ROMA v. DAVID CARMILI PHYSICIAN (2024)

Memorandum and Order

On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff Yvette Roma commenced this action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants David Carmili, Physician, P.C. and David Carmili as an individual alleging various wage and hour violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), §§ 190 et seq. and 650 et seq. (ECF No. 1, “Compl.”). The original complaint was amended on January 2, 2024 and Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on February 8, 2024. (ECF No. 29, Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”).)

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's SAC pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See ECF No. 43, “Notice of Mot.”; ECF No. 44, “Carmili Aff.”; ECF No. 45, “Mot. to Dismiss”; ECF No. 46, “Def. Reply”). Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion to dismiss her claims. (ECF No. 48, “Avshalumov Aff.”; ECF No. 49, Pl. Opp.). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Background

The following facts are drawn exclusively from the Second Amended Complaint, which the Court assumes to be true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, for purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Collins v. Putt, 979 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 2015)); Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Center, 858 F. Supp. 350, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“In deciding the motion [to dismiss], the court must accept as true the material facts alleged in the complaint, and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”).

I. The Parties

David Carmili (“Carmili”) is the owner of David Carmili, Physician, P.C. (“Carmili P.C.”, together with Carmili the “Defendants”), a domestic professional service corporation operating in Ridgewood, New York. (SAC ¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff has been employed by Carmili at Carmili, P.C. as a medical assistant since approximately August 2002. (SAC ¶ 7, 20.)

II. Plaintiff's Regular Work Schedule and Discrepancies in Pay

From in or about June 2017 to September 2022, Plaintiff worked a regular schedule of shifts at Carmili Physician, P.C. beginning at approximately 9:00 a.m. and ending at approximately 6:00 p.m., or later, five days per week. (SAC ¶¶ 21–22.) During this time, Plaintiff regularly worked approximately 42 to 45 hours per week. (SAC ¶¶ 27, 35.)

Although Defendants informed Plaintiff she was permitted to take a lunch break, she was frequently directed to “continue working and performing her job duties during her lunch break, or to eat at her desk while she work[ed].” (SAC ¶ 23.) As a result, Plaintiff often did not take a break for lunch, but Defendants still deducted an hour per day from her pay as a “lunch break.” (SAC ¶¶ 33–34.) Defendants also did not pay Plaintiff at a wage rate of time and a half for all of the hours she worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. (SAC ¶¶ 27, 35.) When Plaintiff was paid for overtime hours, Defendants paid her by a separate check from her regular wages. (SAC ¶ 29.)

Beginning in or around 2015, Defendants verbally promised to pay Plaintiff at a wage rate of $18.00 per hour worked. (SAC ¶ 24.) Despite this promise, Plaintiff only received $16.00 per hour every payroll week. (SAC ¶ 25.) Defendants’ time keeping system also “often malfunctioned,” which led to inaccurate record keeping of “Plaintiff's start time and end times of her work during the Plaintiff's workday.” (SAC ¶ 30.) Despite Plaintiff raising the issue of these timekeeping malfunctions and the accuracy of her pay checks, Defendants did not take steps to remedy these issues. (SAC ¶¶ 31–36, 44.)

Defendants further promised to deduct “$25.00 or $50.00 per week” from Plaintiff's regular wage that would be paid towards her student loans. (SAC ¶ 37.) Although Defendants made these deductions from Plaintiff's paycheck, she later learned no money was paid from the deducted funds towards her student loans. (SAC ¶ 38-40, 46–48.) When Plaintiff attempted to file her taxes, she discovered she owed large sums of interest and penalties on her student loans because, unbeknownst to her, she was late on her payments and “no longer eligible for an end-of-year tax credit” due to the missed payments. (SAC ¶¶ 46–48.)

Plaintiff did not learn about these discrepancies in her pay until “years later” because Defendants failed to provide a paystub or wage statements with each payment of Plaintiff's regular wages. (SAC ¶ 28, 41.) Defendants’ failure to provide a paystub or wage statements made Plaintiff “suspicious that she was not being paid properly,” but prevented Plaintiff from correcting the issues or “ascertain[ing] the amounts she was supposed to be paid, the number of hours she worked during each pay period, and the amount(s) of any and all deductions that Defendants were taking from her pay.” (SAC ¶¶ 41, 45.)

III. The Unlawful Retaliation

Beginning in or about September 2022, shortly after Plaintiff complained about the deductions and discrepancies in her paycheck, Defendants reduced Plaintiff's regular work schedule from five days per week to “Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and Thursday, from 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.” (SAC ¶ 50.) Defendants also demoted Plaintiff from the title of “office manager” and reduced her regular job duties. (SAC ¶ 51.) During this time, Plaintiff frequently heard Defendants call her derogatory names to her co-workers during the workday. (SAC ¶ 52.) Soon after Plaintiff complained about this treatment, Plaintiff's medical training certificates Defendants were storing for her “disappeared,” which prevented her from advancing at work or finding another job in the medical field, and she received an anonymous letter at her home “alleging infidelity with respect to Plaintiff's husband.” (SAC ¶¶ 53–54.)

IV. Causes of Action

Claims One and Two of the SAC allege that Defendants violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and the NYLL, N.Y. Com. Codes R. & Regs. (“NYCCRR”) tit. 12, § 137-1.3, by failing to pay Plaintiff overtime wages for “hours worked in excess of forty hours per week at a wage rate of one and a half (1.5) times the regular wage” Plaintiff was entitled to under 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and NYLL § 652. (SAC ¶¶ 72–82.) Relatedly, Claims Three and Four allege Defendants violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), and NYLL Art. 6, by failing to pay Plaintiff for all of the hours she worked. (SAC ¶¶ 83–90.)

Claim Five asserts Defendants made willful and improper deductions from Plaintiff's regular wages in violation of the NYLL, NYCCRR tit. 12, § 195-4. (SAC ¶¶ 91–93.) Claim Six alleges Defendants unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff after she complained regarding the aforementioned “deductions and discrepancies to her pay” by reducing her work hours, demoting her, and reducing her responsibilities. (SAC ¶¶ 94–99.) Finally, Claims Seven and Eight assert Defendants willfully violated New York's Wage Theft Prevention Act (“WTPA”) by failing to provide Plaintiff with annual wage notices and weekly wage statements. (SAC ¶¶ 100–105.)

V. The Motions

Defendants attack Plaintiff's overtime claims under the FLSA and NYLL (Claims One and Two) for failure to allege she worked in excess of 40 hours per week and failure to deduct daily lunch breaks from her weekly hours. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5–7.) Defendants also assert Plaintiff's claim for unpaid hours under the FLSA (Claim Three) must be dismissed as the FLSA does not recognize “gap time” claims for unpaid work under forty hours per week. (Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8.)

Regarding Claims Seven and Eight, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claims under NYLL § 195 must be dismissed for lack of Article III standing. (Mot. to Dismiss at 8–9.) Finally, Defendants argue this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims because the NYLL claims “predominate[ ] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” (Mot. to Dismiss at 9–10.)

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead facts that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint is facially plausible when the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but must contain more than mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or “naked assertions” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. Although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not demand that a complaint be a model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged, it requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App'x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).

Discussion

I. Unpaid Overtime Claims under the FLSA and NYLL

Claims One and Two allege Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the overtime wages she was owed under Section 206 of the FLSA and Section 652 of the NYLL “for all hours regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at a wage rate of one and a half (1.5) times the regular wage.” (SAC ¶¶ 76, 81.) The FLSA “mandates that an employee engaged in interstate commerce be compensated at a rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty per week.” Nakahata v. New York–Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 200 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)). “[T]he relevant portions of New York Labor Law do not diverge from the requirements of the FLSA,” and the pleading standards for FLSA overtime claims “apply equally to ․ NYLL state law claims.” Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 89 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Copper v. Cavalry Staffing, LLC, 132 F. Supp. 3d 460, 465 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Overtime claims under the FLSA and NYLL are subject to the same standards.”) (citing Dejesus, 726 F.3d at 89 n.5).

“[I]n order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours.” Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013). Although plaintiffs must plead overtime claims with “specificity,” the Second Circuit has “taken care not to foreclose relief to plaintiffs who neglected to keep ‘careful records’ of the hours they worked” and does not require “plaintiffs who plausibly allege that they worked in excess of forty hours for multiple weeks without overtime pay to provide a week-by-week recounting of the hours they worked.” Herrera v. Comme des Garcons, Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 115 (2d Cir. 2023). Indeed, a plaintiff is “not required to keep perfect time records or to plead its hours worked with ‘mathematical precision.’ ” Neil v. Sidney W. Barbanel Consulting Eng'r LLC, No. 12 CV 4061 (SJ) (RLM), 2014 WL 3907909, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2014).

Here, the SAC is sufficiently specific to state a claim for overtime violations under the FLSA and NYLL. The SAC alleges that from approximately June 2017 to September 2022, “Plaintiff regularly worked five days per week for the Defendants” from approximately 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. each day. (SAC ¶¶ 21–22.) This amounted to 45 hours of work per regular work week. (SAC ¶ 22.) “That allegation itself gets us ‘beyond forty hours in any given workweek, and therefore to a plausible claim of overtime.” Herrera, 84 F.4th at 115 (quoting Dejesus, 726 F.3d at 89). Although Defendants argue Plaintiff “contradicts herself” in the Second Amended Complaint by claiming she worked 45 hours per week in certain paragraphs (SAC ¶ 22) and 42 hours in others (SAC ¶ 35), even assuming arguendo Plaintiff only worked 42 hours per week, she has still stated a “plausible claim of overtime” for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week that survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5); Herrera, 84 F.4th at 115.

To the extent Defendants seek to argue Plaintiff did not work in excess of 40 hours per week due to her meal breaks, that is an issue better addressed after discovery, not at the motion to dismiss stage. See Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., Inc., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996)(“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim ․ a district court must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference.”) (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff alleges she was “often told by Defendants and required by Defendants to continue working and performing her job duties during her lunch break, or to eat at her desk while she works.” (SAC ¶ 23.) Where, as here, Plaintiff has alleged she did not receive a “bona fide meal period” during which she was “completely relieved from duty,” the Second Circuit has held that the four corners of the complaint sufficiently allege a plausible overtime claim. Herrera, 84 F.4th at 116.

Accepting Plaintiff's allegations regarding her lunch breaks and the total hours she worked each week as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff adequately alleges that she worked her entire nine-hour shift, five days a week and this allegation sufficiently “pleads that the [Plaintiff's] regular basic workweek exceeded 40 hours per week, every week,” during the alleged period. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has pleaded a plausible overtime claim under the FLSA and NYLL and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims One and Two is denied.

II. Unpaid Hours Under the FLSA Claim

Claim Three alleges “Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff's wages for all hours worked in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).” (SAC ¶ 84.) Defendants argue Claim Three must be dismissed as the FLSA does not recognize “gap-time” claims for unpaid work under forty hours per week. (Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8.) This Court agrees.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants only paid her for 32 hours of work, when she worked approximately 42 hours each week. (SAC ¶ 35.) Where, as here, Plaintiff has “worked over 40 hours in a given week but seeks recovery for unpaid work under 40 hours,” courts consider this a “gap-time claim.” Lundy, 711 F.3d at 115. The Second Circuit is clear that the “FLSA does not provide for gap-time claims even when an employee has worked overtime” because the “text of [the] FLSA requires only payment of minimum wages and overtime.” Lundy, 711 F.3d at 116; Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201 (“The FLSA is unavailing even when an employee works over 40 hours per week and claims gap-time wages for those hours worked under 40 per week, unless the wages fall below the minimum threshold.”). Although Plaintiff points to Gonzalez v. Dom's Lawnmaker, Inc. in support of her argument that, “[i]n addition to raising claims for unpaid overtime, an employee may also seek to pursue gap-time claims for unpaid time,” even Gonzalez is clear that these gap time claims are only “cognizable under the NYLL” not the FLSA. 17-CV-3519 (JMA) (SIL), 2022 WL 17488524, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2022); (Pl. Opp. at 11.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges she was only paid for 32 hours of work at the wage rate of $16.00 per hour, when she actually worked approximately 42 hours each week. As the wages Plaintiff was paid did not “fall below the [statutory] minimum threshold,” she cannot recover for any unpaid work under 40 hours under the FLSA, but has sufficiently alleged a gap-time claim under the NYLL. Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 202 (affirming the “District Court's dismissal with prejudice of any gap-time claims made pursuant to the FLSA,” but noting Plaintiffs may “have a gap-time claim pursuant to the NYLL”); Mendoza v. Cornell University, 1:20-cv-02110 (MKV), 2021 WL 918622, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021) (“A Plaintiff may bring a claim under the FLSA only for failure to pay minimum wages and for overtime wages. To the extent Plaintiff alleges facts related to ‘gap time,’ those allegations are relevant only to the NYLL claim.”) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19; Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action and the Court dismisses Claim Three with prejudice. Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 195 (affirming district court's dismissal of the FLSA gap-time claim with prejudice).

III. Wage Statement Claim under Section 195(3) of the NYLL

Claim Seven alleges Defendants “failed to provide Plaintiff with wage statements, upon each payment of his wages, as required by NYLL § 195(3).” (SAC ¶ 101.) Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert a wage statement claim under Section 195(3) of the NYLL because she failed to allege sufficient injury. (Mot. to Dismiss at 8.)

The Second Circuit recently addressed this issue directly, finding “a plaintiff cannot rely on technical violations of the [NYLL]” and must instead “show some causal connection between the lack of accurate notices and the downstream harm.” Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc., 113 F.4th 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2024). This causal connection may involve “show[ing] that he or she would have undertaken ․ advocacy and plausibly would have avoided some actual harm or obtained some actual benefit if accurate notices had been provided,” for example, by showing “inaccurate or noncompliant notices prevented the employee from obtaining full payment of wages in a timely fashion.” Id. “A plaintiff need not, however, establish an injury that is greater than or different from the loss of wages or overtime pay alleged in their lawsuit.” Lock v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2:23-cv-07904 (NJVC) (ST), 2024 WL 4728594, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2024) (citing Guthrie, 113 F.4th at 308).

In the wake of Guthrie, Courts in this Circuit “are in agreement that a plaintiff has standing if he [or she] plausibly alleges that, by failing to provide the required wage statements, the employer was ‘able to hide [its] violations of wage and hour laws’ and thus prevent the employee from ‘determining and seeking payment for the precise amount of [his] unpaid wages.’ ” Freeland v. Findlay's Tall Timbers Distrib. Center, LLC, 22-CV-6415-FPG, 2024 WL 4652251, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2024) (quoting Castillo v. Hollis Delicatessen Corp., No. 22-CV-5476, 2024 WL 4107258, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2024)) (citing Martinenko v. 212 Steakhouse, Inc., No. 1:22-CV-00518 (JLR), 2024 WL 4275286, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2024); Cinar v. R&G Brenner Income Tax, LLC, 20-CV-1362 (RPK) (JRC), 2024 WL 4224046, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024) (collecting cases); Rosas v. M & M LA Solucion Flat Fixed Inc., 23-CV-1212 (DG)(MMH), 2024 WL 4131905, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2024)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ failure to provide her with accurate wage statements in violation of Section 195(3) of the NYLL prevented her from correcting issues with “deductions and discrepancies with respect to her pay” that she did not learn about “until years later as a direct result of Defendants not providing Plaintiff with a paystub with each payment of her regular wages.” (SAC ¶¶ 41, 45.) Plaintiff further alleges defendant's failure to provide her with wage statements prevented her from “ascertain[ing] the amounts she was supposed to be paid, the number of hours she worked during each pay period, and the amount(s) of any and all deductions that Defendants were taking from her pay.” (SAC ¶ 41.)

These specific allegations go beyond mere “technical violations” and are sufficient to establish Article III standing for the purposes of a Section 195(3) claim under the NYLL in the wake of Guthrie. Guthrie, 113 F.4th at 305; see, e.g. Freeland, 2024 WL 4652251 at *2 (finding plaintiff established Article III standing for a section 195 claim under the NYLL where plaintiff alleged Defendants’ failure to provide accurate wage statements, “prevented him from accurately determinin[ing] what amounts he was being underpaid by”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action for lack of standing is denied.

IV. Wage Notice Claim under Section 195(1) of the NYLL

Claim Eight alleges Defendants “failed to provide Plaintiff with a written notice, in English and in Plaintiff's primary language, of her rate of pay, regular pay day, and such other information as required by NYLL § 195(1).” (SAC ¶ 104.) Defendants argue Claim Eight should be dismissed because employees hired prior to April 9, 2011 are not entitled to bring a wage notice claim under Section 195(1) of the NYLL. (Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) This Court agrees.

“New York Labor Law section 195(1) requires employers to provide employees with wage notices within ten business days of the start of employment.” Kone v. Joy Constr. Corp., No. 15CV1328-LTS, 2016 WL 866349, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under New York's Wage Theft Prevention Act (“WTPA”), employers are subject to damages should they not provide such wage notices. Gamero v. Koodo Sushi Corp., 272 F. Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). It is well settled in the Second Circuit, though, that the WTPA does not apply retroactively, and employees hired prior to April 9, 2011, when the WTPA took effect, may not recover damages under Section 195(1) of the NYLL. Gamero, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 510; Gold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 730 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Because there is no support for retroactivity in either the text or the legislative history, we hold that the 2011 amendment is not retroactive.”).

As Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in August 2002, she has not established standing for purposes of a Section 195(1) claim under the NYLL. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action is granted and the Court dismisses Claim Eight without prejudice because the dismissal is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

V. Supplemental Jurisdiction over the Remaining NYLL Claims

Federal district courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under” the “laws ․ of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The FLSA, a federal statute, creates the cause of action undergirding Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint. (SAC ¶ 76.) Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff's remaining FLSA claim is immaterial, made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, or wholly insubstantial or frivolous. See A&B Alt. Mktg. Inc. v. Int'l Quality Fruit Inc., 35 F.4th 913, 915 n.2 (2d Cir. 2022) (listing these as reasons why subject-matter jurisdiction may not exist even where the complaint contains claims technically arising under federal law). This action thus arises under the laws of the United States, which gives the Court subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. See, e.g., Rocha v. Bakhter Afghan Halal Kababs, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 337, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction to hear state law claims that are so related to federal question claims brought in the same action as to ‘form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.’ ” Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). State and federal claims form part of the same case or controversy if they “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” Id. (citing Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2003)). “It is well settled that NYLL and FLSA claims that arise out of the same compensation policies and practices derive from the same common nucleus of operative fact.” Salustio v. 106 Columbia Deli Corp., 264 F. Supp. 3d 540, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

Defendants argue the Court “should not permit Plaintiff to utilize the FLSA claim as a jurisdictional lynchpin” because the NYLL law claims “substantially predominate over the meager [remaining] FLSA” claim. (Mot. to Dismiss at 10.) In support of their predominance argument, Defendants rely on one case, Melgar v. Pie Chatach 1776 LLC, 23-cv-917 (BMC), 2023 WL 2868299 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2023), which is factually and procedurally inapposite. In Melgar, the court expressed its “disinclin[ation] to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction,” over NYLL claims where “the [single remaining] FLSA [claim had] almost nothing to do with the state law claims plaintiff ha[d] brought.” Id. at *2. Notably, though, the court in Melgar “did not ultimately dismiss [the NYLL] claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction” and instead issued an order to show cause as to why the state law claims should not be dismissed. Isayeva v. Diamond Braces, 22 Civ. 4575 (KPF), 2024 WL 1053349, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2024) (citing Melgar, 2023 WL 2868299, at *1).

Here, the Court has sufficient information to determine that it has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's NYLL claims based on the pleadings alone. As an initial matter, supplemental jurisdiction clearly extends to Claim Two, which seeks to recover for overtime premiums under the NYLL, because it virtually overlaps with Claim One, which seeks to recover for the same violation under the FLSA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 72–82.)

Supplemental jurisdiction also extends to Claims Four through Seven, which seek to recover for unpaid minimum wages (SAC ¶¶ 87–90), prohibited deductions (SAC ¶¶ 91–93), unlawful retaliation (SAC ¶¶ 94–99), and violations of the NYLL's wage statement regulations (SAC ¶¶ 100–102). These claims “form part of the same case or controversy” and “arise from a common nucleus of operative fact” as the remaining FLSA overtime claim because “[r]esolving all of these claims requires considering evidence of the hours [Plaintiff] worked, the rate and method by which [she was] paid, the amounts [she was] paid, and the parties’ records (or lack thereof) on these subjects.” Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 308; Jenkins v. Yellowstone Props., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-7764(VEC)(KHP), 2019 WL 4392955, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2019).

The one court that has considered Melgar also declined to apply its reasoning at the motion to dismiss stage and retained supplemental jurisdiction over the NYLL claims based on the pleadings alone. Isayeva, 2024 WL 1053349, at *14. Indeed, contrary to Defendants’ argument, “courts within the Second Circuit routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law wage claims in conjunction with claims under the FLSA,” particularly where, as here, resolving the FLSA and NYLL claims involves considering overlapping facts and issues, the “pre-trial proceedings are not likely to be materially more burdensome, nor is it likely that a trial will be materially prolonged,” if supplemental jurisdiction is exercised.” Niemiec v. Ann Bendick Realty, No. 1:04-cv-00897-ENV-KAM, 2007 WL 5157027, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2007); Ansoumana v. Gristede's Op. Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

As noted in Section IV supra, the Court ultimately lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over, and dismisses without prejudice, Plaintiff's wage notice claim under the NYLL (Claim Eight) because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue that claim in federal court. Zabrodin v. Silk 222, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 3d 102, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff[ ] lack[s] standing, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over [her] wage notice claims under the NYLL.”).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth previously and based on the Court's review of the parties’ motions, the case record, and applicable law, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Third and Eighth Causes of Action and DENIED as to the remaining Causes of Action. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action is dismissed with prejudice and Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action is dismissed without prejudice. The parties are strongly encouraged to negotiate in good faith to settle this action or they shall proceed to discovery and are hereby referred to Magistrate Judge Pollak for all pre-trial matters.

So ordered.

Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge: