JOHNSON v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK 10 11 20 21 30 31 40 (2025)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff Shakeerah Johnson brings this wide-ranging action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against four categories of defendants, stemming from a child abuse and neglect investigation regarding her stepson. Two categories of defendants have moved to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motions made on behalf of defendants Patchogue-Medford School District (“PMSD”), Joann Luisa, Caitlyn Klindworth, and Miroslava Pradella, ECF No. 32, as well as Michael Delgado and Kaitlin Malone, ECF No. 33, are granted.¹

Background

This lawsuit arises from an alleged case of child abuse. Johnson is the stepmother of EJ, Jr., a minor. Am. Compl., ECF No. 24, ¶¶ 30–31, 35. On or about January 28, 2020, EJ did not arrive home from Oregon Middle School, prompting Johnson to contact the school out of concern for his safety. Id. ¶ 31. Upon arrival at the school, she was directed to the guidance office but not permitted to see her stepson. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. A detective then questioned her about EJ and allegations that her husband had beaten him in her presence. Id. ¶ 35. Even though, she claims, another student had told school officials ² that Johnson was not involved in the alleged incident, she was arrested. Id. ¶¶ 36–38. Johnson was six months pregnant at the time, and requested to be taken to the hospital due to her pain and discomfort, but the request was denied. Id. ¶¶ 39–42.

Johnson claims that Delgado and Malone, then employed as Child Protective Services caseworkers, id. ¶¶ 13–14, participated in “indicating” the New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment Report (“SCR”) of maltreatment and/or abuse as against her,³ and that Delgado and Malone, along with Luisa, Klindworth, and Pradella, participated in the removal of EJ and another child from her home, and initiated a proceeding under Article 10 of the Family Court Act and filed a petition for neglect and an order of protection against her, all allegedly based on fabricated and false evidence. Id. ¶¶ 48–50. Luisa and Pradella were PMSD social workers at the time, and Klindworth was employed by PMSD as a nurse. Id. ¶¶ 19–21.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint contains facts sufficient to make a plausible case. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–58, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–67, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). While not “akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ ” the plausibility pleading standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

In the course of making a determination as to whether a pleading plausibly states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the district court should “draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff[’s] favor.” Faber, 648 F.3d at 104. It must also accept well-pleaded facts as true, and consider them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Chapman v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 546 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2008). At the same time, a court is generally limited to allegations made within the four corners of the complaint. Semente v. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Discussion

I. School Employee Defendants

Luisa, Klindworth, and Pradella (“School Employee Defendants”) are social workers and a nurse at PMSD. By dint of their employment in those positions, those defendants, like all school officials in New York, are obligated by state law to report allegations of child abuse to the SCR when there is “reasonable cause” to suspect that child abuse has occurred. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 413.⁴ Johnson brings constitutional claims under §§ 1983 and 1988 against these defendants. See Am. Compl. ¶ 3.

Although the litigation of such constitutional claims has the trappings of a traditional tort action, it is also significantly burdened by a further consideration, namely, qualified immunity. The qualified immunity mandate provides state actors a strong shield against suits for constitutional violations like the instant action, protecting them from civil liability as long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). “Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, the issue should be decided at the earliest opportunity – preferably at the outset of the case – and may be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, 548 F. Supp. 3d 383, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). It's to that end that a determination of qualified immunity need not await a holding that the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a constitutional violation from which to be immunized. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).

Notwithstanding the reality that the bar for a qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage is high, it is not insurmountable. “[A]s with all Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the motion may be granted only where ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.’ ” McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. K–H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir. 1992)). In deciding qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, the court asks whether a reasonable mandatory reporter, “confronted with the facts as alleged by plaintiff, could reasonably have believed that his actions did not violate some settled constitutional right.” Mauro v. Cuomo, 2023 WL 2403482, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023) (citation omitted). After the Supreme Court's opinion in Pearson, the motion court may merely ask whether “a reasonable official in defendant's position (as that position is described by plaintiff) would have known that his conduct violated the law.” In re New York City, 548 F. Supp. 3d at 412.

Here, Johnson has pled no facts describing liability-creating conduct by the individual social workers, or showing why they would not have had reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect. See Kurtz v. Hansell, 664 F. Supp. 3d 438, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (noting that in child abuse cases “caseworkers are often faced with the choice of interrupting parental custody and possibly being accused of infringing a parent's constitutional rights” and are therefore given “unusual deference” by courts) (citation omitted). In fact, Johnson has pled no facts about what specific information they had, what specific actions they took, or anything beyond two conclusory paragraphs that generalize the School Employee Defendants’ actions with those of an array of other defendants. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49–51.⁵ As such, all claims against them are dismissed.

II. Patchogue-Medford School District

The only available claim for Johnson against PMSD, as a municipal entity, is a Monell claim, which requires the existence of a municipal policy or custom that would open the district to § 1983 liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); see also Lopez v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 668 F. Supp. 2d 406, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). But Johnson states she does not assert a Monell claim against the district in her amended complaint. Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 32-4, at 6. Therefore, having withdrawn them in her amended complaint, all of Johnson's claims against PMSD are dismissed.

III. CPS Caseworkers

Delgado and Malone, the CPS caseworkers, argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 claims by virtue of their jobs rendering them quasi-prosecutors.⁶ See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 33-2, at 8. What is critical for such a defendant citing prosecutorial immunity is whether they have assumed an advocate's role. That is so since it is established Second Circuit law that “a prosecutor's conduct prior to the establishment of probable cause should be considered investigative: ‘A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.’ ” Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 347 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2616, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993)). But once the prosecutor assumes an advocate's role, absolute immunity “protects a prosecutor from § 1983 liability for virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with his function as an advocate.” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994). Where it is unclear from the pleadings whether the alleged unlawful conduct by the state actor comes in his role of advocate as opposed to investigator, the question cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 663 (2d Cir. 1995).

In the operative complaint, Johnson pegs her constitutional claim against Delgado and Malone on allegations that they “indicated” in the New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment Report that there was child abuse or maltreatment with respect to EJ. Am. Compl. ¶ 48. The complaint, however, is absolutely devoid of any allegations of misconduct on the part of these two defendants prior to their alleged entries on the register. Of critical significance, the “indication” of a report results in the referral of a case by SCR for an administrative review to determine whether there is “a fair preponderance of evidence in the record to prove that the subject committed the acts of abuse or maltreatment,” which is followed by “a hearing before an administrative law judge.” Carpenter, 2024 WL 1621521, at *4. In other words, the entry of an “indicated” report only comes after the investigation has concluded and the conclusion that enforcement action is warranted has been drawn. It is akin to the filing of a formal charge in a criminal case and is not part of the child abuse or neglect investigation itself.

Generally, then, the filing of an indicated report, as is the case here, is a line of demarcation. The involvement of a CPS caseworker in the removal of the subject child from the home and the commencement of abuse or neglect proceedings in Family Court are all part of the caseworker's advocacy function and not the investigative function. See Shook v. NYS Cent. Reg. of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, 2025 WL 1718044, at *9–*10 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2025) (finding absolute immunity protected caseworkers who removed children from a home and stated an abuse or neglect report was indicated); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding even an allegedly false neglect and abuse petition filed by caseworkers was part of their “duties as quasi-prosecutors” entitled to absolute immunity). Given the narrow target provided by the complaint's allegation that Delgado and Malone violated Johnson's constitutional rights by filing the indicated report with the SCR, the absolute immunity that cloaks prosecutorial advocacy commands Rule 12 dismissal of the claims against these defendants.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by the School Employee Defendants and PMSD, and Delgado and Malone, are granted. They are dismissed with prejudice.

The remaining parties are referred to United States Magistrate Judge Steven Tiscione for continued pre-trial management of this case.

So Ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All page references to motion filings refer to the Electronic Case Filing system (“ECF”) pagination.

2.   The amended complaint simply states that “Defendants” were told Johnson had no involvement in the alleged incident but does not specify which of the dozens of defendants named in the complaint to whom this information was communicated. See Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Cognizant that, at this stage of the litigation, the motion court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Johnson, the Court assumes moving defendants were told by a child that Johnson was not involved in the incident. See Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011).

3.   An SCR report of suspected child abuse is investigated and classified as either “indicated” or “unfounded.” See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424(7). A report is “indicated” if an investigation determines that a fair preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the alleged abuse or maltreatment has occurred. A report is “unfounded” if an investigation determines that there is not a fair preponderance of evidence of alleged maltreatment. See Carpenter v. Yonkers Middle High Sch., 2024 WL 1621521, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2024) (citing N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 412(6)–(7)).

4.   In creating this reporting requirement, the state legislature also created a form of statutory immunity which protects school officials making such decisions from state claims assuming they act in good faith. See Zappala v. Albicelli, 980 F. Supp. 635, 638 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); see also N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 419.

5.   Indeed, by lumping her claims against the School Employee Defendants with the claims against all others, Johnson engages in impermissible group pleading. A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim must allege with particularity how each of the named defendants is responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. See Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 599–600 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). There is no allegation of unlawful conduct peculiar to each individual defendant, which is a fatal flaw.

6.   Delgado and Malone also ask the Court to take judicial notice of six exhibits under Fed. R. Evid. 201 as documents filed in another court, and to consider them upon this motion. Decl., ECF No. 33-1, at 1–3. The Court declines to do so as it decides this motion on absolute immunity grounds.

VITALIANO, United States District Judge