CUCUL v. MAJOR CLEANING INC LLC 45 LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Israel Cucul (“Cucul”) and Elizabeth Lorenzo (“Lorenzo,” and together with Cucul, the “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action on February 2, 2022. On August 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their third and most recent amended complaint (ECF No. 79, “Third Amended Complaint” or “TAC”) alleging labor law violations pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), and Title 12 of New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations (“NYCRR”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Major Cleaning, Inc. (“Major Cleaning”), Adelson Desouza (“Desouza”), Boucherie Pas LLC d/b/a Boucherie Union Square (“Boucherie”), and Fiorello's Roman Cafe, Inc. d/b/a Café Fiorello (“Fiorello”) failed to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of the FLSA. (TAC ¶¶ 188-203, Counts I & II.) Plaintiffs further allege that all defendants -- Major Cleaning, Desouza, Boucherie, Fiorello, as well as Hurricane Strauss, Inc. d/b/a Westville Chelsea (“Westville Chelsea”), Westville Restaurant, Inc. d/b/a Westville East (“Westville East”), and Broadway Hospitality Venture, LLC d/b/a Bond 45 Italian Kitchen and Bar (“Bond 45,” and together with Boucherie, Fiorello, Westville Chelsea, and Westville East, the “Restaurant Defendants”) -- failed to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of NYLL and NYCRR. (Id. ¶¶ 204-218, Counts III & IV.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Major Cleaning, Desouza, and Bond 45 failed to pay spread-of-hours pay as required by NYLL and NYCRR. (Id. ¶¶ 219-221, Count V.)

Plaintiffs, together with two of the defendants, Bond 45 and Fiorello, now write pursuant to Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d. Cir. 2015), seeking approval of a proposed settlement agreement reached between Plaintiffs, Bond 45, and Fiorello. (ECF No. 96, “Cheeks Letter”; ECF No. 96-1, “Proposed Settlement Agreement” or “PSA.”) For the reasons that follow, the request for approval of the PSA is denied without prejudice to being renewed upon the submission of a revised PSA as well as supplemental information and documentation that comply with the Court's determinations in this Memorandum and Order.

BACKGROUND

As alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs worked at various times between 2017 and 2021, and in various capacities, as overnight cleaning or janitorial workers in a variety of restaurants operated by the Restaurant Defendants. (See generally TAC ¶¶ 41-161.) Plaintiffs allege that they were not directly employed by the Restaurant Defendants and were instead staffed by and received their wages (if any) from Major Cleaning, Desouza, or Desouza's agents. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 43-47, 66, 84, 93-98, 115, 126-127, 129, 144-147, 161, 164.) They further allege, however, that Major Cleaning and Desouza, together with the Restaurant Defendants, constitute joint employers of Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 164.)

Plaintiffs allege that their hours worked varied between 56 hours per week (8 hours per day, every day) and 84 hours per week (12 hours per day, every day) depending on the assignment. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 97, 124, 132, 150.) According to the TAC, Cucul worked at Bond 45 for just over four months -- between September 3, 2017 and January 14, 2018. (Id. ¶ 66.) Thereafter, Cucul worked at Westville Chelsea for over 19 months, from January 15, 2018, through August 22, 2019, and for nearly 7 months at Westville East, from August 23, 2019, through March 20, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 93-94.) Lorenzo worked alongside Cucul at Westville East from September 28, 2019, through March 20, 2020, a period of nearly six months. (Id. ¶¶ 122-123.) Both Plaintiffs worked at Boucherie beginning on August 8, 2021, “for approximately one month.” (Id. ¶ 129.) Finally, “for approximately a one-week period in or around December 2021,” both Plaintiffs worked at Fiorello. (Id. ¶ 147.) The TAC does not allege any further employment of either of the Plaintiffs by any Defendant after December 2021.

As relevant to the instant motion for settlement approval, Plaintiffs allege that Fiorello failed to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of the FLSA (TAC ¶¶ 188-203, Counts I & II), that Bond 45 and Fiorello failed to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of NYLL and NYCRR (id. ¶¶ 204-218, Counts III & IV), and that Bond 45 failed to pay spread-of-hours pay as required by NYLL and NYCRR (id. ¶¶ 219-221, Count V). Plaintiffs seek unpaid wages, overtime, and spread-of-hours premiums, as well as liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 31.)

After motion practice, which resulted in the filing of multiple amended complaints, the case proceeded to discovery. All discovery is scheduled to be completed by February 21, 2025. (ECF No. 95, Minute Entry.) Plaintiffs, Bond 45, and Fiorello now jointly request approval of the PSA. (See Cheeks Letter.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford litigants wide latitude in settling their disputes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (noting that “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing ․ a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared”). An exception to this rule exists for stipulated dismissals of FLSA actions. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015). Parties may not stipulate to dismiss an FLSA action without submitting the proposed settlement to the district court for review and approval. Id.

District courts in this circuit frequently look to the factors outlined in Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), to determine the reasonableness of a proposed settlement. See, e.g., Li Rong Gao v. Perfect Team Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d 636, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Cortes v. New Creators, Inc., No. 15-cv-5680 (PAE), 2016 WL 3455383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2016). These factors include:

(1) the plaintiff's range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of arm's-length bargaining between experienced counsel; and (5) the possibility of fraud or collusion.

Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medley v. Am. Cancer Soc'y, No. 10-cv-3214 (BSJ), 2010 WL 3000028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010)) (citing Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Alleyne v. Time Moving & Storage Inc., 264 F.R.D. 41, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 944 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2019) (referring to the Wolinksy factors examined as part of a district court's fairness review under Cheeks).

“In addition, if attorneys’ fees and costs are provided for in the settlement, district courts will also evaluate the reasonableness of the fees and costs.” Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., 948 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in [an FLSA] action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”). In the present case, attorneys’ fees and costs arise in the context of a settlement with two of the seven named defendants incorporating attorneys’ fees and costs into the settlement amount. See, e.g., Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reviewing FLSA settlement incorporating counsel's fees as part of the total settlement amount).

DISCUSSION

I. Range of Recovery

The Proposed Settlement Agreement with Defendants Bond 45 and Fiorello provides for a total payment of $24,000, of which Cucul will receive $14,933.47 and Lorenzo will receive $709.68, meaning that in total Cucul and Lorenzo will together receive $15,643.15. (Cheeks Letter at 2.) The Proposed Settlement Agreement provides that Plaintiffs’ counsel will receive a total of $8,356.56 comprising $356.56 in “pro-rata out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the action to date” and $8,000 in attorneys’ fees, consisting of one-third of the total payment. (Id.) Attorneys’ fees and costs therefore amount to approximately 35% of the total payment (the quotient of $8,356.56 and $24,000).¹

Plaintiffs’ counsel estimates that “the maximum recovery Plaintiffs could obtain for the alleged backpay owed by [Bond 45 and Fiorello] is $18,185.00, excluding liquidated damages, and $36,370 including liquidated damages.” (Cheeks Letter at 2.) Based on this estimate, Plaintiffs’ counsel notes that “Plaintiffs’ combined recovery, totaling $15,643.13 represents more than 86% of their alleged back-pay and more than 43% of all claimed damages, including penalties ․” (Id.)

If by estimating “the maximum recovery Plaintiffs could obtain for the alleged backpay owed by” Bond 45 and Fiorello, Plaintiffs mean to provide an estimate for Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery of all claims (including, e.g., spread-of-hours pay), then given their other assumptions, the Plaintiffs’ combined recovery of 43% would be reasonable. See Khan v. Young Adult Inst., Inc., No. 18-cv-2824 (HBP), 2018 WL 6250658, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018) (collecting cases of reasonable FLSA settlements ranging from 25% to 40% of plaintiff's maximum recovery). Nonetheless, the PSA and its accompanying submissions are deficient and preclude settlement approval because they fail to provide evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ estimates. See Picorelli v. Watermark Contractors Inc., No. 21-cv-2433 (KMK), 2022 WL 2386761, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2022) (“The possibility of Plaintiff facing evidentiary and legal battles cannot justify the Court's approval of the Settlement Amount as fair and reasonable without any documentation supporting the Settlement Amount or the total possible recovery amount.”).

Here, the Cheeks Letter does not include or attach any documentation to permit the Court to independently assess counsel's estimate of Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery. The TAC itself provides general estimates of how much Plaintiffs worked and how much they were paid (e.g., TAC ¶¶ 70, 78, 84, 86 (alleging Cucul generally worked at Bond 45 from 9:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. the next day seven days per week, with a break from 1:00 a.m. until 6:00 a.m., “subject to modification as directed by supervisors at Bond 45 and/or Major Cleaning,” and was generally paid $800 in wages every two weeks but would often receive less because “Desouza often made deductions from Cucul's wages”)). Neither the TAC nor the submissions filed with the Cheeks Letter provides the total number of hours each Plaintiff claims to have worked without regular or overtime pay or provides any documentation to support such assertions. It is thus unclear what information was used to estimate each Plaintiff's maximum recovery, what methodology was applied to that information, and, relatedly, whether the estimate includes possible statutory damages for failure to pay spread-of-hours pay. Thus, “the Court will not approve the PSA without additional information regarding the underlying data and methodology that were used to generate the Settlement Amount.” Perez, 2021 WL 1964724, at *4; see also Gaspar v. Pers. Touch Moving, Inc., No. 13-cv-8187 (AJN), 2015 WL 7871036, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015) (“the parties did not submit the underlying data to which the methodology [used to generate the settlement amount] was applied ․ the parties must submit this information to the Court before the Court can approve the settlement”).

Should Plaintiffs, Bond 45, and Fiorello renew their motion for settlement approval, they are instructed to: submit to the Court a more detailed explanation of their methodology, i.e., how they arrived at the estimate of Plaintiffs’ estimated damages; differentiate Cucul's damages from Lorenzo's damages; submit the underlying data to which they have applied their methodology; explain whether the estimate accounts for damages arising out of Counts I, II, III, IV, and V of the TAC; and explain the calculations used to apportion attorneys’ fees and costs among the Plaintiffs.

Notwithstanding the Court's request for further supporting information on the calculation of estimated damages, the Court finds that the remaining Wolinsky factors weigh in favor of settlement approval. The Court is satisfied that the PSA was negotiated competently, in good faith, and at arm's length, and that there is no evidence of fraud or collusion. (See Cheeks Letter at 3 (noting that the settlement was negotiated “at arm's length by experienced counsel, based on the parties’ assessment of the risks and expenses of litigation”).) Furthermore, Plaintiffs will be the only employees affected by the settlement and dismissal of the lawsuit as the TAC does not purport to be brought on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. See Escobar v. Fresno Gourmet Deli Corp., No. 16-cv-6816 (PAE), 2016 WL 7048714, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (noting that no other employee came forward and that the plaintiff would “be the only employee affected by the settlement and dismissal,” and that these facts supported approval of the proposed settlement). Accordingly, the Court finds that the remaining factors weigh in favor of approval of the settlement amount in the instant case.

II. Attorneys’ Fees

Because the Court denies the parties’ motion for settlement approval without prejudice, Plaintiffs’ counsel should not be awarded attorneys’ fees at this time. See Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600 (“Under the FLSA and the NYLL, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs”). However, even if sufficient information had been provided regarding the range of recovery, Plaintiffs’ counsel's request for attorneys’ fees would be denied, without prejudice, for failing to provide adequate documentation supporting the requested fees and costs.

“In an FLSA case, the Court must independently ascertain the reasonableness of the fee request.” Gurung v. White Way Threading LLC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 226, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted). When considering applications for attorneys’ fees, courts in this circuit employ the lodestar method. Kazadavenko v. Atl. Adult Day Care Ctr. Inc., No. 21-cv-3284 (ENV) (LB), 2022 WL 2467541, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2022). The lodestar calculation -- which is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case -- creates a presumptively reasonable fee.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[C]ompliance with the Supreme Court's directive that fee award calculations be ‘objective and reviewable,’ implies the district court should at least provide the number of hours and hourly rate it used to produce the lodestar figure.” Id. at 166–67. Plaintiffs’ counsel has not provided the number of hours worked on behalf of Cucul and Lorenzo or the hourly rate used to calculate attorneys’ fees. (See Cheeks Letter at 3.)

Courts may also employ the “percentage of the fund” method which permits attorneys to recover a percentage of the settlement amount via a previously determined contingency fee agreement. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 417-19 (2d Cir. 2010). Courts in this Circuit routinely approve of one-third or below contingency fees for FLSA cases. Lai v. Journey Preparatory Sch., Inc., No. 19-cv-2970 (CLP), 2022 WL 3327824, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2022) (“With this method, courts in this Circuit have routinely found an award representing one-third of the settlement amount to be reasonable.” (citing Romero v. Westbury Jeep Chrysler Dodge, Inc., No. 15-cv-4145 (ADS) (SIL), 2016 WL 1369389, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016))); Kazadavenko, 2022 WL 2467541 at *4 (collecting cases). However, even where fees are reasonable when analyzed under the percentage method, courts will additionally perform a lodestar “cross-check” and “compare the fees generated by the percentage method with those generated by the lodestar method.” Mobley v. Five Gems Mgmt. Corp., 17-cv-9448 (KPF), 2018 WL 1684343, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2018) (citations omitted).

Critically, “[t]he fee applicant must submit adequate documentation supporting the requested attorneys’ fees and costs.” Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600; Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (“In the Second Circuit, that entails submitting contemporaneous billing records documenting, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done”). “[E]ven when the proposed fees do not exceed one third of the total settlement amount, courts in this circuit use the lodestar method as a cross check to ensure the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees.” Navarro Zavala v. Trece Corp., No. 18-cv-1382 (ER), 2020 WL 728802, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (quotation and citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel requests fees and costs of $8,356.56 out of the $24,000 total payment, consisting of $8,000 (or approximately 33.3%) in fees and an additional $356.56 (or 1.5%) in “pro-rata out-of-pocket expenses.” (Cheeks Letter at 2.) Plaintiffs’ counsel represent that as a result of their work investigating and litigating the case through motions practice and discovery, “[t]he total fees counsel has incurred in this action exceed $100,000.” (Id. at 3.) As a result, the Cheeks Letter argues that an $8,000 fee is presumptively reasonable. (Id.) But without supporting evidence -- contemporaneous billing records and documentation for costs requested -- the Court cannot determine whether the attorneys’ fee request from the Proposed Settlement of Cucul's and Lorenzo's claims is commensurate with the amount of time spent on this case on behalf of those two Plaintiffs and is therefore reasonable. Moreover, although their requested costs of $356.56 are not inherently unreasonable, Plaintiffs’ counsel have provided no documentation supporting their requested costs, and have provided no citation in support of their proposed method of apportioning costs based on “the ratio of weeks Plaintiff[s] alleged they worked for [Bond 45 and Fiorello] relative to the total weeks of employment alleged in the Complaint against all Defendants” (Cheeks Letter at 2 n.1), instead of based on costs actually incurred in connection with litigating the action against Bond 45 and Fiorello.

Thus, having “failed to provide contemporaneous billing records for attorneys involved, or even a list of attorneys involved and their billing rates ․, Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] failed to meet [their] burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees requested[.]” Fontana v. Bowls & Salads Mexican Grill Inc., No. 19-cv-1587 (JMA) (ARL), 2022 WL 3362181, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2389298 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2022). Plaintiffs’ counsel's failure to provide this documentation necessarily warrants denial of the fee application without prejudice. See, e.g., Lopez, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (denying application for attorneys’ fees where plaintiff's counsel provided no contemporaneous billing record evidence); Mamani v. Licetti, No. 13-cv-7002 (KMW) (JCF), 2014 WL 2971050, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2014) (“The parties ․ do not provide the Court with any information to aid the Court in assessing the reasonableness of the fee award. Accordingly, the Court cannot approve the Settlement Agreement's allocation of attorney's fees at this time.”).

III. Waiver and Release of Claims

The other provisions of the PSA, with the exception of its provisions governing the waiver and release of claims, are fair and reasonable. See Doe v. Solera Capital LLC, No. 18-cv-1769 (ER), 2021 WL 568806, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2021). With respect to the parties’ obligations under the PSA, “the Court cannot approve overbroad, one-way releases contained in the Agreement.” Gomez v. Shine Servs. LLC, No. 20-cv-4190 (BCM), 2021 WL 1391782, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021); Lopez v. Poko-St. Ann L.P., 176 F. Supp. 3d 340, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The PSA purports to release not only Bond 45 and Fiorello but also

their direct and indirect, past, present, and future parents (including but not limited to grandparent companies, great grandparent companies, and so on), affiliates (including but not limited to any entities directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with one or either of [Bond 45 or Fiorello]”), predecessors, successors, related entities, assigns, beneficiaries, trusts, executors, fiduciaries, attorneys, administrators and agents, including but not limited to The Fireman Group Café Concepts, Inc. [sic], and all of their (including but not limited to [Bond 45's and Fiorello's]) direct and indirect, past, present, and future managers, officers, directors, partners, members, owners, shareholders, employees, employee benefit plans, trusts, fiduciaries, trustees, executors, administrators, representatives, agents, professional advisors, consultants, attorneys, and insurers (collectively, including but not limited to [Bond 45 and Fiorello], the “Releasees” and each a “Releasee”) ․

(PSA ¶ 2(a).)

As other courts in this circuit have found when assessing similar language, the proposed release would “extend the benefit of a release well beyond the settling defendants” and could be applied to “bar future claims against a wide range of unknown and unidentifiable persons and entities with no real connection to the case being settled.” Gomez, 2021 WL 1391782, at *2 (citations omitted); Carranza v. VBFS, Inc., No. 20-cv-2635 (PAE) (KHP), 2022 WL 2763371, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2022); Burgos v. Ne. Logistics, Inc., No. 15-cv-6840 (CBA) (CLP), 2018 WL 2376481, at *6 & n.12 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2376300 (May 24, 2018). A release of such a broad and ill-defined group of Releasees cannot be approved as fair and reasonable, and “[f]or this reason alone, the releases in the [PSA] go ‘beyond what the law permits’ in an FLSA settlement.” See Gomez, 2021 WL 1391782, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this case, the overly broad Releasees definition is paired with an overly broad definition of released claims. Plaintiffs Cucul and Lorenzo would release claims including

any and all wage and hour claims, causes of action, liabilities, charges, penalties, or demands, including but not limited to those arising under or related to federal, state, and local laws, and regulations thereunder, including, but not limited to, any and all claims for notice, pay in lieu of notice, basic pay, unpaid or lost benefits, salary, wages, minimum wages, overtime, wage supplements, spread-of-hours pay, call-in pay, uniform maintenance pay, tools-of-the-trade, bonuses, commissions, incentive payments, gratuities, service charges, charges purporting to be gratuities, payouts, sick leave pay, vacation pay, paid time off, severance pay, expense reimbursements, penalties, premiums, or other compensation or incentives unpaid wages [sic], and all other wage and hour or employment-related claims against the Releases [sic] that were or could have been asserted in this Action, whether known or unknown, under federal, state and/or local wage and hour laws, including, but not limited to, the FLSA, the NYLL, the New York Hospitality Industry Wage Order, and the New York Wage Theft and Prevention Act, from the beginning of time through the date on which Plaintiffs execute this Agreement (collectively, the “Released Claims”).

(PSA ¶ 2(a).) The enumeration of multiple examples of released claims is not inherently unfair or unreasonable, and the PSA's definition of Released Claims is in fact close to what other courts in this circuit have determined to be fair and reasonable. See, e.g., Velandia v. Serendipity 3, Inc., No. 16-cv-1799 (AJN), 2018 WL 3418776, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018) (concluding agreement was appropriately narrow where it released “claims and causes of action for damages, salaries, wages, compensation, spread-of-hours pay, statutory damages, unlawful wage deductions, misappropriation of gratuities, overtime wages, uniform pay, monetary relief, and any other benefits of any kind, earnings, back pay, liquidated, statutory, and other damages, statutory penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs, for the Claims and any other claim brought, or that could have been brought, in this action under the FLSA, the NYLL, the WTPA, and/or any local, state, or federal wage statute, code, or ordinance”).

Nonetheless, the issue lies in the release of “employment-related claims,” a category of claims far broader than the wage and hour claims alleged in the TAC against Bond 45 and Fiorello. Employment-related claims logically encompass wage and hour claims, but could also include, for example, pension claims brought under ERISA, or claims for retaliatory discharge or employment discrimination. In this case, where “the proposed releases are one-sided, extend beyond wage and hour claims, and are further broadened by the expansive definitions of ‘releasees,’ discussed above[,] they are not fair and reasonable to the [P]laintiff[s] and cannot be approved under Cheeks.” Gomez, 2021 WL 1391782, at *3.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies, without prejudice, the motion to approve the Proposed Settlement Agreement for claims by Cucul and Lorenzo against Bond 45 and Fiorello. Plaintiffs, Bond 45, and Fiorello may file a revised motion for settlement approval by submitting a revised PSA as well as supplemental information and documentation that comply with the Court's determinations in this Memorandum and Order by no later than January 15, 2025.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Courts evaluate the fairness of a plaintiff's recovery after deducting attorneys’ fees and costs.” Perez v. Ultra Shine Car Wash, Inc., No. 20-cv-782 (KMK), 2021 WL 1964724, at *3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (citing Arango v. Scotts Co., LLC, No. 17-cv-7174 (KMK), 2020 WL 5898956, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020); Zorn-Hill v. A2B Taxi LLC, No. 19-cv-1058 (KMK), 2020 WL 5578357, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2020); Garcia v. Cloister Apt Corp., No. 16-cv-5542 (HBP), 2019 WL 1382298, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019)). Thus, the Court's evaluation of the fairness of the proposed recovery by Cucul and Lorenzo will be based on $15,643.15.

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge: