METOXEN v. DUDEK (2025)

DECISION AND ORDER

Kristin Metoxen applied for social security disability benefits in 2021, alleging that she was unable to work due to several physical impairments. At a hearing with an administrative law judge, a vocational expert classified Metoxen's past job working with the elderly as that of a senior service aide. Relying on that testimony, the ALJ found that Metoxen could still work as a senior service aide as that job generally is performed in the national economy and denied Metoxen's application.

Metoxen seeks judicial review of that decision, arguing that the vocational expert failed to adequately explain her finding about Metoxen's past work. Leland Dudek, the acting commissioner of the Social Security Administration, argues that Metoxen waived or forfeited her argument by not objecting at the administrative hearing and that the vocational expert's unchallenged testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's finding. Because the vocational expert did not explain why she believed a senior service aide was the best match for Metoxen's job working with the elderly, and because the aide position does not cover the full range of activities Metoxen described, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's reliance on the expert's testimony. An ALJ decision that lacks support in the record cannot stand, even if Metoxen failed to raise the issue during administrative proceedings. Accordingly, I will reverse the decision denying Metoxen disability benefits and remand the matter for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

In 2021, Metoxen applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, claiming that she became disabled in 2020 due to a titanium rod in her right tibia, a painful limp, problems with both shoulders, carpal tunnel syndrome, trigger finger on three fingers, and type 1 diabetes. See R. 216–31, 241–59.¹ Metoxen asserted that she got laid off from her last job as an “outreach specialist” during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic because she was considered a high health risk. R. 245–46. On a work history report, Metoxen characterized that job as an “outreach worker” in “elder services.” R. 260. She said she helped elderly clients getting to the store and to their appointments, carried their groceries from the store to the car and from the car to their house, and assisted some clients transferring from wheelchairs or walkers. R. 263. According to Metoxen, the heaviest weight she had to lift (a wheelchair) was fifty pounds.

The state agency charged with reviewing disability applications on behalf of the Social Security Administration denied Metoxen's application initially and upon her request for reconsideration. See R. 64–103. After the state-agency denial, Metoxen requested a hearing with an ALJ. See R. 130–31. Prior to the hearing, Metoxen's lawyer submitted a brief arguing that Metoxen was unable to perform her past relevant work, which the lawyer characterized as a “patient transporter.” R. 323.

The ALJ held the administrative hearing in October 2023. See R. 40–63. Metoxen continued to be represented by counsel at the hearing. See R. 42. Metoxen testified that she previously worked as an “outreach worker” for the elder services department of the Oneida Nation. R. 46. According to Metoxen, her job duties included scheduling assessments for the elderly and reaching out “to get whatever services they needed or qualified for.” R. 46–47. She said the heaviest amount she lifted at that job was about twenty or twenty-five pounds. R. 47. Although Metoxen initially agreed that the outreach worker position was primarily an office-type job, R. 47, she later clarified that she was out of the office about four to six hours each day “[a]ssessing [her elderly clients’] situations or doing well-checks on them.” R. 53–54. Metoxen also said, “Sometimes I would have to take them to their appointments or to the store.” R. 54. In contrast to what she wrote on the work history report, Metoxen told the ALJ that she did not assist her elderly clients on walkers or wheelchairs, help move them around, or move their equipment.

A vocational expert also testified at the hearing. See R. 56–62. The vocational expert had listened to Metoxen's testimony and confirmed that she had also reviewed the work history records. R. 56. The vocational expert classified Metoxen's outreach worker job as a “senior service aide” under DOT code 196.367-010.² R. 56–57. The vocational expert testified that the senior service aide position is a light job per the DOT and that Metoxen performed it at the light exertional level.³ R. 57. According to the vocational expert, a hypothetical person with Metoxen's age and vocational profile could still perform that job if she were limited to a restricted range of light work. R. 57–61. Metoxen's lawyer posed several other hypotheticals, but he did not ask the vocational expert any questions about Metoxen's prior work. See R. 61–62.

On February 9, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Metoxen was not disabled from her alleged onset date through the date of the decision. See R. 22–39. The ALJ considered the disability applications under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920, which set forth a five-step process for evaluating DIB and SSI claims. See R. 25–34. Relevant here, the ALJ determined between steps three and four of that process that Metoxen had the residual functional capacity to perform light work except that she could only frequently handle and finger bilaterally, she was unable to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and she was unable to work at unprotected heights. R. 29.

At step four, the ALJ determined that Metoxen could perform her past relevant work as a senior service aide as generally performed. R. 33. The ALJ indicated that she based her step-four finding on Metoxen's vocational background and the opinion of the vocational expert. According to the ALJ, the vocational expert testified that Metoxen “worked within the last 15 years as a ․ Senior Service Aide, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) code 195.367-010, light, semiskilled, specific vocational preparation (SVP) of 3, as generally performed pursuant to the DOT, but actually performed as heavy work ⁴ as described by the claimant.” R. 33 (citing Exhibit 4E; Hearing Record). The ALJ further indicated that the vocational expert testified that a hypothetical person with Metoxen's age, education, work experience, and assessed RFC “would be able to perform [that] past relevant work as generally performed but not as actually performed in the nation[al] economy.” R. 33. The ALJ noted that Metoxen asserted in her work history report that the heaviest weight she was required to lift on the job was fifty pounds. The ALJ observed that, while Metoxen's hearing testimony differed slightly from the report—indicating that she lifted only twenty or twenty-five pounds—the ALJ found “it reasonable based on her description of what she was lifting she likely performed [that] position at a greater exertional level.” R. 33. Ultimately, the ALJ accepted the vocational expert's testimony, finding it consistent with the DOT. Because the ALJ found that Metoxen could perform past work, she did not proceed to step five of the analysis (whether, given her limitations, there were jobs in the national economy Metoxen could perform).

Metoxen requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council. See R. 214–15. She argued only that the ALJ erred in not including a reaching limitation in the RFC assessment. See R. 324–25. The Appeals Council denied Metoxen's request for review, R. 11–16, making the ALJ's decision a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, see Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015)).

In August 2024, Metoxen filed this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision denying her claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Compl., ECF No. 1. The matter was reassigned to me after all parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b). See ECF Nos. 5, 7 & 8. Metoxen, who is now represented by a different lawyer, filed a brief in support of her disability claim, see ECF No. 14; Dudek filed a brief in support of the ALJ's decision, see ECF No. 21; and Metoxen filed a reply brief, see ECF No. 22.

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Judicial review of Administration decisions under the Social Security Act is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010)). Pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), federal courts have the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's decision, with or without remanding the matter for a rehearing. A reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision “only if the ALJ based the denial of benefits on incorrect legal standards or less than substantial evidence.” Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)).

“Substantial evidence is not a demanding requirement. It means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Martin, 950 F.3d at 373 (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019)). “When reviewing the record, this court may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). Rather, the court must determine whether the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the administrative findings.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001)).

DISCUSSION

Metoxen seeks remand for rehearing, arguing that the ALJ erred at step four of the five-step evaluation process when she determined that Metoxen could still perform her past job as an outreach worker for the elderly. Metoxen first criticizes the ALJ for relying solely on the vocational expert's unexplained testimony classifying Metoxen's job as a senior service aide and for not developing the record further. According to Metoxen, the senior service aide position does not capture all her job duties, and she insists that a home attendant or a caseworker would have been better fits.

At step four, “the claimant has the burden to demonstrate whether she is capable of performing her past relevant work.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004)). “A claimant is not disabled if [she] can do [her] past relevant work either in the manner [she] performed it before the impairment or in the manner it is generally performed in the national economy.” Ray v. Berryhill, 915 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2008)). In determining whether a claimant can perform her past relevant work, an ALJ may use the services of a vocational expert. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2). Nevertheless, because “[t]he decision as to whether the claimant retains the functional capacity to perform past work ․ has far-reaching implications,” that issue “must be developed and explained fully in the disability decision.” Social Security Ruling 82-62, Titles II and XVI: A Disability Claimant's Capacity to Do Past Relevant Work, In General, 1982 WL 31386, 1982 SSR LEXIS 27, at *7 (1982).⁵ Also, “every effort must be made to secure evidence that resolves the issue as clearly and explicitly as circumstances permit.” Id.

Here, the ALJ determined that Metoxen could perform her past job working with the elderly as that job generally is performed in the national economy. See R. 33. The ALJ reached that determination based on Metoxen's description of her job duties and the testimony of the vocational expert. After reviewing records concerning Metoxen's vocational background and listening to Metoxen's testimony, the vocational expert characterized the elderly services job as a senior service aide (DOT code 195.367-010), which according to the expert was light per the DOT and light as performed. See R. 56–57. The ALJ accepted the vocational expert's testimony, see R. 33, even though the expert never explained why she believed that job was the best fit for Metoxen's past work or why Metoxen's job working with the elderly was not a composite job, see R. 56–62.

Although Metoxen and her lawyer (a different one from the one who represents her now) did not object to the vocational expert's testimony, both the expert and the ALJ should have been aware that the senior service aide job does not cover many of the tasks Metoxen said she performed working with the elderly. The DOT indicates that a senior service aide:

• Performs community contact work on simpler aspects of programs or cases and assists in providing services to clients and family members, under close and regular supervision and tutorage of CASEWORKER (social ser.) 195.107-010 or CASEWORK SUPERVISOR (social ser.) 195.137-010.

• Assists in locating housing for displaced individuals and families.

• Monitors free, supplementary meal program administered by agencies for children and youth from low-income families to ensure cleanliness of facility and that eligibility guidelines are met for persons receiving meals.

• Assists elderly clients in preparation of forms, such as tax and rent refund forms.

• Accompanies elderly clients on visits to social, charitable, and government agencies to assist clients with their problems.

• Submits to and reviews reports and problems with superior.

DOT code 195.367-010, 1991 WL 671595.⁶ Metoxen testified that she scheduled assessments for her elderly clients and reached out “to get whatever services they needed or qualified for.” R. 46–47. Those tasks line up nicely with the first duty listed in the senior service aide job description.

But that's not all the job entailed. Metoxen said she spent four to six hours each workday out of the office assessing her clients’ situations, performing wellness checks on them, and taking them to their appointments or to the store. R. 53–54. Likewise, in her work history report, Metoxen indicated that she helped elderly clients getting to the store and to their appointments, carried their groceries from the store to the car and from the car to their house, and assisted some clients transferring from wheelchairs or walkers. See R. 263. The DOT job description for a senior service aide does not mention any of those activities. While a perfect match may not be required, the vocational expert cannot ignore several of the claimant's main job duties when attempting to locate a DOT counterpart. Because the vocational expert did not explain why she believed a senior service aide was the best match for Metoxen's job working with the elderly, and because the aide position clearly does not cover the full range of activities Metoxen described, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's reliance on the expert's testimony. See Sevec v. Kijakazi, 59 F.4th 293, 298–300 (7th Cir. 2023) (reversing because the vocational expert's testimony about the claimant's past relevant work was “too thin an evidentiary reed on which to base a disability determination”).

Metoxen also criticizes the vocational expert for failing to explain why the elderly services job was not a composite job. “Composite jobs are those which ‘have significant elements of two or more occupations and, as such, have no counterpart in the DOT.’ ” Wiggins v. Colvin, No. 12 CV 9384, 2015 WL 2398478, at *5, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64254, at *13 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2015) (quoting SSR 82-61, Titles II and XVI: Past Relevant Work—The Particular Job or the Occupation as Generally Performed, 1982 WL 31387, 1982 SSR LEXIS 31, at *5 (1982)).⁷ According to the Social Security Administration's own policy manual, a claimant's past relevant work “may be a composite job if it takes multiple DOT occupations to locate the main duties of the [past relevant work] as described by the claimant.” Dorrie L. B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-0007-CJP, 2018 WL 6046148, at *4, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196971, at *11 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2018) (quoting Program Operations Manual DI 25005.020). Because a composite job does not have a DOT counterpart, “the ALJ may not reference it when determining whether a claimant can perform [her] past job as it is generally performed.” Ray, 915 F.3d at 491 (citing POMS DI 25005.020).

Metoxen's written and oral descriptions of her job duties should have alerted both the vocational expert and the ALJ to the possibility of Metoxen's work with the elderly having significant elements of at least two occupations. As explained above, Metoxen's duties extended beyond the primarily office-type tasks of a senior service aide, and a significant portion of her duties encompassed hands-on work with the elderly that appears akin to other jobs. For example, a home attendant or home health aide “[c]ares for elderly ․ persons in [the] patient's home.” See DOT code 354.377-014, 1991 WL 672933. Their job duties include (among other things) purchasing, preparing, and serving food for elderly patients; assisting elderly patients into and out of a wheelchair; accompanying ambulatory patients outside the home, serving as guide, companion, and aide; and performing a variety of miscellaneous duties like running errands. See id. Metoxen presented evidence that she spent much of her time in her elderly clients’ homes assessing their situations and performing wellness checks, accompanying her clients to appointments and to the store, and carrying their groceries. See R. 53–54, 263. Those main duties can be found within the home health aide job description, but they are completely absent from the senior service side job description.

Other evidence should have alerted the ALJ to the possibility of a composite job. In her work history report, Metoxen indicated that the heaviest weight she lifted in her elderly services job (a wheelchair) was fifty pounds. R. 263. However, at the hearing, Metoxen said she lifted only twenty or twenty-five pounds and didn't move her clients’ equipment. See R. 47, 54. The ALJ addressed this inconsistency in her written decision and credited the report, finding “it reasonable based on [Metoxen's] description of what she was lifting she likely performed [her elderly services] position” at the heavy, rather than the light, exertional level. R. 33. Given that finding, the ALJ concluded—contrary to the vocational expert's testimony—that Metoxen was unable to perform the elderly services job as she actually performed it. In other words, the ALJ explicitly determined that Metoxen's job working with the elderly deviated from the job identified by the vocational expert in its lifting requirements and that Metoxen's main duties involved more than simply pushing papers. And yet the ALJ did not consider the possibility of a composite job. Courts within this circuit have remanded under similar circumstances, notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to object at the administrative level. See, e.g., Vickie H. v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-00351-SEB-DLP, 2019 WL 1370700, at *5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50666, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 1, 2019) (listing cases in which courts have remanded “where testimony during the hearing should have alerted the ALJ that the claimant's past work is made up of more than one job”); see also Glenda M.D. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-03313-DLP-JPH, 2022 WL 3053547, at *––––, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137744, at *9–19 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2022); Wiggins, 2015 WL 2398478, at *–––––, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64254, at *15–21.

Dudek argues that Metoxen waived or forfeited her argument by not raising it at the administrative hearing. See Def.’s Br. 5–7. As support, Dudek cites several cases in which the Seventh Circuit has found that a represented claimant who failed to object to vocational expert testimony during the administrative hearing forfeited those objections. See Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 2016); Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2009); Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2004); Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2002). Dudek correctly points out the Metoxen's lawyer did not question the basis for the vocational expert's testimony about Metoxen's past work or suggest that her elderly services job was a composite one. See R. 56–62.

Metoxen has not forfeited her objection to the vocational expert's testimony (and the ALJ's reliance on it). In Sevec, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Social Security Administration's argument that a plaintiff waived her objection to a vocational expert's testimony about her past work by not questioning the expert during the administrative hearing (and while represented by counsel). Sevec, 59 F.4th at 296, 300 n.35. The court acknowledged that claimants have the burden of proof at step four. Nevertheless, the court determined that the ALJ's step-four finding was “without any support in the record,” as the vocational expert's testimony was “both the only support” for that finding and was “substantively inadequate.” Id. at 300 n.35. The same is true here. The only support for the ALJ's finding that Metoxen's work with the elderly was as a senior service aide was the vocational expert's testimony. That testimony is substantively inadequate—the vocational expert failed to explain why she believed a senior service aide was a good match for Metoxen's job duties, which appear to exceed those of an aide. Consequently, the ALJ's step-four finding lacks support in the record. See Biestek, 587 U.S. at 104, 139 S.Ct. 1148 (“[A]n applicant cannot waive the substantial evidence standard.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Because the record does not contain evidence from which the ALJ could determine, with any degree of confidence, that Metoxen could perform her past work with the elderly as generally performed, I find that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's decision. That deficiency was not harmless, as the ALJ never proceeded to the last step of the sequential evaluation process. Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I REVERSE the Social Security Commissioner's final decision and REMAND this action to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further proceedings consistent with this decision. The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED this 15th day of May, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The transcript is filed on the docket at ECF No. 11-1.

2.   The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) is “a publication produced by the Department of Labor that lists job titles and their requirements. The DOT was last revised thirty years ago, leaving many of its job descriptions outdated.” Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2022).

3.   “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).

4.   “Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(d), 416.967(d).

5.   SSR 82-62 was rescinded in June 2024 and replaced by SSR 24-2p, Titles II and XVI: How We Evaluate Past Relevant Work, 2024 WL 3291790, 2024 SSR LEXIS 1 (June 6, 2024). However, as Dudek acknowledges, SSR 82-62 still applies to this case. See Def.’s Br. 11 n.8.

6.   The DOT title for code 195.367-010 is “case aide.” However, the description indicates that the job “[m]ay be designated according to clients serviced as Senior Service Aide.” See DOT code 195.367-010. That's how the vocational expert in our case designated Metoxen's job working with the elderly.

7.   Like SSR 82-62, SSR 82-61 was rescinded and replaced by SSR 24-2p.

STEPHEN C. DRIES, United States Magistrate Judge