ANONYMOUS PLAINTIFF v. SCHUBART (2025)

REMAND MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Case No. 2:25-cv-00495, ECF No. 7 (“Motion to Remand”), as well as the accompanying Memorandum in Support, ECF No. 8 (“Remand Memorandum”). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No. 7, is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This dispute concerns the administrative decisions and disciplinary procedures that resulted in the long-term removal of Plaintiff, a minor student, from Floyd E. Kellam High School.¹ On July 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in the Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach. ECF No. 1; see ECF No. 1-1 (“State Complaint”). Defendants in this case are Dr. Ryan Schubart, Principal of Floyd E. Kellam High School; Matthew D. Delaney, Chief of Schools for Virginia Beach City Public Schools; and Ronald Robertson, Superintendent of Virginia Beach City Public Schools, all being sued in their official and individual capacities. ECF No. 1-1 at 3.

On August 13, 2025, Defendants jointly filed a Notice of Removal in this court. ECF No. 1. They argued that removal was authorized “because this Court has original jurisdiction over this civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Id. at 2. Specifically, they argued that this court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “because Plaintiff's Complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of Plaintiff's rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id.

On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand, ECF No. 7, and an accompanying Memorandum in Support for Remand, ECF No. 8. On August 28, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 9, as well as a Brief in Support of the Motion, ECF No. 10. On the same day, Defendants filed their Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. ECF No. 11.

On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, and a Memorandum in Support of the Response, ECF No. 13, as a pro forma objection until this court ruled on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Shortly thereafter, on September 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply regarding the Motion to Remand. ECF No. 14 (“Plaintiff's Reply”). That same day, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Correction regarding the Reply. ECF No. 15.²

On September 4, 2025, Defendants filed a Reply Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 16. On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 17. Then, on September 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, ECF No. 18, and an accompanying Memorandum in Support, ECF No. 19, to consolidate the instant case with Anonymous Plaintiff 1 (Minor Student at Kellam High School) By Next of Friend – Parent (Anonymous), et al. v. Schubart, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-00540, a case that was also removed by Defendants to this court. See Case No. 2:25-cv-00540, ECF No. 1.

On September 10, 2025, Defendants filed another Reply Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. Case No. 2:25-cv-00495, ECF No. 20. On the same day, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Request for Oral Argument on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No. 7, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. See ECF No. 21. On September 19, 2025, Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate. ECF No. 22.

Having been fully briefed, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is now ripe for judicial determination.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Title 28, Section 1441(a) of the United States Code provides that a defendant in a state civil action over which federal courts have original jurisdiction may remove that action to the federal court. Federal district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

“The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Federico v. Lincoln Mil. Hous., 901 F. Supp. 2d 654, 662 (E.D. Va. 2012) (Doumar, J.). Removal under Section 1331 is proper where “the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises an issue of federal law[.]” In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir. 2006). “Because courts must strictly construe removal jurisdiction, when federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” Borders v. Ford Motor Co., 652 F. Supp. 3d 596, 599-600 (E.D. Va. 2023) (Smith, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that, unless otherwise limited by Congress, state judicial systems have inherent authority to adjudicate claims arising under federal law. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990). However, there exists a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Generally, even when a state court has concurrent jurisdiction over the matter, federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012) (citation omitted).

An exception to this general rule is the doctrine of abstention. Under this doctrine, a district court “may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction” over a case properly before it, but only in “exceptional circumstances.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236. When determining whether to abstain, the court's task “is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction ․ rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist exceptional circumstances ․ to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25-26, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

There are several factors the court must consider when determining whether this “narrow exception” applies. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236. “[T]he general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation,” and for courts to “giv[e] regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Id. at 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236. Other factors include the desire to avoid “piecemeal litigation” and “the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums.” Id. at 818, 96 S.Ct. 1236. A court will consider these factors “with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16, 103 S.Ct. 927. “But the mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816, 96 S.Ct. 1236.

III. ANALYSIS

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that the claims in the Complaint “raise issues” of federal law. Plaintiff, in fact, concedes that Defendants’ removal was “procedurally permissible.” ECF No. 8 at 1. The court agrees that Defendants properly removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1446, as Plaintiff's well-pleaded Complaint alleges several violations of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1-1 at 8-10. Because there is no question that the present action “arises” under federal law and the Constitution, the court has original jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that removal was “legally unwarranted” for three reasons: (1) the state court has concurrent jurisdiction and “must hear § 1983 claims”; (2) “there is no federal interest compelling adjudication in this Court”; and (3) “State court judicial economy supports remand.” ECF No. 8 at 1-3. The court will address each of these arguments in turn.

First, Plaintiff cites Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009), Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), and Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990), to support the argument that “state courts may and must hear § 1983 claims.” ECF No. 8 at 2-3. While the court does not dispute that state courts may hear Section 1983 claims, none of Plaintiff's cited cases – nor any federal court case – prohibits federal courts from adjudicating Section 1983 matters when concurrent jurisdiction exists. Compare Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458, 110 S.Ct. 792 (“[W]e have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”), with Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002 (1951) (“[I]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a State court could entertain it.”) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). While Plaintiff had the right to choose to initiate this action in state court, such a right does not supplant Defendants’ subsequent right to then remove the case to federal court when appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Plaintiff's arguments do not persuade the court to uproot decades of precedent and to hold to the contrary.

Second, Plaintiff's argument that Defendants require a “compelling justification” to remove a case to federal district court is without merit. Section 1441(a) does not require a federal court to have a “compelling” interest for proper removal; it only requires that the district court have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). As discussed above, the court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Section 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, so Plaintiff's second argument is untenable. See supra Part III.

Finally, the court does not find that any exceptional circumstances exist in this case to warrant abstention. Plaintiff's argument for abstention rests on three Petitions ³ currently pending in state court, pursuant to Virginia Code § 22.1-87.⁴ ECF No. 14 at 3-4; see, e.g., ECF No. 14-1 at 1 (Exhibit 1).⁵ Plaintiff asserts that these three Petitions constitute parallel litigation to the present case, and thus warrant abstention under Colorado River, because the Petitions arise from the same facts and legal arguments as Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 14 at 3-4.

However, the court would not categorize these Petitions as the type of “parallel litigation” that qualifies for abstention. Although this case and the state court Petitions arise from the same facts, none of these Petitions were filed on this Plaintiff's behalf. ECF No. 15 at 1. Rather, the Petitions were filed by the respective parents on behalf of the three plaintiffs of those separate ancillary actions.⁶ Whether the state court finds in favor of those students in the Petitions has no bearing on this Plaintiff's case, as those Petitions do not seek redress for Plaintiff's alleged injury.

Yet Plaintiff further contends that abstention is warranted despite the different “parties and exact posture” because the state court is “an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties.” ECF No. 14 at 4 (quoting Moses H. Cone. Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 28, 103 S.Ct. 927). It is not disputed that the state court is an adequate forum to hear Section 1983 claims. However, as the Fourth Circuit has held, “state and federal claims arising out of the same factual circumstances do not qualify as parallel if they differ in scope or involve different remedies.” vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 849 F.3d 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2017).

Indeed, the scope and remedies available under the Petitions are distinct from those of the present action. First, the Petitions were filed against the Virginia Beach School Board, ECF No. 14-1, whereas Plaintiff filed this case against three school administrators in their official and individual capacities, ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Second, the only legal issue in the Petitions filed under Virginia Code § 22.1-87 is whether the School Board “exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or abused its discretion” with respect to the discipline of students other than Plaintiff. Va. Code § 22.1-87;⁷ see ECF No. 14-1.⁸ In this case, however, all of Plaintiff's claims include alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is beyond the scope of the Petitions. ECF No. 1-1 at 8-10. Third, as stated above, Plaintiff would not benefit from any remedy available under the Petitions because none of the cited Petitions were filed on Plaintiff's behalf. ECF No. 15 at 1. The Fourth Circuit has held that “[s]tate and federal suits are parallel only if substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different forums.” vonRosenberg, 849 F.3d at 168 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The same parties are not litigating the Petitions, nor do the Petitions raise substantially the same issues. The Petitions raise procedural due process issues, whereas Plaintiff's case raises violations of Section 1983. Compare ECF No. 14-1, with ECF No. 1-1. Thus, the Petitions, in and of themselves, do not warrant this court's abstention from the instant case.

In sum, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.” Id. at 819, 96 S.Ct. 1236. The mere potential for conflicting adjudicative results “does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 816, 96 S.Ct. 1236. As Defendants assert in their Response, there has been no showing of “exceptional circumstances” that warrant a remand of this case to the state court. See ECF No. 11 at 4-5. Because Plaintiff's claims arise from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and removal by Defendants was procedurally proper, this court has original federal question jurisdiction over this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims based on federal law. The court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. ECF No. 7. Although the parties requested oral arguments on the instant motion, ECF No. 21, upon an examination of the briefs and the record, the court determined that oral argument was unnecessary to aid in the decisional process, as the facts and legal arguments were adequately presented. Accordingly, the court DENIES the parties’ request for oral argument as to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Id.

Finally, because the present action is a federal case in federal court, it must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 5.2(a), which provides that any filing with a minor child's name is afforded privacy protection through reference by the child's initials. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a)(3). This is an exception offered to minor children from Rule 10(a), which requires the full name of all parties to be present on the Complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). Under the Local Civil Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the “[r]edaction of personal identifiers is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2 unless the Court directs otherwise.” E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(C)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff's counsel is DIRECTED to forward the initials of Plaintiff and the parent in the above-captioned case, in writing, to the Clerk of the court within seven (7) days of entry of this Order, with a copy to Defendants’ counsel.

The Clerk is then DIRECTED to change the style of the above-captioned case and correct the caption to comply with FRCP 5.2(a)(3) and this court's Local Civil Rule 7(C)(1). This change shall reflect the initials of both the minor plaintiff and the parent,⁹ where the Plaintiff comes “By and Through” the parent.¹⁰

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court notes that it is not clear what precise disciplinary process took place, given that the Complaint refers to both expulsion and “deferred long-term suspension.” ECF No. 1-1 at 6, 10, 11. What is clear is that Plaintiff was removed from Floyd E. Kellam High School, could not continue the school year, and was reassigned to the Renaissance Academy through October 2025. Id. at 6. However, whether Plaintiff received an expulsion, a long-term suspension, or a “deferred” long-term suspension does not affect the applicable law to the instant Motion to Remand and will be addressed, if appropriate, in later proceedings.

2.   Plaintiff's Reply implied that Plaintiff filed a Petition in state court challenging the School Board's disciplinary decisions. ECF No. 14 at 3-5. However, Plaintiff's Notice of Correction clarifies that this Plaintiff did not file any Petitions in state court related to the instant action. ECF No. 15. Rather, Plaintiff clarifies that the Reply is referring to the pending state Petitions of the respective student plaintiffs in the ancillary action Anonymous Plaintiff 1 (Minor Student at Kellam High School) By Next of Friend – Parent (Anonymous), et al. v. Schubart, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-00540. See id.; see also infra note 3 and accompanying text.

3.   Plaintiff's Remand Memorandum asserted that there were four (4) related actions pending in state court arising from the same facts and legal arguments as the present case. ECF No. 8 at 3-4. Since then, one of those actions has been removed to this court. See Anonymous Plaintiff 1 (Minor Student at Kellam High School), By Next of Friend – Parent (Anonymous), et al. v. Schubart, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-00540. The three Petitions for Judicial Review remain pending in state court. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.

4.   Under Virginia Code § 22.1-87, a parent or guardian of a student who was aggrieved by an action taken by the school board may petition a state court to review that action and seek redressability.

5.   See infra note 8 and accompanying text.

6.   See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.

7.   See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

8.   The court notes that Exhibit 1 of Plaintiff's Reply, ECF No. 14-1, is only one of the three state Petitions, but Plaintiff's Reply implies that all three Petitions are substantively identical, ECF No. 14 at 3-4. Based on the current record, the court cannot make a determination at this juncture, but for purposes of this Motion to Remand, the court accepts the assertion in Plaintiff's Reply.

9.   The court's decision to extend anonymity to Plaintiff's parent is consistent with “the overwhelming majority of district courts [that] also allow anonymity for parents ․ because identifying a minor's parents effectively disposes of minor anonymity.” Elizabeth M. v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 4:25-cv-00021, 2025 WL 934506, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2025); see, e.g., Doe ex rel. by Guardian v. IRS, No. 3:17-cv-102, 2017 WL 1017126 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2017); P.M. v. Evans-Brant Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 09-cv-686S, 2012 WL 42248, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2012) (“[T]here is no public interest in identifying the minor child or the parent bringing suit on behalf of the child, whose identity, if disclosed, could jeopardize the child's confidentiality.”).

10.   See, e.g., D.W. By and Through Williams v. Chesterfield Cnty. Schs., No. 3:17-cv-679, 2018 WL 3097017 (E.D. Va. June 22, 2018) (Lauck, J.).

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE