GILEAD SCIENCES INC v. SAFE CHAIN SOLUTIONS LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs filed this case on July 22, 2021, alleging violations of state and federal trademark law arising from a scheme to sell counterfeit HIV drugs to pharmacies in New York City. (ECF No. 1.) On May 16, 2026, Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Marutollo issued a report and recommendation in which he recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part multiple motions filed by defendant John D. Levitan, including a “motion to dismiss, quash, vacate seizure order, set aside default, and for related relief,” and an “amended motion to vacate default, to dismiss, and to vacate seizure order.” (ECF No. 1681.) On July 2, 2026, the Court adopted Judge Marutollo's report and recommendation and denied the defendant's motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 1715.) Before the Court is the defendant's motion for reconsideration of “the portion of the Court's July 2, 2026 Order, ECF No. 1715 at 11–14, that denied his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 1717.) For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration in the Eastern District of New York is governed by Local Civil Rule 6.3. See Butto v. Collecto Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 491, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). “The standard for granting such a motion is strict.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A court will grant a reconsideration motion only if the moving party can point to “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)). “[A] motion for reconsideration is ‘not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.’ ” Castillo v. Altice USA, Inc., No. 23-CV-5040, 2023 WL 8650270, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2023) (quoting Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)). Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is ultimately within “the sound discretion of the district court.” Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1986)).

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the defendant's motion for reconsideration is untimely. Under Local Civil Rule 6.3, “a notice of motion for reconsideration must be served within 14 days after the entry of the court's order being challenged.” Local Civ. R. 6.3. The Court issued its order adopting Judge Marutollo's report and recommendation on July 2, 2026. (See ECF No. 1715.) On the same day, the Court mailed a copy of the order to the defendant at 511 Windrose Circle Pensacola, Florida 32507, the address he provided on a recent certificate of service. (See ECF No. 1685.) Because the Court mailed the order to the defendant, he had an additional three days to serve his motion for reconsideration under Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Best v. Schneider, No. 12-CV-6142, 2015 WL 13824726, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2015). July 19, 2026 was a Sunday; therefore, the defendant's deadline to file his motion for reconsideration was July 20, 2026. See BIC Corps. v. Far E. Source Corp., No. 99-CV-11385, 2003 WL 282188, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2003) (“If a deadline for filing a paper in court falls on a weekend or legal holiday, Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the last day to file runs until the next business day.”). The defendant's motion for reconsideration is dated July 23, 2026 and was electronically filed on July 24, 2026. Therefore, it is untimely.

The defendant does not dispute that his motion is untimely; instead, he argues that the Court should give him “a nunc pro tunc extension” because he “first learned of the Order on or about July 15, 2026, when he located it while searching PACER to check the status of the case.” (ECF No. 1717 at 1–2.) “Parties to a lawsuit, including pro se litigants, have an obligation to keep the Court informed of their physical addresses, or other contact information.” Altman v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 22-CV-1647, 2022 WL 2872672, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2022). Further, the plaintiff has previously responded to court orders sent to 511 Windrose Circle. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1727.) Courts have considered untimely motions for reconsideration when the court did not send the order promptly, or if there was no record that the court had mailed it at all. See Green v. Cent. Off. Rev. Comm., No. 07-CV-4536, 2010 WL 3025650, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010). In this case, however, the Court mailed the order to the defendant promptly. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration as untimely.

The Court would deny the motion even if it was timely. The defendant does not point to an intervening change in the law, cite new evidence, or identify the need to correct an injustice. Instead, he largely repeats the same arguments he made in his objections to Judge Marutollo's report and recommendation — that the Court did not find “defendant-specific forum contacts” and did not adequately consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. (Compare ECF No. 1718 at 6–11, 13–15 with ECF No. 1694 at 7–9).¹ The Court rejected these arguments in its July 2, 2026 order. (See ECF No. 1715 at 11–14.) The Court also concluded that Section 1965(b) of the RICO statute provided an alternative basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant. (See id. at 13–14.) Although the defendant takes issue with this conclusion in his motion for reconsideration (see ECF No. 1718 at 9–11), he does not identify “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice,” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc., 729 F.3d at 104. The defendant also cites Trump v. Casa, 606 U.S. 631 (2025) (see ECF No. 1718 at 15–16), but that case is not an “an intervening change of controlling law,” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc., 729 F.3d at 104. Indeed, the plaintiff cited it in his motion to dismiss (see ECF No. 1651 at 7–8), and — as he concedes — it has nothing to do with personal jurisdiction (see ECF No. 1718 at 15). In short, the defendant is trying to “relitigat[e] old issues, present[ ] the case under new theories, secur[e] a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise tak[e] a second bite at the apple.” Castillo v. Altice USA, Inc., No. 23-CV-5040, 2023 WL 8650270, at *3. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Finally, the defendant says that the Court should certify “the controlling jurisdictional questions for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)” if it denies his motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 1718 at 16.)² He identifies the following “controlling questions”:

1. Whether N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) and due process permit another actor's New York transactions to be attributed to a nonresident defendant without defendant-specific findings satisfying the governing agency or conspiracy requirements, when the Order identifies the nonresident's own conduct only as alleged relationship management and an “inventory” communication excerpt that does not identify New York.

2. Whether RICO § 1965(b)’s “ends of justice” requirement is satisfied by identifying a § 1965(a) anchor defendant and alleging the additional party's participation in the same scheme, without a case-specific finding that nationwide service is necessary or that another district cannot exercise jurisdiction over all relevant parties.

(ECF No. 1717 at 4.) According to the defendant, certification is appropriate because “substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist, and immediate appellate review may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” (Id.) “28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides a means of appealing from interlocutory orders that are otherwise non-appealable.” Forte v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-264, 2019 WL 3252750, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (citation modified). It “is a rare exception to the final judgment rule that generally prohibits piecemeal appeals.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996). “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), district courts may certify an order to the Second Circuit for interlocutory review when the order involves (1) a controlling issue of law, (2) as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) that an immediate appeal of that order will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Forte, 2019 WL 3252750, at *3 (citation modified). “The proponent of an interlocutory appeal bears the burden of showing that all three of the substantive criteria are met.” Bayron-Paz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 22-CV-6122, 2023 WL 4706161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2023) (citing Casey v. Long Island R.R. Co., 406 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2005)).

The defendant has not met the § 1292(b) criteria. He has not shown a substantial ground for difference in opinion on the personal jurisdiction issue. The Court would deny the motion in any event because “the main effect of granting [the] motion would be to materially delay, rather than materially advance, the ultimate termination of the litigation,” Picard v. Katz, 466 B.R. 208, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), which has been pending in this Court for more than five years. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is also denied.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court does not consider the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim because he raised it for the first time in his motion for reconsideration. (See ECF No. 1718 at 11–12.) “[I]t is well-settled that a party may not, on a motion for reconsideration, raise an argument for the first time.” Image Processing Techs., LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 10-CV-3867, 2012 WL 253097, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2012) (citation modified) (collecting cases).

2.   The defendant also says that the Court “should reopen the jurisdictional record for focused sworn submissions and limited discovery.” (ECF No. 1717 at 3.) “District courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether and to what extent to permit jurisdictional discovery.” Parker v. Bursor, No. 24-CV-245, 2024 WL 4850815, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024) (citing In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 811–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). Jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate in this case, because the Court has concluded that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute and Section 1965(b). (See ECF No. 1715 at 12–14.)

ANN M. DONNELLY United States District Judge