AURA MOODY v. QUEENS BALLPARK COMPANY DAPHNA INBAR JOHN DOE (2026)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Aura Moody alleges Defendants Queens Ballpark Company, L.L.C. and its employees Daphna Inbar and an unidentified John Doe unlawfully discriminated against her based on her race when they required her to remove her hat, which contained a political message, to attend a New York Mets baseball game. Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court denies the motion as to Defendants Queens Ballpark Company and Daphna Inbar and dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's claims against Defendant John Doe.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 14, 2024, Plaintiff, a Black woman, drove with several friends to Citi Field, home stadium of the New York Mets, located in Flushing, New York, to attend a Mets baseball game.¹ (See Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 49 ¶¶ 1–3.) Plaintiff did not purchase her ticket to the game; she says she was given a ticket by the Queens Village Republican Club (the “Club”). (See Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5; Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl's. R. 56.1 Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 65-1 ¶ 5; see also Transcript of Moody Deposition (“Pl. Tr.”), Dkt. No. 53-2 at 40:5–19.) Plaintiff and her friend Taisha Parrott, also a Black woman, wore to the game hats emblazoned with the slogan “Make America Great Again.” (See Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3–4.)

Defendant Queens Ballpark Company (“QBC”) operates the Citi Field ballpark and, as part of those operations, maintains the ballpark's security practices. (See id. ¶ 6.) When Plaintiff and her friends arrived at an entrance to the ballpark and began moving through the security line and bag check area, Alfred Brown, a QBC Security Supervisor, testified that he observed “at least one” attendee reacting negatively to Plaintiff and Ms. Parrott's hats. (Declaration of Alfred Brown in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Brown Decl.”), Dkt. No. 51 ¶¶ 3–5; see also Pl.’s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11.) Mr. Brown further testified that he “became concerned that there might be an incident” and called another QBC Security Supervisor, Defendant Daphna Inbar, for assistance. (Brown Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; see also Pl.’s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff recalls Defendant John Doe scanning her ticket and telling her she could not wear her hat into the ballpark. (See Pl. Tr. at 42:15–44:14; 53:20–54:21; 62:12–15.) Plaintiff testified that she asked what rule prevented her from wearing her hat into the stadium, and if she could put her hat in her bag instead of wearing it. (See id. at 62:16–64:4.) She further testified John Doe refused her request because he thought she might put her hat back on after entering the ballpark. (See id. at 64:5–65:16.) Plaintiff then testified that she asked to speak to a supervisor. (See id. at 65:17–24.) Plaintiff testified that Defendant Inbar arrived on the scene and affirmed to Plaintiff she could not bring the hat inside because it was “too political” and not allowed pursuant to “policy.” (Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff went to the parking lot, put her hat in the car, returned to the entrance, passed through security, and entered the ballpark. (See id. ¶ 29; see also Pl. Tr. at 82:18-23.)

During the game, Plaintiff noticed other attendees inside the ballpark wearing attire with the “Make America Great Again” motto or other similar slogans, and those attendees all appeared to be White. (See Pl. Tr. at 57:7–11.) Plaintiff took photos of some of these individuals wearing their attire during the game. (See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (“Pl's. Mem.”), Dkt. No. 61 Ex. 4.) Based on this, Plaintiff testifies she concluded she was singled out because of her race when asked to remove her hat. (See Pl. Tr. at 109:5–7.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in Queens County Supreme Court on August 21, 2024, asserting a combination of six tort, constitutional, and statutory causes of action against fourteen entities and individuals. (See Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 84–117.) Plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against her because of her race by barring her from entering Citi Field while wearing her Make America Great Again hat but allowing other White attendees to attend the game wearing similar political attire. (See id. ¶ 118.) Defendants later removed Plaintiff's claims to this Court on September 6, 2024. (See Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1).

On September 13, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Dkt. No. 9.) On March 31, 2025, the then-presiding judge, the Honorable Ramón E. Reyes, Jr., United States District Judge, granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, dismissing all Plaintiff's claims without prejudice except her constitutional claim pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against Defendants QBC, Inbar, and Doe. (See Memorandum & Order “(“MTD Order”), Dkt. No. 18.) That claim alleges these Defendants unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff by interfering with her right to make and enforce contracts. (See Compl. ¶¶ 114–17; MTD Order § IV.)

After the parties completed discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims.² (See Dkt. Nos. 46–54.) Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Inbar and Doe because there is no evidence that either acted with intent to discriminate against Plaintiff because of her race. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Mem.”), Dkt. No. 48 pp. 10–12.) Defendants further argue Defendant QBC cannot be vicariously liable for any discrimination by its employees under these circumstances. (See id. pp. 13–15.) Finally, Defendants assert Plaintiff's claims “d[o] not involve the making or enforcing of contracts[,]” and, thus, they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot establish discrimination based on the making or enforcing of a contract (Id. p. 15.) Defendants also seek dismissal of Defendant John Doe from the case because he has not been identified, even after efforts by the parties to do so during discovery. (See id. p. 10.)

Plaintiff opposes summary judgment on the merits, claiming there are numerous disputes of material fact. (See Pl's. Mem. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff also seeks to defer the issue of summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because she not yet identified Defendant John Doe, whose presence and testimony she deems critical to the case. (See id. ¶¶ 2, 22–32.)³

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At the summary judgment stage, the Court may not resolve contested issues of fact but rather determines whether there exists any disputed issue of material fact to be tried. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1967).

“A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ ” Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18, 25 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To evaluate a fact's materiality, the substantive law determines “which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant.” Id. While “disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment[,] [f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party, “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and ․ eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004). Only evidence that would be admissible at trial is considered. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1998).

The initial burden lies with the party moving for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party must show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 323–25. Once the moving party has met its initial burden of establishing that no material facts preclude judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to raise “specific facts” showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586. More specifically, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and point to facts provided “by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “[U]nsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).

In considering a motion for summary judgment where, as here, a party is pro se, the Court is mindful that the Second Circuit has instructed “special solicitude should be afforded pro se litigants generally, when confronted with motions for summary judgment.” Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988). Courts should construe “the submissions of a pro se litigant ․ liberally” and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this solicitude is not limitless; “proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's bald assertions unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Houston v. Teamsters Local 210, Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund-Vacation Fringe Ben. Fund, 27 F. Supp. 3d 346, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Court first addresses the parties’ arguments as to Defendants Inbar and QBC's motion for summary judgment. The Court then addresses Plaintiff's argument that the Court should defer a decision on summary judgment so she may conduct additional discovery to identify Defendant John Doe.

I. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claim Against Defendants Inbar & QBC

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Inbar and QBC intentionally discriminated against her when Defendant Inbar asked Plaintiff to remove her politically themed hat prior to attending the New York Mets game, despite others being allowed to enter the stadium with similar hats. These claims are brough pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981 protects the equal right of all persons, regardless of their race, to make and enforce contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). It provides private individuals a cause of action to seek money damages as redress for racial discrimination by private actors. See id. § 1981a(b).

Courts apply the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which was originally fashioned to evaluate employment discrimination claims, to claims arising under § 1981. See Hudson v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 620 F.2d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1980). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See id. To do so, “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Rather, the defendant's evidence must only raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether its explanation is legitimate, supported by admissible evidence. Id. at 255–56. If the defendant makes this showing, the prima facie case of discrimination is rebutted, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show “that a reasonable jury could conclude that [defendant's] determination was in fact the result of discrimination”—in other words, that the reason offered is pretextual. Ghent v. Moore, 324 F. App'x 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2009). The plaintiff bears “the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A plaintiff “may succeed ․ either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id.

A. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

To establish a prima facie claim of discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff must show (1) they are a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute—in this case, to make and enforce contracts. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Consistent with the statutory requirement that a party asserting a § 1981 claim must prove a deprivation of their own civil rights, a party who is alleging discrimination interfered with a right to make or enforce contracts “must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’ under which the plaintiff has rights.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (quoting § 1981(b)).

Here, the parties agree Plaintiff is a member of a racial minority, so the Court need only examine whether each Defendant intended to discriminate based on Plaintiff's race, and if that discrimination interfered with Plaintiff's right to make and enforce contracts. Because Plaintiff must establish both remaining elements, and because the last element would apply to all Defendants equally, the Court first addresses whether Plaintiff can show an impaired contractual relationship. The Court then addresses the claim that each Defendant engaged in intentional discrimination.

1. Existence of a Contractual Relationship

To succeed on her claims against any Defendant, Plaintiff must establish that she had a contractual relationship within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) that could have been obstructed by discrimination. The statute defines the term “make and enforce contracts” to include “the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Plaintiff may rely on a relationship between her and a third party, so long as she can show that a Defendant's discrimination impacted that relationship. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969). Further, because the protections of § 1981 extend to people who seek to enter contractual relationships, as well as those who have already contracted, Plaintiff need only show she “has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Domino's Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (subjecting defendants to liability under § 1981 when, for racially motivated reasons, they prevented individuals who “sought to enter into contractual relationships” from doing so) (emphasis added).

Here, the Court already found Plaintiff's claim “implicates the enumerated right to make and enforce contracts” if she can show that Defendants “[p]lac[ed] disparate conditions on black and white patrons for entry into places of public accommodation.” (MTD Order pp. 9–10 (citing Joseph v. New York Yankees Partnership, 00-CV-2275, 2000 WL 1559019, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000) (denying summary judgment on § 1981 claim and holding that “imposing an additional condition upon minority customers that is not imposed upon non-minorities ․ in order to enter Yankee Stadium and enjoy the services offered there” created “an issue of fact for trial as to whether [defendant] impaired [plaintiff's] right to enjoy all the terms and conditions of the contractual relationship as could non-minority customers”); James v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 297, 303–05 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (denying summary judgment on § 1981 claim because defendant airline's threat to remove plaintiff from plane if she continued to curse constituted a new condition—not cursing—that was not applied to white passengers)). As discussed infra, based on the photographs of other fans, all of whom appear to be White, wearing attire similar to Plaintiff's, there remains a question of fact as to whether these disparate conditions existed.

Further, if the Club did in fact purchase tickets to the game, then the Club may have had a contract.⁴ See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981) (elements of contract formation are offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent, and mutual intent to be bound). And Plaintiff has presented evidence that the terms and conditions printed on tickets to New York Mets games define the ticket as a revocable license and contemplate transfers by binding the person using the ticket. (See Pl's. Mem. ¶ 34.) If, by transferring the tickets to Plaintiff, the Club intended to make her a beneficiary of that contract, Plaintiff may assert a claim based on rights in that contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304 (1981). Indeed, the Domino's Pizza Court “[did] not mean to exclude the possibility that a third-party intended beneficiary of a contract may have rights under § 1981.” 546 U.S. at 476 n.3 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304 (1981) (“A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty”)). Plaintiff could argue at trial based on this evidence that she was an intended beneficiary of any contract between Defendant QBC and the Club, and that she had rights in such a contract. (See Pl's. Mem. ¶¶ 33–38.) Defendants present no evidence of the Club's intent in support of their motion. Thus, Defendants have not put forth any legal argument or undisputed evidence which would make such an inference unreasonable. Therefore, the question must be resolved at trial, not on summary judgment.

2. Intentional Discrimination

Plaintiff must also show establish intentional discrimination to succeed in her claims against Defendants Inbar and QBC. See, e.g., General Building Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). And a plaintiff must prove each defendant's personal involvement in the discrimination. See Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (“ ‘[A] plaintiff must demonstrate some affirmative link to causally connect the actor with the discriminatory action․ [P]ersonal liability under section 1981 must be predicated on the actor's personal involvement.’ ”) (quoting Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000)).

In the racial discrimination context, this means a plaintiff must prove their race was a determinative factor in a defendant's calculus that led to the alleged discriminatory decision or action. See, e.g., Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1983). In other words, a plaintiff must prove that, if not for their race, the conduct or action would not have occurred. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020). In making this showing, a plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the particular intent to violate plaintiff's rights, nor must a plaintiff produce direct evidence of intent; circumstantial evidence suffices. See Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2001).

When the question of intentional discrimination turns on the intent of one party, a “trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). More specifically:

“summary judgment may not be granted simply because the court believes that the plaintiff will be unable to meet his or her burden of persuasion at trial. There must either be a lack of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position, or the evidence must be so overwhelmingly tilted in one direction that any contrary finding would constitute clear error.”

Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

Here, the Court must determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether each Defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. Because that analysis is specific to each Defendant, the Court first examines this issue as to Defendant Inbar and then as to Defendant QBC.

a) Defendant Inbar

The parties agree that Defendant Inbar instructed that Plaintiff could not enter the ballpark with her hat but dispute whether Defendant Inbar did so with discriminatory intent. (See Defs.’ Mem p. 11.) It is undisputed that Defendant Inbar did not explicitly reference Plaintiff's race in asking her to remove her hat, nor is there any direct evidence that Defendant Inbar personally permitted other attendees of a different race wearing a similar hat into the ballpark. (See id. at 11–12.) Yet discrimination may also be established by inference supported by evidence of more favorable treatment of those outside of the protected class. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Joseph v. New York Yankees P'ship, 00-CV-2275, 2000 WL 1559019, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000) (“Discriminatory intent can be inferred from a plaintiff's identification of specific instances where persons situated similarly ‘in all relevant aspects’ were treated differently along racial lines.”). In other words, Plaintiff may show Defendant Inbar engaged in intentional discrimination by showing Plaintiff was “similarly situated in all material respects” to other individuals against whom she would have the Court compare her. Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997).

Here, even given the lack of direct evidence of discriminatory animus—i.e., there is no proof that Defendant Inbar issued inconsistent instructions to fans regarding their hats, nor that she spoke to any other patrons about their political attire—there is still circumstantial evidence that may give rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff has produced photographic evidence that White attendees were allowed into the ballpark wearing similar hats, implying they were not required to remove them as she was. (See Pl's. Mem. Ex. 4.) It is also undisputed that “[t]here is no QBC policy excluding [“Make America Great Again”] paraphernalia or other political paraphernalia from Citi Field, nor was there any such policy in 2024,” and “all QBC employees, ․ are subject to and required to be familiar with” that policy. (Declaration of Joseph Seminara in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Seminara Decl.”), Dkt. No. 52 ¶¶ 7, 13.)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could infer—based on either Plaintiff's photo evidence and/or evidence that Defendant QBC's policies do not prohibit politically themed hats—that Defendant Inbar knew or should have known attendees were permitted to wear similar hats into the ballpark. After reaching that inference, the question becomes whether Defendant Inbar was motivated to treat Plaintiff differently because of her race. Regardless of whether the Court believes it is likely that a reasonable jury would find that Defendant Inbar was motivated by Plaintiff's race, it is certainly possible that a reasonable jury could do so based on the admissible evidence present before the Court. That is sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to Defendant Inbar's discriminatory intent.

b) Defendant QBC

Having found genuine questions of material fact as to Defendant Inbar's discriminatory intent, the Court now turns to the question of whether that finding also necessitates the same finding as to Defendant QBC. Because there are circumstances under which a reasonable jury could find Defendant QBC liable for Defendant Inbar's actions, the Court concludes it does.

Defendants argue “[t]he facts developed in discovery do not give rise to any potential theory of liability against QBC[,]” relying on cases excluding respondeat superior as a basis for municipal liability under §§ 1981 and 1983 to make that point. (See Defs.’ Mem. p. 13 n.7 (citing Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 314 (2d Cir. 2015)); see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989) (holding “the explicit remedial provisions of § 1983 [are] controlling in the context of damages actions brought against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981”) (emphasis added).

However, QBC is a private entity, not a state actor. And the Court already held that, as a private entity, Defendant QBC could be vicariously liable for the discrimination alleged here. (See MTD Order pp. 13–14 (discussing vicarious liability for non-employer corporate entities in § 1981 context and dismissing all corporate entities except Defendant QBC, “which employed Doe and Inbar.”).) In this Circuit, a private entity is vicariously liable for its employees’ discrimination so long as there is “some affirmative link to causally connect the actor with the discriminatory action.”⁵ Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Fernandez v. Wenig Saltiel LLP, 19-CV-1979, 2024 WL 1345645, at *16–18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) (denying summary judgment on § 1981 and state law hostile work environment claims in part because evidence did not establish supervisor's conduct could not be imputed to employer for failure to exercise reasonable care or take remedial action) (collecting cases).

“The district courts in this Circuit that have addressed vicarious liability for private entities under § 1981 seemingly require conduct perpetrated by a manager or supervisor who could fairly be said to be carrying out the will or policy of the defendant-employer, or where there existed prior notice to the defendant-employer of the employee's offending conduct within the scope of the employee's duties.”

Feacher v. Intercontinental Hotels Grp., 563 F. Supp. 2d 389, 405–06 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citations & quotations omitted).

As a QBC Security Supervisor and Gate Monitor, there is no dispute that Defendant Inbar was a supervisory employee. (See Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14; Pl.’s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14.) Despite her supervisory position, Defendant QBC argues it cannot be liable, even if Defendant Inbar engaged in discrimination, because of its policies allowing political paraphernalia to be worn at Citi Field and prohibiting racial discrimination. (See Defs.’ Mem. pp. 13–14; Seminara Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9.)

However, if Defendant Inbar believed she was acting pursuant to the wishes of Defendant QBC, Defendant QBC can be found liable even if Defendant Inbar was ultimately mistaken in her belief. See Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to this § 1981 action, an employer would be responsible only ‘for those intentional wrongs of his employees that are committed in furtherance of the employment; the tortfeasing employee must think (however misguidedly) that he is doing the employer's business in committing the wrong.’ ” (quoting Hunter v. Allis–Chalmers Corp. Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421–22 (7th Cir. 1986)). It is undisputed that Defendant Inbar thought she was acting in line with company policy—albeit mistakenly—when she prevented Plaintiff from entering the ballpark with her hat. (See Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17.) Given that fact, if a jury were to find Defendant Inbar did so with discriminatory intent, there is a genuine question of material fact as to Defendant QBC's liability that cannot be resolved by the Court on summary judgment.

B. Defendants’ Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reasons & Plaintiff's Evidence of Pretext

Having found Plaintiff could meet her burden to demonstrate a factual dispute as to a prima facie case of § 1981 discrimination, the Court next evaluates whether Defendants’ evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason rebuts Plaintiff's prima facie case. Defendants’ burden here is not demanding; it is one of production, not persuasion, and “involve[s] no credibility assessment.” St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). Defendants need only offer an explanation; they need not persuade the court that their decision was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See, e.g., Tieu v. New York City Econ. Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 3d 305, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory explanation is that Defendant Inbar's “objective” when she asked Plaintiff to remove her hat before entering the ballpark was to “ensure the safety of all patrons ․ and avoid the possibility of any escalation.”⁶ (Defs.’ Mem. pp. 4, 12; see also, e.g., Responses & Objection by Daphna Inbar to Plaintiff's Deposition by Written Questions, Dkt. No. 50-1, Response to Question No. 2 (describing Defendant Inbar's understanding of her role as, inter alia, “to ensure safe and orderly entry to the ballpark for all patrons, and to resolve any issues that arose and prevent them from becoming greater issues.”).) Defendants further proffer that she did so out of a simple mistake about Defendant QBC's safety policies. (See Pl. Tr. at 96:8–97:6 (acknowledging Defendant Inbar was wrong as to Defendant QBC's policy).)

These explanations, supported by evidence, are sufficient to meet Defendants’ burden at this stage of the analysis. Then, “the question in reviewing a motion for summary judgment becomes whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to sustain a reasonable finding that” that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason is pretextual – in other words, that despite the reason, the act truly “was motivated, at least in part, by discrimination.” Tori v. Marist Coll., 344 F. App'x 697, 699 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2007)). Pretext may be shown by, inter alia, “demonstrating weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the [defendant's] proffered nondiscriminatory explanations.” Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013); see also, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980) (a defendant's proffered reason may be “so ridden with error that defendant could not honestly have relied upon it”); Miller v. Na'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 230, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[B]ased on some confluences of circumstances, a reasonable fact-finder may find that an employer's business decision was ‘so lacking in merit as to call into question its genuineness.’ ”) (quoting Dister v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988)). To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff must “establish a genuine issue of material fact ․ as to whether the ․ reason for [the adverse action] is false and as to whether it is more likely that a discriminatory reason motivated the ․ decision.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1994). The plaintiff must do more than show that the reason is false, but must also, at the very least, “point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination.” James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).

Even accepting Defendants’ explanations as true, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, her evidence that multiple other individuals, all of whom appear to be White, were admitted to the ballpark wearing similar politically themed attire is sufficient to rebut Defendants’ explanations as pretextual at the summary judgment stage. A reasonable juror could find that admission of other apparently White individuals to the park in attire like Plaintiff's calls into question the legitimacy of any safety concern cause by Plaintiff wearing the same hat to the ballpark. A reasonable juror could also find that Defendant Inbar's claimed mistake as to the policy was so implausible that it raises a question of pretext. See, e.g., McNulty v. Cnty. of Warren, 16-CV-843, 2019 WL 1080877, at *15–16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2019) (denying summary judgment when evidence of unprecedented criticism, discriminatory comments by supervisor, procedural irregularity of medical exam, and temporal proximity in sequence of events created a genuine issue of fact as to whether employer's reasons for placing plaintiff on involuntary medical leave were pretext for discrimination). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has satisfied her burden to establish a question of fact as to pretext.

Thus, genuine questions of material fact exist with respect to all disputed elements of Plaintiff's claims, so Defendant Inbar and QBC's motion for summary judgment must be denied.

II. The Unidentified John Doe Defendant

Plaintiff asks for the Court to defer its decision on summary judgment to conduct additional discovery as to the identity of Defendant John Doe. (See Pl's. Mem. ¶¶ 22–32.) As detailed below, the parties have conducted sufficient discovery into Defendant John Doe's identity and, therefore, consideration of summary judgment is appropriate. Further, given the parties’ inability to identify Defendant John Doe, it is appropriate at this stage to dismiss the claims against him.

A district court can defer summary judgment or permit additional discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). It does so when the party opposing summary judgment shows by affidavit or declaration that they “ ‘cannot present facts essential to justify [their] opposition’ ” without the additional discovery sought. See Sura v. Zimmer, Inc., 768 Fed. Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)). The purpose of Rule 56(d) is to ensure summary judgment is not granted before the nonmoving party has had the opportunity to conduct discovery needed to mount an opposition. See Elliott v. Cartagena, 84 F.4th 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Indeed, ‘summary judgment [should] be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition․ When a party has not had any opportunity for discovery, summary judgment is generally premature.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986)). The party opposing summary judgment under Rule 56(d) must show ‘(1) what facts are sought and how they are to be obtained; (2) how these facts are reasonably expected to raise a genuine issue of material fact; (3) what efforts the affiant has made to obtain them; and (4) why the affiant's efforts were unsuccessful.’ ” Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2004). On the other hand, where a party asserts only conclusory allegations that discovery is inadequate, and where the plaintiff, even when pro se, has “had more than enough time and opportunity to pursue discovery[,]” courts have granted summary judgment over a Rule 56(d) objection. See, e.g., Turner v. McDonough, 18-CV-4038, 2021 WL 965626, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021).

