JAIRO ADALID MATUTE SALGADO v. JEFFREY CRAWFORD (2026)

ORDER (Granting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition)

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Jairo Adalid Matute Salgado's (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Matute Salgado”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition” (ECF No. 1)). Petitioner submitted his Petition against Respondents Jeffrey Crawford, Markwayne Mullin, Joseph Simon and Todd M. Lyons (collectively, “Respondents”). Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, filed his Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he asserts that he has been illegally detained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agency since April 9, 2026. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that ICE's revocation of the order releasing him from custody pending removal violated DHS's regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1), and his due process rights under the doctrine of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1).

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the Petition and the federal Respondents' submissions, including the declaration of Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer Violeta Englerth. (ECF No. 9-1 (“Declaration”).) Petitioner first entered the United States without inspection in approximately 2002, was detained by Border Patrol officers, and was physically removed to Honduras. (ECF No. 3 ¶ 15 (“Mem. Supp.”).) He next entered without inspection in 2008, this time without being detained, and remained in the United States until approximately December 2018, when he departed the country. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) In approximately July 2019, Mr. Matute Salgado returned to the United States without inspection together with his then-minor daughter. (Id. ¶ 18.) Both were detained by Border Patrol officers and then released. (Id.) Around July 2019, ICE reinstated Petitioner's 2008 order of removal and placed him on an Order of Supervision. (Id. ¶ 19; Declaration at ¶ 11.) Among its conditions, the Order of Supervision required that Petitioner not commit any crimes while on supervision. (ECF No. 9-4 at 3 (“Order of Supervision”).)

Beginning in 2019, Matute Salgado reported annually to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) in conformity with his Order of Supervision. (Mem. Supp. at ¶ 20.) In 2019, he reported in person to the ERO office in Fairfax, Virginia. (Id. ¶ 21.) In 2020, he reported by telephone as instructed. (Id. ¶ 22.) In 2021, ICE placed him on the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program through a government contractor in Manassas, Virginia, and removed his ankle monitor. (Id. ¶ 23.) Petitioner complied with that program, made himself available for all home appearances, and appeared at the program's office as required. (Id. ¶ 24.) In 2022, ICE issued him an Employment Authorization Document based on his Order of Supervision, and renewed that authorization in 2023, 2024, and 2025, with his most recent Employment Authorization Document set to expire in December 2026. (Id. ¶ 25.) At no time did ICE alert Petitioner that he had violated any term of his Order of Supervision. (Id. ¶ 26.)

Sometime after his arrival in 2019, Petitioner requested a reasonable fear interview, and on October 14, 2025, he was interviewed by an asylum officer, who determined that Petitioner had a reasonable fear of torture if returned to Honduras. (Id. ¶¶ 27–29.) His case was referred to the Immigration Court for a full hearing on his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. (Id. ¶ 30; Declaration ¶¶ 18–19.)

On Thursday, April 9, 2026, Petitioner again presented himself for his annual check-in, this time at the ERO office in Chantilly, Virginia. (Mem. Supp. ¶ 31.) Without prior warning, ICE took Petitioner into custody. (Id. ¶ 32.) Petitioner asserts that: (1) at no time during the preceding six years had ICE alleged or explained what violations of the Order of Supervision, if any, he had committed; (2) at no time had ICE provided him evidence that a statutorily authorized officer had considered the facts and circumstances of his conduct before revoking the Order of Supervision; and (3) at no time did ICE provide notice sufficient to permit him to effect an orderly departure from the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 33–35.) According to the federal respondents, ERO agents detained Petitioner under the mistaken belief that he had been released on an Order of Recognizance rather than an Order of Supervision, and on that basis conducted a custody redetermination premised on his “recent encounters with law enforcement.” (Declaration ¶¶ 11, 20.) ICE did not locate the actual Order of Supervision in Petitioner's file until May 11, 2026. (Id. ¶ 21.)

At the time of his detention, Petitioner was living with his wife and two of his five children in Manassas, Virginia, where the family had lived for approximately two years. (Mem. Supp. ¶¶ 37, 41.) His youngest child, a thirteen-year-old United States citizen who has autism and lost his biological mother, leaving Petitioner as his only remaining biological parent. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 43.) Petitioner worked as a welder in Beltsville, Maryland, earning wages sufficient to support his family, and has filed federal income tax returns for 2019 through 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 38–40.) The Petition represents that Petitioner's limited contacts with the criminal and traffic systems — a 2018 driving-under-the-influence conviction, a 2020 capias later dismissed when it emerged that he had in fact paid the fees at issue, and minor traffic citations — do not subject him to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) or the Laken Riley Act, and that he presents neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. (Id. ¶¶ 43–46.)

ICE first purported to revoke the Order of Supervision by a Notice of Revocation of Release issued on May 12, 2026, and served on May 13, 2026, which cited 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). (Declaration ¶¶ 22–23.) After recognizing that it had cited the wrong regulation, ICE issued a corrected Notice of Revocation of Release on May 14, 2026, which was served on Petitioner on May 15, 2026. (Id. ¶ 24; ECF No. 9-3 (“Notice of Revocation of Release” or “Notice”.) The corrected Notice states that Petitioner's “release has been revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1),” and identifies a single basis for the revocation: that he “violated a condition of [his] release.” (Notice at 1.) As the factual predicate for that asserted violation, the corrected Notice identifies a November 7, 2020 arrest for misdemeanor contempt of court, a May 4, 2022 citation for traveling fifteen to nineteen miles per hour over the speed limit (described on the Notice as an “Infraction”), and an August 11, 2025 traffic “Infraction.” (Id.) The corrected Notice was completed and signed by Robert Guadian in his capacity as Field Office Director. (Id. at 2.) Respondents further represent that Petitioner was afforded an informal interview on May 13, 2026 — two days before the corrected Notice of Revocation of Release was served upon him. (Declaration ¶ 23; ECF No. 9 at 3.)

On April 23, 2026, Petitioner filed his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) After the Court ordered Respondents to file a responsive pleading (ECF No. 6), Respondents timely submitted their opposition to Petitioner's Petition on May 15, 2026. (ECF No. 9 (“ Opp.”)). Petitioner submitted his reply on May 22, 2026, (ECF No. 10 (“Reply”)), rendering his Petition ripe for judicial review.

II. DISCUSSION

The Petition asserts seven counts, falling into three groups. First, he claims that the revocation of his Order of Supervision and his resulting detention violate his Fifth Amendment rights to substantive due process (Count One) and procedural due process (Count Two). (Petition ¶¶ 11–15; 16–21.) Second, he claims that the revocation violates the Administrative Procedure Act, because it was (a) contrary to law and constitutional right pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (B) (Count Three); (b) arbitrary and capricious under § 706(2)(A) (Count Four); and (c) in excess of statutory authority under § 706(2)(C) (Count Five). (Id. ¶¶ 22–32; 33–42; 43–48). Third, he claims that his revocation was ultra vires (Count Six) and that it violated DHS's own regulations governing the revocation of an order of supervision, in contravention of the Accardi doctrine. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50; 51–55). In Respondents' framing, however, the Petition “presents a single question premised on the allegedly improper revocation of his order of supervised release.” (Opp. at 2.) The Court finds that Petitioner's regulatory challenge resolves the Petition; accordingly, the Court only addresses Counts Six and Seven and grants relief on that basis.¹

To assess the legality of Petitioner's detention, the Court must determine whether DHS followed its own regulations in revoking his Order of Supervision. As an initial matter, the Court notes that ICE officials lack discretion to decide whether to comply with those regulations. Kale v. Alfonso-Royals, 139 F.4th 329, 336 n.3 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[A]n agency lacks discretion to disobey [its] regulations even if it has discretion to create those regulations in the first place.”); Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268 (requiring the government to follow its own “existing valid regulations”); see also Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 962 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing the Accardi doctrine as providing that, “when an agency fails to follow its own procedures or regulations, that agency's actions are generally invalid.”). Although a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing that his custody is unlawful, the regulation frames what that showing requires here. Section 241.4(1) does not merely permit revocation; it conditions a lawful revocation on specified findings and procedures. A petitioner therefore establishes an Accardi violation by demonstrating that the agency's own notice does not reflect the prerequisites that the regulation demands, and a general invocation of agency discretion does not supply that which the regulation requires. See Aguilar v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1256825, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2026) (granting relief where the notice “lacked the requisite factual findings” or suffered “some other material deficiency under Section 241.4(1)”); Portillo Sosa v. Noem, 2026 WL 1298657, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2026) (rejecting the contention that the regulations' grant of discretion excused the absence of the required findings). The Court accordingly examines whether the agency's notice and the record reflect compliance with the regulation. The Court finds that the corrected Notice of Revocation of Release fails to comply with DHS's regulations in three respects, each of which renders the revocation invalid.

First, the corrected Notice does not properly revoke Petitioner's release, because the record contains no evidence that the ICE official who signed it satisfied the requirements that 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1)(2) imposes before an official below the Executive Associate Commissioner may revoke an order of supervision. Section 241.4(1)(2) specifies which ICE officials may revoke an order of supervision and on what findings. Under that provision, the “Executive Associate Commissioner” has the “authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously approved for release,” and a “district director may also revoke release ․ when, in the district director's opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1)(2).

Here, the corrected Notice of Revocation of Release was signed by Robert Guadian (“Mr. Guadian”) in his capacity as Field Office Director. (Notice at 2.) As an initial matter, “[i]t is not clear from the regulation, which refers to previous Immigration and Naturalization Service position titles, whether an ICE field office director has authority” to revoke release. Argueta Montes v. Mullin, No. 1:26-cv-926, 2026 WL 1459723, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2026) (quoting Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387 (D. Mass. 2017)). While § 241.4(1)(2) authorizes “district director[s]” to revoke orders of supervision, ICE's regulations are contradictory as to whether field office directors and district directors hold the same authority. On the one hand, 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 defines “district director” to include a “field office director” “to the extent that authority has been delegated to such official,” which supports the conclusion that the regulation authorizes field office directors to revoke orders of supervision. On the other hand, 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e) lists “[d]istrict directors” separately from “Field Office Directors,” suggesting that the positions are distinct. Argueta Montes, 2026 WL 1459723 at *3; Ndoye v. Joyce, No. 1:26-cv-1219, 2026 WL 765635, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2026). Some courts have nonetheless noted, at least in dicta, that field office directors may revoke orders of supervision. See Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, No. 1:25-cv-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2841886, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2025); Gazazyan v. Bondi, No. 5:25-cv-2599, 2025 WL 3898484, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025).

However, the Court need not resolve that question here. Assuming arguendo that a field office director qualifies as a “district director” and thus has the authority to revoke release, the official must still make the threshold determinations that § 241.4(1)(2) requires before revoking an order of supervision — namely, that (1) “revocation is in the public interest” and (2) “circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(1)(2). Here, no evidence in the record indicates that Field Office Director Guadian made a finding that revocation served the public interest or that the circumstances did not reasonably permit referral to a more senior ICE official. The corrected Notice checks only the box indicating that Mr. Matute Salgado “violated a condition of [his] release”; it nowhere states that revocation is in the public interest or that referral to the Executive Associate Commissioner was not reasonably possible. (Notice at 1–2.) Indeed, the form itself recites, in an instruction to the issuing officer, that a “§ 241.4 revocation must be [made by the] EAD [(Executive Associate Director ² )] or FOD [(Field Office Director)] where there is a public interest to do so and referral to [the] EAD [is] not reasonable,” but the official who completed the form made no such findings.

Respondents represent, through the Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer's Declaration, that Mr. Guadian signed the Notice “finding that Petitioner's recent police encounters meant revocation was in the public interest and that it was not reasonable to refer the case to the Executive Associate Director.” (Declaration ¶ 22.) However, the Court finds that the Notice fails to bear out this characterization. The Notice of Revocation of Release constitutes the operative agency action, and its contents control; a declarant's after-the-fact gloss constitutes a post-hoc rationalization that “cannot serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action,” Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981), and in any event cannot supply findings that are absent from the Notice itself. “[W]here the regulations require [a particular] determination” as a precondition to a deprivation of liberty, the Court “cannot infer that to be the case.” Serpas v. Simon, No. 1:25-cv-02369-AJT-WBP, 2026 WL 1244544, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2026). Absent evidence of findings that the regulation requires, the corrected Notice of Revocation of Release cannot serve as the basis upon which DHS may detain Mr. Matute Salgado. Accord Rojas Toj v. Mullin, No. 1:26-cv-1142-MSN, 2026 WL 1458900, at *5 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2026); Sosa, 2026 WL 1298657, at *4.

Second, Respondents failed to provide the timely notice and meaningful informal interview that 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) requires. That provision directs that a noncitizen returned to custody “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release” and “will be afforded an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1). Petitioner was detained on April 9, 2026, but no notice of revocation issued until May 12, 2026, and the operative corrected Notice was not served until May 15, 2026, which constitutes more than five weeks after his detention began. (Declaration ¶¶ 20, 24.) This detain-first, explain-later approach to immigration enforcement cannot be reconciled with the regulation's command of prompt notice, nor with the post-hoc-rationalization principle discussed above. Am. Textile, 452 U.S. at 539; see Argueta Montes, 2026 WL 1459723, at *4 (applying that principle to a notice served thirty-eight days after detention).

Furthermore, the defect in the informal interview is even more fundamental. Respondents represent that the interview occurred on May 13, 2026, but the operative corrected Notice of Revocation of Release — the document stating the reasons to which the regulation entitles Petitioner to respond — was not served on him until May 15, 2026, two days after his interview. (Declaration ¶¶ 23, 24.) An interview conducted two days before the reasons for revocation were furnished cannot have afforded Mr. Matute Salgado “an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (emphasis added). The interview thus did not satisfy the regulation, as it preceded the very notice that it was meant to address.

Third, the corrected Notice asserts only one substantive basis for revocation: that Petitioner “violated a condition of [his] release.” (Notice at 1.) The Notice's own contents do not support that assertion. The condition at issue required that Petitioner “not commit any crimes while on this Order of Supervision.” (ECF No. 9-4 at 3.) Yet, none of the three items that the corrected Notice lists establishes the commission of a crime. The first cited incident, on November 7, 2020, reflects an arrest, not a conviction. (Notice at 1.) Not only does an arrest fail to constitute proof that a crime was committed; in this case, the underlying charge was dismissed. (Declaration ¶ 13; Reply ¶ 11.) The remaining two items are described in the Notice itself as traffic “infractions,” and both citations indicate that Petitioner traveled no more than nineteen miles per hour over the limit, placing him below the threshold at which a speeding offense becomes a misdemeanor under Virginia law. Va. Code § 46.2-862 (reckless driving requires speed “20 miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit” or “in excess of 85 miles per hour”). Furthermore, a traffic infraction is, by definition, not a crime. Va. Code § 18.2-8 (traffic infractions are “not deemed to be criminal in nature”). Because the conduct that the corrected Notice recites does not satisfy the condition for revocation of release that it invokes, the asserted basis for revocation under § 241.4(l)(1) additionally fails on its own terms.

Respondents resist this conclusion principally by invoking the rule that habeas tests only the legality of a petitioner's present custody, contending that any infirmity in the original detention stands immaterial so long as some lawful basis for detention exists now. (Opp. at 5) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923)). The Court does not quarrel with this principle, but notes that its invocation does not aid Respondents here, as no presently valid revocation sustains Petitioner's detention. Petitioner's April 9, 2026 seizure rested on an acknowledged error, (Declaration ¶¶ 11, 20), and the corrected May 15 Notice on which federal respondents now rely is deficient for the reasons stated above. A defective revocation cannot supply the lawful basis for present custody that Bilokumsky requires. The Court therefore need not decide whether a validly issued revocation could retroactively cure an unlawful detention that preceded it; here, no valid revocation exists.

Nor have Respondents shown the absence of prejudice. (Opp. at 4–5) (citing Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 474 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming that an agency's violation of its own regulation invalidates the resulting action only where the regulation is intended to benefit the alien and the violation causes prejudice)). The regulatory scheme at issue protects a core liberty interest — freedom from physical detention — and prescribes an entire procedural framework to govern its deprivation; where such a framework is created but not followed, prejudice may be presumed. Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, 2025 WL 2444087, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025); Rojas Toj, 2026 WL 1458900, at *5. In any event, the prejudice here is evident: Petitioner was detained for more than five weeks without the notice that the regulation requires, was given a deficient interview that preceded the operative notice, and was deprived of his liberty on an inadequate notice that does not identify a qualifying violation.

Because ICE disregarded the text of its own regulations in detaining Petitioner, federal respondents must release Petitioner from custody immediately. Kale, 139 F.4th at 336 n.3; accord Portillo Sosa, 2026 WL 1298657, at *4 (“[A]s the challenged action here is revocation of an order of release, the corresponding appropriate relief is to order Petitioner's release, as multiple courts have done on analogous facts.”); Rojas Toj, 2026 WL 1458900, at *5 (failure to follow § 241.4(l)(1) “renders [a noncitizen's] current detention unlawful and entitles him to immediate release.”); Vera Briones v. Mullin, 1:26-cv-00994-MSN-WBP, ECF 5 at 6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2026) (“[T]he proper remedy for an Accardi violation is a petitioner” release”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Mr. Matute Salgado's Petition (ECF No. 1). It is further ORDERED that:

1. Respondents RELEASE Petitioner from custody, with all of his personal property, subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision, no later than 4:00 p.m. on the second business day following the entry of this Order. The federal respondents may not impose any new or additional conditions on Matute Salgado's release, other than those previously imposed upon him in the Order of Supervision, without leave of court.

2. The May 15, 2026 revocation of Petitioner's Order of Supervision is VACATED.

3. Respondents, along with their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, successors, and assigns, and all persons acting in concert with them, are ENJOINED from rearresting Mr. Matute Salgado unless (1) he commits a violation of any federal, state, or local law; (2) he fails to comply with the conditions of his Order of Supervision; or (3) his Order of Supervision has been lawfully revoked in a manner consistent with DHS's regulations and the Due Process Clause.

Let the Clerk file a copy of this Order electronically and notify all counsel of record.

It is so ORDERED.

Richmond, Virginia

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Petition also gestures toward a challenge to the length of his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (Mem. Supp. ¶¶ 49, 50, 54). The Respondents correctly observe that Petitioner has been detained for a comparatively short period and does not seriously press a Zadvydas theory, (Opp. at 1–2), and the posture of this case — detention during withholding-only proceedings that Petitioner himself initiated — stands materially different from the “indefinite and potentially permanent” post-removal-order detention with which Zadvydas was concerned. Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 757 (4th Cir. 2024). Because the unlawfulness of the revocation under DHS's own regulations entitles Petitioner to the release that he seeks, the Court does not reach his remaining counts. See Garcia-Rivera v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-229-MSN-WBP, 2026 WL 1244545, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2026) (resolving an analogous petition on the regulatory ground without reaching the petitioner's other claims); Portillo Sosa v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-0522-AJT-WEF, ECF No. 7 at 9 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2026) (declining to reach Zadvydas where the regulatory claim disposed of the petition). In particular, the Court need not address whether Petitioner's detention independently offends 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas.

2.   The position of Executive Associate Director was previously referred to as the “Executive Associate Commissioner.” (Declaration ¶ 22 n.1.)

David J. Novak United States District Judge