HAI LONG DU v. PARTY PERFECT RENTALS LLC DEMARI KESLER (2024)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff Hai Long Du commenced this diversity action against defendants Party Perfect Rentals LLC and Demari R. Kesler (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that Kesler, while acting in the scope of his employment for Party Perfect, negligently operated a commercial truck and caused the parties’ trucks to collide. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 41, 49. Du seeks to recover damages for his alleged serious injuries pursuant to New York State's No-Fault Insurance Law § 5102(d). Id. ¶ 49.

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion in limine, in which Plaintiff seeks to preclude Defendants from calling Kevin K. Toosi, M.D., Ph. D. (“Dr. Toosi”), as a witness at the upcoming trial. Dkt. No. 36. Defendants intend to call Dr. Toosi as a biomechanics expert; according to Defendant, Dr. Toosi “is expected to testify regarding his examination of documents, photographs[,] and video, as referenced in his report of September 11, 2023 [Dkt. No. 36 at 13-43], and the facts and opinions contained in said report regarding the mechanics of the subject accident, forces, speeds, and the cause(s) thereof.” Dkt. No. 37 at 6. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Toosi “lacks the necessary qualifications to give the purported expert testimony outlined in his report” and that his “purported opinion is not grounded in sufficient facts or data.” Dkt. No. 36 at 2.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion in limine is denied.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The accident at issue occurred on June 3, 2022 on Lexington Avenue in Manhattan near the intersection of East 67th Street. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 1, 4; Dkt. No. 31, at 1. At the time of the accident, Du operated a commercial vehicle on behalf of his employer, and Kesler drove a box truck on behalf of his then-employer, Party Perfect. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 1-2, 8; Dkt. No. 31, at 1-3; Dkt. No. 27-7, at 48:19-49:23. At all relevant times, Kesler acted within the scope of his employment at Party Perfect. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 31, at 1.

Lexington Avenue is a one-way street with two lanes for moving traffic and one bus lane. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 31, at 1. On the date of the accident, Du was driving in the middle lane on Lexington Avenue, while Kesler was driving in the far-left lane behind two Party Perfect vehicles that were driving ahead of him in the left lane. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶¶ 2-3; Dkt. No. 31, at 1; Dkt. No. 27-7, at 91:7-11.

At a certain point, while driving on Lexington Avenue, Kesler attempted to merge from the left lane into the middle lane where Du was driving, and in the process of doing so, Du and Kesler's trucks came into contact with each other. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 31, at 2; Dkt. No. 27-7, at 88:3-18. According to Du, his vehicle was traveling between 15 and 20 miles per hour at the time of the first contact between the two vehicles. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 7.

According to Du, Kesler attempted to merge into the middle lane without first ensuring that there was enough room to safely change lanes. See Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 27-4, at 16. Du further argues that the accident “occurred just past the intersection at East 67th Street.” See Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 4.

Defendants, in contrast, contend that Kesler took several precautionary measures prior to merging, including turning his blinker on, looking in his rearview mirrors, stopping his truck, and signaling to Du that he was trying to merge into the middle lane by pointing to the right. Dkt. No. 27-7, at 88:3-89:21. Kesler testified that he looked at Du, lifted his right arm above his head, and Du shook his head. See id. Defendants claim that Du acknowledged Kesler's hand signal by nodding his head in approval and beginning to slow down. Id. at 101:12-17, 104:2-6, 105:20-25. Kesler then, believing he had enough room to merge, started to “creep out” into the middle lane when Du suddenly increased his speed and drove up, resulting in the parties’ trucks making contact with each other. Id. at 105:20-25, 107:10-15. Kesler claims that Du “went to top speed and came up to the lane [Kesler] was going to turn into” right before the crash occurred. Id. at 90:14-16.

A jury trial is scheduled to commence on May 13, 2024.

B. Dr. Toosi

Dr. Toosi, a biomechanical engineer and consultant, has a bachelor's degree in engineering and masters and doctoral degrees in bioengineering from the University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Toosi also has a post-doctoral fellowship in physical medicine and rehabilitation and urology from the University of Pittsburgh. Dkt. No. 36 at 32. Dr. Toosi received his medical doctorate in 1994 from Mashhad University of Medical Sciences in Iran and “went on to practice medicine as a Primary Care Physician for more than five years” prior to attending the University of Pittsburgh. Id.

In 2005, Dr. Toosi joined “Exponent Failure Analysis Associates, one of the nation's largest engineering and scientific consulting firms, where [he] worked as an engineer/scientist in Biomechanics Practice for three years and received [a] significant amount of on-the-job training in accident reconstruction, crush analysis, and occupant kinematics during motor vehicle accidents.” Id. at 32.

Dr. Toosi currently serves as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Bioengineering at the University of Pittsburgh, where he conducts “clinical research to understand the mechanisms through which repetitive strain injuries of nerves and tendons occur and investigate the acute and chronic changes in the musculoskeletal systems by collecting and analyzing biomechanical data.” Id. at 33. Since 2011, Dr. Toosi also “has been the President/Principal Scientist at Pittsburgh Biomechanics, a consulting firm that he founded, which utilizes engineering principles and biomedical sciences to explore the cause, nature, and severity of injuries in a variety of accident settings, including motor vehicle collisions.” Dkt. No. 38 at 5.

Dr. Toosi has more than “twenty-five years of experience in the areas of clinical medicine, injury biomechanics, and injury causation.” Dkt. No. 36 at 33. Dr. Toosi has authored or co-authored several journal articles and other papers, which are set forth in detail in his curriculum vitae. See id. at 35-38. Dr. Toosi has investigated more than 1,900 accidents arising out of his specialized engineering expertise in accident reconstruction. Id. at 33. Dr. Toosi has received multiple awards and honors related to his biomechanics work. Id. at 35. Dr. Toosi is also affiliated with multiple biomechanics and mechanical engineer associations. Id. Dr. Toosi's research and work experience demonstrate significant crossovers between the fields of medicine and biomechanical engineering, particularly in the area of motor vehicle accidents and injury causation. See id. at 32-38.

In his 17-page expert report (Dkt. No. 36 at 14-31), Dr. Toosi opines that based on his biomechanical accident analysis, and “within a reasonable degree of biomechanical engineering certainty, the loads and mechanisms required to compromise Hai Long Du's spine were not present in the incident of June 3, 2022.” Dkt. No. 36 at 14. According to Dr. Toosi, “Mr. Du's cervical and lumbar spine disc bulges and/or disc herniations and his cervical and lumbar radiculopathies cannot reasonably be attributed to the subject accident.” Id. In support of his opinion, Dr. Toosi reviewed materials from the underlying accident, including photographs, dashboard camera footage, Plaintiff's medical records, vehicle-specific data, and transcripts. See id. at 16-17. Dr. Toosi also conducted a sideswipe analysis and crush energy analysis, as well as an assessment of occupant kinematics. See id. at 23-27. Dr. Toosi's assessment is set forth in detail in his expert report. See id. at 14-31.

LEGAL STANDARD

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 provides, in pertinent part, that an expert, qualified by “knowledge, skill. experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case

Fed. R. Evid. 702. “In other words, ‘the Court must determine: (1) whether the witness is a qualified expert; (2) whether the opinion is based on application of reliable data and methodology to the facts of the case; and (3) whether the expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine an issue of fact.’ ” Nicolas v. ABF Freight Sys., No. 19-CV-06513 (HG) (JAM), 2024 WL 915179, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2024) (quoting Boateng v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, No. 17-CV-209 (KAM) (SIL), 2022 WL 4357555, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022)).

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), “the district court must perform the gatekeeping function to ensure that: any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Nicolas, 2024 WL 915179, at *1 (citing Beruashvili v. Hobart Corp., No. 05-CV-1646 (ENV) (MDG), 2010 WL 11622750, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010)). Indeed, although “[t]he proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied,” Zsa Zsa Jewels, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 419 F. Supp. 3d 490, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), “the district court is the ultimate ‘gatekeeper.’ ” United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

“In serving its gatekeeping function, the court's focus must be on the principles and methodologies underlying the expert's conclusions, rather than on the conclusions themselves.” Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted). The Rule 702 inquiry is “liberal and flexible,” Zsa Zsa Jewels, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 511. “Liberality and flexibility in evaluating qualifications should be the rule; the proposed expert should not be required to satisfy an overly narrow test of his own qualifications.” Lappe v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 222, 227 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 101 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996) (expert qualified to testify on automobile design even though he did not design automobiles for a living). As long as the expert stays within the “reasonable confines of his subject area,” the expert can fairly be considered to possess the “specialized knowledge” required by Rule 702. Id. (citation omitted). “[I]n analyzing the admissibility of expert evidence, the district court has broad discretion in determining what method is appropriate for evaluating reliability under the circumstances of each case.” Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002).

“Although a full evidentiary hearing is often [required] in order to address Daubert issues, a hearing is unnecessary if the objections to the testimony can be decided on written submissions.” Beruashvili, 2010 WL 11622750, at *5.

DISCUSSION

A. Dr. Toosi's qualifications

Before determining whether the testimony and evidence offered by Dr. Toosi meets the Daubert standards, the court must first determine whether he is qualified to testify. See Mancuso v. Consol. Edison, 56 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in relevant part, vacated in part, 216 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 2000). In Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396, n.11 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted), the Second Circuit stated that: “the initial question of whether a witness is qualified to be an ‘expert’ is important because an ‘expert’ witness is permitted substantially more leeway than ‘lay’ witnesses in testifying as to opinions that are not rationally based on [his or her] perception.”

1. Dr. Toosi's qualifications to opine about biomechanics

As an initial matter, it is not clear if Plaintiff challenges Dr. Toosi's qualifications as a biomechanics expert. To the extent Plaintiff is making such a challenge, it is denied.

“Biomechanics is ‘the science concerned with the action of forces, internal or external, on the living body.’ ” Boykin v. W. Exp., Inc., No. 12-CV-7428 (NSR) (JCM), 2015 WL 539423, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (quoting Biomechanics, Stedman's Medical Dictionary (Nov. 2014)); Laureano v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-181 (LAP), 2021 WL 3272002, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2021) (same). Accident reconstruction is intended to provide an “accurate picture of the sequence of events immediately preceding an accident” to the fact finder. See Tuato v. Brown, 85 F. App'x 674, 677 (10th Cir. 2003). Federal courts within the Second Circuit regularly accept the testimony of biomechanical engineers who opine regarding traffic accident injury mechanisms. See, e.g., Boykin, 2015 WL 539423.

As noted above, Dr. Toosi has decades of experience in biomechanics, including multiple degrees, specialized training, published research, and a biomechanics faculty position at the University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Toosi is clearly qualified to opine about biomechanics.

2. Dr. Toosi's qualifications to opine about medical causation

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Toosi “lacks the necessary qualifications, experience, and evidence to give the purported medical causation expert testimony.” Dkt. No. 36 at 2. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Toosi “is not a licensed medical doctor, and he has not practiced medicine of any sorts for the last 25 years.” Id. Plaintiff adds that Dr. Toosi only obtained a medical degree thirty years ago “with no medical education thereafter and no practice outside of Iran.” Id. at 2. As explained below, the Court finds that Dr. Toosi is qualified to opine about the medical causation of Plaintiff's alleged injuries.

“It is well settled that biomechanical experts are permitted to opine as to general causation of injuries in motor vehicle accident cases; i.e., whether the force sustained by a plaintiff in the subject accident could potentially cause certain injuries.” Thomas v. YRC Inc., No. 16-CV-6105 (AT) (HBP), 2018 WL 919998, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts, however, “have not permitted biomechanical experts to testify regarding specific injury causation, or the specific cause of a particular injury, unless the expert has medical training.” Id. (emphasis added).

Here, Dr. Toosi is qualified to testify about medical causation because he does, in fact, have medical training. The Thomas case is instructive, particularly as the Court in Thomas addressed the qualifications of Dr. Toosi specifically to provide medical causation testimony as an expert witness. The Court in Thomas permitted Dr. Toosi to provide a “specific injury causation opinion.” Thomas, 2018 WL 919998 at *5. The Court reasoned as follows:

Dr. Toosi obtained his medical degree in 1994 and worked as primary care physician in Iran for over five years during which time he treated and diagnosed patients (Toosi CV at 1). Since immigrating to the United States, Dr. Toosi completed two medically related post-doctoral fellowships at the University of Pittsburgh (Toosi CV at 1). The majority of his research and experience for the past 20 years is closely related to his medical background in that it involves injury causation and rehabilitative medicine. This is in stark contrast to other biomechanical experts who have been precluded from testifying to specific injury causation. Manlapig v. Jupiter, [14-CV-235 (LGS),] 2016 WL 916425 [ ] *3 [(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016)] (tenured professor at North Dakota State University's Department of Mechanical Engineering with decades of experience in biomechanics not permitted to testify to the specific cause of plaintiff's injuries because he lacked a medical degree, never received any formal medical training and, by his own admission, was not qualified to render specific injury causation opinions); [Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07-CV-1960 (WCC), 2008 WL 2115250, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008)] (biomechanical engineer without a medical background prohibited from testifying that accident was the cause of plaintiff's injuries); see also Smelser v. Norfolk S Ry. Co., 105 F. 3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Morales v. American Hondo Motor Co., 151 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 1998) (biomechanical expert with no medical training who did not review plaintiff's medical records not qualified to give any expert medical opinions); Bowers v. Norfolk, S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (biomechanical engineer precluded from opining on specific causation of plaintiff's injuries because he had no experience “examining patients” or “treating and diagnosing medical conditions”).

Although plaintiff is correct that Dr. Toosi is not licensed to practice medicine in the United States, this fact alone does not negate the significance of his prior formal medical training, experience treating and diagnosing patients or his extensive research on the overlap between engineering and medicine.

Id. at *5-6. The Court in Thomas added that “objections to an expert's qualifications generally go to the ‘credibility and weight’ of the expert's testimony, not its admissibility.” Id. at *6 (citing McCullock v. H.B․ Fuller Co., 61 F. 3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995)).

In support of his motion, Plaintiff argues that “[i]t is unknown what evidence, medical records, or imaging Dr. Toosi based [his] conclusion” that Plaintiff's injuries stem from degenerative changes, as Dr. Toosi “is not a practicing or licensed doctor, he never examined Plaintiff, and he lacks the necessary qualifications, experience, and evidence to give the purported medical causation expert testimony that he intends to give.” Dkt. No. 36 at 5-6. But this argument goes to the credibility and weight of Dr. Toosi's testimony rather than its admissibility. Plaintiff may seek to cross-examine Dr. Toosi on these topics, but Plaintiff's argument about Dr. Toosi's qualifications do not warrant the blanket exclusion of his testimony. See Laureano, 2021 WL 3272002, at *3 (permitting a biomechanics expert to testify even though the expert “has not testified or published regarding this exact factual scenario,” as such purported omissions “do not negate her formal medical training, years of experience treating patients with injuries like [the plaintiff], or her education in bioengineering.”); Manzone v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 17-CV-277 (SIL), 2020 WL 5411483, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2020) (allowing biomechanics expert “to testify about the nature of the slip and fall accident at issue in this case, the cause of the accident, and the types of injuries that could reasonably result”).

Plaintiff relies on Morgan ¹ in support of his argument. Dkt. No. 36 at 7. The reasoning in Morgan, however, actually supports permitting Dr. Toosi to testify. In Morgan, the Court held that while the biomechanics expert at issue “appear[ed] to be a highly qualified biomechanical engineer,” he did not hold a medical degree and was not qualified to opine about medical causation. Morgan, 2008 WL 2115250, at *5. Here, in contrast and as noted above, Dr. Toosi has sufficient medical training as a medical doctor to opine about injury causation.

Plaintiff similarly relies on a New York state court case, Santos v. Nicolos, 879 N.Y.S.2d 701, 702 (Sup. Ct. 2009), to argue that a biomechanics expert with a medical degree is not qualified to testify about causation. See Dkt. No. 36 at 7. By way of background, “New York state courts continue to apply the Frye standard, when determining the admissibility of expert opinions.” M.B. ex rel. Scott v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 12-CV-0825 (GTS) (RFT), 2015 WL 5315961, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2015). Pursuant to Frye, an expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“Frye”). New York law and the Frye test, however, are irrelevant to whether Dr. Toosi is permitted to testify as an expert in the instant case. The Frye test of general acceptance in the scientific community was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (1993) (“ ‘general acceptance’ of a methodology is no longer the test of admissibility.”). The Supreme Court has been clear that “the bright-line ‘general acceptance’ test established by Frye was at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 265 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588). “It is a well-accepted principle that Rule 702 embodies a liberal standard of admissibility for expert opinions, representing a departure from the previously widely followed, and more restrictive, standard of [Frye].” Solid 21, Inc. v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. 19-CV-1262 (AS), 2023 WL 6058614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2023) (quoting Nimely, 414 F.3d at 395).

Nonetheless, even if the Court considered these New York state cases, Santos is distinguishable, as the purported expert in Santos had “a medical degree, [but] is not licensed to practice medicine and has never done so other than during a three-month residency in pathology.” Santos, 879 N.Y.S. 2d at 702. Conversely, here, Dr. Toosi has a medical degree and also “practice[d] medicine as a Primary Care Physician for more than five years.” Dkt. No. 36 at 32. Plaintiff also overlooks the multiple New York state court decisions finding Dr. Toosi qualified to opine about medical causation. See Dkt. No. 38 at 5-6; Gonzalez v. Palen, 18 N.Y.S.3d 578 (N.Y. App. Term. 2015) (“Toosi's lack of a license to practice medicine in the United States did not render him unqualified [ ]. To the contrary, Toosi's stated education, background, experience and areas of specialty rendered him able to testify as to the mechanic[s] of the injury.”).

Accordingly, as the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule, “vigorous cross-examination” and “the presentation of contrary evidence” are the appropriate remedies for Plaintiff's objections to Dr. Toosi's qualifications, rather than preclusion. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 335 (1998) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).

B. The reliability of Dr. Toosi's opinion

The focus of the reliability determination “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Beruashvili, 2010 WL 11622750, at *6 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595). “Expert testimony should be excluded when it is speculative, conjectural, or based on assumptions “so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith.” Beruashvili, 2010 WL 11622750, at *6 (citations omitted).

The Daubert Court articulated four factors to guide district courts in assessing the reliability of expert testimony: (i) whether the expert's theory or technique has been or can be tested; (ii) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (iii) its known or potential rate of error; and (iv) its general acceptance by the relevant scientific community. Beruashvili, 2010 WL 11622750, at *6 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). This list, however, “is not exhaustive and intended to be applied flexibly.” Beruashvili, 2010 WL 11622750, at *6 (citation omitted). “Expert engineering testimony may rest on scientific foundations, the examination of which invokes the Daubert factors directly, but may also rest on the personal knowledge or experience of the engineer.” Beruashvili, 2010 WL 11622750, at *6 (citing Cacciola v. Selco Balers. Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)).

Here, Plaintiff argues that “Dr. Toosi does not have enough facts from which to draw the conclusions he purports to draw,” as he “never examined the vehicles involved in the accident”; “never went to the scene of the accident”; “never observed repair records pertaining to either vehicle involved in the accident”; and “never saw photographs of the damage on the defendants’ vehicle.” Dkt. No. 36 at 8-9. Plaintiff further contends that “Defense counsel failed to provide Dr. Toosi with other relevant evidence such as the repair and property damage file for the defendant vehicle, all of which are material to his delta-v calculations, and his assumptions render his findings incomplete.” Id. at 9.

In response, Defendants argue that “Dr. Toosi's report is well-supported by the evidence in this case,” as “Dr. Toosi demonstrates in clear, simple steps how the relevant scientific mathematical formulas work, and how he applied the data in the instant matter, where photographs and ‘residual crush’ measurements were available for both parties’ vehicles.” Dkt. No. 38 at 12. Defendants add that “Dr. Toosi's education, background, experience and areas of specialty sufficiently qualify him to render an opinion as to whether the accident could have caused plaintiff's alleged injuries.” Id.

Again, Thomas is instructive. As the Court noted in Thomas, “the fact that Dr. Toosi did not visit the accident location does not render his opinion unreliable.” Thomas, 2018 WL 919998, at *6 (citing Franz v. New England Disposal Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-201 (WF), 2016 WL 3344187 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 16, 2016) (biomechanical expert did not need to personally visit the accident site or personally inspect the damaged vehicles to have a sufficient factual basis for his opinion)); Morgan, 2008 WL 2115250 at *4 (plaintiff's argument that biomechanical expert's opinion is unreliable because expert did not visit the scene of the accident, inspect the actual damaged vehicles or view photographs of defendant's vehicle is without merit). Further, as in Thomas, Dr. Toosi relied on a wide variety of materials, including photographs, dashboard camera footage, and medical records, to reach his opinion. See Thomas, 2018 WL 919998, at *6 (“Dr. Toosi based his opinion on 26 separate documents relating to this litigation, including photographs of the accident location [ ]. Such facts and data are sufficiently reliable to support the opinion of Dr. Toosi—a biomechanical expert—concerning the injuries that resulted from a motor vehicle accident.”); see also Clark v. Phi, Inc., No. 12-CV-411, 2013 WL 5701658 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2013) (allowing biomechanical engineer to testify even though he used only photographs and witness accounts that estimated the velocity of an object and noting that the flaws pinpointed in the Daubert motion concerned the weight of the expert's opinion testimony, not his overall unreliability and not to admissibility).

At bottom, Plaintiff's contentions go to the weight of the evidence and are a subject for cross-examination, not admissibility. See McCullock, 61 F.3d at 1044 (“[d]isputes as to the strength of [the expert's] credentials, faults in his use of differential etiology as a methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony”). Dr. Toosi's opinion is therefore sufficiently reliable for purposes of his expert testimony.

C. Dr. Toosi's opinion is relevant to the case and will assist the trier of fact

Dr. Toosi's opinion is certainly relevant to the issues in this case. His specialized expertise in biomechanics, an issue that is complex and technical, is one that will also assist the jury in understanding the evidence at issue. The parties may disagree as to the conclusions reached by Dr. Toosi, “but ultimately the jury will be the judge of whether Plaintiff's alleged injuries were caused by the accident, and it is the jury's responsibility to assess what weight to give the proffered testimony as it attempts to answer this question.” Nicolas, 2024 WL 915179, at *2 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 (“The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”).

Accordingly, Dr. Toosi shall be permitted to testify as an expert witness at trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion in limine is denied.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff cites to Morgan but attributes the wrong citation for this case. See Dkt. No. 36 at 7.

JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO United States Magistrate Judge