Here, Plaintiff asserts “John Doe's testimony is crucial to establishing whether the denial was racially motivated” and “[w]ithout it, she cannot fully rebut Defendants’ assertions.” (Pl's. Mem. ¶ 23(b).) She further submits a declaration asserting, in conclusory fashion, “Defendants have refused to identify John Doe despite my requests, preventing me from deposing him or obtaining related evidence essential to opposing summary judgment.” (Id. p. 20.) She seeks additional discovery pertaining to Defendant John Doe's identity, records, and incident reports. (See id.) In the end, Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ “have resisted” identifying John Doe, and their “refusal ․ constitutes obstruction.” (Id. ¶ 23(c)–(d); see also id. p. 20) But the record before the Court does not support the allegation that Defendants have obstructed her efforts. Even if it did, Plaintiff offers no reason that any additional discovery would tend to identify Defendant John Doe where depositions and video evidence have failed.

As Plaintiff acknowledges, she “has served interrogatories, document requests, video requests, and deposition questions specifically seeking John Doe's identity.” (Pl's. Mem. ¶ 23(c).) And Plaintiff certified jointly with Defendants six months ago that both parties had completed discovery. (See Joint Letter Certifying Completion of Discovery, Dkt. No. 45.)

Further, Defendants have fully complied with all Court-ordered discovery obligations. Over one year ago, the Court ordered Defendants to identify John Doe pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997). (See Order, Dkt. No. 21.) When Defendants could not identify an employee who fit Plaintiff's description, the Court ordered the parties to “continue to cooperate to identify John Doe.” (Order, Dkt. No. 23.) Shortly thereafter, the Court compelled a response to Plaintiff's interrogatory requesting John Doe's identity, permitting Plaintiff to take depositions upon written question of two QBC employees who allegedly observed the incident regarding, among other matters, the identity of John Doe. (See Motion to Compel, Dkt. No. 30; Minute Entry dated Aug. 8, 2025.) Defendants also produced video footage from surveillance cameras at the entrance to Citi Field to allow Plaintiff to try to identify Defendant John Doe herself from the individuals depicted in that footage. According to Defendants, that video footage showed an employee scanning Plaintiff's ticket “without incident and admitting her into the stadium.” (Status Letter, Dkt. No. 22 p. 2.)

In sum, Plaintiff has had many opportunities—with Defendant's cooperation and, considering her pro se status, the Court's assistance—to avail herself of multiple tools of discovery to try to ascertain Defendant John Doe's identity. That these efforts were unsuccessful is unfortunate but does not, in and of itself, establish either that Defendants obstructed her efforts, nor that further discovery will reveal John Doe's identity. To that final point, Plaintiff does not suggest what kinds of additional discovery are needed and how they would identify John Doe. As such, the Court finds no basis to grant additional discovery nor to defer a ruling on summary judgment.

Additionally, because Plaintiff has been unable to identify John Doe despite adequate time and opportunity to do so, the Court now dismisses without prejudice the claims against him. See, e.g., Sachs v. Cantwell, 10-CV-1663, 2012 WL 3822220, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (“Where discovery has closed and the [p]laintiff has had ample time and opportunity to identify and serve John Doe [d]efendants, it is appropriate to dismiss those [d]efendants without prejudice.”); Tortora v. City of N.Y., 15-CV-3717, 2019 WL 9100369, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019) (sua sponte dismissing unidentified defendants at summary judgment stage); DiVincenzi v. City of New York, 19-CV-6012, 2023 WL 3756361, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2023) (same); Engles v. Jones, 6:13-CV-6461, 2018 WL 6832085, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2018) (same).

CONCLUSION

Construing the facts of this matter in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine questions of material fact as to whether the decision to tell Plaintiff to remove her politically themed hat before accepting her ticket and permitting her to attend a New York Mets game was motivated by Plaintiff's race. As such, the Court denies summary judgment as to Defendants Inbar and QBC. However, as Plaintiff has been unable to identify Defendant John Doe despite sufficient time and opportunity to do so, the Court dismisses without prejudice all claims against him.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Most facts described herein are taken from the statements each party submitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. Unless described otherwise, those facts are presumed undisputed for summary judgment purposes. When facts are in dispute, and where necessary, the Court identifies those facts as testimony and references the admissible evidence submitted with the parties’ briefing.

2.   The parties have consented to a Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction to decide dispositive motions and enter final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Notice of Option to Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 46); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

3.   Plaintiff also reasserts Defendant John Doe may be a state actor, and she should have the opportunity to determine that fact in front of a jury. (See Pl's. Mem. ¶¶ 49–55.) But the Court already dismissed that claim because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege state action. (See MTD Order pp. 6–9.)

4.   Defendants originally argued Plaintiff cannot establish interference with a contractual relationship because “Plaintiff never had, or sought to have, a contract[,]” as she did not purchase her ticket to the baseball game, and if any contractual relationship existed, it would be between the Club and QBC, not QBC and Plaintiff. (Defs’ Mem. p. 15.) But Defendants withdraw this argument on reply, which they label a “standing” issue, relying solely on their argument that Defendants did not intentionally discriminate against Plaintiff. (Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 66 p. 3 n.1.)Whether or not existence of a contractual relationship in the § 1981 context is a standing issue, the Court's finding infra that there exists a genuine question of material fact as to whether Defendants engaged in intention discrimination requires the Court to fully address the issue of a contractual relationship within the meaning of the statute.

5.   Many of these cases arise in the employment discrimination context, where courts have found a supervisory employee's allegedly discriminatory conduct toward another employee can be imputed to the employer. But courts in this Circuit have also contemplated vicarious liability for employers on § 1981 claims when, as here, employees allegedly discriminated against non-employees. See, e.g., Brathwaite v. Sec. Indus. Automation Corp., 06-CV-0300, 2006 WL 8439237, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006) (observing § 1981 “applies to a broader range of relationships than just that of employer and employee”); Tchatat v. City of New York, 2015 WL 6159320, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) (reinstating respondeat superior claim for § 1981 liability against corporate entities plaintiff alleged discriminated against him in connection with his arrest while on their premises); Feacher v. Intercontinental Hotels Grp., 563 F. Supp. 2d 389, 405–06 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying summary judgment and finding defendant hotel and its affiliates could be vicariously liable for § 1981 discrimination when plaintiffs alleged hotel restaurant employees refused to serve them because of their race) (collecting cases).

6.   Neither party explicitly acknowledges that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Plaintiff's § 1981 claims, and Defendants do not affirmatively assert these arguments as legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations within that framework. Nevertheless, considering the framework's nature as a “tool for assessing claims” at summary judgment, the Court construes both sides’ arguments and evidence as arguments within that framework whether or not proactively raised as such. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 340 (2020); see also Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 308 n.2 (2025) (“McDonnell Douglas merely aims to provide ‘a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence’ that ‘bears on the critical question of discrimination.’ ” (quoting Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)); cf. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (holding McDonnell Douglas framework is evidentiary standard that does not establish pleading requirement at motion to dismiss stage).

SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ United States Magistrate Judge Eastern District of New York