus. In Gucci II and Licci III, the plaintiffs each provided direct evidence that the respondent bank made relevant transfers through its New York correspondent account and sufficiently alleged how those transfers connected to the party's claims. Here, Olive Group does even not identify a New York bank account, let alone demonstrate that Lufthansa purposefully availed itself of a New York account to pay overflight fees in Afghanistan. Olive Group states simply that Lufthansa's financial transactions create an articulable nexus because, as a global airline, its payments made to foreign governments “necessarily connect to New York financial institutions.” ECF No. 8 at 9. This argument proves too much; accepting it would allow specific jurisdiction over nearly every international entity that transacts any business in New York, thus rendering the second prong of the long-arm statute essentially meaningless. The articulable nexus standard requires more. See Equipav S.A. Pavimentacao, Engenharia e Comercio Ltda. v. Bertin, No. 22-CV-4594, 2024 WL 196670, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024) (finding no basis for specific jurisdiction where the plaintiff failed to plead any facts connecting the foreign defendant's New York bank account to the plaintiff's breach of contract claims).

Accordingly, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Lufthansa. Because the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Lufthansa under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a), it does not reach the other questions raised, including whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with constitutional due process, whether the attachment of overflight fees to collect a judgment is prohibited by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and whether discovery about overflight fees may proceed if attachment is barred.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Lufthansa's motion for a protective order is GRANTED. Lufthansa need not respond to Olive Group's interrogatories.

SO ORDERED.

CLAY H. KAMINSKY, United States Magistrate Judge