UNITED STATES v. LI (2025)

ORDER

BACKGROUND

Defendant Xiang Li was indicted in the District of Rhode Island on April 30, 2025, on charges of conspiracy of commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). On May 13, 2025, Mr. Li was arrested in the Eastern District of New York.

At his initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy of the Eastern District of New York, the Government requested that Mr. Li be detained pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et. seq., arguing that under Section 3142(e), “no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” (Gov't Detention Motion at 2, Dkt. 5.) During the detention hearing held that same day, defense counsel proposed conditions of release that included travel limited to the Eastern District of New York and the District of Rhode Island, electronic monitoring with a curfew, surrender of Mr. Li's Chinese passport, and two individuals to act as suretors: Mr. Li's wife and father-in-law, both of whom lived with Mr. Li. (Transcript of May 13, 2025 Proceedings (“Tr.”) 9:2–20; 10:8–10; 11:12–16, Dkt. 8.)

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Levy stated that he did not find clear and convincing evidence of danger (Tr. 18:16–20), but stated:

So let me tell you what my concern is. I understand Pretrial Services is willing to have him released on an appropriate secured bond․ We don't have a strong enough bond, bail package at this point. It's a very weak package. I think with the condition of home incarceration and a stronger package, you might be able to secure his release. But basically right now we don't have anyone here in the courtroom who has any income. His father-in-law may be here with a small income, but I think we need just a little bit more. The fact that he has three children and a wife here in this country shows, it makes me agree with Pretrial Services that he has roots in the community that he would not want to jeopardize. But I would want to see a stronger bail package.

(Tr. 19:8–23.) Judge Levy then ordered that Mr. Li remain in custody and that the United States Marshal transport him to the District of Rhode Island to face the criminal charges pending there. (Commitment to Another District (“Commitment Order”), Dkt. 2.) He also granted Mr. Li leave to make a renewed application for bail. (Tr. 20:7–21:5.) Counsel for Mr. Li requested that another bail hearing be held on May 16, 2025. (Tr. 22:6–8.)

On May 16, 2025, the Government filed a letter, arguing that the Court should deny Mr. Li's request for a bail hearing because “this Court no longer has jurisdiction to hear the defendant's motion for bail, which should be made in the District of Rhode Island”, i.e., the court “having original jurisdiction over the offense” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). (“Gov't Ltr.” at 1, Dkt. 7.)

A bail hearing was scheduled for May 19, 2025, at which I was the presiding Magistrate Judge. Although Mr. Li had not yet been transported out of this District, the Government did not produce him, repeating its contention that this Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a bail hearing. I directed counsel for Mr. Li to file a written response to the Government's letter, which he did that evening. (“Def. Ltr.,” Dkt. 9.)

DISCUSSION

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), entitled “Review of a Detention Order,” provides that, “[i]f a person is ordered detained by a magistrate judge, or by a person other than a judge of a court having original jurisdiction over the offense and other than a Federal appellate court, the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order.” The Second Circuit has explained that “for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3145, ‘the court having original jurisdiction over the offense’ means the court in the district in which the prosecution is pending, not the court in which the magistrate judge sits.” United States v. El Edwy, 272 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2001).

Based on this provision, the Government argues that Mr. Li's attempt to seek release on bail should be directed to the District Court in the District of Rhode Island, as the “court having original jurisdiction over the offense,” not to this Court. It states that, “if the defendant seeks to amend or revoke the Detention Order, the only court with jurisdiction to entertain such a motion at this stage is the District of Rhode Island.” (Gov't Letter at 2 (citing United States v. Malik, No. 22-MJ-16126, 2022 WL 4449380, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2022) (stating that jurisdiction for purposes of bail review in the state where defendant was arrested “ceased once the case was transferred to the Northern District of Texas” where the criminal complaint was filed)).)

Mr. Li contends, however, that he is not moving for “review” of the order detaining him. Rather, he seeks to “reopen the detention hearing pursuant to § 3142(f) to allow Mr. Li to present a stronger bail package buttressed by two additional sureties who were not known to the defense at the time of the initial hearing.” (Def. Ltr. at 3.)

28 U.S.C. § 3142(f) provides that a detention hearing “may be reopened, before or after a determination by the judicial officer, at any time before trial if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” See United States v. Havens, 487 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (reasoning that a defendant may request to reopen a detention hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) prior to his removal to the district of prosecution). Even without a finding of newly discovered information, a court “may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent authority․” United States v. Maxwell, 527 F. Supp. 3d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); see also United States v. Sikandar, No. 20-CR-582 (MKB), 2021 WL 242231, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021) (considering defendant's renewed bail application where the court previously denied the proposed application “without prejudice to renewal”).

The Second Circuit in El Edwy does not hold that the Bail Reform Act precludes such a revisiting of a court's own bail decision. In that case, after the Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of New York, where the defendant was arrested, released the defendant on bail, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, where the charges originated, applied to the District Court in that district for “Revocation of New York Magistrate Judge's Order of Release Under Title 18, U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1).” El Edwy, 272 F.3d at 151. The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted the motion and revoked the release order. (Id.) The defendant then applied to the District Court for the Southern District of New York to nullify the North Carolina order, which it declined to do, ruling that it was required to defer to the North Carolina Court's order. (Id.) The Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York Court's decision, holding that “[i]n view of the fact that review of Magistrate Judge Fox's order was sought in the district of prosecution in the manner contemplated by § 3145(a), Judge Ward properly refused to undertake review of the defendant's bail status.”¹ Id. at 154.

The appeals court added in a footnote to this holding, “We do not imply that, in the absence of a motion under § 3145(a) in the district of prosecution, the district court in the district of arrest would lack jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge's order. That question is not before us. We therefore do not address it.” Id. at 154, n. 2.

In the absence of a definitive ruling from the Second Circuit, I find that when no party has moved for review of a bail decision in the district of prosecution – as is the case here – the district of arrest retains jurisdiction to modify or revoke its own decision.

The Government cites to Malik, in which the District Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that it no longer had jurisdiction for purposes of bail review “once the case was transferred” to the court where the prosecution was pending. Malik, 2022 WL 4449380, at *1. Respectfully, I do not find that the Commitment Order “transfers the case” to a different court, such that this Court strips itself of jurisdiction thereby. The Commitment Order simply orders that the defendant remain in custody and directs the United States Marshal to deliver him to the District of Rhode Island. Until the Rhode Island Court is requested to review or makes a decision regarding Mr. Li's release or detention, this Court retains jurisdiction over the issue.

Accordingly, I find that this Court has jurisdiction to reopen the bail hearing in order for Mr. Li to propose additional conditions to secure his release. This conclusion does not conflict with the Second Circuit's statement that “section 3145(a) makes clear that the ultimate authority lies with the district that has the primary interest in the question – the district in which the prosecution is pending.” El Edwy, 272 F.3d at 153. If the Government is dissatisfied with this Court's bail determination, it may apply to the District Court for the District of Rhode Island for review, and whatever that Court's decision, this Court would not be able to nullify it. Id.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Li's request to reopen the detention hearing to allow him to present an amended bail package is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While Section 3145(a) applies to review of a release order, the analysis applies equally to subsection (b) which applies to review of a detention order.

Peggy Kuo, United States Magistrate Judge: