DUMMUZI DUHANEY v. KINEXION INC HEAD INJURY ASSOCIATION INC WALTER STOCKTON BARBARA SENZEL (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On February 27, 2026, Plaintiff Dummuzi Duhaney (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Memorandum and Order of this Court (the “Motion” or “Mot.”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) No. 45. In the Motion, pro se Plaintiff requests that this Court grant the Motion to Alter or Amend the judgment and vacate the Memorandum and Order issued on January 30, 2026, granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff leave to amend the Amended Complaint. See id. at 21. Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court construes Plaintiff's submission broadly in deciding this motion and interprets the Motion to raise the strongest arguments suggested. See Weixel v. Bd. Of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 145-146 (2d Cir. 2002). For the following reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiff's Motion be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The facts of this case are set forth in the Court's Memorandum and Order dated January 30, 2026, dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 42 at 2-4. The Court incorporates that factual background by reference and recounts only those additional facts relevant to the instant motion.

Through their ¹ Motion, Plaintiff sets forth a series of facts they argue are not included in their initial pleadings in an attempt to warrant the equitable tolling of their claims. Prior to Plaintiff's termination from Defendant Head Injury Association Inc. (“HIA”) in 2021, the New York State Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs issued a substantiated Category 2 Neglect finding against Plaintiff. See Mot. at 7. Once they were terminated from HIA, Plaintiff – a non-binary and Black individual – applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied. Id. Plaintiff thereafter pursued an administrative appeal with the New York State Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (hereinafter “NYS Appeal Board”) of that determination, a process that lasted approximately ten months. Id.

On May 12, 2022, one day before the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's discrimination claims expired, the NYS Appeal Board reversed the initial determination and found that Plaintiff's action on June 12, 2021, did not constitute misconduct. See Mot. at 8. Following that May 2022 finding, Plaintiff argues that they then “began to investigate legal options for pursuing discrimination claims” through July 2022. See Mot. at 8. Plaintiff thereafter filed their administrative complaint on April 19, 2023, and the Complaint in the instant action on December 2, 2024. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 4 at Attachment 1.

Plaintiff argues in their Motion that during the pendency of the unemployment appeal, they believed that the administrative proceedings and the underlying neglect finding needed to be resolved before they would be able to pursue discrimination claims in federal court, and thus they were focused on issues relating to income and housing stability. See Mot. at 9-10.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Kinexion, Inc., HIA, Walter W. Stockton, and Barbara J. Senzel (together, the “Defendants”) on December 2, 2024. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 4, 2025. See ECF No. 4. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 22, 2025. See ECF No. 25. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned for all purposes on October 24, 2025. See ECF Nos. 32, 34. On January 30, 2026, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety without leave to amend. See ECF No. 42. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Memorandum and Order on February 27, 2026. See ECF No. 45. Defendants thereafter filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on March 20, 2026. See ECF No. 46 (hereinafter the “Opposition” or “Opp.”). After the Court granted Plaintiff permission to file a reply brief to their Motion (see ECF No. 48; see also March 30, 2026 Order), Plaintiff submitted a Reply Brief in Support of their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See ECF No. 49.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to move to alter or amend a judgment within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment. Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule 6.3 and “are committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Reddy v. Salvation Army, No. 06-CIV-5176 (SAS), 2008 WL 4755733, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008) (citing Patterson v. United States, No. 04-CIV-3170 (WHP), 2006 WL 2067036, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006)). Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that is employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Thus, motions for reconsideration are not the proper forum to obtain a “second bite at the apple,” Tsitrin v. Vitaliano, No. 11–CV–5589 (NGG)(MDG), 2013 WL 4069527, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (citations omitted), nor are they a proper tool to repackage and relitigate arguments and issues already considered by the court, see United States v. Gross, No. 98-CR-0159 (SJ), 2002 WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002) (denying reconsideration where the government largely repeated arguments previously raised in opposition to the original motion and attempted to bolster those arguments with evidence it had chosen not to present before the court's initial ruling). Moreover, while this Court must liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se litigant, this does not exempt them from their duty to meet the requirements for reconsideration. See Patterson, 2006 WL 2067036, at *1 (denying pro se litigant's motion for reconsideration after he asserted, for the first time, that DEA mailing records had been forged, when he could have raised the argument previously); see also McAllan v. Von Essen, No. 01 Civ. 5281 (RJH), 2004 WL 1907752, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2004) (denying a pro se litigant's motion for reconsideration because it failed to raise any issue of law or fact overlooked by the court).

A motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the moving party identifies (1) an intervening change of controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)). Courts have consistently denied motions for reconsideration when the moving party (1) seeks to introduce additional facts not in the record on the original motion, (2) advances new arguments or issues that could have been raised on the original motion, or (3) seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided. See Colvin v. State Univ. Coll. at Farmingdale, No. 13-CV-2595 (SJF)(ARL), 2015 WL 2213297, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2015) (cleaned up).

III. DISCUSSION

Because Plaintiff fails to identify an intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied in part. However, in the interests of justice, and considering the liberal amendment policy afforded to pro se litigants, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is granted in limited part with respect to the Court's prior decision denying Plaintiff leave to amend their Amended Complaint.

An intervening change in controlling law refers to a change in binding legal authority, such as a decision of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, occurring after the Court's prior decision that changes the governing law applicable to the issues presented. See Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 956 F.2d at 1255 (identifying an intervening change in controlling law as one basis for reconsideration); see also Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc., 729 F.3d at 104 (reaffirming the Virgin Atlantic standard).

Plaintiff does not identify any intervening change in controlling law and does not contend that any binding authority issued after January 30, 2026 altered the legal standards governing the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims or the application of equitable tolling. See generally Mot.; see also Opp. at 3-5. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis for relief under Rule 59(e) on this ground.

A motion for reconsideration may be granted where newly discovered evidence would be expected to alter the outcome of the Court's prior ruling. See United States v. Posada, 206 F. Supp. 3d 866, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (denying a motion for reconsideration after concluding that the defendant presented no newly discovered evidence and failed to show that any information would affect the court's earlier ruling denying a sentence reduction). Evidence is newly available where it is “evidence that was truly newly discovered or could not have been found by due diligence.” Dimps v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, No. 17-CV-8806 (NSR), 2025 WL 2237408, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2026) (quoting Space Hunters, Inc. v. United States, 500 Fed. Appx. 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2012)) (denying reconsideration where the pro se plaintiff asserted only that some documents had become “available” after dismissal but failed to identify what those documents were or explain how they would affect the outcome of the court's prior ruling).

It is widely held that a motion to reconsider is not the moving party's “opportunity to put forward evidence that they could have, but failed, to provide the Court when the Court initially considered the motion.” Muyet v. United States, Nos. 03-CV-4247 (PKL), 95-CR-941 (PKL), 2009 WL 2568430, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2009) (denying reconsideration where the petitioner sought to supplement the record with evidence and arguments that could have been submitted before the court ruled on the original motion); see also Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of reconsideration where the defendants attempted to advance arguments that could have been raised before judgment and reiterating that reconsideration is not a vehicle for taking a “second bite at the apple”). Moreover, through presenting facts that existed at the time of filing, such a motion cannot “assert new arguments or claims which were not before this court on the original motion.” Koehler v. Bank of Berm., LTD., No. M18-302 (CSH), 2005 WL 1119371, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2005) (citation omitted).

Although Plaintiff proceeds pro se, that status does not relieve a litigant of the obligation to satisfy the requirements for reconsideration or transform previously available information into newly discovered evidence. See Muyet, 2009 WL 2568430, at *3 (recognizing the petitioner's pro se status but holding that reconsideration was unavailable where the purportedly new evidence consisted of facts that were available but not presented in the original motion).

In their motion, Plaintiff seeks to provide a detailed timeline of additional factual allegations regarding the circumstances that allegedly prevented the timely filing of this action. See Mot. at 6. Plaintiff adds that the Court did not provide Plaintiff an opportunity to present this evidence. See id. (“The Court's dismissal on the pleadings prevented Plaintiff from developing a factual record regarding the circumstances that prevent timely filing.”). Nonetheless, the Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that the factual allegations now provided by Plaintiff concern matters that were known to Plaintiff, or otherwise available to Plaintiff, well before the time they commenced this action. See Opp. at 3-4.

Plaintiff's purported additional allegations relate to circumstances occurring between July 2021 and July 2022, including family court proceedings, the pursuit of an unemployment benefits appeal, the reversal of the initial denial of the unemployment benefits by the NYS Appeal Board, and the personal hardships Plaintiff claims prevented a timely filing. See Mot. at 7-8. But because these events occurred prior to the filing of the Complaint and were within Plaintiff's personal knowledge, they do not constitute newly discovered evidence for purposes of reconsideration. Thus, relief under Rule 59(e) is unwarranted on this basis.

Relief under Rule 59(e) may be also be justified to correct a clear error of law. See Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 956 F.2d at 1255 (identifying the need to correct a clear error as a basis for reconsideration); see also Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc., 729 F.3d at 104 (reaffirming the Virgin Atlantic standard). A clear error of the law exists where the Court has overlooked or misapplied controlling legal authority. See Berkley Specialty Ins. Co. v. Midwest Welding, LLC, No. 19CV233RJDJRC, 2022 WL 17418890, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2022) (denying reconsideration where the movant failed to identify controlling decisions or factual matters overlooked by the court).

In their Motion, Plaintiff disagrees with the Court's prior determination that their allegations did not warrant equitable tolling. See Mot. at 6-11. But as this Court already wrote, equitable tolling is “only appropriate in rare and exceptional circumstances, in which a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.” See ECF No. 42 at 8 (citing Baroor v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 362 Fed. Appx. 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added)). And pro se filings, although held to more lenient standards, are not excused from establishing these requirements. See Valverde v. Stinson, 593 F.3d 226, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing whether pro se petitioner's allegations were sufficient to establish basis for equitable tolling). Moreover, equitable tolling requires Plaintiff to have established two elements: “(1) that [they have] been pursuing [their] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [their] way and prevented timely filing.” Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Lawerence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007).

Plaintiff has presented no error of law through their motion to satisfy both of those requirements. “Although the EEOC filing procedures may be confusing and difficult for a layperson,” courts in this District have held that navigating that process as Plaintiff describes does not constitute an “exceptional circumstance”. Sauver v. Fed'n of Org., No. 18-CV-2328 (AMD)(SIL), 2019 WL 2994449, at *3-5 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 9, 2019). Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's personal struggles through their unemployment, courts in this District have also held that personal difficulties such as housing insecurity and unemployment do not constitute exceptional circumstances. See Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff's generalized assertions of mental illness, without a particularized showing that the condition prevented timely filing, were insufficient to warrant equitable tolling); Sabeniano v. Citibank, N.A., No. 16-CV-1723 (AJN), 2020 WL 8514824, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (declining to equitably toll the limitations period where the pro se plaintiff argued that financial hardship, inability to retain counsel, filing mistakes, and pursuit of relief in the wrong forum prevented timely filing); Shearard v. Geithner, No. 09-CV-0963 (JS)(ETB), 2010 WL 2243414, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2010) (declining to apply equitable tolling where the plaintiff alleged physical and mental health problems, misinformation from an EEO counselor, and agency inaction, but failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims.;

Plaintiff's pro se status, as well, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that pro se status is not enough to merit equitable tolling); Bray v. Suffolk County Dept. of Health Services, No. 18-CV-4962 (RRM)(GRB), 2019 WL 4736740, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2019) (declining to equitably toll the filing deadline where the pro se plaintiff argued that confusion regarding the filing requirements excused her untimely discrimination claim, holding that pro se status and ignorance of the law do not constitute rare or exceptional circumstances). Moreover, Plaintiff's pursuit of unemployment benefits does not bear on their discrimination claims. See Baiju v. United States DOL, No. 12-CV-5610 (KAM), 2014 WL 349295, at *14-15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014) (“It is well-established that the issues before an Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and the issues involved in a retaliation or discrimination claim are entirely distinct.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court committed a clear error of law. There is no basis for relief under Rule 59(e) on this ground, as well.

Nonetheless, the Court has the authority to reconsider its prior decision in the interest of justice. However, manifest injustice requires more than mere dissatisfaction with the court's ruling and is not established where a party merely disagrees with the outcome reached by the court. See Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of reconsideration where the plaintiff sought to reargue claims previously rejected by the court rather than identify a legal error warranting relief). Indeed, district courts have held that it requires a showing that the Court's prior ruling resulted in a fundamentally unfair outcome, such that a party is denied an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and arguments. See Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De C.V., 247 F. Supp. 3d 76, 92 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 12 F.Supp.3d 30, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2013)).

The doctrine of equitable tolling is applied sparingly and is not warranted by a litigant's misunderstanding of the law or pro se status. See Bray, 2019 WL 4736740, at *3 (declining to equitably toll the Title VII filing deadline where the pro se plaintiff filed her complaint seven days late after misunderstanding the EEOC filing process, holding that confusion about the law and pro se status are not rare or exceptional circumstances). Despite their pro se status, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court's determination denying equitable tolling resulted in a finding sufficient to constitute “manifest injustice” as required to grant a motion for reconsideration. See Reyes v. Phoenix Beverages, Inc., No. 13CV5588PKCVMS, 2016 WL 6068130, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2016) (“The remainder of Defendant's arguments [․] express mere disagreement with the Court's conclusion, rather than any clear error or manifest injustice”).

Furthermore, as explained previously, the Court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claim because it dismissed all claims over which it possessed original jurisdiction. See ECF No. 42 at 10-11; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see e.g., Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that where all federal claims are dismissed before trial, district courts should generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims); Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003); Walker v. City of New York, 367 F. Supp. 3d 39, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims and concluding that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity weighed in favor of dismissal). In response, Plaintiff states that if they were to have to re-file their claims in state court, “this duplication of effort wastes judicial resources and creates inefficiency in the administration of justice.” See Mot. at 15. But this reasoning, too, does not constitute a fundamentally unfair finding: it simply contends that the Court is exercising its use of discretion where permitted, and ensuring the cases before it fulfill the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Circ. 2006) (reversing a district court decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissal of the federal claim, citing “the absence of a clearly articulated federal interest”).

Finally, it is well settled that the liberal amendment standard applies with particular force in cases with pro se litigants. See Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir 1999) (vacating the district court's dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's civil rights claims after concluding that the plaintiff should have been permitted to amend the complaint to cure the identified pleading deficiencies). Accordingly, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments it suggests. See Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015) (vacating in part the dismissal of pro se employment discrimination action after concluding that the district court failed to construe the complaint liberally to include a retaliation claim fairly suggested by the plaintiff's allegations).

Plaintiff argues that the Court's denial of leave to amend the Amended Complaint resulted in manifest injustice. Considering the Second Circuit's instruction that the liberal amendment policy applies with particular force to pro se litigants, the Court concludes that Plaintiff should be afforded a final opportunity to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court's prior Memorandum and Order. The Court emphasizes that its decision to permit amendment does not alter its prior conclusion that Plaintiff failed to establish an intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law. Rather, the Court exercises its discretion to grant reconsideration solely for the limited purpose of vacating a portion of its judgment and permitting pro se Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint. See Braithwaite v. Gaitman, No. 22-CV-0974(JS)(AYS), 2022 WL 14059127, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022) (granting motion for reconsideration to prevent manifest injustice solely to afford pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend); see also Torres v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 1:24-CV-05769-MKV, 2025 WL 3688015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025) (same). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is granted in part to the limited extent necessary to vacate the judgement and permit the filing of a Second Amended Complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that pro se Plaintiff failed to identify an intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law and thus denies the motion for reconsideration in part. However, the Court, in its discretion and leniency towards Plaintiff's pro se status, grants Plaintiff's motion to for reconsideration in part so that Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint by August 28, 2026.

SO ORDERED:

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff self identifies as nonbinary. See ECF No. 4 at 7 ¶ 1. Plaintiff is therefore referred to throughout this decision using “they/them” pronouns.

LEE G. DUNST United States Magistrate Judge