RAHUL GUJJA v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP IMMIGRATION SERVICES USCIS (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Rahul Gujja and Bhavana Shastry petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”); its director, Joseph B. Edlow; and the Secretary of Homeland Security, Markwayne Mullin. Dkt. 1. They concurrently filed a complaint against those same parties. Id. The court will recommend that the petition be denied.

BACKGROUND

The petitioners immigrated to the United States from India. Dkt. 1 at 9. In June 2022, they filed I-485 applications to register permanent residence or adjust status. Id. at 10. If granted, an I-485 adjusts a resident alien's “status to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 245.1. But as of the petition's filing, USCIS, which is responsible for adjudicating I-485 applications, has yet to issue a decision on their applications. Dkt. 1 at 10. The petitioners allege that USCIS's delay has caused them “substantial harm to their personal well-being, family stability, and ability to plan their lives.” Id. at 13. Their mandamus petition and complaint ask the court to compel USCIS to adjudicate their applications. Id. at 5, 18.

LAW

Through a writ of mandamus, a court may compel an officer or employee of the United States to perform a “ministerial duty.” Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930). Although the writ was abolished by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b), federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Actions in the nature of mandamus are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which states:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

Mandamus is a “ ‘drastic and extraordinary' remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’ ” Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–260 (1947)). It should be employed only to enforce a “precise, definite act about which an official had no discretion whatever,” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (cleaned up), or in “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (cleaned up).

To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must make three showings. First, she must “have no other adequate means to attain ․ relief.” Id. (quoting Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)). Second, she must show that her right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.” Id. at 381 (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403). Third, she must satisfy the court that, “in the exercise of its discretion ․ the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.

DISCUSSION

“[M]andamus is an extraordinary remedy, not to be granted lightly.” In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 1990). The petitioners have not shown entitlement to a writ of mandamus because they have not shown either a clear and indisputable right or that they lack adequate alternative remedies.

When mandamus is sought on the basis of an agency's failure to act, a writ may issue only if the agency “is compelled by law to act within a certain time period.” Norton, 542 U.S. at 65. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires agencies to conclude matters presented to them “within a reasonable time.” Tex. Petrochem. Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1991). But it does not provide a specific deadline. Instead, “the party complaining about the slowness of a decision being rendered must prove facts showing either a dilatory attitude on the part of the official or his subordinates or the normal time necessary to dispose of a similar proceeding.” Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1970). No statute or regulation sets a certain time period by which USCIS must adjudicate I-485 petitions.

As noted, the petitioners must also lack adequate alternative remedies, “a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81. “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, including a “failure to act,” id. § 551(13), may file a civil action under the APA to compel the agency to act. Alleging that USCIS has failed to act on their I-485 applications within a reasonable time, the petitioners could file an action under the APA, and they have. Dkt. 1. Although they allege ongoing anxiety and emotional distress arising from USCIS's inaction, they do not point to any impending harm different from the harm that has allegedly existed for the past few years. Id. at 13. Nor do they explain why their concurrent lawsuit is an inadequate vehicle for relief.

Courts in the Fifth Circuit have repeatedly found that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for slow processing of immigration petitions, noting that the APA provides an alternative remedy, USCIS is not bound by a specific timeline, or both. E.g., Mahmoud v. Mayorkas, No. 4:24-cv-589-P, 2025 WL 2816795, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-cv-00589-P, 2025 WL 2691995 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); Heidarnejad v. USCIS, 721 F. Supp. 3d 520, 525–26 (W.D. Tex. 2024); Oniwon v. USCIS, No. CV H-19-3519, 2020 WL 1940879, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV H-19-3519, 2020 WL 1939686 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2020); Sawan v. Chertoff, 589 F. Supp. 2d 817, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2008). The same disposition is appropriate here because the petitioners have not shown that USCIS was compelled to act by a certain deadline or that they lack adequate alternative remedies.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of mandamus, Dkt. 1, be DENIED.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 15th day of May, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge