CHRISTOPHER GLEN GABRIEL v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (2024)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In this Social Security disability insurance benefits case, the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) moves for reconsideration on the Court's imposition of time limits on its remand order. For the following reasons, the Commissioner's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Christopher Gabriel (“Gabriel”) applied for disability insurance benefits on July 28, 2016, alleging disability as of September 4, 2015, because of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine and seizure disorder. The ALJ found Gabriel not disabled in 2019, and the Appeals Council denied review in 2021.

On February 20, 2024, the Court granted Gabriel's motion for judgment on the pleadings in part, remanding the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings rather than reversing solely for calculation and award of benefits. Because of the excessive period Gabriel has had to wait since he first applied for benefits, the Court directed the ALJ to complete further proceedings within 60 days of the issuance of this order and, if that decision is a denial of benefits, a final decision of the Commissioner be rendered within 60 days of Gabriel's appeal from the ALJ's decision.

The Government now requests that the Court alter its judgment to remove those limits, or, if the Court declines to remove the time limits entirely, to amend its order to allow for 150 days for the ALJ to issue a new decision and, if that decision is a denial of benefits, 120 days from the date any request for review is submitted for the Commissioner to render a final decision.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) enables parties to timely file motions to alter or amend a judgment to “correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 153 (2d Cir. 2008). Such motions must “request a substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely the correction of a clerical error, or relief of a type wholly collateral to the judgment.” ING Glob. v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting id.). Local Rule 6.3 is similar, with both standards being “demanding,” and the remedy to be used “sparingly.” Benny v. City of Long Beach, No. 20-CV-1908 (KAM)(ST), 2022 WL 9446910, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2022).

The Court did not err in imposing time limits. As the Commissioner acknowledges, district courts have discretion to impose time limits in remand orders, and the Second Circuit has imposed those limits when the claimant has faced significant delay. See Gibbons v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-2730, 2023 WL 3830774, at *4 (2d Cir. June 6, 2023) (“As it has now been 13 years since Gibbons filed his most recent claim ․ we direct the district court to set a 120-day time limit on any further ALJ proceedings.”).

The Commissioner attempts to distinguish Gabriel's case by arguing that time limits are only appropriate in cases in which remand occurs at step five of the five-step inquiry used to evaluate Social Security disability claims, where the claimant has met his burden and the Commissioner must “show there is other work that the claimant can perform.” McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing five-step framework) (cleaned up). Because the Court remanded before step five, where Gabriel has not yet met his burden, the Commissioner argues that time limits are inappropriate.

However, the Court cited several cases in which courts remanded on steps one through four, before the claimant was deemed presumptively disabled. See Gabriel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:21-CV-01508 (FB), 2024 WL 653443, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2024) (collecting cases); see also Brandon C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 521CV00159AMNATB, 2023 WL 8020257, at *3 n.10 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2023) (collecting cases). The Court thus acted within its authority.

Moreover, aware of the important distinction between cases remanded at steps one through four and those remanded solely at step five, the Court emphasizes that it did not require the Commissioner to award benefits to Gabriel if the Commissioner fails to meet the Court-imposed time limits. An order requiring the Commissioner to grant benefits if he fails to meet those limits is only appropriate in a step-five remand case because only at that stage is the claimant “entitled to benefits as a matter of law” absent the Commissioner meeting his step-five burden. Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). By contrast, in cases involving remand at steps one through four, the claimant has not yet shown disability, and the Court cannot require the Commissioner to award benefits to a claimant who is not “disabled” as defined by the Social Security Act. The Court fashioned its limited remedy in accordance with these principles.

Finally, the Commissioner makes several functional arguments supporting its request that the Court provide a longer timeframe with which to comply with remand orders. The Commissioner argues, for example, that a hearing must be scheduled at least 75 days prior unless the claimant waives this pre-hearing notice period. However, Gabriel has opposed this motion, and a hearing has already been scheduled; the Court thus sees no practical issue with the 60-day limit that other courts have imposed. See, e.g., Catsigiannis v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-2177 ENV LB, 2013 WL 2445046, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013).

The Commissioner also argues that because the Court has issued four additional time-limited remands in a short window, the cumulative effect of these remand orders “effectively prioritizes the claimants in these cases at the expense of other worthy social security claimants who have also been waiting their turn.” The Court underscores that it afforded the claimants this relief because of their special circumstances — the many years they have had to wait — and concludes that their cases warrant an expedited remand order, as other courts have when faced with similar facts. See, e.g., Urena v. Berryhill, No. 18-CV-3645 (JLC), 2019 WL 1748131, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2019) (“Urena's wait of more than eight years makes the imposition of a deadline all the more imperative.”). Consequently, while the Court is sympathetic to the Commissioner's concerns about caseload, it deems time limits appropriate here.

Notably, in its prior decision, the Court accepted shared responsibility for the protracted delay in the final resolution of the claimant's disability claim. Together, the agency and the courts should make their best efforts to do better in future cases in order to avoid inordinate delays in the discharge of their judicial responsibilities.

Although the Court cannot award benefits if the agency fails to act within the prescribed time frames it has set, it expects the Commissioner to make his best efforts to comply with these time constraints to avoid the necessity for the Court to fashion remedies to enforce its order. However, mindful of the practical burdens facing the Commissioner to address the agency's budgetary and ongoing administrative problems, the Court will consider some relatively brief extensions, if necessary, upon a good-faith showing by the Commissioner that he is expeditiously attempting to comply with his remand obligations.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Commissioner's motion for reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

FREDERIC BLOCK Senior United States District Judge