ANDREW SILVERSTONE v. DETECTIVE EILEEN DAVIS (2026)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Plaintiff Andrew Silverstone's assets—over one million dollars, a BMW, and his passport—were seized pursuant to a state search warrant related to the alleged criminal conduct of his wife. About a year after the seizure, Silverstone hired a lawyer to attempt to obtain the release of the property. Although most of the property was returned to Silverstone approximately three months later, his passport was only returned after he filed this lawsuit. Silverstone alleges that Defendants unlawfully seized and retained his assets and personal property in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, conspired to violate his civil rights, and converted his property in violation of state law.¹ Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”).² Dkt. No. 28. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion, and this matter is DISMISSED.³

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed. Silverstone is a veterinarian who resides in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and is married to Cristina Caro-Valencia. Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 1, 12. In 2021, the Virginia Beach Police Department was investigating Caro-Valencia for allegedly operating an illegal dentistry practice out of Silverstone's veterinary hospital. See Dkt. Nos. 44 ¶ 42;⁴ 44-30. As part of this investigation, Detective Davis obtained several search warrants to seize various assets and personal property belonging to Silverstone and Caro-Valencia. Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 11, 14. In November and December 2021, Detective Davis executed the search warrants seizing Silverstone's personal and business financial accounts, BMW SUV, and other personal property and documents, including his passport. Id. ¶¶ 11–14. The financial account search warrants permitted seizure of Silverstone's account funds and banking records.⁵ See id. ¶ 14–15. In response, each bank provided Detective Davis with a check, presumably representing the full amount of Silverstone's assets in each account, totaling just over one million dollars. Dkt. Nos. 29 ¶ 15; 44, at 15 ¶ 33. Silverstone's assets were then placed in custody with the police department's Property and Evidence department. Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 16. Caro-Valencia was charged with violating Virginia Code 54.1-2409.1A, Practicing a Profession without a License, and the case remained pending until recently. Id. ¶ 14.⁶

Early in the investigation, Detective Davis approached the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney assigned to forfeitures to inquire about pursuing forfeiture of Silverstone's seized money. See Dkt. No. 44, at 11 ¶¶ 7, 9. Finding no legal basis for seizing Silverstone's money, the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney rejected Detective Davis's application for forfeiture. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. A forfeiture action was never filed related to Silverstone's seized property. Dkt. No. 29-13, at 5.

Detective Davis maintained communication with the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorneys assigned to Caro-Valencia's case during the investigation and initial legal proceedings. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 19–24. On various occasions after Caro-Valencia was charged, Detective Davis contacted the prosecuting attorneys assigned to the case to prepare for hearings, discuss the case, and request updates. See id.

Eventually, Silverstone, who was never charged with a crime, retained counsel to pursue the return of the money associated with the bank accounts and the BMW. See Dkt. Nos. 29 ¶ 24; 44-34. On December 13, 2022, Silverstone's counsel emailed the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney assigned to the case a list of Silverstone's assets to prioritize for release. Dkt. No. 44-34. On January 17, 2023, the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney sent an email to the Commonwealth Attorney indicating that based on his review of the evidence in Caro-Valencia's case, he no longer sought to retain the money in the financial accounts for its evidentiary value. Dkt. No. 29-11.

Shortly thereafter, on January 26, 2023, Detective Davis received notice via email of the Commonwealth's Attorneys' decision. Dkt. Nos. 29-13; 29-19. Detective Davis forwarded the email to a Virginia Beach Police Department Property and Evidence technician to initiate the release of the money and BMW. See Dkt. Nos. 29 ¶ 33; 29-13; 29-15, at 2. Silverstone retrieved the money and BMW on February 2, 2023. See Dkt. No. 44-14.

Regarding Silverstone's passport, there is no evidence in the record establishing that he or his counsel made a specific request for its return. See Dkt. No. 44-34. Silverstone did not retrieve his passport until February 12, 2026. Dkt. No. 44, at 15 ¶ 40, n.5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment on a claim or defense, or part of a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The district court will “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. A fact is material if “its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law.” Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Wai Man Tom, 980 F.3d at 1037 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The nonmoving party must then establish that specific, material facts exist which would give rise to a genuine issue. Id. However, a “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In reaching its decision, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Silverstone brings two claims against Detective Davis, a claim under § 1983 for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process and a Virginia state law claim for conversion. Dkt. No. 1. Silverstone alleges that Detective Davis violated his due process rights when she, acting under color of state law, directed and participated in the seizure and retention of Silverstone's property without adequate process and credible legal justification. Id. ¶¶ 24–32. Detective Davis moves for summary judgment, arguing that Silverstone “cannot prove a violation of his due process rights,” and that his “failure to establish a violation of any clearly established constitutional right” entitles Detective Davis to qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 29. Silverstone responds that there is a genuine issue of material fact which bears upon whether Detective Davis's retention of his assets was reasonable. Dkt. No. 44.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Count I, the § 1983 claim, should be dismissed because Detective Davis is entitled to qualified immunity. Having reached this conclusion, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Count III, the conversion claim.

A. Procedural due process violation under § 1983

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Am. Acceptance Corp. of SC v. Gietz, 175 F.4th 502, 506 (4th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). “A procedural due process claim consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (ii) inadequate state process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023) (citation omitted). Procedural due process generally requires “some sort of notice and opportunity to be heard.” Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d 141, 145–46 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)).

1. The Fourth Amendment determines the process Silverstone was due

Here, Silverstone does not challenge the validity of the initial seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Dkt. No. 44, at 18. Instead, Silverstone contends that Detective Davis violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to retain Silverstone's assets “without any valid continuing evidentiary, forfeiture, or other legal basis, and without offering him meaningful process.” Id. As such, the Court must first determine the applicable standard. Gietz, 175 F.4th at 506.

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, dictates the process due for seizures of property in criminal cases. Id. at 506–07. This is true even when the property interest belongs to a third party. Id. In Gietz, law enforcement seized two motorcycles in connection with a murder investigation and subsequent prosecution. Id. at 504. Plaintiff, a third-party lender with liens on the confiscated motorcycles, sued South Carolina law enforcement for depriving it of its property interest without due process. Id. at 505. Like here, the parties agreed that the initial seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but the lender argued that the retention of the property violated its Fourteenth Amendment right to due process despite the pending criminal investigation and prosecution. Id. at 505–06. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that because “criminal matters pose unique considerations with respect to due process rights” and because courts have historically “relied on the Fourth Amendment for guidance as to the proper process that is due for seizure of property in the context of criminal cases”, the Fourth Amendment applied. Id. at 507.

Following Fourth Circuit precedent, the Court finds the Fourth Amendment—not the Fourteenth—determines what process Silverstone was owed.

2. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Silverstone's § 1983 claim

The parties agree, and the Court concurs, that Silverstone was deprived of his property interest when the state seized his assets through execution of the search warrants. Silverstone does not challenge the validity of the initial seizure. Silverstone instead argues that the retention of his property—including over one million dollars and his passport—for over a year after seizure and from the determination that forfeiture was unavailable, establishes a violation of his rights.

The government's retention of property as evidence must maintain a degree of reasonableness, which is the “ultimate touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014) (citation modified). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has explained that law enforcement must possess a “reasonable basis to retain” evidence, Gietz, 175 F.4th at 508, and acknowledged that “limitations to law enforcement's right to retain evidence” may exist in certain circumstances. See id. at 509 (citing Krimstock v. Kelly, 464 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2006)). Silverstone's bank accounts, BMW, and other property were seized pursuant to warrants obtained in connection with the criminal investigation of Caro-Valencia. See Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 10–15. The prosecution of Caro-Valencia was ongoing during the period that Silverstone's assets were held in evidence. See Commonwealth v. Christina Caro Valencia; Woman Convicted of Practicing Dentistry without a License, City of Virginia Beach, https://perma.cc/X9YA-GHAA (last visited July 19, 2026). As such, the retention of Silverstone's property may have been justified by the pending charges given the “highly important governmental need” to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes. Gietz, 175 F.4th at 507–08 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 n.30 (1972)).

However, the Court finds it troubling that Silverstone's money and other property were retained for nearly a year after it was determined that the assets were not subject to forfeiture. See Dkt. No. 29-10. Silverstone argues that the money “had no probative value in any criminal proceeding,” a conclusion eventually also reached by the prosecutors assigned to the case. See Dkt. Nos. 44-9; 44-32. After all, Silverstone's banking records were possessed. Those, not the fungible money in the accounts, had “probative value” according to the prosecutor assigned to Caro-Valincia's case. See Dkt. No. 44-32, at 2. Silverstone's BMW and passport seem to have even less relevance to the criminal case. Detective Davis maintains that it was solely the responsibility of the prosecuting attorneys to evaluate the evidence once it was seized and determine if release is appropriate. But the Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness and the Court questions whether Detective Davis's decision to wait for the prosecuting attorneys' decision for over a year while a large sum of Silverstone's money sat in evidence can meet this standard. See Dkt. Nos. 29 ¶¶ 11–14; 44-14. Having worked on the investigation and execution of the search warrants in Caro-Valencia's case, Detective Davis likely understood the facts of the case well enough to know that Silverstone's money lacked evidentiary value.⁷ Detective Davis also collaborated and regularly communicated with the prosecuting attorneys on Caro-Valencia's case. On this record, the Court concludes that genuine questions of fact exist as to whether the delay in returning Silverstone's money and property was reasonable. Accordingly, genuine questions of fact exist as to whether Silverstone's due process rights were violated.⁸

3. Detective Davis is entitled to qualified immunity

Detective Davis argues that even if the Court finds that Silverstone's constitutional rights were violated, Silverstone's § 1983 claim is barred by qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 29, at 17. “Government officials receive qualified immunity from § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established law.” Ingram v. Hamilton, 179 F.4th 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2026). Whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry on summary judgment. First, the Court must determine whether, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the government official is “alleged to have violated a constitutional right[;]” then, it “must determine whether that right was clearly established.” Id. (citing Bolick v. Anderson, 169 F.4th 528, 539 (4th Cir. 2026)). The government official will be entitled to qualified immunity if they prevail at either step. Id. (citing Bolick, 169 F.4th at 540).

“A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that any reasonable officer would understand that his conduct violates the rights of another.” Id. To satisfy this standard, courts must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution” and that case “must define the right with a high degree of specificity.” Id. (citation modified). It is not enough to define the right as a “broad general proposition.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004). Further, the case establishing the right typically must be one that is published by the United States Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, or the highest court of the state in which the relevant conduct took place (here, the Supreme Court of Virginia). Ingram, 179 F.4th at 257. However, it also may be “sufficient to show that there is a consensus among other jurisdictions as to the particular right at issue.” Id. (citing Case v. Beasley, 167 F.4th 651, 662 (4th Cir. 2026)).

Regardless of the Court's reservations surrounding the reasonableness of the retention of Silverstone's property, Silverstone has not pointed to a relevant case to show that, in this specific context, Detective Davis violated a clearly established right. Silverstone must demonstrate that Detective Davis violated a clearly established right by retaining property (seized pursuant to a valid warrant) after being advised that the property was not subject to forfeiture and given the property's lack of evidentiary value. Silverstone has not met this burden. Silverstone cites no case law to support his proposition that it was clearly established that “a state actor may not retain a person's property for an extended period without lawful process or a valid continuing justification after the grounds for retention have expired or been disavowed.” See Dkt. No. 44, at 28. Silverstone does cite United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop. and Soldal v. Cook Cnty. to support the proposition “that a lawful Fourth Amendment seizure does not eliminate separate due process obligations.” Id. (citing 510 U.S. 43, 49–55 (1993); 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992)). However, those cases establish only a “broad general proposition” against retaining property for “an extended period of time.” See Lee, 372 F.3d at 301. These generic principles do not address the circumstances present here and are insufficient to “put [Detective Davis] on notice that [her] specific conduct was unlawful.” See Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 931 (2026) (quoting Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021)); Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2024) (“A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he or she is doing violates that right.” (citation modified)). Because Silverstone has not shown that Detective Davis violated a clearly established right Detective Davis is entitled to qualified immunity.⁹

B. Conversion under Virginia State Law

Count III asserts a conversion claim under Virginia state law. Dkt. No. 1. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ․ if ․ the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Generally, state law claims, over which the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, should be dismissed if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Having dismissed Silverstone's claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, only Silverstone's state law conversion claim remains. The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. Therefore, Count III is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 28, is GRANTED.

The Clerk is directed to send an electronic copy of this Order to all counsel of record and close this case.

It is so ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendants are former Virginia Beach Police Department Detective Eileen Davis (“Detective Davis”) and Virginia Beach Police Department Chief Paul Neudigate (“Chief Neudigate”).

2.   Silverstone originally brought all three claims against both Chief Neudigate and Detective Davis. Silverstone does not oppose summary judgment with respect to the claims against Chief Neudigate or on Count II, the conspiracy claim. Dkt. No. 44, n.1. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to the claims against Chief Neudigate and Count II.

3.   The Court has determined that a hearing is unnecessary. E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(J).

4.   The Court assumes the additional facts identified in Silverstone's Opposition, Dkt. No. 44, are undisputed as Detective Davis did not raise any objection to these additional facts in her reply. See E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B).

5.   While the return of Silverstone's money seized from the banking institutions is at issue, the seizure of the banking records is not.

6.   Caro-Valencia was convicted in July 2026 of four counts of violation of Practicing a Profession without a License. See Virginia v. Caro Valencia, CR24001985-10, Virginia Judiciary, https://perma.cc/AD9R-UJZH (last visited July 19, 2026); Commonwealth v. Christina Caro Valencia; Woman Convicted of Practicing Dentistry without a License, City of Virginia Beach, https://perma.cc/X9YA-GHAA (last visited July 19, 2026).

7.   There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the certain property seized from Silverstone should be characterized as jointly held with Caro-Valencia. See Dkt. Nos. 29 ¶ 18; 44 ¶ 18. However, whether the assets were jointly held is immaterial to the Court's analysis because the seized property at issue (especially the money) lacked evidentiary value regardless of who held the assets.

8.   Detective Davis argues that Silverstone could have sought return of his property through Virginia Code § 19.2-60, but failed to do so. Dkt. No. 29, at 16 (arguing Silverstone received “post-deprivation due process”). Silverstone asserts that Virginia Code § 19.2-60 is inapplicable because Silverstone does not challenge the validity of the initial search warrants. Dkt. No. 44, at 25. The Court does not address these arguments given its conclusion related to qualified immunity.

9.   The Court has noted throughout this Order that Silverstone's passport was held much longer than his other property—just over four years—and was not obtained by Silverstone until February 2026. There was very little factual development on this issue. For example, it is unknown when Silverstone requested the return of his passport. It is only known that he retrieved the passport in February 2026. Therefore, the Court does not see a reason to treat the passport differently from Silverstone's other property for the purpose of its qualified immunity analysis.

Elizabeth W. Hanes United States District Judge