SHEZAD AKBAR v. SGT ERIC HAMBLIN (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Shezad Akbar sued several law-enforcement officers, counties, and entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and for obstruction of justice, Dkt. 17 (operative complaint) at 1. He also filed eight motions for injunctive relief, Dkts. 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and a motion to quash warrants that a state court issued for his arrest, Dkt. 34; see Dkt. 49 (the defendants' joint response).

Defendants Smith County, Texas; Sheriff Larry Smith; Jeffrey Albright; Jesica Martinez; and the unnamed officers of the Smith County Supervision and Correction Department (“CSCD”) (the “Smith County defendants”) jointly moved to dismiss Akbar's complaint for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 38. Defendants Sergeant Eric Hamblin and Sheriff Tracy Murphree jointly moved to dismiss on the same basis, Dkt. 43, and to stay discovery pending the court's determination of whether they are entitled to qualified immunity, Dkt. 45.

The court requested an advisory regarding the status of Akbar's state criminal cases giving rise to this suit. Dkt. 50. In response to that request, the defendants confirmed that some of those cases are ongoing. See Dkt. 51.

The court will recommend staying and administratively closing the case pending resolution of Akbar's state criminal proceedings. It will also recommend dismissing without prejudice Akbar's motions for injunctive relief, Akbar's motion to quash, and the defendants' motions to dismiss and stay discovery.

BACKGROUND

According to the operative complaint, Akbar was arrested in September 2024 for trespassing on a neighbor's property. Dkt. 17 at 3. He was detained, posted bond, and was released. Id. Hamblin allegedly tampered with his arrest and bond records and repeatedly called him and demanded that he leave his home. Id. Akbar's criminal-trespass charge remains pending in Denton County, Texas. Dkt. 51 at 2.

Without specifying when, Akbar also alleges that he was unlawfully detained in the Smith County jail on an improper felony charge. Dkt. 17 at 4. And without specifying which ones, he alleges that the defendants “interfered with [his] ability to retain and communicate with counsel.” Id.

Akbar further alleges that, in July 2025, Hamblin improperly re-arrested him for the September 2024 criminal trespass. Dkt. 17 at 4. He raises claims of constitutional violations, ADA retaliation and interference, evidence tampering, and harassment. Id. at 4–6. He seeks damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Id. at 6–7.

In his multiple motions for injunctive relief, Akbar asks the court to enjoin his state criminal proceedings and the state investigations of him. He contends that, among other unlawful behaviors, the counties and officers are retaliating against, harassing, and targeting him. See, e.g., Dkts. 19, 24. And he requests, among other things, an order requiring non-parties to take specified actions, see, e.g., Dkts. 26, 27, and an order quashing the Denton County and Smith County arrest warrants for his active cases, see Dkt. 34.

In their motion to dismiss, the Smith County defendants argue that Akbar's complaint does not allege facts necessary to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), or describe specific conduct related to the individual Smith County defendants. Dkt. 38. They also argue that CSCD is a non-jural entity and, as such, is not properly subject to suit. Id.

In their motion to dismiss, Hamblin and Murphree argue that Akbar's claims cannot surmount abstention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); a broken causal chain; or qualified immunity. Dkt. 43. They also assert that the court should dismiss the unserved defendants and that Akbar cannot plausibly plead punitive damages. Their accompanying motion to stay discovery and to abate a Rule 26 conference is premised on their claimed entitlement to qualified immunity. Dkt. 45.

In their joint response to the court's request last month for an advisory on the current status of Akbar's state criminal proceedings, Dkt. 50, the defendants stated that Akbar “was recently released from Smith County, has two pending cases in Denton County, but is currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Corrections with a forty five (45) year projected released date of 2071,” Dkt. 51 at 1. Based on the exhibits to that response, it appears that Akbar was released from the Smith County jail and transferred to the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Dkt. 51-1 at 1–2. It is unclear whether his incarceration is related to the Smith County offense, other offenses, a possible probation violation, or some combination of those things. The defendants also attached copies of the registers of actions in Akbar's Denton County proceedings, which do not show final dispositions of the Denton County offenses. Dkts. 51-2, 51-3. And as of the filing of Akbar's motions for injunctive relief, his request that the court “[s]uspend all Smith County and Denton County criminal proceedings,” Dkt. 19 at 6, indicates that at least some of the state-court proceedings remain pending.

LAW

I. Heck

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that,

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see Olivier v. City of Brandon, 146 S. Ct. 916, 920 (2026) (explaining that “Heck prohibits the use of § 1983 to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so as to obtain release from custody or monetary damages”). In other words, “a civil tort action, including an action under section 1983, is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2007). If a plaintiff fails to “satisf[y] the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).

Where no party has raised the potential applicability of Heck (whether because there has not yet been a relevant conviction or for some other reason), a court may not properly conclude that Heck bars the suit. See Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2022). But in at least some of those cases, a stay will be warranted. As the Supreme Court explained in Wallace v. Kato,

[i]f a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.

549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007) (citations omitted). In the scenario Wallace described, a district court may properly stay the case, Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 883 (5th Cir. 2018), and call for supplemental briefing on the applicability of Heck when the state criminal proceedings have concluded, Williams v. McDonough, No. 22-40281, 2023 WL 2733443, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2023); see Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (explaining that “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”).

II. Younger

Younger confirmed one of several doctrines that require a federal court to abstain from hearing a case. Abstention under Younger is generally appropriate when: (1) there is an on-going state judicial proceeding, (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); accord Daves v. Dallas County, 64 F.4th 616, 623–33 (5th Cir. 2023); see Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 717–18 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding Younger abstention appropriate because the claimant's requested relief would “interfere with the state court's ability to conduct proceedings”). Unlike Heck, which applies to claims for damages, Olivier, 146 S. Ct. at 920; Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, Younger “applies to suits for injunctive and declaratory relief,” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2016).

But even when each of Younger's three requirements is met, a court may decline to abstain when

(1) the state-court proceeding was brought in bad faith or to harass the federal plaintiff; (2) the federal plaintiff seeks to challenge a state statute that is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it,” or (3) where other “extraordinary circumstances” threaten “irreparable loss [that] is both great and immediate.”

Gates, 885 F.3d at 880 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53–54).

DISCUSSION

I. Potential Heck Bar

To decide whether Akbar's damages claims are Heck-barred, the court would need to “conduct a fact-specific analysis to determine whether success on [the] ․ claims would require negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is inherently inconsistent with a conviction on one of the underlying criminal charges.” Quinn v. Guerrero, No. 4:09-CV-166, 2010 WL 412901, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2010) (citing Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008)), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 653477 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2010). “Therefore, ‘if the factual basis for the conviction [would be] temporally and conceptually distinct' from [Akbar's] ․ claims, [those] claims would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal charge and would thus not be barred under Heck.” McCollom v. City of Kemp, No. 3:14-CV-1488-B, 2014 WL 6085289, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2014) (quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 498).

But where there has not yet been a conviction, Wallace provides the relevant guidance. 549 U.S. at 393–94. “[I]f the facts supporting the criminal charge are not temporally and conceptually distinct from the facts supporting the civil claims, or if it is unclear whether they would be distinct, the civil claims must be stayed.” McCollom, 2014 WL 6085289, at *3 (citing Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Although Akbar's complaint is not clear on this point, the arrests and detentions he complains of appear to relate directly to pending criminal proceedings. See Dkts. 17, 51. “[F]ollowing [Heck], district courts should stay ․ cases that may implicate the validity of pending criminal proceedings until those underlying proceedings have run their course.” Gates, 885 F.3d at 883; see, e.g., Busick v. City of Madison, 90 F. App'x 713, 713–14 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.8). The court should do so here and administratively close the case while Akbar's state criminal proceedings play out. See Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending Inc., 389 F.3d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[t]he effect of an administrative closure is no different from a simple stay, except that it affects the count of active cases pending on the court's docket; i.e., administratively closed cases are not counted as active”); Barnes v. Thompson, No. 3:18-cv-1419-N-BN, 2018 WL 2684545, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2018). The court will recommend that, within 30 days after the last relevant state-court judgment is rendered, Akbar be ordered to file a motion to reopen this case—and that, if he does not, the court assume that he either concedes that his federal claims are Heck-barred or no longer wants to pursue those claims in this court.

A stay and administrative closure will have implications for the defendants, too. Their motions to dismiss should be dismissed without prejudice, subject to being re-urged after the stay lifts. See Cummings v. Webb, No. 4:20-CV-00207-SDJ-CAN, 2020 WL 8484872, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 489119 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2021); Quinn, 2010 WL 412901, at *4. Hamblin and Murphree's motion to stay discovery and to abate a Rule 26 conference pending the court's determination of qualified immunity, which depends on their motion to dismiss, should likewise be dismissed without prejudice, subject to being re-urged after the stay lifts. See id.

II. Younger Abstention

As noted, Akbar filed numerous motions for injunctive relief alongside his complaint. Dkts. 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. The first of those motions asks the court to enjoin the defendants from:

a. Harassing, intimidating, or targeting [him];

b. Blocking, interfering with, or preventing [him] from communicating with or retaining legal counsel;

c. Contacting, investigating, surveilling, or interfering with [his] home, work, or custody rights.

d. Initiating, continuing, or maintaining any criminal proceedings in Denton or Smith Counties linked to Sgt. Hamblin or the Task Force;

e. Interfering with [his] 100% legal custody or contact with his son;

f. Accessing [his] electronic devices, including phones, computers, or network systems, without authorization;

g. Tampering with, deleting, or altering any evidence related to [him] or any legal proceeding involving [him];

h. Interfering with [his] communications, including telephone, internet, or digital access.

i. Conducting any surveillance or harassment targeting [him] or his property;

j. Obstructing [his] access to legal counsel or ability to participate in legal proceedings.

Dkt. 19 at 5. It also asks the court to “[s]uspend all Smith County and Denton County criminal proceedings until Federal oversight has completed their investigations,” id. at 6, and includes a supplement requesting ADA-specific relief, id. at 8.

Some of Akbar's other motions add requests to: (1) preserve evidence; (2) conduct independent reviews of some of the defendants in this federal case; (3) declare that evidence is tainted; (4) stop any additional arrests; (5) ensure protection of his ADA rights; (6) refund his bond; and (7) stop interference with various online products, software, or applications. Dkts. 22 at 4, 24 at 2–3, 25 at 2–3, 26 at 4, 27 at 3, 28 at 10, 29 at 4–5. Others ask the court to take action against non-parties, such as: (1) compelling an entity that Akbar calls “Sam Pack Ford” to release Akbar's vehicle; (2) restoring Akbar's AAA Motor Club roadside assistance; and (3) compelling telecommunications providers to preserve data and Akbar's phone service. See Dkts. 26 at 4, 27 at 4. Five of the motions are supported by exhibits. See Dkts. 19, 22, 26, 27, 28. The remaining three are not. See Dkts. 24, 25, 29.

Akbar also separately moved for invalidation of his Texas arrest warrants. Dkt. 34. In that motion, he contends that the warrants were based on non-existent case numbers and were therefore invalid. Id. at 2–3. But he does not cite any legal authority, and he does not explain how the listed warrant numbers relate to this federal action or even to his state charges. Id.

In response, the defendants urge Younger abstention. Dkt. 49. They contend that “an overarching theme of [Akbar's] requested relief is to interfere with a pre-existing and still pending State court proceeding.” Id. at 4.

Because at least some of the underlying state-court cases are ongoing, the first Younger requirement is met. See DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1177–78 (5th Cir. 1984). “The state has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws,” id. at 1176, so the second Younger requirement is satisfied, too. And “a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). To overcome that presumption, Akbar would have to “show that he had no opportunity to litigate the federal issue in state court.” DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1178 (emphasis omitted). Akbar does not assert that he has pursued any appellate remedies or sought a writ of mandamus to resolve his complaints in state court. That means the third Younger requirement is also satisfied.

Nevertheless, Akbar could avoid Younger abstention by proving that his case falls within an exception to the general rule. As noted, the first Younger exception applies when a state-court proceeding is brought in bad faith or to harass. Gates, 885 F.3d at 880. “A prosecution is taken in bad faith if state officials proceed ‘without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,’ ” id. at 881 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)); accord Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1571 (5th Cir. 1988), and it is “[Akbar's] burden to establish actual proof of bad faith,” Gates, 885 F.3d at 881. Mere allegations are “insufficient to obtain federal court intervention.” Aurelio v. Mullin, No. 24-1120, 2024 WL 4404239, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 4, 2024).

Although Akbar does not explicitly argue that the bad-faith exception applies, one of his motions for injunctive relief asserts that the defendants have been harassing, targeting, and intimidating him. See Dkt. 19. But none of his motions attaches any evidence to support that assertion. He can therefore not claim the first exception to Younger abstention. See McNatt v. State of Texas, 37 F.3d 629, 1994 WL 558769, at *1 (5th Cir. 1994).

Nor can he claim the others. He does not challenge any specific state statute, and he “has not identified any imminent irreparable injury other than a possible conviction.” Duran v. Del Prado, No. SA-25-CV-01491-JKP, 2025 WL 4220097, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 362711 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026). He says that he has suffered “[o]ngoing harassment, risk of unlawful arrest, and destruction of evidence,” Dkts. 24 at 3, 25 at 3; “restriction of transportation, threats to safety, denial of income, and obstruction of access to legal counsel,” Dkt. 26 at 2; “interference with his electronic devices and phone service,” Dkt. 27 at 1–2; and “prejudice to his legal defense,” Dkt. 28 at 9. But those alleged injuries, which Akbar does not substantiate, do not rise to the level of “extraordinary circumstances” threatening “great and immediate” harm. Gates, 885 F.3d at 880 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53–54).

The main rule of Younger therefore applies. The court should abstain from asserting jurisdiction over Akbar's requests for injunctive relief and dismiss the motions without prejudice. See Moore v. City of Clarksdale, No. 4:22-CV-41-DMB-JMV, 2022 WL 17869259, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 22, 2022); Darnell v. Sabo, No. 4:19-cv-00871-O-BP, 2020 WL 3442057, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3440885 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2020); All Am. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Corley, 191 F. Supp. 3d 646, 668 (S.D. Miss. 2016).

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDEDED that:

1) this case be STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending resolution of Akbar's pending state criminal proceedings;

2) within 30 days after the last relevant state-court judgment is rendered, Akbar be ordered to file a motion to reopen this case, with the understanding that his failure to do so may result in dismissal of the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute or to comply with the court's order;

3) the parties be ordered to file, within 14 days of any order reinstating the case, supplemental briefing explaining whether Heck bars Akbar's complaint; and

4) Akbar's motions for injunctive relief, Dkts. 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, Akbar's

motion to quash, Dkt. 34, the defendants' motions to dismiss, Dkts. 38, 43, and Hamblin and Murphree's motion to stay the case pending the court's resolution of the issue of qualified immunity, Dkt. 45, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 26th day of May, 2026

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge