VW CREDIT LEASING LTD v. RUNWAY TOWING CORP (2024)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff VW Credit Leasing LTD. (“VW”) held the title to a 2017 Audi A6 (the “Audi”) that was leased to Plaintiff-Intervenor Pearl Betesh (together with VW, “Plaintiffs”). ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 6, 33 (VW's Amended Complaint). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Runway Towing & Recovery Corp., Runway Towing Corp., and Cynthia Pritsinevelos (a towing company and its owner, together, “Runway”), and the Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority (“TBTA,” and together with Runway, “Defendants”) violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) by depriving them of the Audi by means of an unreasonable seizure and without due process of the law. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 86–98; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 95–106 (Betesh's Complaint).¹ Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated the New York Constitution and that Runway violated Section 349 of the New York General Business Law (“GBL”) and is liable for conversion. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 99–100, 109–21; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 107–08, 118–31. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and monetary damages. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 101–08, pp. 20–21; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 109–17, pp. 23–24.

VW has moved for summary judgment on its claim against Defendants for violations of Section 1983 and on its claim seeking a declaratory judgment. ECF No. 96-1 (VW's Motion for Summary Judgment). Betesh has moved for summary judgment on all her claims. ECF No. 98-14 (Betesh's Motion for Summary Judgment). Defendants have also moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 108 (TBTA's Motion for Summary Judgment); ECF No. 112 (Documents Supporting Runway's Motion for Summary Judgment).²

For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) grants in part and denies in part VW's motion for summary judgment against the TBTA; (2) grants in part and denies in part the TBTA's motion for summary judgment against VW; (3) denies VW's motion for summary judgment against Runway; (4) grants in part Runway's motion for summary judgment against VW; (5) denies Betesh's motion for summary judgment against the TBTA and Runway; (6) grants the TBTA's motion for summary judgment against Betesh; (7) grants in part Runway's motion for summary judgment against Betesh; and (8) declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over VW's and Betesh's state law claims against Runway.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3

Defendant TBTA is a public benefit corporation that functions as a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and oversees the operations of certain bridges and tunnels in New York City. ECF No. 72 (TBTA Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint); ECF No. 23 at ¶ 8. Defendant Runway is a private towing service operating under a permit issued by the New York City Police Department that allows it to remove vehicles at the request of law enforcement agencies from public property within the area that encompasses Brooklyn. ECF No, 99-1 ¶ 21; ECF No. 114 ¶ 21; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 91–94; ECF No. 111 ¶¶ 91–94.

On or about November 30, 2016, Betesh leased the Audi from a car dealership in Brooklyn, which then assigned the lease agreement and title to the vehicle to VW, making VW the titled owner of the Audi. ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 1–3. Betesh was required to either purchase or return the Audi at the end of the lease. ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 1–2; ECF No. 111 ¶¶ 1–2.

Betesh's car registration was suspended on January 18, 2020, because Betesh had passed through toll plazas operated by the Port Authority without paying the required tolls owed to the Port Authority and because her liability insurance had lapsed. ECF No. 99-1 ¶ 10; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 15, 42, 48; ECF No. 111 ¶ 15. Each month between August and December of 2019, before her registration was suspended, Betesh was sent multiple notices alerting her about her unpaid tolls and warning that failure to respond would result in the suspension of her registration. ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 42–51; ECF No. 111 ¶¶ 42–51. The notices stated that “failure to respond to this Notice of Violation may result in referral to a collection agency, imposition of additional fees and charges and/or suspension of your vehicle registration by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles.” ECF No. 101-22; ECF No. 101-23 (TBTA Summary Judgment Exhibits). The notices also provided for procedures pursuant to which Betesh could “dispute the violation(s) listed.” Id. On January 4, 2020, Betesh received a Suspension Order from the DMV stating that her registration and license plates had been “suspended indefinitely effective 01/18/2020 due to the failure to maintain continuous liability insurance coverage.” ECF No. 101-24. The Suspension Order warned that a “suspended vehicle cannot be driven” and told Betesh how to contest the suspension. Id.

On or about January 26, 2020, the TBTA's license plate reader system flagged the Audi as a vehicle that had a suspended registration and was a “persistent toll violator” while it was driving through the Hugh L. Carey Tunnel.⁴ ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 7–8; ECF No. 99-2 ¶ 11. A TBTA officer stopped the Audi, informed the driver, Eli Betesh, Plaintiff Betesh's husband, that the car's registration was suspended, and directed him to drive the vehicle to a TBTA administrative building (the “TBTA Building”) near the exit of the tunnel where it could be parked temporarily. ECF No. 107 ¶ 9; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 8–9, 13–16. Once the Audi arrived at the TBTA Building, the officer issued a criminal summons to Mr. Betesh for driving with a suspended registration and removed the license plates from the Audi. ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 11–12; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 17–19. The officer also provided Mr. Betesh with a form that stated that his license plates had been “confiscated or surrendered to police to comply with S/R order” and that his vehicle was “towed because [its] registration was suspended due to unpaid toll violations” and that he needed to “pay the tolls and fees due” to the Port Authority “in order to clear the suspension and re-register [the] vehicle or to have continued access to MTA Bridge and Tunnels facilities.” ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 11–12; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 20–22; ECF No. 106 ¶ 17; ECF No. 97 at 51 (VW Summary Judgment Exhibits). Mr. Betesh left the TBTA Building about an hour later, leaving the Audi at the TBTA Building. ECF No. 99-2 ¶ 26.

Early in the morning on January 27, 2020, TBTA officers called Runway and arranged for the Audi to be towed from the TBTA Building. ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 28–29; ECF No. 99-1 ¶ 1; ECF No. 114 ¶ 1. Neither Mr. Betesh nor his wife was present when the Audi was towed. ECF No. 99-1 ¶ 2; ECF No. 99-2 ¶ 28. Runway brought the Audi to its private storage facility. ECF No. 107 ¶ 11. Once the Audi was towed by Runway, the TBTA had no further involvement with the vehicle other than to mail the registered owner, Betesh, a copy of the tow receipt. ECF No. 107 ¶ 23; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 85, 105–06. Runway was not compensated by the TBTA for towing the Audi, and Runway has no contractual relationship with the TBTA. ECF No. 107 ¶ 31; ECF No. 99-1 ¶ 17; ECF No. 114 ¶ 17; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 96–98. Roughly nine days later, on February 4, 2020, Betesh informed VW that the Audi had been “impounded” and that she owed unpaid tolls to the Port Authority. ECF No. 99-2 ¶ 32.

The TBTA's actions in stopping the Audi because its registration was suspended, removing its license plates, and eventually arranging to have the vehicle towed by Runway were consistent with the TBTA's written policies related to vehicles with suspended registrations due to persistent toll violations. ECF No. 107 ¶ 17; ECF No. 106 ¶ 22. The TBTA's policy does not require the TBTA to notify titled owners of vehicles that the vehicle has been towed and the TBTA did not communicate with VW about the Audi at any point. ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 13–15, 22.

After towing the Audi, Runway held it pending payment of the towing and storage fees but not pending payment of the unpaid tolls that Betesh owed to the Port Authority. ECF No. 99-1 ¶ 19. On March 25, 2020, Runway sent VW and Betesh a letter titled “Notice of Lien and Sale,” which stated that Runway claimed a lien on the Audi under the New York lien law, that the estimated retail value of the Audi prior to the filing of the lien was $31,750, that VW or Betesh could redeem the Audi by paying the lien charges, and that if VW or Betesh failed to do so by April 7, 2020, the Audi would be advertised for sale at a public auction on April 24, 2020. ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 16, 34; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 57–59; ECF No. 111 ¶¶ 57–59; ECF No. 106 ¶ 34. Neither VW nor Betesh redeemed the Audi, which Runway eventually sold to itself on April 24, 2020. ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 36–38; ECF No. 99-1 ¶¶ 10, 15; ECF No. 114 ¶¶ 10, 15.

VW filed this lawsuit on November 3, 2020, and amended its complaint on January 14, 2021. ECF No. 23. Betesh filed her intervenor complaint on February 8, 2021. ECF No. 32. Both Plaintiffs allege that the TBTA and Runway deprived them of their property, in violation of Section 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 86–98; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 95–106. Plaintiffs allege Monell liability on the part of the TBTA for creating a policy and practice for handling and disposing of vehicles that violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 95–98; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 104–106. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment with respect to their constitutional claims. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 101–108; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 109–117. Plaintiffs also raise state claims, including claims for violation of the New York Constitution, conversion, and violation of the GBL. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 99–100, 109–121; ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 107–08, 118–131.

The Court denied TBTA's motion to dismiss on September 30, 2021. See September 30, 2021, ECF Minute Entry. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on December 16, 2022, see ECF No. 96; ECF No. 98-14, and Defendants served their cross-motions and oppositions on January 23, 2023, see ECF No. 108; ECF No. 112.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, a court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).⁵ The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “Where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011).

When deciding a summary judgment motion, any ambiguities and inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. LaFond v. Gen. Physics Servs. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995). Although “courts must refrain from assessing competing evidence in the summary judgment record and avoid making credibility judgments,” the non-moving party must defeat summary judgment by putting forth “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.” Saeli v. Chautauqua Cnty., 36 F.4th 445, 456 (2d Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original) (affirming summary judgment dismissing complaint). “[R]eliance upon conclusory statements or mere allegations is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion,” rather the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by his or her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). When, as has happened here, “both parties have moved for summary judgment, the [C]ourt must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Dish Network Corp. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 21 F.4th 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2021).

DISCUSSION

The parties largely agree with respect to the material facts at issue and devote the majority of their affirmative summary judgment briefs to Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983 that Defendants (1) deprived them of their property by effecting an unlawful warrantless seizure, and (2) deprived them of their property without due process of law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendants did not conduct an unlawful seizure or taking of Plaintiffs’ property, and that Defendants did not deprive Betesh of her property without due process. However, the Court finds that the TBTA did deprive VW of its property without due process, and that the TBTA's violation of VW's due process rights is attributable to a policy or custom of the TBTA.

I. Plaintiffs’ Federal Constitutional Claims

“Under Section 1983, individuals may bring a private cause of action against persons acting under color of state law to recover money damages for deprivations of their federal or constitutional rights.” Sagy v. City of New York, No. 18-cv-1975, 2022 WL 6777602, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2022). As a public benefit corporation, the TBTA is treated as a municipal entity for purposes of assessing liability under Section 1983 and, therefore, may not be held liable unless it meets the requirements for Monell liability. Canete v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 17-cv-3961, 2018 WL 4538897, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018). “To succeed on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a policy or custom of the [TBTA] caused a deprivation of their federal or constitutional rights.” Nixon v. City of New York, 668 F.Supp.3d 143, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2023); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that a local government entity can only be sued under Section 1983 when execution of a government's policy or custom causes injury). The elements of a Monell claim are (1) a municipal policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a constitutional right. Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, to the extent the Court finds that the TBTA violated either Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the Court must also find that the violation was caused by a policy or custom of the TBTA rather than by an individual employee's one-off action.

A. Both Plaintiffs Held Protected Property Interests in the Audi

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine that each Plaintiff held a protected property interest in the Audi at the time that it was stopped by the TBTA before the Court can determine whether either Plaintiff's property interest was violated by Defendants. An individual may have “a property interest in the continued possession and use of [a vehicle] sufficient to trigger the protections of due process” even when they do “not hold title to the vehicle.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999). As the lessee of the Audi, Betesh did not hold title to the vehicle but had paid “substantial sums” that gave her “a protected possessory interest in the car.” See Alexandre v. Cortes, 140 F.3d 406, 410–11 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff, who had purchased a car using a purchase agreement pursuant to which the seller retained title to the vehicle until the full purchase price was paid, held a protected possessory interest in the car because of the sums he had already paid, even though he had not yet paid the full purchase price or acquired title, and had fallen behind on his payments). Similarly, VW held a protected interest in the Audi because it was the titleholder of the vehicle, and because a leasing company “has a protected possessory interest in a vehicle.” HVT Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, No. 15-cv-5867, 2018 WL 3134414, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1409821 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2018).

B. The TBTA Did Not Unconstitutionally Seize the Audi

Plaintiffs do not dispute the constitutionality of the decision to suspend Betesh's registration or of the TBTA officer's actions in stopping the Audi as it exited the tunnel. ECF No. 96; ECF No. 98-14; ECF No. 109. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claims that the Audi was unconstitutionally seized without a warrant stem from the events that occurred at the TBTA Building after the stop.

“A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.” In re 650 Fifth Ave. Co., 991 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2021). VW first alleges that the TBTA's confiscation of Betesh's license plates constitutes a seizure. ECF No. 109 at 12. Betesh raises no such argument. However, VW fails to explain: (1) how the TBTA's confiscation of Betesh's license plates constitutes a seizure of the Audi itself; and (2) how it, as lessor of the Audi, has a protectible property interest in the government-issued license plates affixed to the car. Although the Court agrees that VW held a protected property interest in the Audi itself, VW does not point to any facts or caselaw, and the Court is not aware of any, to support a finding that VW held a protected property interest in the vehicle's license plates.⁶

Plaintiffs next allege that the TBTA unconstitutionally seized the Audi when it phoned Runway to request that the Audi be towed from the TBTA Building. ECF No. 98-14 at 7–12; ECF No. 96-1 at 12–18. Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless seizures “are per se unreasonable ․ unless they fall within one of several recognized exceptions” to the warrant requirement. United States v. Casado, 303 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2002). One such “recognized exception” to the warrant requirement relates to “what the Supreme Court has called community caretaking functions.” Barnes v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-7283, 2015 WL 4076007, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015). “It is well established that police have the authority, despite the absence of a warrant, to seize and remove from the streets automobiles in the interests of public safety and as part of their community caretaking functions—an authority that is beyond reasonable challenge.” United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 2019). “[U]nder this community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle,” and “whether a decision to impound is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is based on all the facts and circumstances of a given case.” Id. at 728, 731; see also Vasquez v. Yadali, No. 16-cv-895, 2020 WL 1082786, at *7 ( S.D.N.Y. Mar. 05, 2020) (“[I]t is reasonable for police officers to impound [a] vehicle under community care functions where, among other things, the vehicle would otherwise ․ threaten public safety.”).

The undisputed facts support a finding that any seizure of the Audi by the TBTA that took place when the TBTA called Runway to tow the vehicle did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. In Lyle, the Second Circuit held that it was not an unreasonable seizure for the government to tow and impound the vehicle of a driver who “could not lawfully drive [his vehicle] away” from the scene of an incident to ensure the vehicle was not left in a location “where it could have become a nuisance.” Id. at 729, 731. The parties agree that once the Audi's license plates were removed, it could no longer legally be operated on public roads. ECF No. 108 at 15; ECF No. 109 at 1. Where, as here, “the driver's violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the driver from lawfully operating the vehicle,” and “it is necessary to remove the vehicle from a[ ] public location,” “impoundment may be proper under the community caretaking doctrine.” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, because Mr. Betesh could not “lawfully drive” the Audi away from the TBTA Building without its plates, the TBTA's decision to call Runway to request a tow was justified under the community caretaking exception. See, e.g., United States v. Fabian, No. 16-cr-131, 2019 WL 3578226, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (holding that the community caretaking function justified the state's decision to tow and impound a vehicle because the vehicle did not have proper plates). Plaintiff's argument that being “a persistent toll violator” has nothing to do with “safely operating a vehicle” ignores the simple fact that the Audi could not be lawfully driven without license plates and that it had been left by Betesh at the TBTA Building. ECF No. 96-1 at 14. Accordingly, any seizure of the Audi by the TBTA when it phoned Runway to tow the vehicle was not an unconstitutional warrantless seizure.

Plaintiffs also argue that, even if the warrant exception applied, the TBTA's conduct nonetheless violated the Fourth Amendment because, after it seized the Audi, the TBTA instructed Runway to retain it to force Plaintiffs to pay the tolls that Betesh owed to the Port Authority. ECF No. 96-1 at 15–18; ECF No. 98-14 at 6, 10–11. However, the undisputed facts elicited in discovery and put forth in the parties’ respective statements of material facts do not support Plaintiffs’ unfounded assertions that the TBTA somehow prohibited Runway from returning the vehicle to either VW or Betesh until the overdue tolls were paid. The form that the TBTA provided to Mr. Betesh at the TBTA Building stated that the Beteshes needed to pay the overdue tolls “in order to ․ re-register [the] vehicle” and continue driving it through “MTA Bridges and Tunnels Facilities.” ECF No. 107 ¶¶ 11–12; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 20–22; ECF No. 106 ¶ 17; ECF No. 97 at 51. Nothing in the form stated that the Audi itself was being held pending the payment of the Port Authority tolls. As the Notice of Lien and Sale that Runway eventually provided to Plaintiffs stated, the Audi was held by Runway pending only the “lien charges” asserted by Runway related to the “towing and/or daily storage” fees. ECF No. 96-2 at 22. The undisputed facts do not support a finding that the TBTA played any role in Runway's continued retention of the Audi at its impound facility after the vehicle was towed or that the TBTA took any action that would have prevented Plaintiffs from retrieving the Audi. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have not violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by seizing or retaining the Audi without a warrant, and grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ unreasonable seizure claims.

C. Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Claims

Plaintiffs next allege that the TBTA deprived them of their property rights in the Audi without due process by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard either before or after the Audi was towed.⁷ ECF No. 96-1 at 6–12; ECF No. 98-3 at 13–18. “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that individuals receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.” Toyota Lease Tr. v. Vill. of Freeport, No. 20-cv-2207, 2023 WL 4443992, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2023). “To determine whether a plaintiff was deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,” courts “identify the property interest involved, and “determine whether the plaintiff received constitutionally adequate process in the course of the deprivation. O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court has already determined that VW and Betesh each held a property interested in the Audi. See supra Section I.A. Accordingly, the only remaining question is whether each Plaintiff received constitutionally adequate process.

In general, “individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993). “Due process does not, in all cases, require a hearing before the state interferes with a protected interest, so long as some form of hearing is provided before an individual is finally deprived of the property interest.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). “In determining how much process is due, a court must weigh (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the value of other safeguards, and (3) the government's interest” (the “Mathews Test”⁸ ). Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2009).

With respect to Betesh, the Court finds that she was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Audi was towed. Between August 30, 2019, and December 22, 2019, before Betesh's registration was suspended and the Audi was towed, Betesh received eleven letters from the DMV informing her that she had failed to pay overdue tolls, that “failure to respond ․ may result in ․ suspension of your vehicle registration,” and providing information on how to dispute the alleged violations. ECF No. 101-22. Before Betesh's registration was eventually suspended, effective January 18, 2020, Betesh also received a letter from the DMV, dated December 4, 2019, informing her about the forthcoming suspension due to both unpaid tolls and her lapsed insurance coverage, providing her with procedures to either pay the fees owed “or request a hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles,” and warning her that “an uninsured vehicle cannot be driven” and that “operating a motor vehicle with a suspended registration is a misdemeanor.” ECF No. 101-23; ECF No. 101-24. These letters were consistent with the DMV's official policy, which provides for the provision of notice and an opportunity to be heard before an individual's registration is suspended. ECF No. 108 at 16. And, after the Audi was towed, the TBTA gave Betesh notice of where the Audi had been towed to. ECF No. 107 ¶ 23; ECF No. 99-2 ¶¶ 85, 105–06.

Applying the Mathews Test, the Court finds that Betesh received constitutionally sufficient process before her vehicle was towed. Although there is no doubt that Betesh has a property interest in the Audi, so, too, does the TBTA have an interest in keeping unregistered and uninsured vehicles off the roads it maintains. The second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, cuts firmly in favor of the TBTA. Although courts have held that a pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard is not necessary when impractical, see, e.g., Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 158, Betesh was provided with multiple opportunities to contest her suspended registration and the determination that she lacked insurance, was explicitly offered an opportunity to be heard, and was warned that it was unlawful to operate her vehicle without insurance or an active registration. The risk that any individual who genuinely intended to remedy and contest any issues with their continued use of their property would be deprived of the opportunity to do so in the face of such significant pre-seizure notice is low. Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 299 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that vehicle owner's due process rights were not violated when he was provided with pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard by branches of city's administrative parking violations system). Accordingly, the Court finds that the TBTA did not violate Betesh's due process rights when it asked Runway to tow the Audi.

However, with respect to VW, the TBTA agrees that its existing policies do not require the TBTA to notify titled owners or lessors that a vehicle has been towed and that it did not at any point communicate with VW regarding the tow. ECF No. 107 ¶ 22. The TBTA argues that VW received sufficient notice because, months after the Audi was towed, Runway, which is not a state actor, informed it of the impending sale, ECF No. 108 at 19. Aside from the notice provided by Runway, the only notice VW received that the Audi had been towed was when the Beteshes informed it in February 2020 that the car had been towed. That Betesh may have informed VW that the Audi was towed “is of no consequence in the due process analysis.” TD Auto Fin. LLC v. Cnty. of Putnam, No. 21-cv-9080, 2023 WL 6295116, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023) (“[T]he fact that [a lessor] fortuitously learned that the [leased vehicle] had been seized from [the lessee] did not relieve the [state actor] of its obligation to provide adequate notice to [the lessor] regarding the seizure.”).

The first and third Mathews factors are the same for VW as they were for Betesh—VW undeniably had a significant property interest in the Audi, and the TBTA undeniably had a strong safety interest in regulating the cars on the road. However, the second factor, which analyzes the risk of erroneous deprivation, must necessarily come out in VW's favor because, pursuant to the TBTA's current policies, practices, and customs, “a lienholder may not receive notice of a seizure until substantially after the Audi has been impounded, and will have no opportunity” to contest the seizure or otherwise attempt to reclaim its property. TD Auto, 2023 WL 6295116, at *11. Balancing the interests at stake, the Court finds that the TBTA's interests are “outweighed by its unlawful abrogation of [VW's] right to due process of law.” Id. Consistent with the Constitution's due process requirements, the TBTA cannot insist that it has no obligation to provide lienholders with any notice, either pre- or post- tow. However, the Court does not agree with VW that due process necessarily requires the TBTA to provide lienholders with notice and an opportunity to be heard before seized vehicles are towed. “Due process is flexible,” Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 158, and “where a pre-deprivation hearing is impractical and a post-deprivation hearing is meaningful, the State satisfies its constitutional obligations by providing the latter.” Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, given the practicalities at play, the Court does not see any reason why providing lienholders with post-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard would not be meaningful. See, e.g., HVT, Inc., 2018 WL 3134414, at *10–11 (in situations where a pre-deprivation hearing is impractical, notice and a prompt opportunity to be heard post-deprivation is sufficient).

Accordingly, the Court grants the TBTA's motion for summary judgment as to Betesh's due process claims but denies the TBTA's motion for summary judgment as to VW's due process claims. Because VW has demonstrated that the TBTA's policy of not notifying lienholders either prior to or after it has called for their vehicles to be towed caused a violation of VW's due process rights, Monell liability attaches, and the Court grants VW's motion for summary judgment with respect to its due process claim against the TBTA. Consistent with the due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the TBTA must provide lienholders with notice and an opportunity to be heard when it arranges for vehicles to be towed.

D. Betesh's Monell Claim Fails

“It is well-settled that a Monell claim cannot succeed without an underlying constitutional violation.” Mastromonaco v. Cnty. of Westchester, 779 F. App'x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Oquendo v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 20, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Mastromonaco); Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a district court does not need to address Monell liability if it finds no underlying constitutional violation). Applying these standards, the Court need not consider Betesh's Monell claim on the merits. Because the Court has concluded that Betesh's Section 1983 due process, improper seizure, and takings claims fail, see supra Sections I. B., I.C., see infra Section I. F., it follows that there can be no municipal liability with respect to these claims. Grytsyk v. Morales, 527 F. Supp. 3d 639, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

E. Runway Did Not Act Under Color of State Law

Under Section 1983, “constitutional torts are only actionable against state actors or private parties acting under color of state law.” Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court “has never held that a [state actor's] mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the state.” Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). The actions of a “nominally private entity are attributable to the state when: (1) the entity acts pursuant to the “coercive power” of the state or is “controlled” by the state; ․ (2) when the state provides significant encouragement to the entity, the entity is a willful participant in joint activity with the state, or the entity's functions are entwined with state policies; ․ or (3) when the entity has been delegated a public function by the state.” Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008). A “merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002).

“Private activity does not qualify as state action based solely on the private entity's ․ licensing or regulation by the government.” Kellier v. MMS, No. 20-cv-10939, 2021 WL 535504, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2021). Under factual circumstances substantially similar to those here, the Supreme Court held that a private storage company that received the personal property of an evicted tenant from a city marshal and then attempted to sell the property was not acting under color of state law because his attempted sale of the property was “not compelled by the state.” Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164–66, 98 S.Ct. 1729. And, courts have rejected the notion that private towing companies operating pursuant to licenses, permits, or contracts issued by the state are state actors. See, e.g., Calderon v. Burton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Companies that provide services to municipalities ․ are not thereby transformed into state actors ․ where, as here, the function performed (towing cars) has not been historically, traditionally and exclusively the prerogative of the state.”)

Here, Runway's actions in asserting a lien on the Audi and eventually selling it were not compelled by the state, entwined with state policies, encouraged by the state, or part of a public function delegated to Runway by the state. See Sybalski, 546 F.3d at 257. Although the Court finds that the TBTA violated VW's due process rights when it arranged for the tow of the Audi but failed to provide VW with notice either before or after the tow occurred, the Court does not find that Runway was a state actor for the purpose of the allegations in this case. Accordingly, Runway cannot be held liable pursuant to Section 1983, and Runway's actions in imposing a garageman's lien on the Audi after towing it and eventually selling it cannot be attributed to the TBTA.

F. Defendants Did Not Carry Out an Improper Fifth Amendment Taking

VW also argues, very briefly, that Defendants effectuated a taking as defined by the Fifth Amendment when Runway placed a lien on the Audi to cover the costs of its tow and storage, and eventually sold the Audi. Betesh articulates a takings claim in her complaint but does not reference the claim in her motion seeking summary judgment. Regardless, because the Court has found that Runway was not functioning as a state actor when it imposed the lien and sold the vehicle, see infra Section I.E., Plaintiffs will be unable to establish a necessary element of a takings claim—that the government took property without providing compensation. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019) (“A property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his property without paying for it.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ takings claims.

II. Plaintiffs’ Claims for Declaratory Relief Are Dismissed

Both Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, “is procedural only” and “does not create an independent cause of action.” Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012); TD Auto, 2023 WL 6295116, at *13 (same). “[A] request for a declaratory judgment is not a cause of action; it is a request for a remedy that does not exist independent of a plausible underlying claim for relief.” Performing Arts Ctr. v. Actor's Equity Ass'n, No. 20-cv-2531, 2022 WL 16755284, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2022). Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiffs have asserted “declaratory relief” as standalone claims or as claims tied to underlying claims on which the Court has granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs, see supra Section I, those claims must be dismissed. See, e.g., Roller v. Red Payments, LLC, No. 19-cv-5285, 2022 WL 4226094, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2022) (dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claims after dismissing his underlying substantive claims because plaintiff was “not entitled to independent declaratory relief”).

With respect to VW's due process claim, on which the Court has granted VW summary judgment, the Court must determine whether a declaratory judgment is warranted as a remedy. In making this determination, the court must analyze “(1) whether the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues involved; and (2) whether a judgment would finalize the controversy and offer relief from uncertainty.” Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 F.3d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 2003). Courts may also consider “whether there is a better or more effective remedy,” and “[d]ismissal of a declaratory judgment action is warranted where ․ the declaratory relief plaintiff seeks is duplicative of his other causes of action.” Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 623 F. Supp. 3d 6, 23 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). In granting VW summary judgment on its due process claim, the Court determined that the TBTA violated VW's constitutional rights by failing to provide lienholders with notice and an opportunity to be heard either before or after arranging for the tow of the vehicle. This relief is substantially similar to the declaratory relief that VW seeks, and an additional declaration would not serve a useful purpose in clarifying the issues involved or offering relief from uncertainty. Accordingly, the Court dismisses VW's declaratory judgment claim in full. Id. (dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim as duplicative when, “[i]n granting summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor on its due process claim,” the court “determined that the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights”).

III. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the TBTA Brought Under the New York Constitution Are Dismissed

Plaintiffs also assert claims against the TBTA under the New York Constitution that mirror their federal constitutional claims. “The New York State Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process are virtually coextensive with those of the Federal Constitution.” TD Auto, 2023 WL 6295116, at *13; Bloomingburg Jewish Educ. Ctr. v. Vill. of Bloomingburg, New York, 111 F. Supp. 3d 459, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The New York Constitution's due process, equal protection, and free exercise protections are essentially coextensive with those provided by the Federal Constitution.”). “The proscription against unlawful searches and seizures under the New York Constitution conforms with that found in the Fourth Amendment.” Domeneck v. City of New York, No. 18-cv-7419, 2019 WL 5727409, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2019).

A. VW's Due Process Claim Against the TBTA Brought Under the New York Constitution

“Various federal courts in this circuit have held that there is no private right of action under the New York State Constitution where, as here, remedies are available under § 1983.” Stratakos v. Nassau Cnty., No. 15-cv-7244, 2019 WL 6699817, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019); see also Leibovitz v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-7106, 2018 WL 1157872, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2018) (same); Watson v. Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr., 412 F. Supp. 3d 147, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (same). Accordingly, because the Court has determined that VW is entitled to summary judgment on its Section 1983 due process claim against the TBTA, the TBTA is entitled to summary judgment on VW's due process claims brought under the New York Constitution. See, e.g., TD Auto, 2023 WL 6295116, at *13; Stratakos, 2019 WL 6699817, at *14.

B. Betesh's Due Process Claim Against the TBTA Brought Under the New York Constitution

The Court has determined that Betesh is not entitled to summary judgment on her Section 1983 due process claim against the TBTA because she received adequate process before the TBTA seized and arranged for the tow of the Audi. Accordingly, for the same reasons that the TBTA's motion for summary judgment on Betesh's federal due process claim must be granted, see supra Section I.C., the TBTA's motion for summary judgment on Betesh's due process claim brought under Article I, Section 6 of the New York Constitution must also be granted. See, e.g., Algarin v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 460 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he conclusion that plaintiff's federal due process rights were not violated dictates the conclusion that plaintiff's parallel rights under the New York State Constitution were not also infringed.”).

C. Plaintiffs’ Unreasonable Seizure Claims Against the TBTA Brought Under the New York Constitution

Section 12 of Article I of the New York Constitution, the provision under which Plaintiffs bring their New York Constitution unreasonable seizure claims, “is consistent with the search and seizure provisions found in the Federal Constitution.” Herrera v. Shea, No. 20-cv-3665, 2020 WL 7711856, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2020); see also Johns v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 221 F.R.D. 400, 408 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Due process and search and seizure rights under the New York state and United States constitutions are coextensive with one another.”). Accordingly, because the Court has already held that the TBTA did not effectuate an unconstitutional seizure of the Audi under the Federal Constitution, see supra Section I.B., the TBTA is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ analogous state constitutional claims for the reasons already articulated. See, e.g., Josie v. City of New York, No. 21-cv-2486, 2023 WL 3765063, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2023) (“[T]he New York State Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process are virtually coextensive with those in the U.S. Constitution.”); Nocera v. N.Y.C. Fire Comm'r, 921 F. Supp. 192, 195 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that “the standards for [a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment] claims under the New York State Constitution are no different from the standards applied to his claims under the United States Constitution” and granting defendants summary judgment on plaintiff's federal and state constitutional claims); People v. Tardi, 28 N.Y.3d 1077, 44 N.Y.S.3d 366, 66 N.E.3d 1084, 1086 (2016) (recognizing that, pursuant to the community caretaking exception, officials are permitted to tow and impound a vehicle consistent with the New York Constitution); People v. King, 188 A.D.3d 721, 133 N.Y.S.3d 287, 288 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (recognizing that government entities “may also impound a vehicle without a warrant in the interests of public safety and as part of what the United States Supreme Court has called community caretaking functions”); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561 (1986) (identifying a “presumption that the provision against unlawful searches and seizures contained in NY Constitution, Article I § 12 conforms with that found in the 4th Amendment,” which “supports a policy of uniformity between State and Federal courts”).

D. Plaintiffs’ Takings Claims Against the TBTA Brought Under the New York Constitution

Section Seven of Article I of the New York Constitution, the provision under which Plaintiffs bring their state law takings claims, mirrors the Federal Constitution in prohibiting the taking of private property “for public use without just compensation.” Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. State, 30 N.Y.3d 136, 65 N.Y.S.3d 94, 87 N.E.3d 126, 155 (2017). “[F]ederal takings jurisprudence applies equally to claims under the New York [C]onstitution.” Singh v. Joshi, 201 F. Supp. 3d 245, 249 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1070–71 (1989) (analyzing plaintiff's federal and state takings claims together). Like the takings clause of the Federal Constitution, under the New York Constitution, “a taking cannot occur in the absence of government compulsion.” Walton v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 13 N.Y.3d 475, 893 N.Y.S.2d 453, 921 N.E.2d 145, 154 (2009). Accordingly, and for the reasons stated in supra Section I.F., because the Court has found that Runway's conduct is not attributable to the TBTA and because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the TBTA itself effectuated a taking, see supra Section I.E., the TBTA is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ takings claim brought under the New York Constitution.

IV. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Remaining State Law Claims Against Runway

28 U.S.C. § 1367 dictates that the Court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to claims in an action” over which it has original jurisdiction that “they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Id. § 1367(a). However, the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” for a number of reasons, including if a claim based in state law “substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the [Court] has original jurisdiction.” Id.§ 1367(c)(2). To determine whether the state issues substantially predominate, courts look at the “proof” required, “the scope of the issues raised,” and the “comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001). In weighing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if state claims do substantially predominate, the Court must consider “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).

The Court has supplemental, rather than original, jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against Runway, namely their claims under the New York Constitution, Section 349 of the GBL, and for conversion. Accordingly, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and dismiss those claims if it determines that the state law claims substantially predominate over the only federal claim that it has not dismissed, VW's due process claim against the TBTA, and that dismissal would be consistent with and promote the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2018).

Courts in this circuit “have found that state law claims predominate when the federal law claims are merely peripheral or cover a much narrower issue than the state law claims, or where the factual or legal analysis of the claims are unrelated.” Dunlop v. City of New York, No. 06-cv-433, 2006 WL 2853972, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County, when all of plaintiff's federal claims were dismissed “with just one narrow exception,” the Second Circuit determined that, “even if the existence of one narrow surviving federal claim means that not all claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed, it has nonetheless become clear that the state-law claims now substantially predominate in this litigation.” 665 F.3d 408, 439 (2d Cir. 2011). Citing to United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the Second Circuit explained that “[o]nce it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed.” Oneida, 665 F.3d at 439. Indeed, “[t]o the extent that the state law claims are more complex or require more judicial resources to adjudicate, or are more salient in the case as a whole than the federal law claims, it can be fairly said that the state law claims predominate.” UBS Sec. LLC v. Dondero, 705 F.Supp.3d 156, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Here, examining “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims,” it is clear that “the proper course is to decline to exercise jurisdiction” over the parties’ state law claims against Runway. Oneida, 665 F.3d at 439. Determination of Plaintiffs’ conversion and GBL claims against Runway would require analysis of an entirely different set of law and facts than determination of VW's federal due process claim against the TBTA. In determining the only remaining federal claim, the Court focused on the TBTA's conduct up until the Audi was towed and analyzed that conduct under federal constitutional precedents, see supra Section I, whereas to determine Plaintiffs’ conversion and GBL claims, the Court would have to analyze Runway's conduct after the Audi was towed, and rely on state precedent. Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge this chasm between the facts and law relevant to the state claims as compared to the federal claims—VW has not moved for summary judgment on its conversion and GBL claims, and although Betesh purports to move for summary judgment on all her claims, her briefing does not mention her GBL claim, and she devotes exactly two paragraphs of her 25-page motion for summary judgment to her conversion claim. See ECF No. 96; ECF No. 98-14 at 25. Accordingly, the Court finds that the state law issues predominate with respect to Plaintiffs’ conversion and GBL claims against Runway. Calixto v. Balsamo & Rosenblatt, P.C., No. 18-cv-4675, 2020 WL 13547912, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim brought under the GBL because the state claims substantially predominated over the only remaining federal law issue, which was the damages to which plaintiff was entitled).

The Court also finds that the predominance of state law issues counsels in favor of the Court exercising its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ New York Constitution claims against Runway. In her summary judgment briefing, Betesh urges the Court to treat her state constitutional claims congruously with her federal constitutional claims. ECF No. 98-14 at 21. The Court cannot do so. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims against Runway because it found that under federal constitutional precedent, Runway could not be considered a state actor, a necessary prerequisite to an actionable federal claim under Section 1983. See Section I.E. Although courts largely interpret the due process protections provided by the New York Constitution co-extensively with the Federal Constitution, the protections offered by each constitution vary in one important regard. “Conspicuously absent from the [New York] State Constitution is any language requiring State action before an individual may find refuge in its protections.” Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (1978). State courts have interpreted the New York Constitution as providing “a basis to apply a more flexible State involvement requirement than is currently being imposed by the Supreme Court with respect to the Federal provision.” Id., 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 379 N.E.2d at 1174; see also People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 783 N.Y.S.2d 485, 817 N.E.2d 341, 364 (2004) (same). Thus, while the Court's finding that Runway is not a state actor under the Federal Constitution is outcome-determinative for Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims against Runway, it is not so for Plaintiffs’ claims against Runway under the New York Constitution. As such, state law issues would necessarily predominate in any analysis of Plaintiffs’ New York Constitution claims, and thus those claims are better left in the hands of a New York state court. Vargas v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. 16-cv-5733, 2020 WL 2836824, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020) (holding that it is especially appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining non-federal claims when those claims “are analyzed under different legal frameworks and standards” than the federal claims that the court analyzed).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state law claims against Runway predominate because they cover a broader set of issues than the remaining federal claim, and require factual and legal analyses unrelated to that federal claim, which a state court is in a better position to conduct. See, e.g., Raymond v. City of New York, 317 F. Supp. 3d 746, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims despite not dismissing all of plaintiff's federal claims because the state law claims “substantially predominate” and “[c]onsideration of the remaining state and local law claims would involve proof and disputes and analysis of facts” not relevant to the federal claims); DigitAlb, Sh.a v. Setplex, LLC, 284 F. Supp. 3d 547, 564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (in determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts consider “whether the factual or legal analyses governing the federal and state claims are unrelated”). Because the state law claims predominate, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Having determined that it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Runway under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), the Court must now determine whether declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction would “promote the values ․ [of] economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 2004).

“Comity takes into account such factors as the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.” Chenensky v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “Comity and respect for New York state courts dictate that where possible, state courts should decide matters of state law, and that absent exceptional circumstances, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [state] claims.” Wilson v. Dantas, No. 12-cv-3238, 2013 WL 92999, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013). Since no such exceptional circumstances apply to Plaintiffs’ state claims, comity counsels in favor of the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

The values of judicial economy and convenience also counsel in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Although the parties have completed discovery and the Court has decided certain motions, retaining jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims would not serve judicial economy or convenience because the parties and the Court are not yet ready for, or even preparing for, trial; the parties have not sufficiently briefed summary judgment motions on their state law claims against Runway;⁹ and the remaining state law claims are not easily resolvable at this time. See FIH, LLC v. Barr, No. 20-489, 2021 WL 5286659, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (upholding the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because, “although discovery had been completed, the parties’ briefing on the viability of the state law claims was perfunctory”); Chenensky, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (finding that judicial economy favored declining jurisdiction over “even an old case” when the court had issued two opinions resolving dispositive motions and had not ventured into the parties’ state law claims, and explaining that “[i]n weighing convenience, courts ask whether the case is easily resolvable”); McKoy v. Trump Corp., No. 18-cv-9936, 2024 WL 233936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2024) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction promoted the values of economy and convenience when the parties and court were not yet ready for trial, and portions of defendant's summary judgment motion still required adjudication).

Accordingly, because the Court finds that the values of judicial economy, convenience, and comity would not be served by exercising supplemental jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Runway, and dismisses those claims. See, e.g., Garro v. Conn., 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), and holding that the district court would have been “well within [its] discretion in declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim after dismissing all but an insubstantial federal claim”); Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 991 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims after ruling in plaintiff's favor on his federal due process claim).¹⁰

V. Damages

The Court has granted VW's motion seeking summary judgment on its due process Monell claim with respect to the tow of the Audi, and found that the TBTA has an obligation to provide lienholders with notice and an opportunity to be heard. On or before May 1, 2024, VW and the TBTA shall meet and confer and submit to the Court a joint letter not to exceed 10 pages expressing their respective positions (to the extent they cannot reach an agreement) regarding: (1) an appropriate modification to the TBTA's existing policies to provide for notification to lienholders when a vehicle is towed at the TBTA's behest; and (2) what, if any, money damages are appropriate in light of this Order.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1. GRANTS VW's motion for summary judgment against the TBTA with respect to its federal due process claim, and DENIES the TBTA's motion for summary judgment on the same claim.

2. DENIES VW's motion for summary judgment against the TBTA with respect to its remaining federal constitutional claims, its New York Constitution claims, and its claim for declaratory relief, and GRANTS the TBTA's motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims.

3. DENIES VW's motion for summary judgment against Runway with respect to its federal constitutional claims and its claim for declaratory relief, and GRANTS Runway's motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims.

4. DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over VW's claims against Runway under the New York Constitution, the GBL, and for conversion.

5. DENIES Betesh's motion for summary judgment against the TBTA and GRANTS the TBTA's motion for summary judgment against Betesh.

6. DENIES Betesh's motion for summary judgment against Runway with respect to her federal constitutional claims and her claim for declaratory relief, and GRANTS Runway's motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims.

7. DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Betesh's claims against Runway under the New York Constitution, the GBL, and for conversion.

The only remaining issue in this case is determining an appropriate damages remedy with respect to VW's due process Monell claim. The Court awaits the parties’ submissions regarding those damages, as directed in Section V.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Port Authority of New York And New Jersey (“Port Authority”), a bi-state agency was initially also named as a defendant. ECF No. 23 ¶ 7. On October 25, 2022, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Port Authority from this action. ECF No. 82.

2.   The Runway Defendants did not file a memorandum of law in support of their motion for summary judgment but instead filed a series of declarations, affidavits, and exhibits, which the Court interprets as Runway's motion for summary judgment, along with co-Defendant TBTA's motion for summary judgment, in which Runway appears to join.

4.   At that time, the TBTA's policy was to use its license plate reader system to flag vehicles with suspended registrations regardless of whether the registrations were related to toll violations incurred at TBTA crossing points or at crossing points managed by other agencies, such as the Port Authority. ECF No. 106 ¶ 7. Generally, when a vehicle goes through a crossing point without paying a toll, the tolling authority who manages the crossing point at issue provides the registered owner of the vehicle with notification of the violation. Id. Once a vehicle has persistently failed to respond to those notices or resolve the amounts due, the tolling authority forwards that vehicle's information to the DMV to begin the process of potentially suspending the vehicle's registration. Id.

5.   Unless noted, case law quotations in this Order accept all alterations and omit internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes.

6.   The Court notes that the Second Circuit has held that “automobile license plates are governmental property intended primarily to serve a governmental purpose,” in the speech context, further undermining VW's argument that it held a protected property interest in the license plates. Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2001)

7.   As discussed below, see infra Section I.E., the Court finds that Runway was not acting under color of state law when, after towing the vehicle, it failed to timely notify Plaintiff and VW that it had towed the Audi, asserted a lien on the vehicle, and eventually sold it. Accordingly, Runway's actions beyond towing the Audi are not attributable to TBTA and cannot form the basis for a due process violation. See Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Under § 1983, constitutional torts are only actionable against state actors or private parties acting under color of state law.”).

8.   This balancing test was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

9.   As discussed, see supra pp. –––– – ––––, the substance of the parties’ summary judgment motions primarily concerned their federal constitutional claims. The parties gave short, if any, shrift to their state claims against Runway.

10.   Although the Court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Runway because the state law issues predominate over the remaining federal claim, the Court has exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ New York Constitution claims against the TBTA, the only defendant against whom a federal claim survives, see supra Section III. The Court did so because unique state law issues did not predominate with respect to that limited set of claims, the adjudication of which was closely tied to the adjudication of Plaintiffs’ federal claims against the TBTA. See, e.g., Salu v. Miranda, 830 F. App'x 341, 348 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction to dismiss certain state law claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other state law claims); Sosa v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 14-cv-7094, 2018 WL 10125147, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over only certain state claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims that were distinct from the only surviving federal claim).

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge: