UNITED STATES v. MATTHEWS (2025)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Kenneth Matthews’ Motion to Suppress. Mot., Dkt. No. 19. Matthews’ vehicle was stopped by Virginia State Police because the vehicle's rear license plate was secured by a license plate mounting bracket, which the officer believed obscured the license plate, in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-716. As a result of the stop, a firearm, cash, and fentanyl were discovered, resulting in the instant Indictment. Matthews moves to suppress all evidence recovered during the traffic stop. Matthews argues that the Court should suppress the evidence because the state trooper did not have a reasonable basis to initiate the traffic stop. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2025, Virginia State Police Trooper Nicholson observed a Ford F-150 truck with a rear license plate that was partially obscured by a license plate mounting bracket. Trooper Nicholson initiated a traffic stop. Shortly thereafter, another officer arrived with a drug-sniffing K-9. The K-9 completed a free-air sniff and alerted to the presence of narcotics in or around the vehicle. Trooper Nicholson then removed Matthews from the vehicle, confiscated an iPhone from Matthews’ person, and conducted a search of the truck. During the search, Trooper Nicholson discovered two additional iPhones, a loaded Glock 43X handgun, a rubber-banded fold of money containing $1,087.00 in U.S. currency, and approximately 320.6 grams of fentanyl.

Both parties provided a photograph of the license plate, which is produced below.¹ The photograph shows a standard Virginia license plate bearing the logo “Virginia is for Lovers,” surrounded by a license plate mounting bracket bearing the name of what appears to be a car dealership. At the top of the plate, the word “VIRGINIA” is partially obscured, with approximately the top half of the word being covered up by the mounting bracket.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). The stop “is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A stop does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment when the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Reasonable articulable suspicion is “more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch” but “less ․ than probable cause.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, “[a]n officer has reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a car when he observes facts that suggest the driver is subject to stop for violation of the traffic laws.” United States v. Gupta, No. 1:06-0237, 2006 WL 6093874, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2006), aff'd, 230 F. App'x 270 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). “In assessing the legitimacy of a traffic stop[,]” the Court does not endeavor “to discern an officer's subjective intent for stopping the vehicle[;]” instead, the Court asks whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.” United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2016) (first quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 340 (4th Cir. 2008); and then quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769) (cleaned up).

III. ANALYSIS

Matthews challenges only the traffic stop itself, asserting that Trooper Nicholson had no reasonable basis to initiate the stop. The Government contends that Trooper Nicholson stopped Matthews’ vehicle because he observed an equipment violation, specifically an obstructed license plate, in violation of Virginia state law.

Virginia Code § 46.2-716, prohibits a “․ bracket, holder, mounting, frame, or any other type of covering [from being] placed, mounted, or installed on, around, or over any license plate if [such covering] in any way alters or obscures ․ the name or abbreviated name of the state wherein the vehicle is registered.” Va. Code § 46.2-716(B)(iii). Here, Trooper Nicholson observed that the top of the vehicle's rear license plate was obscured by a license plate mounting bracket. And the photographs provided by the parties confirm that “VIRGINIA” at the top of the license plate is obscured.

Despite this, Matthews argues that the license plate mounting bracket did not prevent Trooper Nicholson from identifying the name of the state where the license was registered—Virginia—or the vehicle license plate number. Mot. at 4. As such, Matthews contends that Trooper Nicholson lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that Matthews had committed a crime or traffic violation—namely, operating a vehicle with equipment violations. Id. The Government, on the other hand, argues that whether Trooper Nicholson could determine the name of the licensing state and license plate number is irrelevant because the license plate mounting bracket obscured the name of the licensing state, which provided Trooper Nicholson with a reasonable basis to stop the vehicle. Resp. at 4, Dkt. No. 20.

The Court finds that Trooper Nicholson had reasonable articulable suspicion to execute the traffic stop because he observed an obscured license plate, in violation of Virginia's traffic laws. The plain language of the statute at issue prohibits the state name or license plate number from being altered or obscured “in any way.” See Va. Code § 46.2-716(B)(i), (iii); see also United States v. Davis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (articulating the “well-settled rule[ ] of statutory construction” that a statute's intent is derived “from the plain and natural meaning [of] the words used”). As such, given his observations, Trooper Nicholson had reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (noting that “[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”) (citations omitted). The degree of obstruction, or whether the name could nevertheless be ascertained, is irrelevant to this standard.

Although little caselaw exists on this point, the caselaw that does exist supports this conclusion. The Virginia Court of Appeals, in Tarpley v. Commonwealth, considered facts similar to those presented here. No. 1364-22-1, 2023 WL 8041464 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023).² In Tarpley, the officer observed that the vehicle's window tinting appeared darker than legal and that a license plate border obstructed the top portion of the word Virginia. Id. at *1. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's finding that the stop was reasonable, noting that “[t]he degree of obstruction is not relevant ․ as the statute prohibits driving with a license plate that in any way alters or obscures a state's name on the license plate.” Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in orignal). While state court decisions, especially unpublished ones, are not binding on this Court, the Court considers the Tarpley court's interpretation of a Virginia statute to be persuasive. Finally, while no federal court has interpreted the statute at issue, district courts have implicitly accepted the above interpretation. See United States v. Green, No. 7:11-cr-57, 2011 WL 6439387, at *4 (W.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2011) (noting defendant's concession that an obstructed license plate justified an initial stop of his vehicle); United States v. Greenwood, 405 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (E.D. Va. 2005) (concluding the officer had an objectively reasonable basis for a traffic stop where the front license plate was bent such that the officer could not read the issuing state).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Matthews's Motion to Suppress, Dkt. No. 19, is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the parties submitted two different photographs, neither disputes the state of the license plate at the time of the stop.

2.   Matthews argues that the facts of the Tarpley case are “readily distinguishable” from the facts of this case, contending that the stop occurred only because of dark window tinting and not an obscured license plate. Mot. at 5. Not so. The traffic stop in Tarpley was effected because of both the “possible illegal tint to the car's windows and the license plate holder that partially obscured the license plate.” Tarpley, 2023 WL 8041464 at *1 (emphasis added).

Elizabeth W. Hanes, United States District Judge