IN RE: the Complaint of JACKSON CREEK MARINE (2023)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Pending before the Court is Claimant State Highway Administration of the State of Maryland's Motion to Dismiss Limitation Plaintiff Jackson Creek Marine, LLC's Complaint in Admiralty for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ECF No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2023, Jackson Creek Marine, LLC (“Jackson Creek”), as owner of the tug Jacqueline A (the “Vessel”), filed a Complaint in Admiralty seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability for potential claims arising from a March 10, 2015 incident involving the Vessel. Compl., ECF No. 1.

As owner of the Vessel, Jackson Creek seeks relief under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30. Compl. ¶ 2, 11. The Act limits “the liability of the owner of a vessel for any claim, debt, or liability,” subject to certain exceptions, to “the value of the vessel and pending freight.” 46 U.S.C. § 30523. However, in order for the vessel owner to avail himself of this right, any “action must be brought within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim.” Id. at § 30529.

In the Complaint, Jackson Creek stated that it was only aware of one potential claimant, the State Highway Administration of the State of Maryland (“SHA”), related to an incident in which “a barge towed by the Vessel made contact with” the “fendering system” of the Nanticoke River Memorial Bridge in Maryland. Compl. ¶ 5.

On May 19, 2023, SHA filed an Answer to the Complaint and a Claim against Jackson Creek for damage to the bridge fendering system. SHA's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Claim to Limitation Pl.'s Compl. in Admiralty, ECF No. 11. No other parties have filed claims against Jackson Creek.

On August 15, 2023, SHA filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case because Jackson Creek allegedly failed to file its Complaint within the statutory six-month filing period. SHA's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Limitation Pl.'s Compl. in Admiralty at 1, ECF No. 18. Jackson Creek argues the six-month filing period is not jurisdictional and is instead an affirmative defense that must be raised at summary judgment. Limitation Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n at 1, ECF No. 19. Having been fully briefed, the matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's underlying power to hear the case. Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and possess “only the jurisdiction authorized them by the United States Constitution and by federal statute.” U.S. ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009).

A litigant's alleged failure to comply with a statute of limitations can be raised as a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction only if the time bar is appropriately understood to be “jurisdictional.” United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015). When a statute of limitations is jurisdictional, “a litigant's failure to comply with the bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case.” Id. at 408–09, 135 S.Ct. 1625. Moreover, “a court must enforce the limitation even if the other party has waived any timeliness objection.” Id. at 409, 135 S.Ct. 1625. Given these “harsh consequences,” the Supreme Court has in recent years “repeatedly held that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court's power only if Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ as much.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153, 133 S.Ct. 817, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

SHA contends that the Court must dismiss Jackson Marine's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Jackson Creek allegedly filed its Complaint outside of the six-month time limit for bringing limitations suits under 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a).

SHA principally relies on a 1939 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as support for its position that the Limitation Act time bar is jurisdictional. See Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 1939). In Standard Wholesale, the Fourth Circuit considered an appeal from a district court's dismissal of a limitations suit on account of the plaintiff's failure to file within the six-month time limit in the Limitations Act. Id. at 374, 376–77. However, in its opinion, the Fourth Circuit did not consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction specifically, instead affirming because the undisputed facts demonstrated to the court that the complaint was not timely filed. Id. at 376–77. As such, there is no binding precedent from the Fourth Circuit that the Limitations Act time bar is jurisdictional. See also Big Deal, Inc. v. Pouchie, No. 91-1650, 1992 WL 51311, at *1–3 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming lower court grant of summary judgment on timeliness grounds).

True, a number of courts of appeals have historically viewed the Limitations Act's six-month time bar as jurisdictional. See, e.g., In re Eckstein Marine Serv. L.L.C., 672 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2012); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1976); Petition of Spearin, Preston & Burrows, Inc., 190 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1951). However, as recently recognized by the Fifth Circuit, “subsequent Supreme Court decisions have effected an intervening change in the law.” In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2021). In overturning its earlier holding that the Limitation Act's time bar was jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit cited to the Supreme Court's “burgeoning ‘clear statement’ rule” that “ ‘even when [a] time limit is important (most are) and even when it is framed in mandatory terms (again, most are),’ it should—absent a clear statement by Congress—be deemed nonjurisdictional.” Id. at 791 (alteration in original) (quoting Wong, 575 U.S. at 410, 135 S.Ct. 1625); see also Martz v. Horazdovsky, 33 F.4th 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding Limitation Act time bar is not jurisdictional).

The Court takes heed of this recent Supreme Court precedent and finds itself in agreement with the Fifth Circuit. Given that SHA does not contend that Congress has indicated the Limitations Act time bar is jurisdictional, and that the Court likewise does not discern such a clear statement from Congress, the Court finds that the Limitation Act's time bar is not jurisdictional. See Wong, 575 U.S. at 410, 135 S.Ct. 1625; In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th at 794; Martz, 33 F.4th at 1163. As such, it is not appropriate to raise in a motion challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court thus concludes that SHA's challenge is premature. Even if Jackson Creek filed its Complaint outside of the time limit—a fact contested by Jackson Creek—further factual development is needed to fully address SHA's notice argument. The Court also declines to resolve this issue now under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, or summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, because SHA has expressly stated that it is not seeking such relief. See SHA's Reply Br. at 1, ECF No. 20.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, SHA's motion is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED.

Elizabeth W. Hanes, United States District Judge