LENZI v. SYSTEMAX INC CEO (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

“A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Unfortunately, this employment discrimination case has devolved into just that. Plaintiff commenced this action on December 29, 2014—more than a decade ago. Throughout protracted discovery and summary judgment motion practice, Plaintiff was represented by attorneys at the law firm of Valli Kane & Vagnini, LLP (“VKV”). Ultimately, District Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein—who was previously assigned to this case—granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiff, now represented by a second attorney, successfully appealed. On remand, Plaintiff engaged yet another attorney—Michael Maloney of Felicello Law P.C.—to represent her. In March 2024, the case settled. However, the parties’ settlement and the closing of this case marked only the beginning of what has become a contentious battle over fees.

What followed in this case is “a sobering parable regarding the divisive and destructive power of money.” Stephan Zouras LLP v. Marrone, No. 3:20-CV-2357, 2023 WL 4143439, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5153547 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2023). Not a month after agreeing to the settlement, Plaintiff moved to vacate VKV's charging lien. Represented by Mr. Maloney, Plaintiff essentially sought to deprive her former attorneys at VKV of the fees they incurred during their time representing Plaintiff. The parties’ submissions on this topic totaled more than 800 pages and required an evidentiary hearing with testimony from Plaintiff and one VKV attorney. On April 23, 2025, the undersigned orally denied Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the lien. Now, in what is the left in this eleven-year-old case, the Court is tasked with setting the amount of the lien. The Court concludes that VKV is entitled to some—but not all—of its requested fees. Specifically, the Court sets the amount of VKV's charging lien at $273,979.25.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The tortured history of this case could fill a Russian novel. Accordingly, the Court sets forth only those facts necessary to resolve the single, narrow question regarding the amount of VKV's lien.

Plaintiff commenced this action on December 29, 2014, alleging a myriad of claims against her former employer Systemax and two of its executives. ECF No. 1. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged causes of actions for pay discrimination and retaliation under the Equal Pay Act and New York Labor Law, discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law, and other retaliation claims under the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (“CPSIA”) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act. ECF No. 25.

The case was hard-fought from the start. There was protracted motion practice before Judge Feuerstein relating to the pleadings (ECF No. 17; ECF No. 24; ECF No. 26; ECF No. 41), discovery, and summary judgment motion practice (ECF No. 59; ECF No. 60). Throughout all of this, Plaintiff was represented by attorneys at VKV.

On March 9, 2018, Judge Feuerstein granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion in its entirety, dismissing Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. ECF No. 65. Although the lawyers at VKV expressed interest in pursuing appeal, see ECF No. 173-17 (March 29, 2018 email under seal from Mr. Valli noting his rate for the appeal); ECF No. 173-19 (June 19, 2018 email from Mr. Valli again offering to handle the appeal), Plaintiff instead retained Mr. Perry Friedman—a specialized appellate lawyer—to represent her on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. ECF No. 185 at 15:24-16:1.

On December 6, 2019, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Judge Feuerstein's decision granting summary judgment to Defendants. Specifically, the Second Circuit reinstated Plaintiff's pay discrimination and retaliation claims, but agreed with the District Court that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's CPSIA whistleblower retaliation claim. See generally Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit also noted that, in briefing before Judge Feuerstein, Plaintiff (and her attorneys at VKV) “embraced [an] erroneous statement of law” regarding the standard for pay discrimination claims. Id. at 109. However, on the next page of that decision, the Second Circuit noted that it was “tak[ing] this opportunity to clarify” the proper standard because there had been considerable confusion about the appropriate legal standard for such claims. Id. at 110. The case was remanded for further proceedings before Judge Feuerstein. Id. at 116.

Despite discussions with VKV about their potential continued representation of Plaintiff on remand, Plaintiff again chose to retain another new counsel—Mr. Michael Maloney. See ECF No. 72 (Mr. Maloney's Notice of Appearance). At that point, VKV was relieved as counsel. ECF No. 73. With the assistance of Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay, the parties reached a confidential settlement in principle on March 19, 2024. See ECF No. 129; ECF No. 131; ECF No. 153 (Stipulation of Dismissal).

But things did not end there. On March 19, 2024, VKV reasserted a charging lien. ECF No. 132. Soon after, on March 30, 2024, Plaintiff served a motion to vacate the charging lien asserted by her former counsel at VKV. The Motion to Vacate was fully briefed on April 23, 2024. See ECF No. 146 (the “Motion to Vacate”); ECF No. 147; ECF No. 148; ECF No. 149.¹ District Judge Natasha C. Merle (to whom this case was then assigned) referred the Motion to Vacate to Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields (who had recently been reassigned to the case after Judge Lindsay's recusal following a settlement conference between the parties). Electronic Order, dated May 3, 2024. Judge Shields subsequently recused herself, and the case was randomly reassigned to the undersigned on August 8, 2024. ECF No. 159. The parties consented to the undersigned for all purposes on September 27, 2024. ECF No. 164; ECF No. 165.

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate pressed three central arguments. First, Plaintiff asserted that because VKV's representation terminated without a recovery, VKV was not entitled to assert a charging lien at all. ECF No. 147 at 9. Second, Plaintiff argued that VKV committed legal malpractice by, among other things, failing to appropriately set forth the proper legal standard in its summary judgment papers, failing to depose relevant witnesses, allegedly refusing to obtain an expert, and failing to develop an adequate factual record. Id. at 12. Finally, Plaintiff asserted that VKV's fees were unreasonable. Id. at 14.

On November 25, 2024, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing with testimony from Plaintiff and Robert Valli, Jr. of VKV. ECF No. 181 (minute order); ECF No. 185 (transcript). Subsequently, the Court disposed of the first two arguments advanced by Plaintiff in an oral decision on March 12, 2025. See ECF No. 191. The Court concluded that VKV was entitled to assert a lien because the lien attaches to the client's cause of action and VKV was counsel of record in a proceeding that was “in logical sequence” with the proceeding in which Plaintiff recovered. Id. at 21:4-15. Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiff's malpractice arguments “amount[ed] to nothing more than Monday morning quarter-backing” and that the alleged conduct by VKV “certainly [was] not grounds for malpractice under the very high standard that needs to be met for such a claim.” Id. at 24:4-8. The Court encouraged the parties to discuss how they wished to proceed with respect to Plaintiff's remaining argument—that the amount of fees requested by VKV was unreasonable. ECF No. 190. On April 4, 2025, the parties advised that they were “unable to reach a negotiated solution” and requested that the Court “adjudicate the remaining issues in dispute,”—to wit, the quantity of fees to which VKV is entitled. ECF No. 193.

In connection with the Court's determination of the appropriate fee amount, the Court ordered the parties to disclose the settlement amount paid by Defendants to Plaintiff and the amount of money that Plaintiff is to pay to Mr. Maloney's law firm. ECF No. 199. The reason for the Court's request was straightforward: a charging lien is supposed to be “fair.” See, e.g., Joffe v. King & Spalding LLP, 337 F. Supp. 3d 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff'd sub nom. Joffe v. Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, P.C., 827 F. App'x 35 (2d Cir. 2020). The Court concluded that it might not be able to ascertain a “fair” amount without understanding (1) Plaintiff's degree of success in the litigation and (2) how much Plaintiff would be left with in the end, should the Court conclude VKV was entitled to compensation. ECF No. 197 at 5:4-7. The straightforward request was met with stunning resistance. Indeed, by the end, no party—not VKV, not Plaintiff, and not Defendants—wished to disclose the settlement amount.² Ultimately, the parties reluctantly disclosed both amounts to the Court in ex parte submissions. ECF No. 202; ECF No. 203. Nonetheless, the Court has concluded that consideration of the settlement number or Mr. Maloney's fee arrangement is not necessary and thus has not considered either in connection with VKV's asserted charging lien.

With that background, the only task left for the Court is to set the amount of VKV's asserted charging lien.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“A charging lien is equitable in nature, and the overriding criterion for determining the amount of a charging lien is that it be fair.” Pettiford v. City of Yonkers, No. 14-CV-6271, 2020 WL 1331918, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 833 F. App'x 893 (2d Cir. 2020). With respect to “the amount at which the charging lien should be fixed, it is ․ well settled in New York that absent an express agreement between the attorney and client to the contrary, a discharged attorney may recover the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered, determined at the time of the discharge and computed on the basis of quantum meruit.” Stair v. Calhoun, 722 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); accord Minott v. Google LLC, No. 24-CV-01674, 2024 WL 3518525, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2024), aff'd sub nom. Minott v. Washington L. Firm PLLC, 2025 WL 2111878 (2d Cir. July 29, 2025). “The party seeking attorney's fees ․ bears the burden of establishing that the number of hours for which compensation is sought is reasonable.” Custodio v. Am. Chain Link & Const., Inc., No. 06-CV-7148, 2014 WL 116147, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014). District courts maintain significant discretion in deciding what qualifies as a reasonable fee award. See Lin v. DJ's Int'l Buffet Inc., No. 2:17-CV-04994, 2017 WL 11930426, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025).

In setting the amount of the lien, “courts should consider the rate a reasonable, paying client would pay and use that rate to calculate the ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’ ” Minott, 2024 WL 3518525, at *4 (citation omitted). Courts may also consider may consider the Johnson factors: “(1) the difficulty of the matter; (2) the nature and extent of the services rendered; (3) the time reasonably expended on those services; (4) the quality of performance by counsel; (5) the qualifications of counsel; (6) the amount at issue; and (7) the results obtained.” Stair, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citation omitted).

Next, courts take the hourly rates awarded and multiply them by “the reasonable number of hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). A court may exercise its discretion and reduce an award where it determines “that some of the time was not reasonably necessary” to complete the work. Sullivan v. Aircraft Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 19-CV-6500, 2023 WL 6160187, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2023) (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 111 (2d Cir. 2012)), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6158953 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2023). Specifically, courts routinely reduce awards where the billing records are replete with a “variety of evils, which include double billing, block entries, matters being performed by the wrong level provider (e.g., an attorney performing paralegal work), and unreasonable hours expended.” McDevitt v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 16-CV-4164, 2025 WL 1359336, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2025). However, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that “trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (citations omitted); accord O'Toole v. Allied Interstate, LLC, No. 12-CV-4942, 2012 WL 6197086, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012) (“As a concession to the mortality of judges, the law does not require a line-item review of fee applications.”).

III. DISCUSSION

In connection with Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Charging Lien, VKV requests the following rates and fees, set forth in the chart on the following page. See ECF No. 170.³

A few additional points about VKV's request are worth mentioning at the outset. First, VKV purports to have removed time for duplicative or excessive entries. ECF No. 148 at 22. Second, VKV represents that its request apparently excludes time for the “over 1,100 back and forth emails with Plaintiff.” Id.⁴ Third, VKV is not seeking costs or expenses. ECF No. 148-1 ¶ 179. And finally, VKV concedes that a 10% reduction in the number of hours requested is appropriate. Id. ¶ 177.

A. Hourly Rates

The Court concludes that VKV's requested rates are above those typically awarded in comparable cases in this District and therefore reduces its rates as set forth below.

1. Robert J. Valli, Jr.

Robert J. Valli, Jr. is founder and managing partner at VKV. See Robert J. Valli, Jr., Valli Kane & Vagnini, https://newyorkemploymentlawattorneys.com/robert-j-valli-jr/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2025). VKV is a “plaintiff side employment” firm that “primarily focuses on representing employees on an individual and/or class action basis.” ECF No. 204 at 1 n.1. Mr. Valli graduated from St. John's University School of Law in 1990, and has been practicing a civil rights and employment lawyer for 28 years. Id. at 1. Mr. Valli seeks a rate of $550 per hour for 7.65 hours worked after January 1, 2018 and $500 per hour for 75.55 hours worked prior to 2018.

As a starting point “[i]n recent years, fees have been awarded in the Eastern District of New York at an hourly rate of $300 to $450 for partners.” Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, No. 21-CV-2468, 2023 WL 11969895, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2023) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4355514 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024); Holloway v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-3858, 2024 WL 4333761, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2024) (collecting civil rights cases and noting experienced attorneys in these are typically awarded between $300 and $450). However, cases in this District have also recognized that “attorney's fees, like other goods and services, increase in cost with inflation.” Almond v. PJ Far Rockaway, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-06792, 2018 WL 922184, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir. 1998) (district courts should generally apply “current rates, rather than historical rates”). One recent case suggested that the appropriate range for partner rates in light of inflation is $450-$650. Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 763 F. Supp. 3d 233, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

Taking into account the Johnson factors and the rates typically awarded in this District, the Court concludes that Mr. Valli is entitled to a rate of $450 for his time on this case. Mr. Valli is an experienced employment attorney. However, although employment discrimination cases are challenging, this case was no more complex than others. And while VKV's representation of Plaintiff was adequate in the Court's view, there were some missteps made along the way. Notably, as discussed at length above, VKV failed to appropriately challenge Defendants’ statement of the applicable legal standard during summary judgment briefing with Judge Feuerstein. In the undersigned's opinion, such a failure rises nowhere near the level of malpractice suggested by Plaintiff.⁵ That is especially true in light of the complex state of the law at the time that VKV submitted its briefing opposing summary judgment. Still, VKV would have been well advised to challenge the applicable legal standard before Judge Feuerstein. In the undersigned's opinion, this misstep is appropriately addressed by awarding Mr. Valli a reduced rate of $450—which takes into account VKV's otherwise adequate representation of Plaintiff in proceedings before this Court.

In requesting a higher rate, Mr. Valli relies principally on D'Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., No. 11-CV-3303, 2015 WL 5308094 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015). In that case, the court awarded Mr. Valli $450 where he served as lead trial counsel. Mr. Valli asserts that, adjusted for inflation, his requested higher rates in this litigation are commensurate to the rate he was awarded in D'Annunzio. Critically, however, the award in D'Annunzio was premised in large part on Mr. Valli's role as lead trial counsel. Id. at *4 (“Because Mr. Valli has substantial experience, and he served as lead trial counsel, for which he achieved a highly favorable result [in a damages trial], the Court recommends an hourly rate of $450.”) (emphasis added). As no trial ever took place in this case, this Court sees no reason to award Mr. Valli an exceptionally high rate here.

2. Sara Wyn Kane

Ms. Kane co-founded VKV and is a named partner at the firm. She graduated from Hofstra University School of Law in 1998. ECF No. 204 at 1. Ms. Kane has “devoted over twenty (20) years of her legal career fighting for her clients’ Civil Rights against all varieties of employment discrimination.” Sara Wyn Kane, Valli Kane & Vagnini, https://newyorkemploymentlawattorneys.com/sara-wyn-kane/ (last visited August 26, 2025). Ms. Kane seeks a rate of $475 per hour for work performed prior to 2018 and a rate of $500 for work performed on and after January 1, 2018.

For largely the same reasons outlined above with respect to Mr. Valli, the Court reduces Ms. Kane's hourly rate to $425. This rate takes into account that this case was not particularly complex, that Ms. Kane was not counsel to Plaintiff on appeal or at the time of her recovery, and that the time records demonstrate that Ms. Kane was heavily involved in the preparation of Plaintiff's partially deficient summary judgment briefing.

3. Matthew Berman

Mr. Berman's requested rates require a more fulsome discussion. Mr. Berman, who was a senior associate at the firm up until the end of 2018 but is now a partner, requests a rate of $450. Mr. Berman is a 1999 graduate of the Fordham University School of Law. ECF No. 204 at 1-2. After ten years specializing in class action litigation (including discrimination and securities cases), Mr. Berman has since devoted 14 years to employment law litigation. Id. at 2.

To start, a rate of $450 for a senior associate is at the top of—if not above—the range of rates typically awarded in this District. See, e.g., Herrera v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., No. 20-CV-4284, 2025 WL 934882, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025) (inflation-adjusted rates of $300-$450 for senior associates in Title VII case), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 929782 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025); Schwartz v. Jzanus Ltd., No. 21-CV-480, 2022 WL 603996, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2022) (awarding $240 for senior associate in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case); Laboy v. Quality Auto. Servs., Inc., No. 21-CV-2501, 2024 WL 472983, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2024) (noting that senior associates are typically awarded $200 to $325 in Fair Labor Standards Act cases).

But Mr. Berman's requested hourly rate raises a more fundamental question as to whether VKV appropriately staffed this matter. Once Mr. Berman joined this case in 2015, he performed the vast majority of the work. Indeed, Mr. Berman billed over 420 hours to this matter. Based on VKV's submissions, not a single junior associate was staffed on Plaintiff's case (not including the two law clerks who billed a combined total of fewer than 15 hours). That means that Mr. Berman—who was by then well into his second decade practicing law—was left conducting tasks that would have been more appropriate for a junior attorney. For example, Mr. Berman billed time for drafting a subpoena and deposition notice—tasks that a junior associate could have handled with ease. ECF No. 154-1 at 67. Courts may reduce a fee award where a law firm misallocates its resources and time amongst attorneys. See Ruradan Corp. v. City of New York, No. 22-CV-3074, 2024 WL 3567276, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024) (“Many of the tasks for which Plaintiff seeks fees could have been undertaken by a paralegal or a less expensive attorney.”); Magalios v. Peralta, No. 19-CV-6188, 2024 WL 1856303, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2024) (collecting cases holding the same).⁶

In light of Mr. Berman's status as a senior associate and the Court's concerns that VKV may not have staffed this case efficiently, the Court awards Mr. Berman an hourly rate of $375.⁷

4. Tito Sinha

Mr. Sinha was the lead associate on this case through 2015, when he apparently departed the firm. Mr. Sinha graduated from the City University of New York School of Law in 1997. Mr. Sinha seeks a rate of $350 for 242.39 hours billed. In setting an appropriate rate for Mr. Sinha, the Court notes that: (1) the hourly rates typically awarded to senior associates is between $300 and $450 in the most generous cases, (2) Mr. Sinha departed the firm in the early years of this litigation, and (3) the quality of Mr. Sinha's work is therefore difficult to judge. With these factors in mind, the Court concludes that Mr. Sinha, as a senior associate, is entitled to an hourly rate of $300.

5. Alexander White and Danielle Mietus

VKV seeks rates of $150 for law clerk Alexander White and $125 for law clerk Danielle Mietus. Courts in this District have found rates between $75 and $150 to be reasonable for law clerks. See Holiday Park Drive, LLC v. Newist Corp., No. 23-CV-02623, 2025 WL 990165, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2025) (holding that “the Eastern District has found a rate of $75.00 to $120.00[ ] a reasonable number,” but noting recent cases finding up to $150 reasonable in light of inflation). VKV offers no reason why Mr. White should be awarded a higher rate than Ms. Mietus. If anything, Ms. Mietus (a 2016 graduate of Albany Law School) is more experienced than Mr. White (a 2017 graduate of Brooklyn Law School). ECF No. 204 at 2. What is more, the tasks undertaken by Ms. Mietus were more involved than those completed by Mr. White. Mr. White's tasks primarily focused on discovery (writing extension requests to the Court or drafting a deposition notice). See generally ECF No. 154-1. By contrast, Ms. Mietus was apparently involved in preparation of the statement of facts for Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment briefing. Id. The Court will set both law clerks’ rates at $125.

6. MaryAnne Greenfield

Ms. Greenfield, a paralegal, seeks rates of $150 for 118.23 hours recorded prior to 2018 and $200 for 2.95 hours recorded on or after January 1, 2028. “Courts in this District generally consider hourly rates ranging from $70 to $150 to be reasonable for paralegals.” Trs. of Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare, Pension, & Annuity Funds v. Kore Contracting Corp., No. 24-CV-3235, 2025 WL 825049, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2025) (collecting cases); see Jaramillo v. Latino Regal Corp., No. 19-CV-3104, 2024 WL 4648135, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2024) (noting that an award of $120 “sits at the higher end of the rates typically awarded in this district”) (citation omitted). Ms. Greenfield's work on this case proved exemplary in some respects. Specifically, the time records (and other exhibits submitted in connection with the Motion to Vacate) demonstrate that Ms. Greenfield was tasked with responding to copious amounts of emails from Plaintiff. But the record in this case does not warrant awarding Ms. Greefield a rate at the very top end of the spectrum. Indeed, some (but not all) of Ms. Greenfield's time entries are vague (“Worked on organizing 6 boxes of documents”) or contained block billing (“Worked on privilege log; emails and telephone calls with client; discussions with MB; bates stamp additional documents for production”). ECF No. 154-1 at 67, 80. These billing practices make it difficult for the Court to ascertain the precise allocation of Ms. Greenfield's time. See Abularach v. High Wing Aviation LLC, No. 22-CV-1266, 2025 WL 405986, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2025) (reducing award where “[c]ounsel employed block billing in its invoicing that makes it impossible to determine the precise number of hours spent on” different tasks). Accordingly, the Court concludes that a rate of $100 is appropriate for Ms. Greenfield across both time periods.

B. Number of Hours

“In determining the number of hours reasonably expended on a case, a district court properly excludes documented hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” Raja v. Burns, 43 F.4th 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Plaintiff raises a number of objections to the hours expended by VKV. The Court concludes that some of Plaintiff's objections have merit, while others do not.

First, Plaintiff objects to VKV's staffing of this matter. ECF No. 147 at 15. Plaintiff contends that VKV staffed three partners (Mr. Valli, Ms. Kane, and Mr. Berman), while not staffing an associate. Plaintiff's concern is a legitimate one, if slightly exaggerated. To start, Mr. Berman was not a partner at the time of his work on this matter. And, in any event, the Court already has taken account of this apparent misallocation of staffing resources by reducing Mr. Berman's rate to that of a senior associate. See supra p. –––– – ––––.

Second, Plaintiff contends that 236.1 hours should be excluded altogether as relating to matters other than this proceeding. ECF No. 147-6 ¶¶ 63-67. The Court rejects the argument that VKV is not entitled to these fees. Under New York law, “[t]he attorney's lien attaches to the client's cause of action, and any recovery thereon, albeit the recovery is effected in an action other than the action in which the services were rendered ․ especially where the recovery is in an action which is a logical sequence of a prior action in connection with which the services were rendered.” Sellick v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 15-CV-9082, 2017 WL 1133443, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017) (Sullivan, J.) (citation omitted); accord Mason v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-5885, 2016 WL 2766652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016) (concluding that an attorney was entitled to enforce a charging lien where the prior action where an attorney was counsel of record was in “logical sequence” with the action in which the client ultimately recovered and both proceedings “ar[o]se from the same events”). Because the Department of Labor proceedings in which VKV appeared as counsel were required as part of her exhaustion of administrative remedies and arose from the same events (namely, her employment with Systemax), VKV is entitled to fees for its work in that proceeding.⁸

Third, Plaintiff contends that VKV spent too much time on the initial pleadings. ECF No. 147-6 ¶¶ 68-70. For example, Plaintiff argues that VKV improperly spent time twice amending the complaint to include facts that should have been included in the original pleadings. The Court declines to exercise its discretion to further reduce VKV's fees on this basis. Amended pleadings are a dime a dozen in federal court, and VKV's decision regarding which factual information to allege in the complaint was within its discretion.

Fourth, Plaintiff suggests that VKV billed excessive time for document discovery matters. ECF No. 147 at 17-18. Plaintiff estimates that the discovery in this case amounted to “3.5 standard size banker's boxes of files” and cites a case describing “700 large bankers boxes” being reviewed in less than a week. Id. (citing ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 6:16-CV-1523, 2023 WL 2655111, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023), aff'd, 144 F.4th 360 (2d Cir. 2025)). The Court notes that Plaintiff's citation to ELG is misleading, as the attorney's review of the 700 bankers’ boxes in such a short period of time gave rise to a spoliation motion. But in any event, Plaintiff's objections regarding document discovery are largely hindsight critiques and fail to account for VKV's zealous advocacy, which included addressing multiple objections by Defendants to VKV's document discovery requests. And most critically, Plaintiff fails to take into account her own conduct as a litigant in this case. She frequently contacted her attorneys with questions regarding document productions and written discovery. Indeed, many of VKV's time entries regarding document discovery included time spent communicating with Plaintiff herself. See, e.g., ECF No. 154-1 at 48 (“Draft and revise plaintiff's requests for the production of documents; teleconference with client re: same.”); id. (“Emails with client re: plaintiff's requests to defendants for production of documents.”); id. (“E-mail to/from Danielle, RV, MB re the interrogatories and Danielle's suggested edits.”); id. at 49 (“E-mail to/from MB, Danielle regarding their RFP's and ROG's.”); id. at 50 (“Emails with client re: document production and requests for admission.”). Plaintiff is certainly entitled (indeed, encouraged) to play an active role in pursuing her case—but not for free. Accordingly, the Court declines to make any specific reductions to VKV's fees on the basis of document discovery time entries.

Fifth, Plaintiff contends that VKV spent excessive time on work that was never completed. ECF No. 135-11 at 19. For example, Plaintiff argues that VKV is not entitled to fees for its preparation of a declaration that was never signed and a deposition that never took place. Id. Courts may exclude time “spent working on submissions that were never filed.” Indep. Project, Inc. v. Ventresca Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d 482, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Additionally, the Court agrees that the time incurred for a deposition that apparently never took place is grounds for a reduction of the fees.⁹ Similarly, Plaintiff contends that VKV spent 18.5 hours to prepare for the depositions of two witnesses, while the depositions of both witnesses combined totaled only 8.5 hours. ECF No. 147-6 ¶ 83. In light of these issues, the Court concludes that a reduction in fees is appropriate.

Sixth, Plaintiff argues that VKV's requested fees for its preparation of summary judgment briefing is excessive. It is true that the mere fact that a motion is unsuccessful is not necessarily grounds for a fee reduction. See King Fook Jewellry Grp. Ltd. v. Jacob & Co. Watches, Inc., No. 14-CV-742, 2019 WL 2535928, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2019) (“Preventing prevailing parties from recovering fees for unsuccessful efforts during an otherwise successful litigation may discourage attorneys from zealously representing their clients.”) (citation omitted) (cleaned up), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4879212 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2019). However, as noted, VKV omitted a critical argument from its summary judgment briefing—to wit, that the legal standard pressed by Defendants was erroneous. In light of this crucial omission, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that VKV's hours spent preparing for the summary judgment motion are too high.¹⁰

Considering the entire record as a whole, the Court concludes that a blanket reduction of 15% of VKV's hours is appropriate (in addition to the already-reduced rates). See Juarez v. 156-40 Grill LLC, No. 15-CV-5081, 2024 WL 4834313, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2024) (“To appropriately trim lawyers’ requested fees to a reasonable rate, a district court had discretion to make an across-the-board reduction to the hours billed or to exclude particular entries that are improper.”). The Court therefore sets the amount of the lien as follows:

IV. CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the Court has considered the entire record and concludes that VKV is entitled to some (but not all) of the fees it asserts in connection with its charging lien. Accordingly, the Court concludes that VKV's charging lien shall be fixed at $273,979.25.

Because much of the content in the parties’ submissions is redacted, the Court is filing this decision with restricted access to case participants only. The Court concurrently shall email a PDF copy of the decision to all counsel. Counsel shall meet and confer in good faith and jointly propose narrowly tailored redactions to the decision no later than September 24, 2025. The parties shall jointly email one PDF copy of this decision with redactions proposed (but NOT applied) to the undersigned's chambers on that date. The Court will review the parties’ proposed redactions and promptly file a redacted version on the public docket.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court notes that the parties’ submissions with respect to the Motion to Vacate are most generously described as disorganized. The fully briefed motion contains seven docket entries. See ECF No. 135 (Plaintiff's motion to seal, which attaches both redacted and unredacted versions of the Motion to Vacate and supporting documents); ECF No. 146 (Plaintiff's Notice of Motion); ECF No. 147 (redacted versions of the Motion to Vacate and supporting materials); ECF No. 148 (redacted versions of VKV's opposition and supporting materials); ECF No. 149 (redacted versions of Plaintiff's reply); ECF No. 172 (unredacted versions of Plaintiff's reply filed under seal); ECF No. 173 (unredacted versions of VKV's opposition and supporting materials filed under seal). The Court generally cites the public docket and, to the extent the Court cites a portion of a document filed under seal, the parties are directed to comply with the Court's instructions in Part IV. The Court may require the parties to submit more tailored redactions to the extent necessary in a future order.

2.   The Court's request was no surprise to Plaintiff. This on the record colloquy with Judge Lindsay at the parties’ successful settlement conference demonstrates why:THE COURT: ․ But I want, Ms. Lenzi, you to be aware that there could easily come a time when that settlement amount could be disclosed, ordered disclosed by the Court. That would be up to Judge Merle to decide, or whoever she refers the settlement dispute to.So are you accepting this agreement with the understanding that there may be a time in the future, again I won't know for sure, but it is I would think possible if the litigation proceeds with respect to what the prior attorney is owed that the settlement amount will be disclosed. Are you aware of that?MS. LENZI: Yes.ECF No. 133 at 11:14-25. VKV's reasons for opposing the Court's consideration of the settlement amount are self-evident: it could potentially reduce their fees. As for Defendants, the Court chooses not to speculate.

3.   In their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, VKV first proposed the following rates for 972.92 hours of work: $600 for Mr. Valli, $550 for Ms. Kane, $450 for Mr. Berman, $450 for Mr. Sinha, and $150 for Mr. White, Ms. Greenfield, and Ms. Mietus. The grand total originally requested using these rates and hours was $418,243. ECF No. 148-25. In response to the Court's October 9, 2024 Order requesting clarification, however, VKV changed course, adopting lower rates. See ECF No. 170. The Court understands VKV's latest submission to be its final request.

4.   This is a quite curious assertion. The time records are replete with communications with Plaintiff. The Court assumes two possibilities. The first (and more charitable) is that VKV simply did not record at all these communications for which they purport not to seek fees. The second is that VKV removed from its fee request only some of its communications with Plaintiff—which would make VKV's assertion “too cute by half.” Accordingly, the Court gives little weight to this assertion, which is contradicted by the billing records.

5.   The Court notes that Plaintiff's suggestion that VKV engaged in professional malpractice is not well-taken. The majority of Plaintiff's accusations against VKV amount to strategic disagreements concocted with the benefit of hindsight. Such disagreements do not constitute malpractice. See In re Jackson, 653 B.R. 1, 27 (D. Conn. 2023) (“[W]here allegations involve errors in the exercise of an attorney's professional judgment in areas such as strategy, the selection of appropriate evidence or argument, they are not actionable as malpractice.”) (quoting Bixby v. Somerville, 62 A.D.3d 1137, 880 N.Y.S.2d 205 (3d Dep't 2009)). And with respect to Plaintiff's main gripe—that VKV failed to appropriately brief the standard on pay discrimination claims before Judge Feuerstein—the Second Circuit noted that “[d]istrict courts in this Circuit routinely invoke[d]” the same standard that VKV set forth in its summary judgment papers. Lenzi, 944 F.3d at 109. The Second Circuit took “this opportunity to clarify” the appropriate legal standard. Id. at 110. Reliance on district court cases that incorrectly state a legal standard is not necessarily malpractice.

6.   In response, VKV asserts that “[g]iven that Plaintiff herself is an attorney, and closely scrutinized all aspects of her case, it made sense to assign an experienced associate to the matter.” ECF No. 148 at 22 n.3. Maybe so. But that staffing choice does not entitle VKV to improperly bolster its fees by requesting that Mr. Berman be awarded such a high rate.

7.   Plaintiff takes the argument too far. Plaintiff asserts that VKV “fails to justify why this case was staffed with two partners” and claims this staffing choice “requires a substantial reduction.” ECF No. 149 at 9. The exaggerated version of the argument is meritless. While staffing three individuals who bill partner rates (with no associates) demonstrates a questionable allocation of resources, staffing two partners at a smaller firm does not. That is especially true where, as here, the billing records demonstrate that Mr. Valli and Ms. Kane recorded time for tasks appropriate for a partner and the overlap of work between the two was minimal. The argument is particularly disingenuous because two partners from Felicello Law, Plaintiff's current firm, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff on multiple occasions in this case. See, e.g., ECF No. 120 (Notice of Appearance by Rosanne Felicello); Electronic Order, dated October 31, 2023 (Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Nina R. Morrison in which Ms. Felicello and Mr. Maloney—both partners—appeared on behalf of Plaintiff); Electronic Order, dated April 26, 2024 (both Ms. Felicello and Mr. Maloney appearing before Judge Merle).

8.   With respect to the so-called “Florida proceeding”—where Plaintiff apparently utilized VKV for purposes of defending a defamation action in Florida brought by one of the Defendants in this case, Plaintiff does not point to any billing entries that are related to this proceeding.

9.   VKV does not affirmatively state that the deposition of this witness, Dr. Ahmed, took place. And, indeed, the time records suggest it may not have. On January 31, 2017, Mr. Berman billed 3.5 hours to attending Dr. Ahmed's apparent deposition. ECF No. 173-26 at 76. But on November 12, 2017—ten months later—Mr. Berman recorded time to “email[ing] defendants re: Dr. Ahmed deposition dates.” Id. at 80. It is theoretically possible that Dr. Ahmed was deposed twice, but VKV produced no evidence to demonstrate that he was deposed at all.

10.   If not addressed elsewhere, the Court has considered and rejected the balance of Plaintiff's arguments as meritless.

LEE G. DUNST, Magistrate Judge: