HAGUE v. EDLOW (2026)

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. ECF 15. Plaintiffs sued Joseph Edlow in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and USCIS based on the allegedly improper denial of Form I-140 Immigrant Petitions for Alien Worker (“Form I-140”) Plaintiffs filed with USCIS. ECF 1 ¶ 1. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Background

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) allows the issuance of “EB-3” immigrant visas to noncitizens who have been offered permanent employment as “skilled,” “professional,” or certain “unskilled” workers by a U.S. based employer. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A). To apply for an EB-3 visa, the employer must first apply for and receive a labor certification from the Department of Labor (“DOL”) by filing a Form ETA-9089. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(3)(C), 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). The labor certification ensures that there are no qualified U.S. workers available to take the job. Id.

Once the labor certification is approved, it is valid for 180 days, 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(b), and the employer must file a Form I-140 petition with USCIS along with the labor certification, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l). If the evidence establishes that visa eligibility requirements are met, USCIS “will approve” the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(i). If the submitted evidence does not demonstrate eligibility, USCIS in its discretion may deny the petition for lack of evidence or ineligibility or request the missing evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(ii).¹

For a Form I-140 petition to be considered “properly filed,” it must be accepted for processing under 8 C.F.R. § 103, be accompanied by the required labor certification, and be accompanied by any other required supporting documentation. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a). Section 103 outlines specific filing requirements for immigration benefit requests including I-140 petitions. 8 C.F.R. § 103. Each benefit request must be signed with a valid signature, properly executed, filed in compliance with the applicable regulations, and submitted with the correct fees. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii). If a benefit request does not meet any of these requirements, USCIS will reject it and the petition will not retain its filing date. Id.

The filing fee for an I-140 petition is $715. 8 C.F.R. § 106.2(a)(11). In addition to the application fee, I-140 applicants must pay a $600 Asylum Program Fee. 8 C.F.R. § 106.2(c)(13). There are two exceptions to the Asylum Program Fee: a “nonprofit” employer does not pay an Asylum Program Fee, and a “small employer” pays a reduced Asylum Program fee of $300. 8 C.F.R. § 106.2(c)(13)(i), (ii). A “small employer” is defined as a “firm or individual that has 25 or fewer full-time equivalent employees in the United States, including any affiliates and subsidiaries.” 8 C.F.R. § 106.1(f)(1).

B. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are Hague Electric LLC (“Hague Electric”) and its owner, Donald Hague. Hague Electric employs more than 25 employees. ECF 1 at ¶ 16. Plaintiffs, seeking to hire Diogo Leitao, a foreign worker with a Portuguese passport, as an “Electrician Apprentice,” began the visa application process by filing a Form ETA-9089 with DOL on July 31, 2023. ECF 1-3 at 60; ECF 1 at ¶ 14. DOL approved Plaintiffs' labor certification on November 20, 2024, and indicated that it would expire on May 19, 2025. ECF 1-3 at 60. The labor certification indicated that Hague Electric had 25 employees on payroll in Mr. Leitao's intended area of employment. Id. at 16.

Plaintiffs filed their first I-140 petition with Defendant USCIS on or about February 11, 2025, along with all required documents, including the labor certification and two checks of $715 and $600 for the filing fee and Asylum Program Fee respectively. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 13, 17; ECF 1-3 at 3. In this petition, Plaintiffs mistakenly indicated that Hague Electric employed 25 or fewer full-time U.S. employees in the answer to Part 1 Question 6 of the form. ECF 1-3 at 8. This contradicted Plaintiffs' answer to Part 5 Question 4 of the form, which indicated that Hague Electric had 28 U.S. employees. ECF 1-3 at 10.

On March 4, 2025, USCIS rejected the first petition. ECF 1 at ¶ 18; ECF 1-3 at 58. In the rejection notice, USCIS stated that “The payment amount is incorrect, or has not been provided.” ECF 1-3 at 58. The rejection notice further instructed Plaintiffs to “review the USCIS Form G-1055 for fee information” and “be sure to complete the petition fully, submit the appropriate fees, and include all required supporting documentation.” Id.

On April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs submitted a second I-140 petition with all required documents and two checks for $715 and $600. ECF 1 at ¶ 20. The second petition indicated again that Hague Electric employed 25 or fewer full-time employees in the answer to Part 1 Question 6. ECF 1-3 at 82. Plaintiffs did, however, change their answer to Part 5 Question 4, indicating that Hague Electric had 30 U.S. employees. Id. at 84. USCIS rejected the second petition on April 28, 2025. Id. at 73; ECF 1 at ¶ 20. This time, USCIS provided a slightly different explanation for their rejection: “The payment amount provided does not match the required amount according to what you have selected on the form, or no payment amount has been provided.” ECF 1-3 at 73.

With the labor certification expiration deadline only a few days away, Plaintiffs filed a third I-140 petition on or about May 14, 2025. ECF 1 at ¶ 21; ECF 16-3. The third petition contained the same answers to Part 1 Question 6 and Part 5 Question 4 as the second petition, USCIS rejected it as well. ECF 16-3 at 2, 4; ECF 1 at ¶ 21.

On June 17, 2025, one month after the labor certification had expired, Plaintiffs filed a fourth and final I-140 petition. ECF 1 at ¶ 22; ECF 16-4. Along with the required documents and the two checks for $715 and $600, Plaintiffs included a cover letter explaining that Hague Electric employed more than 25 employees and that they had corrected the answer to Part 1 Question 6 to reflect this. ECF 1 at ¶ 22; ECF 1-3 at 169. The cover letter also notified USCIS of Plaintiffs' intent to file a writ of mandamus if this fourth petition was rejected. ECF 1-3 at 169. On July 2, 2025, USCIS rejected the fourth petition because the labor certification had expired. ECF 1-3 at 173.

C. Procedural Background

On October 24, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court, bringing claims under the APA and the Mandamus Act. ECF 1. Plaintiffs' Complaint argues that Defendants improperly rejected their first petition because it was submitted with the required documentation and filing fees, and that the rejections of the subsequent three petitions were also improper. Id. ¶¶1-2. Plaintiffs request that the Court set aside Defendants' rejections as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law pursuant to Section 706(2) of the APA and compel Defendants to accept and immediately adjudicate Plaintiffs' petition as provided by Section 706(1) of the APA. Id. ¶¶ 31-36. Under the Mandamus Act, Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants' lack of a reasoned rejection was an abuse of discretion and contrary to the law, and request that this Court compel USCIS to adjudicate the petition. Id. ¶¶ 37-43.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 30, 2026, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. ECF 15, 16. Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief on March 4, 2026. ECF 21.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a moving party to challenge the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. The moving party may either attack the complaint on its face, asserting that the complaint “fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based,” or challenge “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings.” White v. CMA Const. Co., 947 F. Supp. 231, 233 (E.D. Va. 1996). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768-69 (4th Cir. 1991).

Alternatively, a court may dismiss a claim when the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss should be granted unless the plaintiff has “set forth ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Taylor v. First Premier Bank, 841 F. Supp. 2d 931, 932 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must construe the complaint, read as a whole, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the facts asserted therein as true. LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 2012). The general pleading standard requires that the complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ․ [and that] give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may “consider documents that are explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference ․ and those attached to the complaint as exhibits.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Additionally, a court may consider “a document submitted by the movant that was not attached to or expressly incorporated in the complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. This Case Is Not Moot

Defendants first argue that because “USCIS properly rejected Plaintiffs' Form I-140 petitions,” this case is moot. ECF 16 at 8. “The mootness doctrine is an important part” of Article III's limitation on federal courts' “jurisdiction.” Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36 F.4th 166, 169 (4th Cir. 2022). But a case is only moot “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012). Defendants' mootness argument is based on the mistaken premise that the only relief Plaintiffs' request is an adjudication of their Form I-140 petitions. See, e.g., ECF 16 at 8. Plaintiffs request more than that. For example, Plaintiffs ask this Court to “[o]rder Defendants to accept the Form I-140 nunc pro tunc.” ECF 1 at 9. An order from this Court granting such relief would provide “effectual relief” to Plaintiffs such that this case presents a live controversy.

B. Plaintiffs' APA Challenges Fail

Plaintiffs bring claims under Section 706(1) and 706(2) of the APA. See ECF 1 ¶ 32; see also ECF 21 at 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court “to compel [USCIS] to accept a wrongfully rejected I-140 filing either by finding the agency's rejection an ‘action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed’ under § 706(1) or by finding it ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law’ under § 706(2) of the APA.” ECF 21 at 2. The Court construes Plaintiffs' complaint as requesting the Court order that the June 17, 2025, Form I-140 filing “be accepted and adjudicated nunc pro tunc, as if timely filed” as of February 11, 2025, the date of the first Form I-140 filing. Id.; see also ECF 1 ¶¶ 2, 22. For the reasons discussed below, both APA claims fail.

1. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Section 706(1) Claim

Section 706(1) empowers a court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Section 706(1) claim. ECF 16 at 10-12. “A claim for agency action unlawfully or unreasonably delayed ‘can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.’ ” Lovo v. Miller, 107 F.4th 199, 210 (4th Cir. 2024). The Fourth Circuit treats this requirement “as part of APA § 701(a)(2)'s preclusion of judicial review of ‘agency action committed to agency discretion by law.’ ” Sarshartehran v. Rubio, 2025 WL 1261787, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 1, 2025) (citing Lovo, 104 F.4th at 211).

This Court, therefore, “must decide whether the INA or its enacting regulations requires USCIS to” treat the June 17, 2025, Form I-140 as if it was filed on February 11, 2025. Lovo, 107 F.4th at 211. Because Plaintiffs points to no statute or regulation requiring such treatment, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Section 706(1) claim.

Plaintiffs first argue that this requirement is rooted in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5. See ECF 1 ¶ 33. But nothing in this section requires USCIS to treat a Form I-140 petition as relating back to a previously denied petition. Instead, that provision simply details the “[s]pecific requirements for initial supporting documents” that must be included with the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g). In their Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs argue 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) and the instructions on Form I-140 impose a nondiscretionary duty to review I-140 filings “in their totality.” ECF 21 at 3-5. Section 103.2(b), however, only establishes that documents filed with a petition should be referred to as part of petition itself, and does not speak to whether a later filed petition must relate back to a previously dismissed petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) (“Any evidence submitted in connection with a benefit request is incorporated into and considered part of the request.”). Similarly, the Form I-140 instructions Plaintiffs cite only outline the possible documentation for fee exemptions, and do not impose any obligation on USCIS's evaluation process. ECF 21 at 4.

Plaintiffs also argue that USCIS failed to abide by a nondiscretionary duty to act on petitions within a reasonable time. ECF 1 ¶ 32. Plaintiffs contend that this obligation stems from 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), which states that “[w]ith due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.” But that section is “too broad to create a discrete, non-discretionary duty sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Section 706(1).” Vafamand v. Platek, 2025 WL 2621796, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 2025); see Ramizi v. Blinken, 745 F. Supp. 3d 244, 262 (E.D.N.C. 2024) (“Section 555(b) does not identify a discrete agency action; by its plain terms, it applies to every agency action.”). And even if 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) creates a non-discretionary duty to timely concluded each matter presented, USCIS satisfied that duty by rejecting each of Plaintiffs' petitions within a month of submission. See ECF 1-3 at 58, 73, 173. Nor can 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) be read to impose a duty upon USCIS to treat the June 17, 2025, petition as relating back to the February 11, 2025 petition.

Plaintiffs cites to Sadup Softech LLC v. USCIS, 2023 WL 4085741 (D. Neb. June 20, 2023), to support jurisdiction. ECF 21 at 2-3. But in Sadup, the court addressed a different jurisdictional argument: whether the plaintiff had standing given the petition was denied based on plaintiff's own failure to follow the agency's rules. Sadup, 2023 WL 4085741, at *2. The court found that the plaintiff had standing only because the plaintiff had “sufficiently identified” how “the rejection was contrary to the relevant regulations.” Id. Plaintiffs here have made no such showing.

As such, Plaintiffs have failed to identify a discrete and nondiscretionary duty owed to them by USCIS and, therefore, have not established subject matter jurisdiction for their Section 706(1) claim.

2. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim Under Section 706(2)

Plaintiffs also bring a claim under Section 706(2) of the APA, requesting the Court set aside USCIS's rejections of their petitions because “Defendants unlawfully rejected [the] Form I-140, despite Plaintiffs' compliance with all the requirements as per the legal procedures and requirements.” ECF 7 ¶ 34; see also id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs also argue, for the first time, in their Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that USCIS “failed to provide a reasonable explanation of the alleged mistake committed.” ECF 21 at 8. Defendants argue that the rejections were lawful because each petition failed “to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1),” and noncompliant petitions “can be rejected by the agency” without violating the APA. ECF 16 at 15.

As a preliminary matter, the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' § 706(2) claim. Unlike a § 706(1) claim, a § 706(2) claim does not seek to compel agency action, but rather judicial review of an agency's decision. To have jurisdiction under § 706(2), Plaintiffs need only show that they are challenging a “final agency action.” See NAACP v. Bureau of the Census, 945 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, Defendants concede that the denial of the Form I-140 petitions constitutes a final agency action, ECF 16 at 12.

Plaintiffs, however, have failed to state a claim under § 706(2). Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), a court may “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” Courts presume that agency action is valid and must be upheld if the record shows that the agency had a rational basis for the decision. See Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Under this deferential standard, a court should only overrule an agency's decision where the agency has “failed to consider relevant factors and committed a clear error of judgment.” Md. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 542 F.3d 424, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2008). And courts should uphold agency actions where the agency provides “an explanation of its decision that includes a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 292, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2018).

USCIS had a rational basis for rejecting each of Plaintiffs' petitions. First, none of the petitions were “properly filed” according to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a). To be properly filed, each petition must comply with 8 C.F.R. § 103, which requires that petitions be accompanied by all necessary evidence to establish eligibility and that USCIS deny petitions that are improperly executed or submitted with incorrect fees. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii), (b)(1). None of Plaintiffs' petitions complied with § 103.2: the first three petitions were accompanied by an improper fee payment based on the information provided in the petition and the fourth petition attached an expired labor certification.

Plaintiffs argue for the first time in their Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that Defendants “failed to provide a reasonable explanation of the alleged mistake committed.” ECF 21 at 8. Even assuming this argument is properly before the court, see Jones v. Mazda Fin. Servs., 2026 WL 91647, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2026) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”), it fails. The first rejection notice stated that “[t]he payment amount is incorrect or has not been provided,” and instructed Plaintiffs to review the fee information and resubmit the petition. ECF 1-3 at 58. The second rejection stated that based on the answers provided on the form, USCIS had determined that the wrong fee applied. ECF 1-3 at 73. The third petition faced the same defect. ECF 17 at 16. And the final rejection clearly explained that the labor certification was out of date, which is undisputed. Id. at 173.

Plaintiffs have failed to plead that USCIS acted arbitrarily or capriciously or provided an insufficient explanation for denying the petitions, and, therefore, have failed to state a claim under Section 706(2).

C. Plaintiffs' Mandamus Act Claim Fails For Lack Of Jurisdiction

Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim under the Mandamus Act arguing that USCIS failed to abide by a nondiscretionary duty to properly adjudicate their I-140 petition. ECF 1 ¶¶ 37-43. Like § 706(1) of the APA, the Mandamus Act “only permits federal courts to exercise jurisdiction if an agency has a clear duty to act.” Lovo, 107 F.4th at 216; see also Hyatt v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 146 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D. Va. 2015) (noting that relief under § 706(1) and by writ of mandamus is “functionally identical”). As discussed above, Plaintiffs failed to identify a discrete and nondiscretionary duty to accept and adjudicate their petition. Therefore, the Mandamus Act claim must also be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for their APA § 706(1) and Mandamus Act claim and have failed to state a claim under APA § 706(2). Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 15) is GRANTED as to all counts. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' APA § 706(1) and Mandamus Act claims are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' APA § 706(2) claim is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Upon approval of the I-140 petition, the employee must file a Form I-485 for adjustment of status to legal permanent resident. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(3)(ii). USCIS may approve the application and adjust the employee's immigration status. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii).

Michael S. Nachmanoff, United States District Judge