UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS (2024)

Memorandum and Order

Defendant Luke Andrew Williams, formerly known as Larby Amirouche, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. (ECF No. 49, May 5, 2022, Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr., 28:2-30:15.) The Court sentenced him to twenty months of imprisonment. (ECF No. 52, Judgment in a Criminal Case.) Williams surrendered to the federal Bureau of Prisons on March 27, 2024, to begin serving his sentence. (ECF No. 68, Mar. 29, 2024, Ltr. from D. Pitluck.) Shortly after surrendering, Williams moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction. (ECF No. 73, Mem. Law Supp. Def.’s Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.) Now before the Court is Williams's emergency motion for release to home confinement pending the Court's resolution of his § 2255 motion. (ECF No. 75, Def.’s Emergency Mot. Release Home Confinement Pending Resolution of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Pet. (“Mot.”).)

The Second Circuit explained in Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001), that “the authority of the federal courts to grant bail to habeas petitioners” is “a limited one, to be exercised in special cases only.” District courts within the Second Circuit have interpreted the Mapp standard to apply to bail pending a motion to vacate under § 2255 as well. See, e.g., United States v. Callahan, No. 13-cr-453 (ADS), 2019 WL 3457987, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019). “[T]he standard for release on bail under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is even higher than ․ for release pending direct appeal.” Id. (quoting United States v. Whitman, 153 F. Supp. 3d 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). To prevail, the defendant must show that the § 2255 motion raises “substantial questions” upon which he or she has a “high probability of success” and that “extraordinary circumstances” justify his or her immediate release. Id.

Williams suggest that the Mapp standard does not apply – or that a lower standard might apply – because he seeks only home confinement and not bail. (Mot. 3.) The Court respectfully disagrees. “[N]o statutory authority allows a district court to order a defendant's immediate release to home confinement via a post-judgment motion in a criminal case.” United States v. Bravata, No. 22-1897, 2023 WL 6146991, at *2 (6th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (affirming denial of immediate release to home confinement pending resolution of § 2255 motion) (citing United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A sentencing court has no authority to order that a convicted defendant be confined in a particular facility ․”)). To the contrary, the relevant federal statute provides that the Bureau of Prisons “shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment” and that its designation “is not reviewable by any court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). To the extent Williams may obtain any preliminary relief on his § 2255 motion, that relief must come from the Court's inherent power to grant bail pending post-conviction review. Thus, Williams thus must satisfy the stringent Mapp standard.

Williams has failed to show entitlement to preliminary relief under the Mapp standard. First, the Court has conducted a preliminary review of Williams's § 2255 motion and does not conclude based on that review that Williams's “victory can be predicted with confidence.” See Callahan, 2019 WL 3457987, at *3 (denying release pending resolution of § 2255 motion). Williams's § 2255 motion is largely based on arguments that the attorney he hired to defend him was ineffective in various ways; however, Williams pleaded guilty and affirmed at both his guilty plea and his sentencing that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation of him. The Court may not “upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions” from Williams about “how would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies.” See Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017). Rather, the Court must “look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate” that Williams would have insisted on foregoing a guilty plea and proceeding to trial but for his attorney's alleged deficiencies. See id. The Court finds such evidence lacking based on its preliminary review of the record Williams provided. The Court emphasizes that it has not in fact decided the merits of Williams's claims and that this preliminary review will have no bearing on the Court's ultimate decision on Williams's motion. See Callahan, 2019 WL 3457987, at *3.

Second, the Court finds a lack of “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to grant preliminary release. See id. As to Williams's arguments that his ineffective counsel claims themselves present extraordinary circumstances, (Mot. 7, 13-23), the Court “will not release him pending review ․ based solely on his subjective belief regarding the merits” of his § 2255 motion, see Callahan, 2019 WL 3457987, at *3 (collecting cases); Iuteri v. Nardoza, 662 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing grant of bail pending habeas review due to lack of extraordinary circumstances and explaining that “[v]irtually all habeas corpus petitioners argue that their confinement is unlawful”). Williams's arguments about his lack of criminal history, community ties, and voluntary surrender, (Mot. 7, 12-13), “may bear upon the merits of a bail motion” but not release pending post-conviction review. See Fan v. United States, 710 F. App'x 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (affirming denial of reconsideration of order denying bail pending resolution of § 2255 motion premised on ineffective counsel claims). Finally, Williams's arguments that immediate release is justified based on allegedly inadequate medical care, (Mot. 7-11, 23-27), and alleged lockdowns, (ECF No. 78, May 13, 2024, Ltr. from L. Williams), lack sufficient evidentiary support to justify immediate, extraordinary relief, see McNaught v. United States, No. 08-cv-2998 (JGK), 2009 WL 1181266, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2009).

The Court assures Williams that it is aware of his § 2255 motion and will resolve that motion in due course, factoring Williams's expected release date into the timing of its decision. At this stage, however, the Court does not find Williams entitled to preliminary relief. Williams's motion for release to home confinement pending the Court's review of his § 2255 motion is respectfully denied. The Court respectfully requests that the Government serve a copy of this order on Williams and note service on the docket by May 17, 2024.

So ordered.

Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge: