CUCUL v. MAJOR CLEANING INC LLC 45 LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiffs Israel Cucul (“Cucul”) and Elizabeth Lorenzo (“Lorenzo,” and together with Cucul, the “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action on February 2, 2022. On August 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their third and most recent amended complaint (ECF No. 79 (“Third Amended Complaint” or “TAC”)) alleging labor law violations pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), and Title 12 of New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations (“NYCRR”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Major Cleaning, Inc. (“Major Cleaning”), Adelson Desouza (“Desouza”), Boucherie Pas LLC d/b/a Boucherie Union Square (“Boucherie”), and Fiorello's Roman Cafe, Inc. d/b/a Café Fiorello (“Fiorello”) failed to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of the FLSA. (TAC ¶¶ 188–203, Counts I & II.) Plaintiffs further allege that all defendants -- Major Cleaning, Desouza, Boucherie, Fiorello, as well as Hurricane Strauss, Inc. d/b/a Westville Chelsea (“Westville Chelsea”), Westville Restaurant, Inc. d/b/a Westville East (“Westville East”), and Broadway Hospitality Venture, LLC d/b/a Bond 45 Italian Kitchen and Bar (“Bond 45,” and together with Boucherie, Fiorello, Westville Chelsea, and Westville East, the “Restaurant Defendants”) -- failed to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of NYLL and NYCRR. (Id. ¶¶ 204–218, Counts III & IV.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Major Cleaning, Desouza, and Bond 45 failed to pay spread-of-hours pay as required by NYLL and NYCRR. (Id. ¶¶ 219–221, Count V.)

Presently before the Court are three motions brought pursuant to Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), to seek approval of three settlement agreements reached between Plaintiffs and all Defendants. The first motion, dated January 24, 2025, seeks approval of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs, Bond 45, and Fiorello. (ECF No. 100 (“B&F Cheeks Letter”); ECF No. 100-1 (“B&F Settlement Agreement” or “B&F SA”).) The same parties had previously submitted a motion for approval of a prior proposed settlement agreement, which this Court denied without prejudice for failure to provide sufficient information and documentation, as well as due to the overbreadth of waivers and releases in the prior proposed settlement. (See ECF No. 96 (former Cheeks motion as to Bond 45 and Fiorello settlement agreement); ECF No. 97 (memorandum and order denying former Cheeks motion as to Bond 45 and Fiorello settlement agreement).)

The second motion, dated April 9, 2025, seeks approval of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and Boucherie. (ECF No. 102 (“Boucherie Cheeks Letter”); ECF No. 102-1 (“Boucherie Settlement Agreement” or “Boucherie SA”).)

The third motion, dated May 16, 2025, seeks approval of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs, Major Cleaning, Desouza, Westville Chelsea, and Westville East. (ECF No. 105 (“MCI & Westville Cheeks Letter”); ECF No. 105-1 (“Major Cleaning and Westville Settlement Agreement” or “MCI & Westville SA”).)

In light of the information and documentation provided in support of the three pending Cheeks letters (ECF Nos. 100, 102 & 105), and considering the terms of the three settlement agreements (ECF Nos. 101-1, 102-1 & 105-1), the Court GRANTS the motions for approval of the three settlement agreements.

BACKGROUND

As alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs worked at various times between 2017 and 2021, and in various capacities, as overnight cleaning or janitorial workers in a variety of restaurants operated by the Restaurant Defendants. (See generally TAC ¶¶ 41–161.) Plaintiffs allege that they were not directly employed by the Restaurant Defendants and were instead staffed by and received their wages (if any) from Major Cleaning, Desouza, or Desouza's agents. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 43–47, 66, 84, 93–98, 115, 126–127, 129, 144–147, 161, 164.) They allege, however, that Major Cleaning and Desouza, together with the Restaurant Defendants, constitute joint employers of Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 164.)

Plaintiffs allege that their hours worked varied between 56 hours per week (8 hours per day, every day) and 84 hours per week (12 hours per day, every day) depending on the assignment, except for one week during which Cucul worked 88 hours. (Id. ¶¶ 68–70, 97, 124, 132, 150.) According to the TAC, Cucul worked at Bond 45 for just over four months -- between September 3, 2017 and January 14, 2018. (Id. ¶ 66.) Thereafter, Cucul worked at Westville Chelsea for over 19 months, from January 15, 2018, through August 22, 2019, and for nearly 7 months at Westville East, from August 23, 2019, through March 20, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 93–94.) Lorenzo worked alongside Cucul at Westville East from September 28, 2019, through March 20, 2020, a period of nearly six months. (Id. ¶¶ 122–123.) Both Plaintiffs worked at Boucherie beginning on August 8, 2021, “for approximately one month.” (Id. ¶ 129.) Finally, “for approximately a one-week period in or around December 2021,” both Plaintiffs worked at Fiorello. (Id. ¶ 147.) The TAC does not allege any further employment of either Plaintiff by any Defendant after December 2021.

The TAC seeks unpaid wages, overtime, and spread-of-hours premiums, as well as liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 31.)

After motion practice and the filing of multiple amended complaints, the case proceeded to discovery. On January 24, 2025, Plaintiffs, Bond 45, and Fiorello jointly requested approval of the B&F Settlement Agreement. (See ECF Nos. 100.) On April 9, 2025, Plaintiffs and Boucherie jointly requested approval of the Boucherie Settlement Agreement. (See ECF No. 102.) On May 16, 2025, Plaintiffs, Major Cleaning, Desouza, Westville Chelsea, and Westville jointly requested approval of the Major Cleaning and Westville Settlement Agreement. (See ECF No. 105.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford litigants wide latitude in settling their disputes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (noting that “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing ․ a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared”). An exception to this rule exists for stipulated dismissals of FLSA actions. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206. Parties may not stipulate to dismiss an FLSA action without submitting the proposed settlement to the district court for review and approval. Id.

District courts in this circuit frequently look to the factors outlined in Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), to determine the reasonableness of a proposed settlement. See, e.g., Li Rong Gao v. Perfect Team Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d 636, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Naraine v. Washdry Tech Inc., 749 F. Supp. 3d 398, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). These factors include:

(1) the plaintiff's range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of arm's-length bargaining between experienced counsel; and (5) the possibility of fraud or collusion.

Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medley v. Am. Cancer Soc'y, No. 10-cv-3214(BSJ), 2010 WL 3000028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010)) (citing Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Alleyne v. Time Moving & Storage Inc., 264 F.R.D. 41, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 944 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2019) (referring to the Wolinksy factors examined as part of a district court's fairness review under Cheeks).

“In addition, if attorneys’ fees and costs are provided for in the settlement, district courts will also evaluate the reasonableness of the fees and costs.” Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., 948 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in [an FLSA] action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”). In the present case, attorneys’ fees and costs are incorporated into the settlement amounts. See, e.g., Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reviewing FLSA settlement incorporating counsel's fees as part of total settlement amount).

DISCUSSION

I. Range of Recovery

The three pending settlement agreements provide a total payment to Plaintiffs of $71,095.80.¹ (See ECF No. 100 at 5 (Plaintiffs would receive $15,749.55 from B&F SA); ECF No. 102 at 2 ($6,220.78 from Boucherie SA); ECF No. 105 at 2 ($49,125.47 from MCI & Westville SA).) As calculated by Plaintiffs’ counsel and inclusive of liquidated damages,² Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery for their claims alleged in the TAC is $216,710. (See ECF No. 100 at 4 (Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery against Bond 45 and Fiorello, considering liquidated damages, is $36,370); ECF No. 102 at 2–4 ($20,500, considering liquidated damages, against Boucherie); ECF No. 105 at 5–7 ($159,840, considering liquidated damages, against Major Cleaning, Desouza, Westville Chelsea, and Westville East).) Thus, Plaintiffs’ actual combined recovery of $71,096 pursuant to the three pending settlement agreements amounts to approximately 32.8% of their combined alleged maximum recovery of $216,710 against all defendants.

The ratio of funds payable to Plaintiffs to their maximum recovery falls within the range of ratios which other courts in this Circuit have found to be reasonable when evaluating FLSA settlements. See Khan v. Young Adult Inst., Inc., No. 18-cv-2824(HBP), 2018 WL 6250658, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018) (collecting cases of reasonable FLSA settlements ranging from 25% to 40% of plaintiffs’ maximum recovery).³ Thus, the Court finds the recovery provided by the proposed settlement agreements to be reasonable.⁴

II. Remaining Wolinsky factors

The Court finds that the remaining Wolinsky factors weigh in favor of approving each settlement. The Court is satisfied that the B&F, Boucherie, and Major Cleaning and Westville Settlement Agreements were negotiated competently, in good faith, and at arm's length, and that there is no evidence of fraud or collusion. (See ECF No. 96 (former B&F Cheeks letter) at 3 (noting that the settlement was negotiated “at arm's length by experienced counsel, based on the parties’ assessment of the risks and expenses of litigation”); ECF No. 102 (Boucherie Cheeks Letter) at 5 (same); ECF No. 105 (MCI & Westville Cheeks Letter) at 7 (same).) Furthermore, Plaintiffs will be the only employees affected by the settlement and dismissal of the lawsuit, as the TAC does not purport to be brought on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. See Escobar v. Fresno Gourmet Deli Corp., No. 16-cv-6816(PAE), 2016 WL 7048714, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (noting that no other employee came forward, that the plaintiff would “be the only employee affected by the settlement and dismissal,” and that these facts supported approval of the proposed settlement). The Court finds that the remaining provisions of each proposed settlement agreement are fair and reasonable.

Thus, the Court finds that the Wolinsky factors weigh in favor of approval of the proposed settlement agreements.

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

For the reasons set forth below, the Court awards the requested attorneys’ fees of $36,999.99 and costs of $2,903.34.

A. Requested Attorneys’ Fees

“In an FLSA case, the Court must independently ascertain the reasonableness of the fee request.” Gurung v. White Way Threading LLC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 226, 229–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted). Courts consider six factors when assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in FLSA settlements: “(1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of the litigation; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy considerations.” Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000) (alteration adopted; quoting In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)); see also Naraine, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 409.

When considering applications for attorneys’ fees, courts in this circuit employ the lodestar method, which is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case,” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), or the “percentage of the fund” method, which permits attorneys to recover a percentage of the settlement amount via a previously determined contingency fee agreement. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 417–19 (2d Cir. 2010).

Although “[t]he trend in this Circuit is toward the percentage method,” courts employ the lodestar method as a “ ‘cross-check’ to a percentage award.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa, Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 121–23 (2d Cir. 2005). Importantly, “[t]he fee applicant must submit adequate documentation supporting the requested attorneys’ fees and costs.” Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600. “In the Second Circuit, that entails submitting contemporaneous billing records documenting, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (citing N.Y. State Ass'n v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983)).

Here, Plaintiffs retained Trief & Olk in connection with this action. Three named attorneys and one or more unnamed paralegals expended a total of approximately 340.1 hours at the following rates: Eyal Dror billed 306.1 hours at hourly rates of $450 and $500; Shelly Friedland billed 4.8 hours at hourly rates of $600 and $650; Ted Trief billed 5.9 hours at an hourly rate of $800; and an unnamed paralegal or paralegals billed 23.3 hours at an hourly rate of $175. (See ECF No. 101.)⁵ Based on the hours and hourly rates supplied by Plaintiffs’ counsel, Plaintiffs’ counsel “generated a total lodestar of $156,732.50.” (ECF No. 105 at 5.) Plaintiffs’ counsel request $36,999.99, which is just under one-third of the total settlement amount of $111,000 from all proposed settlement agreements, in “accord[ance] with the terms of the retainer signed by Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 105 at 6–7.) Courts in this Circuit routinely approve of one-third or below contingency fees for FLSA cases. See Lai v. Journey Preparatory Sch., Inc., No. 19-cv-2970(CLP), 2022 WL 3327824, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2022) (citing Romero v. Westbury Jeep Chrysler Dodge, Inc., No. 15-cv-4145(ADS)(SIL), 2016 WL 1369389, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016)); Kazadavenko v. Atl. Adult Day Care Ctr. Inc., No. 21-cv-3284(ENV)(LB), 2022 WL 2467541, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2022).

Using the contemporaneous billing records submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, (ECF No. 101 (billing entries ⁶ ),) and comparing the fees generated by the percentage method with those generated by the lodestar method, the Court finds that the hours billed were reasonable in light of the procedural posture of the case, including motion practice and the exchange of written discovery, and in light of the complexities innate in prosecuting two Plaintiffs’ claims against six corporate Defendants and one individual Defendant.

The hourly rates billed by Trief & Olk attorneys and paralegals, however, exceed reasonable rates in FLSA actions, as other courts in this Circuit have held. Aponte v. 5th Ave. Kings Fruit & Vegetables Corp., No. 20-cv-5625(RLM), 2022 WL 17718551, at *4–7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2022) (in awarding post-trial attorneys’ fees, reducing Shelly Friedland's hourly rate from $400 to “a blended rate of $350 for all hours,” reducing Ted Trief's “hourly rate from $500 to $450,” and reducing hourly rates for Trief & Olk legal assistants from $150 and $100 to $125 and $75); accord Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (When determining the reasonable hourly rate, courts consider the prevailing hourly rate within its district as the rate a “reasonable, paying client would have paid.”); Bevel v. Mennella's Poultry Co., Inc., No. 23-cv-5678(JLR)(SLC), 2024 WL 1349010, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2024) ($500 per hour was reasonable for sole practitioner who “has practiced law since 2001” (citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1346537 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024); Canales v. Norwich Serv. Station Inc., No. 20-cv-4759(JMW), 2021 WL 5759727, at *5 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2021) ($500 per hour was reasonable for named partner); Trs. of Pavers Dist. Council Welfare, Pension & Annuity Funds v. Kore Contracting Corp., No. 24-cv-3235, 2025 WL 825049, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2025) (“Courts in this District generally consider hourly rates ranging from $70 to $150 to be reasonable for paralegals.”).

Nonetheless, an adjusted lodestar cross-check confirms the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ counsel's request for attorneys’ fees of $36,999.99 or one-third the total settlement amount. Adjusting Plaintiffs’ counsel's hourly rates to a conservative $200 for attorneys and $60 for paralegals, see Pucciarelli v. Lakeview Cars, Inc., No. 16-cv-4751(RRM)(RER), 2017 WL 2778029, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2017) (“reasonable hourly rates in FLSA cases are approximately $300–$450 for partners, $200–$325 for senior associates, $100–$200 for junior associates, and $60–$80 for legal support staff” (citing Romero, 2016 WL 1369389, at *2)), the lodestar for Plaintiffs’ counsel would be approximately $64,718, nearly double the requested attorneys’ fees of $36,999.99. (See ECF No. 101); Grice v. Pepsi Beverages Co., 363 F. Supp. 3d 401, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (adjusting hourly rates proposed by plaintiffs’ counsel from $875 and $500 down to $300 for purposes of calculating lodestar cross-check). Thus, the adjusted lodestar cross-check confirms the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ counsel's requested attorneys’ fees of $36,999.99.

Finally, the remaining Goldberger factors “weigh in favor of finding the award fair and reasonable.” Naraine, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 410; Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 50. The risks of litigation are high as “FLSA claims typically involve complex mixed questions of fact and law.” Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Moreover, “the public policy goal of encouraging attorneys to take on FLSA and NYLL actions that protect the wages of workers is served here.” Naraine, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 410.

B. Requested Costs

Plaintiffs’ counsel request an additional $2,903.34 in claimed costs in connection with filing costs, costs to serve process on the Defendants, printing costs, mediation fees, and “general litigation expenses.” (ECF No. 102 at 4; see also ECF No. 100-4; ECF No. 102-2; ECF No. 105-2.) The Court awards the requested costs as “incidental and necessary to plaintiffs’ representation.” Morales v. City Scrap Metal, Inc., No. 19-cv-6682(CLP), 2022 WL 20539979, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2022) (cleaned up; quoting Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, 840 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see id. at *5 (awarding counsel costs in the amount of $1,448.30 for “filing fees and fees for effectuating service on the defendants”); Morris v. Affinity Health Plan, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (awarding $7,707.10 in costs for filing fees and postage); Naraine, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 409–10 (awarding $709 in costs for “filing fees and fees for effectuating service on Defendants”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the parties’ requests for approval of (1) the B&F Settlement Agreement to resolve claims by Plaintiffs against Bond 45 and Fiorello (ECF No. 100-1); (2) the Boucherie Settlement Agreement to resolve claims by Plaintiffs against Boucherie (ECF No. 102-1); and (3) the Major Cleaning and Westville Settlement Agreement to resolve claims by Plaintiffs against Major Cleaning, Desouza, Westville Chelsea, and Westville East (ECF No. 105-1).

Given that the B&F Settlement Agreement, Boucherie Settlement Agreement, and Major Cleaning and Westville Settlement Agreement have been approved, obligations required by the agreements are in effect. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the approved agreements. Should any party seek to enforce another's obligations under the approved agreements, it may move to enforce the terms of each agreement, as incorporated herein.

Within one week of entry of this Order, the parties shall file stipulations of dismissal in accordance with the terms of the approved agreements. (See ECF No. 100-1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 102-1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 105-1 ¶ 10.) Until stipulations of dismissal required by the approved agreements are filed and so ordered by the Court, closure of this action shall be held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Courts evaluate the fairness of a plaintiff's recovery after deducting attorneys’ fees and costs.” Perez v. Ultra Shine Car Wash, Inc., No. 20-cv-782(KMK), 2021 WL 1964724, at *3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (citing Arango v. Scotts Co., LLC, No. 17-cv-7174(KMK), 2020 WL 5898956, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020); Zorn-Hill v. A2B Taxi LLC, No. 19-cv-1058(KMK), 2020 WL 5578357, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2020); Garcia v. Cloister Apt Corp., No. 16-cv-5542(HBP), 2019 WL 1382298, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019)). Thus, the Court's evaluation of the fairness of the proposed recovery by Plaintiffs will be based on $71,095.80.

2.   Liquidated damages are considered in determining whether the range of recovery. See, e.g., Charicando v. Tribesmen Gen. Contracting, Inc., No 22-cv-5920(DLI)(TAM), 2025 WL 665293, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-cv-5920(DLI)(TAM), Feb. 28, 2025 Text Order.

3.   Each proposed settlement agreement, considered alone, similarly provides Plaintiffs with a recovery within the range of recoveries which other courts in this Circuit have found to be reasonable. (See ECF No. 100 at 4–5 (B&F SA, considered alone, results in approximately 43.3% recovery); ECF No. 102 at 2–4 (Boucherie SA, considered alone, results in approximately 30.3% recovery); ECF No. 105 at 2, 5–7 (MCI & Westville SA, considered alone, results in approximately 30.7% recovery).)

4.   The TAC alleges that Cucul's wages from Bond 45, Westville Chelsea, and Westville East were often paid late or with unexplained reductions. (See TAC ¶¶ 84–86, 115–117.) Plaintiffs’ counsel's present submissions include calculations of Cucul's maximum recovery premised on Cucul having received his wages on a regular basis and without any unexplained reductions. (See, e.g., ECF No. 100 at 3.) The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs’ counsel no longer relies on allegations in the August 2, 2024 TAC that Cucul's wages were late or improperly reduced to the extent those allegations are at odds with the calculations in Plaintiffs’ more recent Cheeks letters.

5.   The parties do not provide a total number of hours billed, but instead provide individual billing entries with corresponding hours or increments of hours for each entry. The total hours and hours each attorney billed in this action are the result of the Court's review of these individual billing entries. (See ECF No. 101.)

6.   Contrary to Plaintiffs’ counsel's assertion that public filing of billing records would result in “disclosure of privileged and confidential information,” (ECF No. 100 (B&F Cheeks Letter) at 4 n.2), billing narratives are not necessarily privileged. See DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2005) (“attorney time records and billing statements are not privileged when they do not contain detailed accounts of the legal services rendered”).

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge: